

### INFORMATION TO USERS

This dissertation was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.

#### **University Microfilms**

300 North Zeeb Road  
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

A Xerox Education Company

المنارة للاستشارات

72-20,050

LATORRE, Eduardo, 1941-  
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: A CASE STUDY OF A  
CAUDILLISTIC POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE  
CHALLENGE OF A POPULIST MOVEMENT.

Columbia University, Ph.D., 1972  
Political Science, general

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

© Copyright by

Eduardo Latorre

1972

المنارة للاستشارات

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC:  
A CASE STUDY OF A CAUDILLISTIC POLITICAL SYSTEM  
AND THE CHALLENGE OF A POPULIST MOVEMENT

by

Eduardo Latorre

1972

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, in the Faculty  
of Political Science, Columbia University

المنارة للاستشارات

PLEASE NOTE:

Some pages may have

indistinct print.

Filmed as received.

University Microfilms, A Xerox Education Company

المنارة للاستشارات

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.



## ABSTRACT

### THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: A CASE STUDY OF A CAUDILLISTIC POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE CHALLENGE OF A POPULIST MOVEMENT

Eduardo Latorre

The thesis of this dissertation is that the reason for the chaotic political pattern of the Dominican Republic in the 1960's lies in a dominant caudillistic political system, characterized by violence, instability, and oligarchic hegemony, and the challenge to this system by new social forces seeking the establishment of a populist order. In general, politics take place within the existing traditional framework, which since the turn of the 20th Century includes the domination of the country by the imperial power in the Caribbean, the United States of America, but it is the effort to maintain and transform this traditional system which gives Dominican political life its significance.

It is argued that the maintenance of the caudillistic political system, with or without a democratic facade, leads to the continuation of endless political disorder, extravagant social inequality, harsh

economic exploitation, and ruthless foreign domination, for the state is rendered incapable of assuming any significant functions beyond the personalistic rewarding of a caudillo and his clientele. Unwilling or incapable of reform, the traditional elites and their domestic and foreign allies find themselves at the task of forcefully preventing revolution in an effort to preserve what had already become an obsolete status quo at the time of the death of dictator Rafael Trujillo in May, 1961.

The challenging populist movement was at first of a reformist nature. It sought to carry out socio-economic reforms through the establishment of representative democracy--the "ideal" political system for over a century--which had existed only on paper, as more than twenty constitutions and the tyrannical rule of caudillos could evidence. Elections were held, the populists won, and seven months later they were ousted in a coup d'etat. With legitimacy and legality in their hands, the populists attempted a comeback through a coup d'etat of their own which unexpectedly lead into a rebellion and direct United States military intervention. The traditional groups were elected into office while the nation was under foreign occupation, and those who had begun by questioning the socio-economic system, then the imperial rights of the United States, ended up by also questioning representative democracy itself. The populists radicalize into a nationalist revolutionary movement with an indigenous political ideology, the Dictatorship

with Popular Support, and abandon representative democracy as a viable system for political organization, socio-economic modernization, and the preservation of national independence.

Since the foundation of the Republic, Dominicans have existed in a state of permanent internal war, a fact that continued as the populist challenge occurred, but now aggravated by increasing social disintegration and political polarization. The future entails a continuation of violence until a major transformation takes place, and, fortunately, in 1970 that did not seem to be too far away.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter		Page
I.	INTRODUCTION .....	3
II.	THE LEGACY OF THE PAST.....	16
	The Colonial Era .....	17
	The Loss of Identity .....	32
	Independence and Caudillism .....	43
	United States Hegemony.....	72
III.	IN SEARCH FOR AN HEIR.....	99
IV.	FREE ELECTIONS.....	166
V.	COUP D'ETAT .....	231
VI.	REBELLION AND REVOLUTION.....	296
VII.	ENFORCED STABILITY .....	375
VIII.	CONCLUSION .....	452
	BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	465
	APPENDIX .....	512

## LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
1.	Social Stratification of the Population of Three Middle-Sized Dominican Cities by Percentile.....	242

## CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is a study of Dominican politics. It is an effort to understand the political life of a small Caribbean nation in the process of change. The study is limited to the period from the death of dictator Rafael Trujillo in 1961 to the establishment of a second constitutional government of President Balaguer in 1970. In this time span of only 9 years, Dominican society has undergone three general elections, two coup d'etats, two foreign military interventions, one rebellion in an attempt at revolution, and fifteen different governments. Why, is the question one seeks to answer, has the Dominican Republic had such a chaotic state of affairs?

The thesis of this dissertation is that the reason for the "politics of chaos," as one author has chosen to call it,<sup>1</sup> lies in a dominant "caudillistic" system, characterized by violence, instability, and an hegemony of oligarchic values, and the challenge to this system by new

---

<sup>1</sup> Abraham F. Lowenthal, "The Dominican Republic: The Politics of Chaos," in Arpad Von Lazar and Robert F. Kaufman (eds.), Reform and Revolution: Readings in Latin American Politics (New York: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1969), pp. 34-58.

social forces seeking the establishment of a "populist" order in Dominicana. In general, politics take place within the existing traditional framework, but it is the efforts to maintain and transform this system which give Dominican political life its significance.

Robert L. Gilmore has defined caudillism as "the union of personalism and violence for the conquest of power. It is a means for the selection and establishment of political leadership in the absence of a social structure adequate to the functioning of representative government."<sup>1</sup> As most of Latin America, the Dominican Republic entered a caudillistic political stage after the war of independence in the mid-nineteenth century, and it is contended by this author that it culminates in the three decades of the Trujillo dictatorship. The fact that it has survived in a modified version does not rest from the proposition that caudillism as a system of political leadership is "an inherently unstable hierarchical arrangement, a structure composed of a network of personal alliances cemented together by community of interests, by force of personality, by ties of friendship and even of family."<sup>2</sup> It is as such an anachronism in face of a more highly complex society, but those who

---

<sup>1</sup> Robert L. Gilmore, Caudillism and Militarism in Venezuela, 1810-1910 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1964), p. 47.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 50.

have challenged it have not been able to muster enough power to displace the groups that maintain it.

Torcuato S. Di Tella has defined populism as "a political movement which enjoys the support of the mass of the urban working-class and/or peasantry but which does not result from the autonomous organizational power of either of these two sectors. It is also supported by non-working-class sectors upholding an anti-status-quo ideology."<sup>1</sup> The sources of populist support are three: (1) an elite placed at the middle or upper-middle levels of social stratification and impregnated with an anti-status-quo motivation; (2) a mobilized mass as a result of the so-called revolution of rising expectations; and (3) an ideology as a widespread emotional state to help communication between leaders and followers and to create collective enthusiasm.<sup>2</sup> Although immediately after the assassination of dictator Trujillo political competition took place exclusively within the caudillo tradition, soon after began the formation of a populist movement, which added a new dimension of political conflict to an already violent and unstable society by questioning the basis of its existence.

---

<sup>1</sup>Torcuato S. Di Tella, "Populism and Reform in Latin America," in Claudio Veliz (ed.), Obstacles to Change in Latin America (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 47.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 53.



The chaotic political pattern which Dominicana has followed in the 1960's resembles rather closely that of the 1844-1916 period, largely because the framework within which politics has been played remained the same. The attempts at change and reform have been suppressed by the opposition of the traditional groups and/or extra-national power, which thus far have proven to be overwhelming. Nevertheless, just as the elements of continuity are present in Dominican reality, so are the elements of change. More and more the society becomes complex due to the process of modernization, and although the political system has been lagging behind other processes, it is bound to make new strides through adaptation or transformation.

The use of a conflict model by positing the political system in a state of tension between traditional political groups and new populist forces in favor of change is, as Alan Angell has already argued, an oversimplification. The reason lies in that this model "denies to the traditional forces the ability to adapt and expand to new circumstances."<sup>1</sup> Although in Dominicana some adaptation has taken place in the 1960's, the permanent recourse to the use of violence does not seem very indicative that significant changes have occurred, and it will

---

<sup>1</sup> Alan Angell, "Populism and Political Change: The Case of Colombia," in Paul Halmos (ed.), Latin American Sociological Studies (Keele, Staffordshire: The University of Keele, The Sociological Review, Monograph No. 11, February 1967), p. 90.

be argued that the existing political system has failed. However, this does not rule out the possibility that traditional groups in the future may adopt new policies and change.

Conflict models do have a tendency to exaggerate the existence of tensions within the society, but they seem to be more useful than structural-functionalist models for the study of Dominican politics. In the first place, a state of conflict exists as evidenced by the great deal of violence and instability that has occurred. Number two, if we use a structuralist-functionalist definition of the political system as "the legitimate, order maintaining system in the society,"<sup>1</sup> we would have to come to the conclusion that in Dominicana one does not exist, for there has been no order, and needless to say legitimacy. Finally, just as conflict models tend to exaggerate tension, so do structuralist models exaggerate the adaptive capacity of the society by their emphasis on homoestatic behavior and the treatment of conflict as "aberrant," "dysfunctional," or some form of "deviancy."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 7.

<sup>2</sup>The foremost critic of structural-functionalism as failing to properly take into account the role of conflict and social change has been Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959). For a defense see, Francesca Cancian, "Functional Analysis of Change," American Sociological Review, Vol. 25, No. 6 (December 1960), pp. 818-927. For an effort to integrate both, see Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1966).

Besides the use of a conflict model for the study of Dominican politics, there are six assumptions that better be made explicit. The first assumption is that the social system that exists in Dominicana was established during the period of Spanish colonization, and that it has survived basically intact for almost five centuries. There are four characteristics to this social system. First of all, the establishment of a ruling oligarchy based on three factors: (1) race, the rule of the "whites;" (2) wealth, at first interpreted in terms of land ownership but later to include also commercial and industrial enterprises; and (3) occupation, at first the officials of the crown and the church, the former later substituted for those of the government and the addition of those with professional degrees, but only if they met the requirement of wealth. The second characteristic of this social system was its self-perpetuation through the institution of the extended family, the maintenance of an educational system only for the select few, and the control of property. Access to the oligarchy was very limited. Third, the existence of an ample supply of labor, by definition non-"white," which could be put to work at subsistence level for the benefit of the ruling group. Finally, a value system of social inequality in which socialization took place at two different levels: one for the "good families" which would maintain their superiority through the manipulation of European (Hispanic) culture, while in the other the mass of the people

were socialized within the same value structure but as inferiors to those at the upper level.

The second assumption is that the establishment of an independent republic did not bring about any substantial change in the social system, with the exception that the institution of slavery had been abolished by the Haitian occupation, 1822-1844. In spite of the political turmoil that existed after independence, the social system was neither challenged nor were there any changes to the basis of its existence. Political conflict in the caudillistic system was not tied to any social question, but existed within the framework of oligarchic values and structures.

This brings us to the third assumption, and that is that society began to undergo change by entering the stage of "unifying autocracy," as defined by Gino Germani,<sup>1</sup> during the period of 1916-1961. The North American Occupation and the Trujillo Dictatorship not only forcefully provided order, but also systems of communication and transportation which centralized political power and integrated the nation physically. Furthermore, at this time there were modernizing social and economic changes through capital accumulation and modest industrial development, which led to the appearance of middle-sectors within

---

<sup>1</sup>Gino Germani, Política y Sociedad en una Epoca de Transición (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidós, 1962), p. 148.

the social hierarchy and a new urban working class. Unfortunately, concomitant development in the political system did not take place, and instead the caudillistic system of the past continued into the present.

The fourth assumption is that the caudillistic political system that has existed in independent Dominicana until the present is characterized by what Martin C. Needler has called permanent instability.<sup>1</sup> This is the case when a political system does not function as it is officially supposed to nor does it develop greater harmony among its elements, which remain inconsistent with each other. Dominicana, with minor exceptions, has never functioned as it was officially supposed to, that is to say constitutional representative government, nor has its political system developed greater harmony among its elements, as the continuance of a hierarchically structured, politically fragmented and volatile society can evidence.

Three implications can be derived from this assumption. The first one is that political instability in the Dominican Republic did not arise as a result of social mobilization, as Samuel P. Huntington has argued to be the case in developing nations,<sup>2</sup> but from "the maintenance,

<sup>1</sup>Martin C. Needler, Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence, and Evolutionary Change (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 20-21.

<sup>2</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968).

after their implantation by process of cultural diffusion, of public ideologies and sets of institutions incompatible with the attitudes and dominance relations of the informal sector of the polity . . ."<sup>1</sup> Second, that the continuation of the caudillistic political system does not imply the maintenance of order, but, on the contrary, the perpetuation of disorder except in those cases in which a dictatorship exists. Finally, that in the absence of "legitimate authority," political conflict is relegated to a mere power dispute between personalities and the benefits to be derived by the caudillo and his clientele through controlling the government. In this caudillistic system, as R. A. Humphreys once observed about Latin America in general, politics are power politics.<sup>2</sup>

In the 1960's there persisted in Dominicana traditional power conflicts for the control of the government, but in addition there was the new thrust of the populist forces seeking not only the reform of the political system but the social structure as well. This brings us the fifth assumption, and that is that the politics of the period are characterized by internal war. In his introduction to the study of the subject, Harry Eckstein has defined internal war, broadly speaking, as

---

<sup>1</sup>Needler, op. cit., p. 27.

<sup>2</sup>R. A. Humphreys, "Latin America: The Caudillo Tradition," in Michael Howard (ed.), Soldiers and Government (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959), p. 153.

"attempts to change by violence, or threat of violence, a government's policies, rulers, or organization."<sup>1</sup> Hardly a single day has passed in which there has been no violence or the threat of it, and two coup d'etats, one rebellion, and two foreign military interventions, are only the concrete manifestations of a state of internal war. Insurgency, terror, and institutionalized violence are a part of an existing reality and not infrequent isolated cases.

Just as Dominicana exists in a state of violence and permanent instability, so does it exist in a permanent state of foreign intervention, which is our sixth and last assumption. Proximity to the United States in the sensitive Caribbean area makes the nation vulnerable to its powerful neighbor's definition of its strategic security and the protection of its interests, whether political or economic, because the Dominican Republic lies within its sphere of influence. Since the beginnings of the century, the United States has occupied the nation militarily; it once controlled its customs; it built an army; it became the financial and commercial metropolis; it continuously demonstrates its power; and it influences domestic political groups by giving them advice, access to funds, or denying them recognition. To study Dominican politics without

---

<sup>1</sup>Harry Eckstein (ed.), Internal War (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 1, ff.

taking into account the overwhelming role of the United States would be as absurd as studying Eastern European politics without the Soviet Union, Irish politics without England, or Korean politics without China. The influence of North American power in Dominican puts the nation in a state of permanent intervention no matter whether the former actively participates in a political event or not, for abstinence or neutrality can also be forms of intervention.

From what has been said so far, a clear image of Dominican society in the 1960's should appear. First, a nation with a stable oligarchic social system. Second, a political system which is violent and unstable and which has survived through time in spite of the increasing complexity of the society. Third, a challenge to the existing social and political systems by new arising groups in the side of change. Fourth, a fierce competition for political power among the different groups which takes the characteristics of an internal war. Although this power struggle sometimes is between forces for and against the existing status-quo, sometimes it is also between groups located in one side of the dividing line, which then proceed to make tactical alliances with groups on the other side. Finally, the United States is a major actor in the political system heavily influencing the particular outcomes in the society.

In addition to the bibliography, the author gathered a great deal of information for the preparation of this dissertation by talking to many Dominicans in several trips to the Republic, as well as having



lived there from 1967 to 1970. However, no formal interviews are accounted for, because the technique was early abandoned since it seemed to produce no results. Informal conversation was more fruitful in providing an image of the particular events and the roles the different groups had played.

The clipping files on the Dominican Republic of the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, were checked for the period of January 1960 to November 1967. The author is thankful for the courtesy provided. The same is true of Publicaciones Ahora, Santo Domingo, for allowing him to check all the issues of Ahora from its foundation in January 1962 until January 1970. This magazine has the largest circulation in Dominicana, and it serves as a forum for political and intellectual communication. In addition, Santo Domingo dailies were clipped from January 1968 until January 1970, and many other numbers were seen before and after that period.

The actual organization of the material was done in eight chapters, of which the first and the last respectively are the introduction and conclusion. The second chapter, "The Legacy of the Past," deals with the historical background for the period under study: the establishment of the oligarchic social system, the caudillistic political system, and the hegemony of the United States in the Caribbean. The third chapter, "In Search for an Heir," deals with political competition exclusively

within the caudillistic system and the efforts of the participants to maintain and/or reform it. The fourth chapter, "Free Elections," deals with the beginnings of the populist movement and their bid for power within the system. The fifth chapter, "Coup d'Etat," deals with the failure of the populist government to survive in power within the caudillistic system, while Chapter VI, "Rebellion and Revolution," deals with the same problem for the conservative coalition, the populists' second bid for power within the system, the North American invasion to maintain the system, and the beginnings of a revolution. Finally, Chapter VII, "Enforced Stability," deals with the contrast of enforced order while society undergoes greater polarization and the rise of a revolutionary ideology.

This dissertation is a case study, and as such it is limited to the nation and the historical period that is dealt with. If a contribution is made, it is to the understanding of a politically underdeveloped society whose past and present have been marked by an enormous amount of suffering. No more claim than this can be made, and, if successful, it would seem that it is more than sufficient.

## CHAPTER II

## THE LEGACY OF THE PAST

There seems to be no escape from the proposition that in order to understand the present one must know the past. A given time period in the history of a society is only a part of a series of developments that has its roots in what had already occurred before. Sometimes the present is a major turning point, the midwife between the past and the future, and other times it is only an extension of long existing trends. In the 1960's, the Dominican Republic seemed to be a mixture of both, an amalgam of continuity and change, none precise, none definitive, giving the society the characteristic of a very uncertain future, at least in what it relates to man's capacity to shape his destiny. To understand this reality, the tortuous course of the past must first be taken into account.

The history of Dominicana can be divided into four distinctive periods: (1) the period of discovery and Spanish colonization; (2) the period of uncertainty from 1795 to 1844; (3) the period of independence and the rise of the caudillistic political system; and (4) the period of United States hegemony. Although these follow each other chronologically, the beginning of one period does not mean the obliteration of the

former, but only a turning point with many of the trends of one continuing to the next. The importance of this chapter lies in tracing those elements of continuity more than dealing with the period itself.

### The Colonial Era

The island presently shared by the Dominican Republic and the Republic of Haiti was discovered by Christopher Columbus on his first trip to America. The date was December 5, 1492, and he called it Hispaniola,<sup>1</sup> in honor of Spain. By fortune, one of this three ships sank in the northern coast of the island, and thus the Admiral left some of his men in a newly built fort. On his return from Europe, the second trip, Columbus returned where he had left his men, only to find that they had been killed by the Indians, but since this time he had brought

---

<sup>1</sup>The matter of names becomes at times extremely confusing. The island was given the name of Hispaniola by Columbus, but it had been called both Quisqueya and Haiti by its original residents. In modern times, these names refer respectively to the Dominican Republic and the Republic of Haiti. During the Spanish colony, the capital city was Santo Domingo, but the same name became applicable to the island. When the Western side became a French colony, it became Saint Domingue, while the Spanish Eastern side was called Santo Domingo. During the period of Haitian sovereignty, 1822-1844, the entire island became either Haiti or Saint Domingue, while the inhabitants of the Eastern side continued to refer to it in Spanish terms, Santo Domingo. After independence from Haiti, the Eastern side becomes the Dominican Republic, but sometimes also is called Santo Domingo or Dominicana. The capital city of the independent republic remained Santo Domingo, but from 1936-1961 it was called Ciudad Trujillo.

people to colonize, they were settled in Hispaniola in spite of the recent tragedy. The island became the seat of the Spanish Empire in the New World of the Europeans.

The significance of the colonial period lies in the transplantation and adaptation of Spanish society to the new conditions that it met, and the firm hold of its culture, values, and traditions, which persist throughout the time with only minor modifications. It is at this period that the basis of Dominican society are laid, most of which remains valid in the present day.

Hispaniola became a series of firsts in the Americas. First mass, first church, first hospital, first university, first town, and so on and so forth. It was the center of the continent, where all people came and where the major decisions were made. This was the time of the island's greatest glory and importance which was never to return. Columbus had been named Viceroy of the new lands, and there soon were the honors, pomp, pageantry, and castle due to a family of such high position.

When the Europeans arrived, they found the island divided into five major Indian tribes. These Indians were Tainos, which is a sub-cultural group of the Arawaks. They were not exceptionally developed in terms of organization, art, or warfare, and the indigenous culture

offered no major resistance to the domination of Spain. In less than 50 years, the Tainos had been erased, their labor being substituted by the importation of Negro slaves from Africa.

Right from the beginning we have the establishment of a racially heterogenous society with the predominance of Spanish culture. The whites were on top of the social, political, and economic hierarchy while the non-whites were to be used for their purposes and desires. With some adjustments, this affirmation remains valid for the present: almost five centuries later. The fear of the whites of losing their predominance has been one of the most constant factors of Dominican history, including today.<sup>1</sup>

Another recurrent factor, which begins at the beginning, is the crisis of authority. The first case is the dispute between Columbus and the Catholic Kings of Spain over the authorities of the new Admiral and Viceroy of the Indies. As a result, Columbus was imprisoned and sent back to Spain, for apparently he had overreached his authority

---

<sup>1</sup> A white person today is not necessarily ethnically pure. The term refers mostly to social standing, those in the upper crust. Probably its origin lies in the fact that when Spaniards first colonized, there was little question on the matter, and as miscegenation occurred, the term was not modified and remains so until today. The same is true in other areas of Latin America. See George I. Banksten, "The Politics of Latin America," in Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 470-479.

vis-a-vis the Spanish crown. In spite of the fact that he was relieved from prison and his titles were restored, the authority and privileges that he once had were lost forever.<sup>1</sup> The legitimacy of the crown was never questioned, and Columbus never rebelled or even tried to.

The second case must be discussed in greater detail for it was a rebellion against the constituted authority which had far reaching effects not only to Dominicana, but to all of Latin America. This is the rebellion of Francisco Roldán, who came with Columbus as his squire, and who was to challenge the authority of the Admiral.

The first government of Hispaniola was ridden with nepotism. Columbus gave the highest positions to his brothers, Diego and Bartholomew, and to persons who were loyal to him. Thus, Roldán, the squire, was made Mayor of La Isabela, the first city and the decision-making center of the New World, not particularly for his ability, but because he was a trusted man (hombre de confianza). At this time of 1496, there was severe discontent due to hunger, sickness, and arbitrary policies by the Columbus government, and slowly Francisco Roldán became the most vocal critic until he headed a rebellion of the discontents.

---

<sup>1</sup>For entirely different views of the case, see Salvador de Madariaga, Cristobal Colón (Mexico: Editorial Hermes, 1952), pp. 361-499; and José Gabriel García, Compendio de la Historia de Santo Domingo (Santo Domingo: Publicaciones Ahora, 1968, 4th edition), Vol. I, pp. 45-73.

Instead of forcing the Indians to pay tribute, he said that there was to be no tribute in the Indies, and took his men in open rebellion to the province of Xaragua. He also protested against the enslavement of the Indians, who were being sent to Spain. The attempt to quell the rebellion failed, and the authorities had no alternative but to negotiate. It all ended with a treaty which restituted Roldán to his previous functions, the distribution of land and Indians to the rebels who wanted to stay, the payment of their salaries to those who wanted to return to Europe, and finally, that if the Admiral did not keep his part of the agreement, he could be forced into it.<sup>1</sup>

The first rebellion of the Americas shows several things. For one, that the so-called "hombres de confianza" are not always to be trusted. Second, that the authority of Spain was not as decisive as one would be led to believe. Third, that the cry for justice is a rallying point for rebellions. Fourth, that violence pays if the authorities can not bring the rebels to their knees;<sup>2</sup> and finally, that the cry for justice

---

<sup>1</sup> Pedro Mir, Tres Leyendas de Colores (Santo Domingo: Editora Nacional, 1969), pp. 89-90. For different view of the rebellion see Mir, pp. 15-136; García, op. cit., pp. 49-61; and Madariaga, op. cit., pp. 450-465.

<sup>2</sup> There had been other insurrections in the island. Some by Spaniards, like the one by Pedro Margarite and Father Boil, and some by Indians, like Caonabo and Mayobanex, but they all failed. The leaders paid with their lives. See García, op. cit., pp. 33-60.



can be quickly put aside if the rebels are allowed to participate in the distribution of the spoils.

Those who cried against the slavery of the Indians were the first to take them in the new system of distribution to which their rebellion gave birth: the repartimiento, later to be called encomienda. To satisfy the rebels, they were given land and Indians to work it, a procedure which is one of the hallmarks of Spanish colonization and became common throughout Latin America. A form of slavery for the Indians without the odious title and formality of slave.

Roldán put into question whether it was correct that the new colonies were to exist for the exclusive exploitation of the Columbus family, of course, with due royalties to the Spanish crown. The results of the rebellion made it clear that America was for the exploitation of all Spaniards, but no one ever questioned the fact of the exploitation itself. From the beginning, society was conceived as something to be exploited, if you could get away with it, and therefore legality and procedures were mere formalities due to the Crown, but in the colony, it was a question of power. Those who were on top would stay there only if they were able to maintain down those who were below. If they could not be kept down, they would be allowed to share in the spoils.

The rebellion also gave birth to a new group of people. The former Spanish workers and servants who rebelled became land owners

and masters of a number of Indians who would work for them. A new form of nobility without title, for now they were part of the upper-crust, barring, of course, the authentic nobles who had come to the island. This was social climbing par excellence, from servant to aristocrat, with the only drawback of being a second class aristocrat. In their mannerism and behavior they became imitators of those in the first rank, and thus we have the birth of what later came to be known as the oligarchy.<sup>1</sup>

As far as the Spaniards were concerned, the order of things had already been achieved. The legitimate political authority was the Crown, and the colony was to be used for the benefit of all Spaniards, those in the island as well as those in the metropolis. The adventurers who came were to distribute the wealth, and the Indians, among themselves, while those who remained in the old continent were to benefit indirectly from the royalties due to the monarchy. The ones who questioned this new order were the Indians, and they rebelled.

The leader of the rebellion was the Indian chief, Guarocuya, who had been brought up by the Spaniards. He was baptized with the name

---

<sup>1</sup>Oligarchy can mean many things, from the rule of the few to a particular social group which has the same position of feudal nobility where there are no titles. See James Payne, "The Oligarchy Muddle," World Politics, Vol. XX, No. 3 (April 1968), pp. 439-453.

of Enrique and known by the name of Enriquillo.<sup>1</sup> By this time, Don Diego Columbus, the son of the Admiral, had been restored to power in Hispaniola by the monarchy. The king was now Charles V, but he was not to have with Diego the same problems the Catholic kings had with his father. A court of appeal to the decisions of the new admiral was created under the name of the Real Audiencia de Indias, which eventually was to be the major governing body of the Spanish American empire. The repartimiento had not ceased, and Enriquillo, in spite of the fact that he was a descendant of Indian chiefs, was given to a man in San Juan de la Maguana.

He was not only put to work like a slave, but he and his wife were both abused by their encomendero. He made recourse to the legal proceedings of the time, including the Real Audiencia, but it was to no avail. The legal machinery and the new order was for the benefit of the Spaniards only, in spite of the clearly defined provisions made for the Indians. As Pedro Mir says, at this time Enriquillo realized that his real name was Guarocuya, and that Enrique was only a name given to him by the conquerors.<sup>2</sup> Placed in doubt of the legitimacy of the whole system which until the moment he had accepted, Enriquillo rebelled in the mountains of Bahoruco in the year 1520.

<sup>1</sup> A historical novel was written in the 19th century about the life of this Indian chief. It is compulsory reading in all high schools of Dominicana. See Manuel de Jesús Galván, Enriquillo (Ciudad Trujillo: Librería Dominicana, 1952).

<sup>2</sup> Mir, op. cit., p. 155.

The rebellion was to last 13 years. The strategy was defensive, for the Indians made no military incursions into enemy territory, but they defeated every Spanish army which came into theirs through the procedure of slowly wearing them out with guerrilla warfare. The news of the insurrection spread throughout the land, and Indians ran away into the mountains. The costs of the rebellion were increasing enormously in terms of military operations as well as damage being occasioned to crops and properties. Since they could not be subjugated by force, the Spaniards decided to negotiate. Enriquillo was recognized as an equal; he and his people were to live in a reservation, and they were to owe fidelity to the Emperor and his laws.<sup>1</sup>

It turns out that both parts kept their agreement, but the Indians were the losing party. Through violence Enriquillo and his Indians received certain benefits, land and freedom, but at the price of recognizing the legitimacy of Spanish authority. The rest of the Indians of the island were to remain under the encomienda, and Enriquillo even agreed to persecute and return runaway Indians and black slaves. This third crisis of authority was the recognition of the legitimacy of the conquest and the establishment of the Spanish order in Hispaniola,

---

<sup>1</sup>García, op. cit., pp. 106-109.

and, therefore, the legal right to exploit the island for the benefit of Spain and the resident Spaniards.<sup>1</sup>

The newly established reservation of Boyá was to have a short history, for it actually became a cemetery. Enriquillo died about a year after the peace agreement, and soon the entire race followed after him. The Negro slaves had also revolted, but they were never successful, and besides, they were not so lucky--they lived.<sup>2</sup>

Santo Domingo constitutes something of a microcosm of the Western Hemisphere, for in this land were born, flourished, and then diffused all the institutions planted in the New World. The somewhat overly handled expression "cradle of the Americas" is applied with all justice.<sup>3</sup>

For better or for worse, the rest of Spanish America would have to live with some of the creations that out of circumstances and design were born in Hispaniola: the legitimacy of the Spanish order; a hierarchically structured society based on race and culture; the fickleness of the representative authorities; the unending fight for local power,

---

<sup>1</sup>Manuel Arturo Peña Battle, "Enriquillo o el Germen de la Teoría Moderna del Derecho de Gentes," Obras Escogidas (Santo Domingo: Julio D. Postigo e hijos, editores, 1968), Vol. I, pp. 51-81.

<sup>2</sup>For the conditions and rebellions of the Negroes, see Carlos Larrazábal Blanco, Los Negros y la Esclavitud en Santo Domingo (Santo Domingo: Julio D. Postigo e Hijos, ed., 1967); and Mir, op. cit., pp. 205-265.

<sup>3</sup>Ricardo Pattee, La República Dominicana (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1967), p. 25. Unless otherwise specified, all translations are made by the author of this dissertation.

prestige, and spoils; and the view that society is something to be exploited, not to be created.

Just as the institutions moved to the rest of the New World, so did the Spanish inhabitants of the island. The colony suffered from severe migrations into other islands and into the continent, which had the effect of decreasing the importance of the island in terms of wealth, influence, and people. The magnificence that once was, was never to return, but a new element was added that had not been accounted for: contraband, pirates, and buccaneers. This was to lead to the division of the island into two different societies.

Spain's mercantilistic economic policy prohibited commerce between the colonies and any other nation except the metropolis. Obviously, this was an open invitation for high profits in contraband, since there were articles and produce desired both for importation and for exportation. Other nations, particularly France and England, were also interested in the produce of the Spanish colonies. These factors led to the creation of a group of people who would deal in contraband, pillage the colonies, steal in high seas, and settle in areas under their own control.

One of the major bases became the island Tortuga which is off the Northwestern coast of Hispaniola. Pirates and buccaneers made continuous incursions into the major island, and Spanish authorities

were impotent to do anything about it. Migrations had taken away those who would be willing to fight in the land, and the navy was busy protecting the already established commerce or Spanish interests in Europe.

The absolute weakness of the authorities is clearly demonstrated in the pillage of the city of Santo Domingo in 1586 by Sir Francis Drake, the English pirate. Apparently he had been commissioned by Queen Elizabeth to create as much havoc as possible in an attempt to break the Spanish monopoly on trade with the colonies. With 600 men, he captured the city, robbed it, and demanded 25,000 ducats as ransom for leaving. He received the money and left to create more consternation in Cartagena and Florida.<sup>1</sup>

The legitimate constituted authorities could not provide any security for the colony and Hispaniola was at the mercy of pirates and mercenaries. The dominion of Spain was very precarious, which meant that the colonials were free to handle their affairs and rather untouched by the formalities of laws and dispositions. Incapable of putting an end to the pirates and desirous of maintaining the trade

---

<sup>1</sup>García, op. cit., pp. 134-137.

monopoly, the Spanish authorities decided to depopulate a great deal of the northern coast of the island.<sup>1</sup> In essence, this meant that Spain could not even effectively maintain control over its territory, for it chose to give part of the island to outlaws.

Besides the lack of a clearly defined authority, one of the effects of Spain's abandonment of Hispaniola was to be the division of the island into two colonies: one French and one Spanish, which will later appear as two independent nations, Haiti and Dominicana. The beginnings of French influence were due to the settlement of pirates and buccaneers in the Western part of the island, and it slowly became more and more a permanent settlement, but the fate of the island was decided in the war of the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV. In the Peace Treaty of Ryswick in 1697, Spain ceded the western part of the island to France.

It may seem in retrospect that this cession was a mistake of Spanish policy, but it must be remembered that at the time Spain had no control over the territory and in the deal she recovered some European land that had been taken by the French.<sup>2</sup> Now, one of the

---

<sup>1</sup> Americo Lugo, Historia de Santo Domingo (Ciudad Trujillo: Editorial Librería Dominicana, 1952), pp. 112-117; and Manuel Arturo Peña Batlle, "Las Devastaciones de 1605 y 1606," Obras Escogidas; op. cit., pp. 143-241.

<sup>2</sup> García, op. cit., pp. 172-176.



problems of the cession was that no clearly defined boundaries were established, but more important was the establishment of two societies which were different not only in language and culture but in structure.<sup>1</sup>

The French were extremely successful in the exploitation of their newly acquired colony of Saint-Domingue, which was mostly geared as a crop-export economy.<sup>2</sup> This required the vast importation of Negro slaves to handle the large scale enterprises efficiently, but it also created a class system based on a very small minority of land-owning whites at the top, thousands of working slaves at the bottom, and a few whites and mulattoes in the middle.

While the French colony prospered, the Spanish side grew in misery. There had been further migrations, and the Spanish colony was in a state of decay. Agriculture was basically for local consumption, but cattle raising began to flourish as Santo Domingo became the meat supplier of Saint-Domingue.<sup>3</sup> This led to the splitting up of large

---

<sup>1</sup>Jean Price Mars, La République d'Haiti et la République Dominicaine. Les aspects divers d'un problème d'histoire, de géographie et d'ethnologie (Port-au-Prince: 1953), 2 Vols.

<sup>2</sup>Emilio Cordero Michel, La Revolución Haitiana y Santo Domingo (Santo Domingo: Editora Nacional, 1968), pp. 17-24.

<sup>3</sup>Harmannus Hoetink, "Materiales para el Estudio de la República Dominicana en la Segunda Mitad del Siglo XIX: Cambios en la Estructura Agraria," Caribbean Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (October 1965), pp. 3-7.

areas of the country into what has been called "hatos," which is no other than cattle ranches, and the appearance of the "hateros" as an important group in the colony.<sup>1</sup> This became the breeding grounds for the caudillos.

In a situation of general impoverishment, with small scale agricultural production, a great deal of cattle raising, and only minor sugar plantations, there was no need for the importation of large quantities of slaves. Contrary to what happened in Saint-Domingue, which became ethnically a Negro society, in Santo Domingo, not only were there not as many slaves but color lines were more flexible, and the society became ethnically mulatto.<sup>2</sup> For example, in the early 1790's there were 35,000 whites, 38,000 free mulattos and blacks, and 30,000 black slaves in the Spanish side of the island, compared to 36,000 whites, 28,000 free mulattos, and 500,000 black slaves.<sup>3</sup> This meant that the population of Haiti was not only six times larger, but that in terms of size there was the absolute predominance of the Blacks, while in Santo Domingo there was a more equitable distribution.

<sup>1</sup> Juan Bosch, "Origen y Desarrollo de la Sociedad de los Hateros," Ahora, No. 243 (8 Julio 1968), pp. 24-26, 75.

<sup>2</sup> One Dominican author makes the claim that a mulatto society has particular characteristics of its own. See Pedro A. Pérez Cabral, La Comunidad Mulata (Caracas: Gráfica Americana, 1967).

<sup>3</sup> Larrazábal Blanco, op. cit., p. 184; and Selden Rodman, Haiti: The Black Republic (New York: The Devin-Adair Co., 1954), pp. 6-7.

Given the fact that there was a legitimate but ineffective authority in the Spanish colony, that there was no substantial progress in the economy, and that there was fear of invasion or encroachment by the more populous and prosperous Haiti, migrations into other parts of the Spanish empire continued. There was a feeling of hopelessness and abandonment by the metropolis which was to be confirmed with the cession of the entire island to France by the Treaty of Basilea in 1795.<sup>1</sup> Already different except in class structure,<sup>2</sup> this could have been the time to reunite the island into one society, but it did not turn out that way. Instead, Spanish values became more firm in the eastern side.

#### The Loss of Identity

Throughout the colonial period, there was a severe lack of governmental authority, but this authority was never successfully put into question, except momentarily. Spain was the mother country and

---

<sup>1</sup>García, op. cit., pp. 263-266.

<sup>2</sup>Basically, it was white landowners and government officials at the top, merchants, small landowners, and workers of different colors in the middle, and black slaves at the bottom. For the origins of social classes in Santo Domingo, see Juan Bosch, Trujillo: Causas de Una Tiranía Sin Ejemplos (Caracas: 1961), pp. 33-40; and his recent Composición Social Dominicana (Santo Domingo: Publicaciones Ahora, 1970). The latter book is based on series of articles by Bosch which appeared in the magazine Ahora, No. 235 (13 May 1968)—No. 247 (5 August 1968).

the rightful ruler to which all owed allegiance, although sometimes there were minor rebellions due to foolish policies, particularly the depopulations of the early 17th century.<sup>1</sup> The Spanish splendor in Hispaniola, which was born in glory and ended in misery, left the markings of its language, culture, and religion, but it also left a tradition of irresponsible authority and a class society which the French Revolution was to put into question.

The Bastille fell six years before Basilea, and the United States had already become an independent republican nation. Liberty and independence, equality and legality, was the cry of the day. The establishment of a republic would have meant the encroachment by the "foreign" Saint-Domingue, and equality the end of slave labor and color prejudice. The problem was solved in Europe by a war settlement between France and Spain, but for Dominicans, as Peña Battle put it, it was the beginning of the serious problem of denationalization. "In face of the danger placed by the conquest of French materialism, they [Dominicans] felt the substantial and vital necessity of allying themselves with the influence of the Spanish past, the reverse, in Santo Domingo, of materialism."<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Protests were made through the legal recourse of the Audiencia as well as through the force of arms, but it was to no avail. See Lugo, op. cit., pp. 126-153.

<sup>2</sup>Manuel A. Peña Battle, "El Tratado de Basilea y la Desnacionalización de Santo Domingo Español," Obras Escogidas, op. cit., p. 115.

The French Assembly had decreed in 1790 that all free people in the colonies were to enjoy equal rights, but this left the system of slavery intact and it made only vague references to the mulatto middle class in Saint-Domingue. As a result, the mulattos allied with the Negro slaves against the whites in a general insurrection in 1791.<sup>1</sup> Whites were massacred, plantations were burned, and alliances were made with the Spanish and the English. The French Republic was not faring too well in the colony. Yet, luck would have it that the rise of Robespierre in France meant the declaration of the freedom of slaves. Alliances were broken and the black armies, with Toussaint Louverture at the head, changed sides to become loyal again to the French Republic in 1794.<sup>2</sup>

Presumably, Spanish government and troops were to abandon Santo Domingo a month after the cession had been announced to the inhabitants (October 17, 1795), but it did not happen that way. Three envoys were sent from the Western side: one white, one mulatto, and one black.<sup>3</sup> These men were to negotiate the transfer to French authority, and their message to Dominicans was the freedom of all slaves. Yet, nothing changed, except for whites migrating into other colonies,

<sup>1</sup>Cordero Michel, op. cit., pp. 33-48.

<sup>2</sup>García, op. cit., pp. 229-289.

<sup>3</sup>Peña Batlle, "El Tratado de Basilea," op. cit., pp. 87-88.

until Toussaint invaded the eastern side in 1801 and took possession in the name of France, which at this time was ruled by Napoleon Bonaparte. After 300 years, the liberation of slaves took place.

The entire old political and juridical order fell to the ground, being substituted by a new order that was partially inspired in the egalitarian principles of the French Revolution. The bourgeoisie was not destroyed as a class, but its power--above all its economic power--was partially liquidated. Social integration became a fact.<sup>1</sup>

Those who had migrated had their properties expropriated, but contrary to what one would have imagined, the transition from slave to free labor occurred with a period of prosperity. One major reason was the increase in trade between the formerly separated colonies, and the beneficiaries were the merchants and cattlemen (hateros). Yet, it was these same people who were to conspire and ally with French troops to overthrow the black regime. Napoleon had become suspicious that Toussaint had separatist tendencies, and in 1802 a combined French, Dutch, and Spanish fleet, carrying only seasoned French troops, disembarked in Samaná, located on the eastern side of the island.

After a few battles in which Dominicans collaborated in the south and were hostile in the north, the French took the eastern side of the

---

<sup>1</sup> Juan Isidro Jiménez Grullón, La República Dominicana: Una Ficción? (Mérida, Venezuela: Talleres Gráficos Universitarios, 1965), p. 31.

of the island, while the Haitians moved into the western side. One of the first orders of the day was the re-establishment of slavery: the full restoration of the status-quo-ante, with the exception that it was under the aegis of Napoleon Bonaparte. Toussaint had been captured, sent to France, and executed, but command of the troops had been taken by one of his lieutenants, Jean Jacques Dessalines. Meanwhile, a coup d'etat had taken place in the eastern side in which General Ferrand deposed General Kerverseau, who was also shipped back to Europe, and this intrigue gave the Haitians a breathing spell. Dessalines proclaimed the independence of Haiti on January 1, 1804.

The independence of Haiti must not be seen exclusively as a political revolution, like the North American, because the social implications were the ones which dictated the political outcome. Dependence for the Haitians would have meant the restoration of slavery in a black nation: the supremacy of the whites with the monopoly of political power, the economic wealth, and the social status. The choice was rather clear for the first social revolution in the Americas: political dependence and slavery or political independence and freedom, in the complete sense of the word. They opted for the second choice, and they were willing to defend it.

The presence of France in the eastern side meant a threat to the newly established revolutionaries, besides their ambition of making the

island "one and indivisible."<sup>1</sup> Also, the eastern side offered a great deal of unused land to be cultivated, and therefore Dessalines invaded with two armies, one in the north and one in the south. After the unsuccessful siege of the city of Santo Domingo, many tribulations and atrocities, the Haitians retreated to the western side. Back in Haiti, where all whites who were not priests, teachers, or somehow useful, had been massacred, a plot was hatched and Dessalines assassinated in 1807. The country split in two factions, one with Petion in the south and one with Christophe in the north, which meant that no invasion of the east could take place until the nation was again united.

Those in the eastern side were also aware of the threat that the Haitians perceived with the French presence. Unwilling to have another Haitian invasion, which meant not only conquest but change of the social order, negotiations and plots began under the hatero Juan Sánchez Ramírez to restore the eastern side back to Spain. This meant the absolute and complete restoration of the ancien regime under its previously recognized legitimate authority. With the aid of Spain and

---

<sup>1</sup>The saying captures what presumably was Toussaint's and Dessalines' policy, which was maintained in Haiti with respect to the Dominican Republic. On the other hand, Cordero Michel makes clear that the French threat was a reality at the time, for Ferrand, the French Commander in Santo Domingo, did decree aggressions against the new republic, including the capture of Negroes to be sold as slaves, op. cit., pp. 84-87.



England, Santo Domingo went back in 1810 to what it had been 15 years before--a Spanish colony.<sup>1</sup>

Sánchez Ramírez died a year later, and as fate would have it, the economy was under disastrous conditions. Politically, the colony was split into several factions which continually made revolts and conspiracies. The first group was that of the defenders of the existing order in alliance with Spanish troops; second, the Negro slaves, who wanted to be free under Haitian rule; third, those who wanted a politically free nation; and finally, those who wanted to abrogate the colonial status, but also wanted an annexation to La Gran Colombia in fear of Haiti and the overthrow of the existing order.<sup>2</sup> This last group came out in the forefront, and in December of 1821 in a smooth coup d'etat, the new Estado Independiente de Haiti Español was born under the leadership of Núñez de Cáceres.<sup>3</sup> Spain was too weak and too involved

---

<sup>1</sup> Juan Bosch has argued that this is a case of historical arrhythmia, which he goes on to say is characteristic of the nation, for, after previous unsuccessful attempts, 1810 was the year in which Latin Americans began their definite fight for independence, while the Dominicans chose to go back as a colony. See Bosch, Trujillo, op. cit., pp. 81-89.

<sup>2</sup> More or less this same division into four groups is the one of the Haitian historian, J. C. Dornasainvil, Manuel d'Histoire d'Haiti (Port-au-Prince: 1925), p. 232. Cited in Pattee, op. cit., p. 111-112. The same can be gathered by reading carefully the Dominican historian García, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 20-88.

<sup>3</sup> To capture the spirit of the times and the sequence of events, see the historical novel by Max Henríquez Ureña, La Independencia Efímera (Santo Domingo: Librería Dominicana, 1938, 1967).

in the rest of the continent to be able to restore its rule in Dominicana.

The new state was to last exactly three months. The timing of its birth had been ill-conceived, for Haiti had been recently reunified, and, free of its internal squabbles, it could now move into the east. It was clear that Dominicans, who were already split, for slavery had been left intact, could not by themselves halt the superior Haitian force, and the hopes of Gran Colombia being the protector did not materialize. On February, 1822, the island was again declared "one and indivisible" by the invading and unopposed Haitian army under the leadership of Boyer, and, of course, once more the slaves were liberated.

There were further migrations and the population had decreased to one-third of what it was in 1793. The Haitians established strict military and despotic controls, deprived the Church of its properties, and reduced the previously miserable economy into further misery.<sup>1</sup> During this period a republican assembly functioned with representatives from all parts of the island, including some degree of opposition, but revolts and conspiracies by Dominicans, which were frequent, were ruthlessly smashed.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Sumner Welles, La Viña de Naboth, trans. M. A. Moore (Santiago, R.D.: Editorial El Diario, 1939), Vol. I, pp. 57-63.

<sup>2</sup> Jiménez Grullón does not consider the Boyer regime as tyrannical, but on the contrary, a liberal revolutionary regime; op. cit., pp. 42-43.

Anyone who had been born in Santo Domingo in the early 1790's was considered a Spanish subject, unless he was a slave. From 1795 until 1810 he was a French citizen, but if he had been a slave, he was legally free yet he was not. The slave was really free only during the year in which Toussaint Louverture controlled the island, but in 1802 he was back in chains. The man who had been born free became a Spanish subject once more, only to become briefly a mixture of a citizen of Spanish Haiti and Gran Colombian, and then Haitian citizen. The slave was legally free once again and forever in 1822. If the element of race is also added to the picture, then the confusion is even greater.

If one can imagine a dark mulatto living in the eastern side of the island at this time, it would seem reasonable to consider all the trials that he went through in trying to decide what he was, what he believed, and who to follow. Whites, monarchy, and Spain on one hand; blacks, republic, and Haiti on the other; and infinite variations in between. Few social systems in the world have had as turbulent and indecisive periods of history.

Yet, there was a thread of nationality which would eventually culminate into producing Dominicana. In the first place, the division of the island in the early 17th Century into a French and Spanish side, a fact which was only made legal later by the Treaty of Ryswick, gave particularly different characteristics to the two societies in culture,

economy, and even race. Second, the cession to France of the whole island could have been the time to break the centripetal forces which pulled the two societies in different directions, but at this time France was undergoing its revolutionary period, which put in question the existing order in Santo Domingo. Furthermore, the Haitian social revolution complicated matters even more by challenging the supremacy of the whites.

After the attempts to survive dangerously by remaining a French colony, then a Spanish colony, and then independent and annexed to Gran Colombia, came the period of Haitian domination, black supremacy, and the destruction of the previously existing order. As it turned out, the society which was to be born was heavily tainted by a desire to capture the thread of the past which had been broken by its neighboring country. The culture was to be Spanish, the whites would have supremacy, the nation was to be independent, the regime was to be republican, and the economy would be in the hands of the merchants and the hateros.

Had the Haitians destroyed the white elements on the eastern side during the tenure of Toussaint or Boyer, as Dessalines had done on the western side, the likelihood would have been that the island would have remained "one and indivisible." The thread of being Dominican was mostly carried by the whites and mulattos since, after all, it is highly doubtful that the blacks, who had continually revolted, wanted to

return to slavery. Yet, the fact remains that attempts were made to Africanize the eastern side and emasculate the whites of all political and economic power, needless to say of social prestige.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, instead of carrying an integrationist policy, the Haitians treated Santo Domingo as a conquered territory, which in effect helped to reaffirm the feeling of Dominican nationality.<sup>2</sup>

In 1838 a society called La Trinitaria was founded by a young Dominican named Juan Pablo Duarte.<sup>3</sup> The sole purpose of this group was the creation of an independent Dominican Republic, an event at which they would succeed six years later. Duarte, like Bolívar and San Martín, had been educated in Europe and had served in the army of the later proclaimed enemy, but unlike the two mentioned heroes of the Latin American independence, the enemy was Haiti, not Spain. Luckily for the Dominican revolutionaries, Boyer was overthrown by Charles Herard in 1843. The Haitians were again divided and had weakened

---

<sup>1</sup>García, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 96-100. Part of the Africanization program included the immigration of freed Negro slaves from the United States that were settled on the eastern side of the island. *Ibid.*, pp. 118-120.

<sup>2</sup>Pattee, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-120.

<sup>3</sup>For the life of Duarte, see the apologetic biography by Joaquín Balaguer, *El Cristo de la Libertad* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Americana, 1950); and Pedro Troncoso Sánchez, "La Faceta Dinámica de Juan Pablo Duarte," in his *Estudios de Historia Política Dominicana* (Santo Domingo: Julio Postigo e hijos, editores, 1968), pp. 27-76.

their control of the eastern side of the island. Dominicans conspired with Haitian reformers and mulattos, for Herard wanted to abandon the policy of giving preference to mulattos in administrative positions, a fact which also helped to bring lukewarm Dominicans into the cause for independence. In a coup de force in the city of Santo Domingo, the independence of the Dominican Republic was proclaimed by the Trinitarians on February 27, 1844.

#### Independence and Caudillism

One thing is to declare yourself independent and another is to make this declaration into a fact. The Trinitarians were a group of young idealists who wanted to create in Santo Domingo a society similar to those of bourgeois Europe and those that had been proclaimed in the rest of the continent. They wanted an independent republic based on the principles of representative democracy.<sup>1</sup> This was not unusual for their day, but not all Dominicans desired the same thing, and besides, there was Haiti to think about.

There were two other groups to take into consideration. One group was those who were opposed to dividing the island, the other was composed of those who desired separation from Haiti but annexation or

---

<sup>1</sup>Francisco A. Avelino, Las Ideas Políticas en Santo Domingo (Santo Domingo: Editorial Arte y Cine, 1966), pp. 35-56.

protection from a European power.<sup>1</sup> The Trinitarians allied with the European annexationists in order to overcome the third group as well as the Haitians themselves. The pro-Haiti group was relatively small, since a declaration had been previously made that there was to be no slavery in the new republic<sup>2</sup> and they were overcome in less than three weeks. This left the unholy alliance united in the purpose of separation from Haiti facing an invasion from the west.

The Trinitarians had been bold in their coup de force in the city, but they could not sway the country into independence without their annexationist allies, because they had not the power to face the Haitians by themselves. It was regional caudillos, such as Pedro Santana, and notable public figures such as Tomás Bobadilla, who could move masses of men into action based on their personal prestige.<sup>3</sup> The weakness of the Trinitarians is demonstrated in the fact that they had to hold secondary positions in the provisional government created in March 1844.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Julio G. Campillo Pérez, El Grillo y el Ruiseñor (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, 1966), pp. 21-23.

<sup>2</sup> Avelino, op. cit., p. 39.

<sup>3</sup> To have an idea of what Tomás Bobadilla was in the country, it suffices to know that he was known as "The Man of the Pencil" for his ability. See Miguel Angel Monclús, El Caudillismo en la República Dominicana (Ciudad Trujillo: Impresora Dominicana, 1948), p. 11.

<sup>4</sup> García, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 231-232.

Haitian troops moved west and were met by the newly created Dominican armies. A few battles were fought and the invasion was contained. Free of immediate danger, the Trinitarians overthrew the provisional government and replaced the pro-annexation junta with a pro-independence junta. In spite of some support for the independence movement in the north, the annexationists were able to regain control of the government and persecute and exile the Trinitarians.<sup>1</sup> The first two decades of independent Dominicana were to be a search for some nation which would be willing to take it, guarantee the power position of the ruling caudillo, and maintain the socio-economic status quo of the country.

The key figure was Pedro Santana. He had been commander of the southern army, which was the most powerful, and he was an "hatero" from the east. While negotiations were taking place to find a suitable metropolis, he called for a constituent assembly to give the nation a constitution. The Constitution of 1844 was the same as most Latin American constitutions: a republican form of government, division of powers, a bi-cameral congress, guarantees of human rights, definition of rights and duties of the citizen, and so on.<sup>2</sup> Two things stand out in

---

<sup>1</sup> Welles, op. cit., pp. 71-80.

<sup>2</sup> García, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 264-270. It is interesting to note that the name chosen for the lower house of the Congress was Tribunado and for the upper house Conservative Council. These were later changed to Chamber of Deputies and Senate.



particular: one is the requisite of property for the enjoyment of certain political rights, and the other is Article 210 which gives dictatorial powers to Santana and legally renders useless the rest of the Constitution.

For a foreigner to become a Dominican national, he had to be a proprietor of real estate over the value of 6,000 pesos. In essence, this eliminated Haitian peasants in particular from becoming part of the new state. The same requirement was made to be eligible for Congress or President, which would keep non-property owners outside of the government. Finally, the vote was reserved for property owners, unless they were officers of the army, held professional degrees, were teachers, or rented land.<sup>1</sup> Obviously, the writers of the first constitution wanted to have a government of property owners, by property owners, and for property owners.

Yet, Article 210 read that as long as the war lasted, the President could mobilize the armies and "take all measures he deems opportune for national defense and security; and therefore he is able to give all orders, dispositions, and decrees that are convenient without being

---

<sup>1</sup>Avelino, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-46. Universal manhood suffrage was established for the first time in 1858, but it was abrogated soon thereafter. It was established again in 1872 until the present. Women were allowed to vote in 1947 in one of Trujillo's constitutions.

subject of any responsibility."<sup>1</sup> This meant that Santana could do whatever he pleased without being legally responsible for it. Considering that the members of the constituent assembly were of his own faction and social class, it seems uncalled for to have this absolute power, yet he forced them to accept it. In essence, he reminded them who was boss, and he also made clear that power in Dominicana did not reside in pieces of paper but in the control of the means of violence. Rump elections were held through indirect vote, and Pedro Santana was elected the first president of the Dominican Republic.<sup>2</sup>

As long as Santana held the armed forces, he would hold the reins of the nation. The fact that he was an hatero from the Seibo region had given him the opportunity to become a regional caudillo in the area.<sup>3</sup> When the war for separation broke out, Santana brought his

<sup>1</sup>Cited in Jiménez Grullón, op. cit., p. 54, ff. Underlining is his.

<sup>2</sup>Electoral procedures were through an indirect vote and an electoral college. Electors were chosen from the five provinces of the nation: Azua, Santo Domingo, El Seibo, La Vega, and Santiago. Electors had a double vote, for they had to vote for a man who was from their province as well as the national candidate of their choice. Since electors were usually handpicked, at least the double vote procedures prevented the "unanimous" election of a candidate. See Campillo Pérez, op. cit., pp. 29-33.

<sup>3</sup>For studies of the phenomenon of caudillism, see Alfred B. Thomas, "The Caudillo in the Caribbean: An Interpretation," in A. Curtis Wilgus (ed.), The Caribbean: Its Political Problems (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1956), III, 174-186; and Robert L. Gilmore, Caudillism and Militarism in Venezuela, 1810-1910 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1964).

men, his Seibanos, to fight against the Haitians. A recognition of his power was what gave him the command of the Southern Army, and the fact that he defeated the enemy strengthened that position. In 1845, 1849, and 1856 Santana defeated Haitian attempts to regain their lost territory, and this made him the natural person to look up to. As Robert L. Gilmore wrote, "Caudillos manifested their capacity for leadership by violence, the successful practice of which proved the quality of their virtue by dominating and holding the wills of other men."<sup>1</sup>

As long as there was fear of Haiti, safeguarding the territorial integrity of the new nation was preeminent over legalities, and thus the preeminence of armed forces over constitutions. Furthermore, like his hatero predecessor, Juan Sánchez Ramírez, Santana did not believe in the viability of Dominicana as a nation, and therefore legality was only a facade to keep up with the times and legitimize his power until an annexation to a more powerful nation could take place. Unlike the Trinitarians, these people were not concerned with independence, but only with the prevention of Haitian domination. As Hugo Tolentino put it, Santana hated the Haitians not only as foreigners, but particularly as

---

<sup>1</sup>Gilmore, op. cit., p. 51.

Negroes. "Feeling white and Spanish, having lived in the framework of colonial traditions, and carrying on the activity of an hatero, caudillo, and of semi-feudal lord, conditioned his struggle against Haiti."<sup>1</sup>

Pedro Santana was Dominicana's first ruling caudillo. He was the absolute master for there were not any institutions to oppose him, except brute force. Even the Church, which had been weakened by the Haitian occupation through the confiscation of its properties, was forced into humility as the caudillo demanded and obtained the resignation of Archbishop Portes e Infante, who had opposed him.<sup>2</sup> The only way to obtain a position of power within the system was through the favor of "The Liberator," the title given to Santana, or through the successful command of opposition military forces. The later alternative did not prove viable, because Santana was able to quell all internal opposition through repression, exile, and executions.<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, an ambitious annexationist, Buenaventura Báez, won the favor of the caudillo from the early days of the separatist

---

<sup>1</sup>Hugo Tolentino, La Traición de Pedro Santana (Santo Domingo: Impresos Benty, 1968), p. 28.

<sup>2</sup>García, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 95-98.

<sup>3</sup>Welles, op. cit., p. 92.

struggle.<sup>1</sup> Santana placed him in control of the National Congress, which Báez successfully manipulated in the interest of his caudillo. Even the title of Liberator was Báez's idea in his efforts at flattery and shows of subservency. As a trusted man, "hombre de confianza," Santana allowed Báez to become President in 1849.<sup>2</sup> By the end of the presidential term, however, Santana had become suspicious of his former collaborator, and therefore he decided to take the presidency back in 1853. The caudillo made a tirade against Báez, who thought it best to leave the country. The latter had already become the only rallying alternative to Santana, a caudillo by default, if you wish, and a merry-go-round with the presidency was begun.

---

<sup>1</sup>Before Independence, Buenaventura Báez had served as Senator in the Haitian Congress. He enjoyed some personal support in the South, where he was from, and he was involved in a conspiracy with the French Consul, Levasseur, to separate the eastern part of the island to make it a French protectorate. In 1844, he joined the movement for separation as an annexationist, and sided with Santana against the Trinitarians. For his early role, see García, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 212-213.

<sup>2</sup>Santana had been President from 1844 to his resignation in 1848. Apparently he had been ill while President and there was a rising conspiracy headed by his Minister of War, Manuel Jiménez. Instead of fighting, Santana resigned, and Jiménez became President. But, the following year there was a Haitian invasion headed by Faustin Soulouque, and Santana was recalled to serve as commander of the Southern Army. Once the Haitians had been defeated, the old caudillo threw Jiménez out of the presidency and resumed his position, except that he now signed papers as Commander and not as President. Elections were called and Santana had Santiago Espaillet elected, but the latter declined to accept the puppetry, thus Santana had Buenaventura Báez elected. See Campillo Pérez, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-36.

While Báez was in exile, Santana was negotiating the annexation of Dominicana to the United States, a matter which ran into the opposition of France, England, and Spain, and they forced Santana to allow the return of Báez and to resign from the Presidency in 1856.<sup>1</sup> It was now Báez's turn to be President and Santana's to go in exile. Two years later, a revolt broke out in the north, the Cibao region, Báez was defeated and exiled and Santana became President again. This time the Liberator stayed in power until his death, but not before fulfilling his dream of annexation in 1861.

The seventeen years of independence had been under the dominion of the annexationists represented in the figures of Santana and Báez. Neither those in favor of independence nor those in favor of reunion with Haiti were ever able to challenge their predominance. The political struggles took place between two ambitious men desiring annexation as the only means to insure separation from Haiti, the black nation which would destroy the rule of the whites and put an end to civilization as had been known in the Spanish colony. There was no belief in Dominicana as a nation nor was there trust in the abilities of its people, no matter what the Constitutions of 1844, February 1854,

---

<sup>1</sup>Welles, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-166.

December 1854, or 1858 were to say.<sup>1</sup> The control of force was the means to local power, and the protection of a foreign power was the means to maintain the social system intact, even at the price of dependence.

Their efforts to find a suitable metropolis were so persistent that "supplications were made even to the precarious kingdom of Sardinia,"<sup>2</sup> but rivalries within the international powers were to delay the happening for seventeen years. Britain and the United States were opposed to a European annexation; France was opposed to a Spanish annexation, and vice versa; and all three European powers were opposed to a North American annexation. The Civil War in the United States, however, "opened possibilities for unimpeded European actions on the American Continent."<sup>3</sup> Santana negotiated secretly with the

---

<sup>1</sup> Since Báez had posed a more liberal image than he, when Santana returned to power he decided to have a more liberal constitution than that of 1844. The February 1854 Constitution liberalized commerce, made procedures for naturalization easier in order to attract immigrants, enlarged the legislative power, and most significantly, it did not include the famous Article 210, thus making the President responsible for his acts. Yet, less than a year later he had another reactionary constitution made, December 1854. When he returned from exile to head the liberal revolt in the north, he allowed them to draw up the 1858 Constitution, which called for universal suffrage, but once safely in power, Santana returned to his December 1854 Constitution. See García, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 121-126, 142-147.

<sup>2</sup> Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi, *Antecedentes de la Anexión a España* (Ciudad Trujillo: 1955), p. 6. Cited in Pattee, *op. cit.*, pp. 280-283.

<sup>3</sup> René Albrecht-Carrié, *A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna* (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), p. 117.

Spaniards, and the Dominican Republic was annexed to Spain on March 18, 1861.

The old "Liberator" was given the aristocratic title of Marquis de las Carreras, and he was to remain as Governor General of the regained colony. His dream had been fulfilled, for the nation was now presumably free from Haiti, its civilization and social structure were going to prevail, and he himself, Pedro Santana, had his position as leader and ruler guaranteed from potential rivals such as Báez, who also received a nobility title, and legitimized by the Spanish crown. In the finale to his "Annexation Address," Santana said: "Let us hoist the flag of its [Spain] monarchy and proclaim ourselves subjects of our Queen and Sovereign. . . . Long live Isabel II! Long live liberty! Long live Religion! Long live the Dominican people! Long live forever the Spanish nation!"<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately for Santana and Spain, the Dominican people did no longer feel that they were part of the Spanish nation, and a war of national liberation soon broke out. A Front for the Restoration of the Republic was formed which included not only the followers of Báez, but even old Trinitarians from the struggle of 1844 and former followers of Santana, including his eternal friend Tomás Bobadilla, and everyone else opposed to the annexation. Apparently, the time elapsed between

<sup>1</sup> Cited in Welles, op. cit., p. 209.



the end of the Haitian Occupation and the new Spanish colonization had served to accentuate the feeling of nationality which had been previously suppressed or remained dormant, but now battles were fought all over the nation for its independence. Aided by a change of government in Madrid, which took seriously the cost of 300,000,000 pesetas and 10,888 casualties in its regular army for the dream of recreating a lost empire,<sup>1</sup> Spanish troops were withdrawn in July of 1865. The Dominican flag was again hoisted as the symbol of a sovereign nation and its people.

Although Dominicans managed to recover their independence, again returned the problem of caudillism. The Provisional Government of the Restoration Front had drawn the Constitution of 1865 to be the legal document regulating the affairs of the renewed republic,<sup>2</sup> but the Front was to quickly fall apart by quarrels between caudillos. Santana had died, ironically, just before his arrest by Spanish authorities on the grounds of treason,<sup>3</sup> and as a solution to an impasse in which there had

---

<sup>1</sup> Bernardo Pichardo, Resumen de Historia Patria (Buenos Aires: 1947), p. 144.

<sup>2</sup> The Provisional Government had adopted the Constitution of 1858, but as soon as hostilities ceased, the Constitution of 1865 was proclaimed. Garcia, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 37-50.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 477-479.

already been two coup d'etats and the assassination of one of the provisional presidents, Buenaventura Báez was recalled from abroad to serve as President for the third time.

As soon as he was in office he revived Santana's old December 1854 Constitution, but he lasted less than a year. His political party was the Red Party and those who were against him formed the Blue Party. The latter held elections among themselves, and brought up another liberal constitution but soon enough Báez was back in office due to a coup d'etat, and he brought back his favorite, the 1854 Constitution. This time he lasted in office six years,<sup>1</sup> until thrown out by the Blues in a "revolution" in 1874. Out to exile he went, and two years later it was his "revolution" which put him back in office for the last time, but he did not die without being thrown out of office and sent into exile once more.<sup>2</sup>

The problem with Báez was that he could not become a strong man as he wished, but that he only was the most notorious caudillo

---

<sup>1</sup>This period of history is known as "the period of the six years." In these years executions placed the country in horror. Báez topped the executions by choosing the men of the Restoration, "just like Santana had done with the heroes of the Independence. Jails were full of prisoners and the exiles could be counted by the hundreds." Monclús, op. cit., p. 50.

<sup>2</sup>There was also a faction which had broken out of the Báez camp as the Green Party, but many times it was called the Discolored Red Party. For the ups and downs of this period, see Campillo Pérez, op. cit., Chapter III.

among several caudillos disputing the reins of power and the glory of the presidency.<sup>1</sup> Had he been able to muster enough power to keep the others in check, he would have been "in" for several years, just as Santana had done in the past and Heureaux and Trujillo would do in the future. Two things stand out in particular in Báez's post-Restoration political career, but the most important question is why was political stability only possible with a strong man, a caudillo's caudillo. First we shall deal with Báez's annexation attempt, second with the Hartmond loan, and third with the problem of stability.

One wonders with amazement why Báez attempted to annex Dominicana to the United States.<sup>2</sup> Certainly he had been an annexationist for most of his life, but he had also been opportunistic enough to realize that Santana's recent attempt had been an absolute failure. North American interest in the island, particularly strategic Samaná Bay, had been present for many years, but the United States was not as yet ready to impose its will in Latin America as it would be able to do

---

<sup>1</sup>"The effectiveness of the lesser caudillos of locality and state lay in their ability to generate at need armed support from the population." Gillmore continues to say that those with the national government had the legal right to call the militia, while those in opposition depended on their peons, friends, relatives, tenants, or others. Op. cit., p. 52.

<sup>2</sup>Báez shares with Manuel Joaquín Delmonte the dubious honor of having been the first Dominicans to call for intervention by the United States in 1850. Welles, op. cit., pp. 110-111.

later on.<sup>1</sup> The Haitian President, Geffrard, had for all practical purposes renounced the claim to the eastern territories, which meant that there was no Haitian threat as there had been in the past. It may be argued that with a much larger population and the same level of technology, Haitian power capabilities continued to be a threat, but since they no longer had the intentions of invasion it ceased to be a real threat, although it may have remained as a potential one.<sup>2</sup>

It all boils down to two major factors. First, that Báez could not stay in power on his own, and thus he was to use North American arms to keep him as President.<sup>3</sup> Even before the annexation treaty had

<sup>1</sup>"The interest of the United States of America in the West Indies precedes its own political emancipation. It manifests itself for the first time when the insurrect British colonies were fighting their war for independence." Enrique Apolinar Henríquez, Episodios Imperialistas (Ciudad Trujillo: Editora Montalvo, 1959), p. 143. The particular interest in Samaná Bay comes to the fore for the first time in 1849. See Welles, op. cit., pp. 102-105.

<sup>2</sup>The politics of the two nations attained a new character, for it was no longer the fear and the threat of invasion. Haitian political groups would aid or oppose Dominican political groups, as for instance Geffrard aided Sánchez against Santana during the Annexation, but there was recognition of the right of Dominicana to exist. A formal peace treaty was signed in 1874. García, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 224-226.

<sup>3</sup>With the failure of what he thought would have kept him in power indefinitely, Báez proceeded to attempt to strengthen his party, but it was to no avail because many of his followers had disapproved of his actions and had moved over to the Blues. Pichardo, op. cit., p. 163. Speaking of caudillos in general, Harry Bernstein said that they "seem to have had no deep need for social and political institutions to help them rule. . . . Caudillos, whether by election or natural selection, were practical politicians interested in the fact of supremacy, not

been sent to the Senate of the United States, a North American fleet had been sent to the island for the purpose of maintaining Báez in power. These ships were patrolling Dominican coasts and making shows of power at different ports. It got to the point that even Haitian authorities were informed that "the Dominican Republic was under the protection of the United States, and that, consequently, any aid given to Dominican revolutionaries would be seen by them (North Americans) as an insult."<sup>1</sup> The second factor was money: a business deal. It turns out that the North American envoys were generally fortune hunters who had been residing in Dominicana, and who had already obtained heavy concessions of lands and mines from the Dominican government. For them, particularly Cazneau and Fabens, annexation meant protection for their properties and a guarantee of a fortune.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately for them, internal dissention in the United States government prevented

---

the theory of sovereignty; in discipline, not destiny; in patronage, not philosophy." Bernstein, "The Concept of the Nation-State in the Caribbean," in A. Curtis Wilgus (ed.), The Caribbean: Its Political Problems (Gainsville: University of Florida Press, 1956), Vol. VII, p. 10-11.

<sup>1</sup>García, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 174.

<sup>2</sup>For a documented report on the activities of these people, see Welles, op. cit., pp. 287-387; for a list of some of the most important grants, see Franklyn Franco, República Dominicana: Clases, Crisis y Comandos (La Habana: Casa de las Americas, 1966), pp. 25-26; and for an interesting side story, see Arturo Espaillat, Trujillo: The Last Caesar (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1963), Chapter IX.

the annexation treaty from being ratified by the Senate.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, part of Báez's interest was that the annexation included the granting of money to the Dominican government to solve a desperate economic situation.<sup>2</sup>

The Hartmond loan affair was for the same two reasons. In 1869 Báez negotiated a loan for 520,000 sterling pounds with the Hartmond & Co. of London, for he needed money with which to finance his followers and troops to keep him in the Presidency.<sup>3</sup> The problem with this loan was that in Article 9 of the contract the customs and all the recourses of the Dominican state were given as guarantee "to English capitalists behind whom probably was the English government."<sup>4</sup> The placing of national sovereignty in jeopardy for the purposes of political expediency is a clear indicator of the lack of

---

<sup>1</sup>President Ulysses Grant "brought all the pressure he could bring to bear in the Senate to get his treaty ratified. A personal feud with the powerful Senator Sumner was a strong factor in defeating this treaty by a vote that fell just short of the necessary two-thirds." Richard W. Van Alstyne, The Rising American Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 163.

<sup>2</sup>Welles, op. cit., p. 257.

<sup>3</sup>Antonio de la Rosa, Las Finanzas de Santo Domingo y el Control Americano (Santo Domingo: Editora Nacional, 1915, 1969), p. 25. At this time Báez was facing a rebellion which seemed to be gaining ground. He needed money to finance his operations against Generals Cabral and Luperón. García, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 165.

<sup>4</sup>De la Rosa, op. cit., p. 26.

legitimacy that was attached to the existence of the Republic by some of its leading figures.<sup>1</sup>

In the period from Independence to the Restoration of the Republic, national identity had been established while at the same time the traditional order had been restored. The social question, mainly the fact of slavery and race, was laid aside because the new republic was born without slavery and it had gone back to its culture and ways of 1790. This meant the establishment of the colonial order, including white supremacy, with the exception of waiting to be incorporated into a metropolis. The war of Restoration took away the political question about annexation, but it left the cultural socio-economic order intact. Then we have in the second republic a semi-feudal order that was presumably legitimate with a bourgeois constitution, where obviously the former and the latter are incompatible. Thus, with a lack of legitimacy there is nothing else left but force; force which could be mustered by a regional caudillo due to his followers' allegiance to him as a man or through the benefits to be derived, material or psychological, by association with him.

---

<sup>1</sup>The preceding administration, headed by Gral. José María Cabral, had also attempted to rent or cede the Samaná Bay and Peninsula to the United States. García, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, pp. 133-135.

Caudillism as a system of political leadership for the state was an inherently unstable hierarchical arrangement, a structure composed of a network of personal alliances cemented together by community of interests, by force of personality, by ties of friendship and even of family. . . . What stability it possessed was due to the role of political office and especially of the officers corps of the militia in systematizing relationships among the caudillos. As a political system it imposed limitations on the authority of the caudillo effective in inverse ratio to the degree of dominance achieved by the caudillo over his associates.<sup>1</sup>

The population of Dominicana in 1871 was estimated as somewhere between 150,000 and 200,000 people, but interestingly enough, the economy had declined to more primitive ways of production than it had been in the colonial period.<sup>2</sup> The predominant productive enterprises at this time were cattle ranches and shifting agriculture; there were very few "latifundios" and the principal land owners were the Church and the State. It was a sorry state of affairs provoked by a deficient infrastructure, political instability, and the lack of people to work the lands.<sup>3</sup> As a result, people would flock to the call of arms of the regional caudillo probably in the hope of bettering their lot.<sup>4</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> Gilmore, op. cit., p. 50.

<sup>2</sup> Hoetink, op. cit., p. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> A breed of courageous men, the monteros, who were sort of vassals of the hateros, dedicated to look for lost cattle, hunting, and menial tasks, were those who followed their caudillos into battles. "The lost caste of the 'monteros', says the historian Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi, "constituted not only the basic element of our primitive economy, which was the only one we had, but also the principal element of our wars, both the national as well as the fratricidal wars." Preface to the novel by Pedro F. Bono, El Montero (Santo Domingo: Julio D. Postigo e hijos, editores, 1968), p. 22.



lack of means of communications insured the existence of a fragmented society broken into the parcels of the different caudillos.<sup>1</sup> Thus, stability would only be insured by the rise of a caudillo's caudillo, and that stability would obviously be quite temporary.

Yet, the seeds of change were implanted at this same time. The reintroduction of commercial agriculture was brought by foreign capitalists, largely Cubans escaping the hazards of their own war for independence.<sup>2</sup> Mainly, the money was invested in sugar plantations, but there were also investments made in coffee and cocoa plantations. The entry of capitalism would lead not only to the production of new goods and services, immigration, economic growth, and a new powerful social group, but also to the economic dependence of Dominicana on the United States as an export market and as a source of imports and finance.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Harmannus Hoetink, "Materiales para el Estudio de la República Dominicana en la Segunda Mitad del Siglo XIX Cambios en la Estructura de las Comunicaciones," Caribbean Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3 (October 1968), pp. 3-22.

<sup>2</sup>Hoetink, "Cambios en la Estructura Agraria," op. cit., pp. 9-10.

<sup>3</sup>Harmannus Hoetink, "Materiales para el Estudio de la República Dominicana en la Segunda Mitad del Siglo XIX: Cambios en la Estructura Demográfica y en la Distribución Geográfica de la Población," Caribbean Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3 (October 1967), pp. 3-34; and "Materiales para el Estudio de la República Dominicana en la Segunda Mitad del Siglo XIX: Cambios de la Estructura del Poder Económico," Caribbean Studies, Vol. 8, No. 4 (January 1969), pp. 3-37.

As these changes were taking place, a strongman was in the making: General Ulises Heureaux, better known by his nickname, Lili's. The son of a Haitian civil judge, he distinguished himself for bravery in the War of Restoration, and he tied his destiny to the most important figure of the event, General Gregorio Luperón.<sup>1</sup> The latter was to act as his mentor, and Lili's became second in command and a trusted man (hombre de confianza). In 1879, Luperón organized a revolt against the existing government. The rebellious forces were triumphant and Luperón designated Archbishop Meriño as President and Lili's as Minister of Interior, a position from which he passed on to President of the Republic in 1882, also by design of his caudillo.<sup>2</sup>

The next step for Lili's was to become a caudillos' caudillo, and for this he had to: first, work for Luperón; second, get rid of him; and third, consolidate his own forces. The old hero of the Restoration had been an ardent opposer of Buenaventura Báez, and Luperón had been one of the founders of the Blue Party. The fact was that this opposition

---

<sup>1</sup>Luperón was offered the presidency of the provisional government during the War of Restoration, but he refused to accept it the same as Duarte had done before him during the War of Independence. Miguel Angel Monclus argues that he preferred to stay behind the scenes, but that if he had taken the presidency, the chances were that the wartime coalition would have been maintained and subsequent history would have been different. Monclus, op. cit., pp. 63-65.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 85-89. It is noticeable the striking parallel between the rise to power of Báez and Lili's. They both rode on the coattails of a great caudillo, became their trusted men, flattered them, and then fought them.

party also became the Partido Nacional Liberal, which was to be "a frustrated attempt at a party of principles without a principal figure to follow and to 'adore.'"<sup>1</sup>

The Blue Party had fostered noble democratic experiments, such as that of the government of President Ulises Espaillat in 1876, but they proved to be short-lived in the face of rebellious caudillos.<sup>2</sup>

The liberals of the time thought that what was needed to put the nation in the road toward peace and progress was to have the unification of all Dominicans to work together for the common good. Espaillat even managed to get an agreement between the two parties: "It was the fraternization of God and the Devil!"<sup>3</sup> This union did not last long for the simple reason that there was no real consensus as to the values that would hold it together--democracy. In the feudal age, power had been diffused in the hands of the nobles, just like in Dominicana it was in the hands of the caudillos, but the nobles recognized as legitimate the binding authority of the monarchy and the church, while in Santo Domingo governmental authority was only recognized as a tentative matter, and not for the principles it embodied, but for the power of whosoever held the government. Some even thought that constitutions should include a

<sup>1</sup>Campillo Pérez, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

<sup>2</sup>García, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, pp. 251-269.

<sup>3</sup>Jiménez Grullón, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

clause that would say that "Governments shall last in power as long as they can maintain themselves there."<sup>1</sup> In effect, the only existing legitimacy was that of mustering enough power vis-à-vis the other caudillos, and keeping the government as long as they could, and with the absence of any normative concern, the holding of the reins of power proved to be neither legitimate nor stable in the long run.

While Minister of Interior, Heureaux managed to destroy all opposition to the Blues while acting in the name of President Meriño and presumably for the sake of Luperón, now the undisputed leader of the party.<sup>2</sup> As a result, he was given the Presidency in 1882, and this term of office was constitutionally prescribed for a duration of only two years. Lili's was not strong enough to make his bid for undisputed power, and therefore he was ready to step down from the Presidency. But before doing this, he was to foment division within the party to erode the leadership of Luperón, and to insure that the new president and vice-president were favorable to him.<sup>3</sup> Since the transition of

---

<sup>1</sup> Monclús, op. cit., p. 156.

<sup>2</sup> There were two revolts at this time: one by General Braulio Alvarez and the second by General Cesareo Guillermo. Both were crushed without mercy. "The prisoners, the wounded, even children fifteen years old who were captured with weapons in their hands, were condemned to capital punishment." Welles, op. cit., p. 419.

<sup>3</sup> "Cunningly [Lili's] exploited the vanity of many of the personalities of the party, secretly and separately offering his support in case they decided to run for the Presidency." Campillo Pérez, op. cit., p. 88.

of power, the elections, and the taking of office was an affair between different shades of Blues, it all took place with absolute calm.

The elected president, Francisco G. Billini, faced the power of Luperón, the intrigues of Heureaux, and a revolt from a regional caudillo, while at the same time he attempted to promote a democratic government. The result was his resignation, and the coming to office of the vice-president, Alejandro Woss y Gil, who was more amiable to Lili's. Again, there were to be elections in 1886, all as the constitution prescribed, but this time Heureaux was to go as a candidate for president with one of Luperón's favorites as vice-president. All the time he continued to draw support from his Blues as well as from those who had been in opposition within the party and from without the party, while simultaneously he was pledging allegiance to Luperón.<sup>1</sup>

To remain in power, Heureaux thought that he not only needed the persecution and the elimination of the opposition, but that it was also necessary to have sufficient money with which to buy people's wills and to acquire war material. . . . In this second period Heureaux, placing as guarantee our customs' revenues, negotiated with the firm of Westendorp & Co., from Holland, the nominal sum of 770,000 sterling pounds which the country received as a loan.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>"His ideology, if one could be talked about, consisted in reducing the traditional political parties to impotence and to create a system which depended exclusively on his person. He associated personalities of different tendencies to his official pursuits, weakened the opposition, and managed to become the arbiter between conflicting groups." Pattee, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

<sup>2</sup>Campillo Pérez, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

Lilís at first even supported Luperón for the presidency in the scheduled elections of 1888, but once he received the money from Holland, he was ready to turn against the old caudillo. He announced his intention to seek reelection, organized his supporters under the Partido Llista, persecuted the opposition, fixed the election returns, and became the strongman.<sup>1</sup>

For the effective maintenance of his tyranny, Lilís increased and strengthened his armed forces in order to deter or destroy any possible uprising, and he established a rather efficient spying system which kept him informed of all occurrences in the nation.<sup>2</sup> His personal prestige as a caudillo is an important factor to take into consideration in the maintenance of his regime, because Heureaux was as popular just as he was ruthless in dealing with all opposition.<sup>3</sup> He never failed to maintain the facade of a constitution and the apparent mechanisms of representative democracy, and he was cunning in his

---

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., pp. 99-102.

<sup>2</sup> "There was not a town, a village, or even a group of two or three huts which did not nest a paid spy by the Dictator." The espionage system was not limited to Dominicana, for after the death of Lilís letters were found from his agents in Venezuela, Cuba, Puerto Rico, New York, Paris, London and Berlin. Welles, op. cit., p. 488.

<sup>3</sup> He was particularly popular in the Capital. Monclús, op. cit., p. 119.

dealings with foreign powers. He played off the United States, giving concessions to North American capitalists and even trying to rent Samaná Bay, while at the same time borrowing money from Europeans and defaulting on them, because he knew the United States was to oppose any show of force against him.<sup>1</sup>

Purposely or not, his policies were to lead to the complete dependence on the United States. During the tyranny of Lili's, North Americans were to obtain not only the monopoly of navigation between Dominican and North American ports, but also the principal concessions of mines and railroads, and the largest plantations of sugar cane, coffee, cocoa, figs, and bananas. In addition, beer breweries and the best enterprises, such as the electricity plant and the construction of the ports of Puerto Plata and Santo Domingo, also fell into their hands.<sup>2</sup> In general, Dominican commerce was to follow this pattern and approximately half of all imports were now North American and the same percentage of all exports went to the United States.<sup>3</sup> This remains true today.

---

<sup>1</sup> Welles, *op. cit.*, pp. 451-481.

<sup>2</sup> De la Rosa, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 92-93.

The money Heureaux had negotiated with Westendorp and Co. in 1888 had been used for "political" reasons, and a new loan was negotiated in 1890. This time part of the revenue derived from the custom houses was to go directly for the payment of the loans, but more important, it was Westendorp which collected its money directly through a tax collecting outfit under its control.<sup>1</sup> "The discovery of the easy way to get money through loans and bonds promoted in the Executive the insatiable thirst that stimulated the palace coterie with the purpose of obtaining the scraps from the feast."<sup>2</sup> In the midst of corruption and financial disorder, a disagreement ensued between Westendorp and the Dominican government which led consequently in 1893 to the transfer of the loan and contracts to the San Domingo Improvement Company. This company was registered in the United States and this meant that now the production of the economy, the pattern of trade, the collection of customs duties, and the financing of the government were in North American hands.

Lilís was assassinated in 1899 and then followed the eternal power crisis due to the fact that authority was only possible in the temporal figure of a man without any mechanisms of transfer. In a

---

<sup>1</sup>Westendorp designated a General Receivership with its own agents that were to collect 30% of all customs duties, and this administrative body was known as the "Regie." Welles, op. cit., pp. 446-447.

<sup>2</sup>Monclus, op. cit., p. 107.



monarchy the mechanism is heredity just as in a republic it is elections, but in a caudillo system it is violence. Only through violence can the next pretender consolidate his power which he can keep until he dies or is thrown out by another caudillo. The system is inherently unstable because it is absolutely dependent on violence. No two great caudillos can coexist peacefully in the same society, and therefore it is not possible to transfer power peacefully from one to the next. Power must be obtained by violence, and so is the maintenance of it.

The faster one caudillo can rise above the others, the quicker he will get to the government, but then he must become a strongman and eliminate all opposition in order to remain there. Many times it happens that no one is able to consolidate this position, and therefore the period of time is marked by a continuous instability of men going in and out of the government. Those who are "out" fight those who are "in" until one can get "in" and eliminate all the "outs," except in cases in which a third person is designated as a sign of truce between the quarreling caudillos and which never lasts very long.

Heureaux did not only leave Dominicana "under the weight of a considerable public debt and under the yoke of the San Domingo Improvement Co.,"<sup>1</sup> but he left it without a substitute. Two caudillos,

---

<sup>1</sup>De la Rosa, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

Juan Isidro Jiménez and Horacio Vázquez, were to dispute the reins of power until both were to be displaced by what was to become the strongest power on Earth, the United States of America. There were the usual uprisings and pronunciamientos, the making and unmaking of constitutions, short-lived truces and rigged elections. Men were to follow these caudillos under the primitive banners of two cocks, one with tail and one without tail, a fact which speaks louder than words in demonstrating the banality of the issues in dispute.<sup>1</sup>

Lilís was followed constitutionally by the vice-president, General Wenceslao Figuereo, but soon there was a "revolutionary" provisional government established in Santiago for the purpose of displacing the Lilistas. By November of 1899, elections had been held and Jiménez was President and Vázquez Vice-president by an arrangement of the two caudillos. There were public liberties at this time, but by 1902 Vázquez overthrew the government on the grounds that the administration had been corrupt. He lasted in power about a year when a group of Lilistas and Jimenistas were to throw him out, and they themselves were to go out in another year when Horacistas and Jimenistas were to ally to throw them out at the end of 1903.

The inability of Dominicans to establish and maintain a purposeful and stable government left a permanent vacuum for the interests

<sup>1</sup>Campillo Pérez, op. cit., Chapter V.

and purposes of others. At this juncture of the nation's history, the appetite of its powerful northern neighbor was on the increase. The United States had recently acquired the colony of Puerto Rico, created the state of Panama, and established a protectorate in Cuba. The defeat of Spain in the Spanish-American War of 1898, symbolically marked the end of one empire, but it also marked the establishment of another one, the North American empire.<sup>1</sup> The strength of the United States and the weakness of the Dominicans combined in the establishment of North American hegemony over the nation at least until the present day. The degree of dominance and the methods of control vary according to circumstances, but nevertheless its presence is there and Dominican politics are since largely dependent or even decided in Washington.

#### United States Hegemony

Like any other nation, the international system was to have effect in the society and the politics of Dominicana. It was a European treaty which split the island to create two distinct societies, and it was another one later which ceded the Spanish side to France to create a loss of identity to its inhabitants, which in turn made the society cling

---

<sup>1</sup>Claude Julien, *El Imperio Americano*, trans. Esteban Riambau (Barcelona: Ediciones Grijalbo, S.A., 1969), Chapter II.

desperately to a gone past. It was the wars with Haiti and Spain that finally cemented the concept of Dominican nationality, but which also were responsible for the unstable and violent political system of caudillism which has not yet been surmounted. It was the fact of great power disputes which insured the political independence of the nation during the 19th Century, except for the brief interlude of Spanish Annexation, and it was internal dissention in the United States government which prevented Dominicana from becoming another addition to the North American nation.

The defeat of Spain and the withdrawal of Britain from the Caribbean, relinquishing her rights to a joint construction and protection of a trans-ithmian canal, gave North America absolute supremacy in the area. As Richard Van Alstyne wrote:

The United States now had a blank check to treat the region of the Caribbean as its exclusive sphere of influence; and it proceeded to do so, using either or both of two arguments as justification--the Monroe Doctrine and the Defense requirements of the canal. This meant that whatever independence (or self-determination) was enjoyed by the local republics . . . was henceforth mortgaged to the foreign policy of the United States.<sup>1</sup>

As far as Dominicana was concerned, the direct control of the United States would come as a product of its political and economic disorder at a time the imperial power desired order in its new sphere of influence. The policy for the maintenance of order is still a constant

<sup>1</sup>Van Alstyne, op. cit., p. 166.

today, for once supremacy has been achieved, disorders can only weaken that position. This could come about either by the rise of "undesirable" political groups which would question the fact of supremacy, or by the meddling of other powers through alliances with the "undesirables" or through making their presence felt in a political vacuum. If there is order and subserviency, there is no need for direct interventions, as Trujillo was to prove.

At the turn of the century, the public debt of Dominicana had risen to approximately thirty-four million dollars, of which twenty-four were owed to foreign lenders, and the government had by decree recovered the control of its customs, for the San Domingo Improvement Company had resulted in a disaster of inefficiency and corruption.<sup>1</sup> In 1903, Belgium proposed to the United States the creation of an international debt commission to handle the affairs of the bankrupt republic, but the North Americans "did not want the collaboration of outside powers, even small ones."<sup>2</sup> The Caribbean was to be theirs exclusively.

In 1905, at the suggestion of the United States,<sup>3</sup> the Dominican

---

<sup>1</sup> De la Rosa, op. cit., pp. 95-116.

<sup>2</sup> Van Alstyne, op. cit., p. 167.

<sup>3</sup> Although President Roosevelt claimed that the suggestion came from the Dominican government, Sumner Welles cites the instructions given to the North American Minister in Santo Domingo, who was supposed to tell the Dominicans about it and then have them ask for it. Welles, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 90-91. The same will happen in 1965.

government agreed to allow the North American government to assume the responsibility for the administration of its customs in an arrangement in which 55 percent of the income derived was to be used for the payment of the public debt and 45 percent for the expenditures of the local government.<sup>1</sup> In essence, this meant that the United States now had control over the actions of any Dominican government, for it could always deny it funds with which to operate. Furthermore, "undesirable" political groups could be kept out, intriguing foreign powers would have to deal directly with the United States, and hopefully, order would be maintained. It did not turn out that simple.

The modus vivendi, as the new customs arrangement was called because Roosevelt had not as yet managed to get the North American Senate to approve it as a treaty, had been signed by President Carlos F. Morales. This man had risen to the presidency as a follower of Juan Isidro Jiménez, the tail-less cock party, in the "revolution" of 1903. Elections were held in 1904 after an arrangement had been made with the opposing caudillo, Horacio Vázquez, the cock-with-tail party, that his cousin, General Ramón Cáceres (Mon)--the man who had killed Lilís--would go in the same ticket. It was a clean sweep victory for the Morales-Cáceres ticket, simply because it was the only ticket in

---

<sup>1</sup>Welles, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 94-95.

the elections. The modus vivendi was signed in January 1905, the United States faithfully paying the Dominican government its own money, and by December of the same year, Morales had risen in revolt against his own government.

Apparently, the vice-president had also been in control of the Armed Forces, a fact which rendered the head of state a formality, and thus Morales sought to reassert his power. However, he failed, obtained asylum in the United States Legation, and was expatriated on a ship of the United States Navy. Cáceres was now not only the strongman, but also the President. He would remain in office until his assassination in 1911.

The United States-Dominicana customs arrangement was legalized in 1907, but what is important is the establishment of a quasi-protectorate, for Dominicans had long lost their sovereignty. The two key clauses of the Convention, as De la Rosa points out, were that the government of the United States was empowered to give the protection it considered necessary for the Customs Receiver to carry out his functions, and second, that the Dominican government could not contract any loans or modify its customs tariff without the previous consent of the President of the United States.<sup>1</sup> This meant that if loans

---

<sup>1</sup>De la Rosa, op. cit., pp. 152-153. For the text of the Convention, see Welles, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 115-119.

were to be contracted, the financiers were to be North Americans; that if tariffs were to be modified, they had to benefit North American interests; and that if the United States wished to land troops, it could legally do so on the grounds of protecting the Customs Receiver.<sup>1</sup>

The fact that President Cáceres had built up the Armed Forces gave its commander, General Alfredo Victoria, a lead over other power contenders at the time of his death. Since at that time there was no Vice-President, the General had his uncle Eladio Victoria to serve as Provisional President until elections were held. The ballots were cast, and obviously the victor was uncle Eladio, who took office in February, 1912. Three separate revolts ensued: the first was an unsuccessful comeback attempt by former President Carlos Morales; the other two--one by the "Horacistas" and one by the "Jimenistas"--were to eventually overcome the government.

Disorder had broken out, and order had to be maintained. The U. S. Minister, W. W. Russell, wrote to his Secretary of State, Philander Knox, in September of 1912, that only "complete control by our government would permanently insure order and justice, but any degree of control would be beneficial; indeed, without our effective control, one administration here would be as good as another."<sup>2</sup> It was

<sup>1</sup> Melvin K. Knight, The Americans in Santo Domingo (New York: Vanguard Press, 1928).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 50.



too soon for complete control--that would come later--but in the meantime order had to be restored.

Given the circumstances that the Victorias had been unable to quell the revolts, the United States decided for a coalition government of the Jimenistas and Horacistas, and Eladio Victoria was forced to resign by the simple procedure of denying him the funds from the customs collection.<sup>1</sup> The new Provisional Government headed by Monsignor Adolfo Alejandro Nouel, as a sign of truce between the rival caudillos, proved to be short-lived in the midst of factional squabbles. Another Provisional Government went up, and it quickly went down. The third Provisional Government came under the aegis of the Woodrow Wilson Plan, which meant that elections were to be held, no protests allowed, under the direction and supervision of the Government of the United States.<sup>2</sup> Warships were brought to Santo Domingo in order to make sure that everyone had understood that this was to be the case, and so it was. Juan Isidro Jiménez was elected President in 1914, with his rival, Horacio Vázquez, a close second in the balloting.

---

<sup>1</sup>Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1927 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 263-264.

<sup>2</sup>Campillo Pérez, op. cit., pp. 137-138.

In the United States, as in the Dominican Republic, an elected government is the legal government of the nation, but in the former there was a democratic tradition to sustain it, while in the latter there was a caudillistic tradition to disregard it. President Jiménez soon faced the eternal squabbles, rivalries, and disorders. A new suggestion was now made by Minister W. W. Russell in the efforts to maintain order and further North American control. This time it was proposed to the Dominican government, among other things, that the internal revenue of the nation be collected by the United States, and that a civil guard or police, organized and directed by a North American officer, be substituted for the Dominican Army.<sup>1</sup> President Jiménez rejected the proposition; the Minister of War and Navy, General Desiderio Arias, carried a coup de force; and North American Marines were landed "nominally for the protection of the Legation of the United States, the General Receivership, and foreigners."<sup>2</sup>

Russell and Admiral Caperton offered Jiménez the use of Marines to restore him to power, but he chose to resign May 16, 1916, in order to prevent "the humiliation of a North American intervention."<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Welles, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 219-222.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 229.

<sup>3</sup>Pichardo, op. cit., pp. 289-290. He cites entire speech.

Unfortunately, it was to no avail, for the previous day North American troops had taken control of Santo Domingo, and then slowly moved to the rest of the nation. Faced with superior force, General Desiderio Arias withdrew with his men to the interior, and Congress designated Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal as Provisional President to deal with the situation. He was not even recognized. Tired of negotiating, the United States placed Dominicana under direct military occupation and "submitted to a military government and martial law."<sup>1</sup>

Whatever armed opposition there was at the beginning was soon to disappear except for the sporadic appearance of guerrilla bands under local leadership. The recognition of superior force was clear, and the United States was to do what it pleased. Caudillism, based on violence and the recognition of power, was now supplanted by a foreign power which in effect becomes the supreme caudillo. Of the two old caudillos since Lili's, Monclús said: "Juan Isidro Jiménez, valetudinarian and exhausted, would leave and die in obscurity and in misery; while Horacio Vázquez was to preach prudence and would recommend his friends to give up their weapons."<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Welles, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 289-290. The Proclamation was made by Captain H. S. Knapp, "acting under the authority and by order of the United States of America . . ."

<sup>2</sup>Monclús, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

The occupying forces were soon to accomplish five major tasks. The first was to obliterate all opposition to the military dictatorship through the establishment of censorship, the persecution of dissidents, and the confiscation of all weapons. According to Arturo Espaillat, the Marines "confiscated and dumped into the sea some 3,000,000 small arms--enough to supply three weapons to every man, woman, and child in the country."<sup>1</sup> The second task was to establish the formality of the government for which Dominicans were sought, save the Ministry of War and Navy and the Ministry of Interior (and Police), because these two had to do with the control of the institutionalized means of violence. Dominicans refused to cooperate, and therefore all ministries were filled with North American officers. Although under the direct control of the United States Department of the Navy, the "Dominican" government maintained diplomatic relations with Washington as if it was existing as an independent nation.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Espaillat, op. cit., p. 24.

<sup>2</sup> This got to the ridiculous point that once the United States had not recognized a Central American government, and the Military Governor sent a message to the new government saying that he wished closer relations with his "Grande y buen amigo." Immediately, Washington sent orders that this cordial message had to be taken back. Welles, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 258. This is also cited in Franco, op. cit., p. 27.

The third task was to fulfill the cherished dream of building a North American controlled constabulary.<sup>1</sup> Dominican armies had been formed to return the colony to Spain in 1808, to defend the newly acquired independence from Haiti in 1844, and to restore the independent republic in 1863. The latter army only had some strength under the control of strongmen Lili's and Cáceres, but most of the time it withered with the political turbulence of the rise and fall of caudillos.<sup>2</sup> However, the fourth organized army was the constabulary, and this has survived until the present day. Obviously, at this time the officers in command were to be North Americans: one Captain was to be the Major and fourteen sergeants and corporals were to be the Captains.<sup>3</sup> Some Dominicans, neither strong nationalists nor of high social standing, also became officers. One of these entered as a Second Lieutenant: his name was Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina.

A fourth task of the Occupation Government was the building of roads and the improvement of communication, sanitation, and educational facilities. The previously isolated areas were now open not only

---

<sup>1</sup>Marvin Goldwert, The Constabulary in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua: Progeny and Legacy of United States Intervention (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962).

<sup>2</sup>Ernesto Vega y Pagán, Historia de las Fuerzas Armadas (Ciudad Trujillo: 1955), 2 vols.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 18-40.

for travel and commerce, but for the movement of troops. The effect of the roads, better communications, a new capable military, a more efficient bureaucratic structure, and the ruthlessness and cruelty in dealing with the opposition,<sup>1</sup> brings us to the most important task of the military dictatorship: the centralization of Dominicana. Albeit it was a modest beginning, but the nation would no longer be fragmented as in the past. Regional caudillos would no longer be a threat for their bases of power could be penetrated and they were no match for the regulars, but this also meant that whosoever controlled the armed forces controlled the nation without the possibility of opposition.

In general, North Americans were rather content with the Occupation. Franklin Delano Roosevelt said in 1928: "We accomplished an excellent piece of constructive work and the world ought to thank us for it."<sup>2</sup> All imperial powers justify their actions with some noble formula: for the French it was the civilizing mission; for the English it was the white men's burden; and for the North Americans it was "benevolent imperialism."

---

<sup>1</sup> Welles, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 262-268.

<sup>2</sup> Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Our Foreign Policy: A Democratic View," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. VI (July 1928), p. 583. Cited in Raymond H. Pulley, "The United States and the Trujillo Dictatorship, 1933-1940: The High Price of Caribbean Stability," *Caribbean Studies*, Vol. V, No. 3 (October 1965), p. 23.

The old assumption that any group of people were qualified to operate a constitutional government and were therefore qualified for full membership in the family of nations, seems to have received too many negations for anyone glibly to assert it. . . . For what many Dominicans seem to be asking is not immediate independence, but that the United States show a little more consideration for Latin American susceptibilities, and a little more charity in dealing with the wayward children who need patience and time to go to school.<sup>1</sup>

Dominicans fought for national liberation on two fronts: internally, with guerrilla warfare and civil disobedience, and externally, by the exiles writing and speaking in an effort to arouse world opinion. They were aided by North American intellectuals and politicians which managed to make the matter a campaign issue in 1920, but also by the end of the First World War which decreased the island's strategic value.<sup>2</sup> At least, withdrawal came ten years before it happened in Haiti and Nicaragua, but not before Dominicans accepted whatever had been done during the military dictatorship. This included not only administrative reforms, but the constabulary, the Convention of 1907 until the entire debt had been paid, and, obviously, a government which would agree to it.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Randolph G. Adams, "Santo Domingo: A Study in Benevolent Imperialism," The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. XX, No. 1 (January 1921), p. 24.

<sup>2</sup> Joseph R. Juárez, "United States Withdrawal from Santo Domingo," The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. XLII, No. 2 (May 1962), pp. 152-190.

<sup>3</sup> For the entire conditions, see Welles, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 317-323.

In spite of a national liberation front, Union Patriótica Dominicana, which argued for "simple and pure withdrawal," a Dominican from a family of sugar interests and other prestigious representatives of the wealthy, agreed to the conditions and to form a provisional government in 1922 to hold elections in 1924. With the absence of Jiménez, the winner was Horacio Vázquez, the cock-with-tail party, and that same year the Marines were withdrawn. The period of direct United States control was ended, but there remained a North American-made constabulary, a pro-United States government, North American control of customs, finances, some wealth, and half the trade, and furthermore, Rafael Trujillo, who by the end of the year was the highest ranking military officer.<sup>1</sup>

The Vázquez government was traditional, constitutional, respectful of civil liberties, and caudillistic. In 1928, the Constitution was amended to extend the Presidential term of office for two more years. Trujillo swore his loyalty while arranging a conspiracy and placing his family and friends in the military; brother Anibal, Captain; cousin

---

<sup>1</sup>At the time of the Marine withdrawal, September 1924, Trujillo had the rank of Major, the third ranking officer. On December 6, 1924, President Vázquez promoted him to Lieutenant Colonel and Chief of Staff. See Robert D. Crassweller, Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator (New York: The MacMillan Press, 1966), pp. 48-49. Trujillo's rise in the Constabulary had been sponsored by Colonel Richard M. Cutts, USMC, who would later advise him throughout his career. The New York Times, June 1, 1961.



José García Trujillo, Lieutenant; nephew José René Román, Second Lieutenant; brother Héctor, Cadet; and brothers Romeo and Pedro heading the sergeants and corporals respectively.<sup>1</sup> In 1930, Trujillo, now Brigadier General, was ready to move, and Vázquez was overthrown, taking asylum in the United States Legation. Rafael Trujillo became the "elected" president of the Dominican Republic on August 16, 1930. A new caudillo had risen: The Era of Trujillo had begun.<sup>2</sup>

In many ways Herbert Wendt is correct when he affirms that Dominican history "came to a head in Trujillo: he was the most typical and the most brutal representative of a long tradition."<sup>3</sup> Yes, he was the heir of the tradition of caudillism, but he was to modify tradition without recognition. The elements of continuity were all there, untouched and unmolested, but he was to add new dimensions that neither Santana nor Lili's would have been capable of dreaming. The thirty-one year dictatorship was to inadvertently transform Dominicana

---

<sup>1</sup>Vega y Pagán, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 149-151.

<sup>2</sup>Many books and articles have been written about the Era of Trujillo, as the reign of the dictator was officially known, but there are four books that can be considered the best. See Bosch, Trujillo, op. cit.; Crassweller, op. cit.; Jesús de Galindez, La Era de Trujillo (Buenos Aires: Editorial Americana, 1958); and Howard J. Wiarda, Dictatorship and Development: The Methods of Control in Trujillo's Dominican Republic (Gainesville: Latin American Monographs-Second series, No. 5, University of Florida Press, 1968).

<sup>3</sup>Herbert Wendt, The Red, White, and Black Continent, Trans. Richard and Clara Winston (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1966), p. 94.

into largely a very different society to that of 1930. At the beginning of the Era, that would have been impossible to predict, and at its close there were many who refused to recognize the change that had occurred.

As all caudillos had done, or tried to do, in the past, Trujillo was to try to stay in control. For this the consolidation of power is a necessity which was to be realized by increasing the means of violence at the disposal of the dictator. This took the form of increasing the firepower capability of the armed forces to insure his own position; second, the absolute elimination of all opposition inside the country; and third, the use of diffuse terror in order to prevent the forming of any opposition within or without the regime.<sup>1</sup> Other measures which increased the power of the Generalissimo were the control of all institutions existing in the nation, including the Roman Catholic Church, for the service and the glory of Trujillo. The government machinery was made rather efficient for prompt and adequate service to his whims, and there was total control over all communications, movement, and speech. It was the absolute atomization of the individual who had to

---

<sup>1</sup>For the methods of control, see Wiarda's book, op. cit.; and for the use of diffuse terror, see Galindez, op. cit., Chapter IV. Many may have thought that terror was used only against the opposition, but it was also used within the regime. "The Dominican army, far from being a Praetorian Guard, was kept in a state of frightened subjugation. Trujillo took every precaution to guard himself against a military coup. Officers were shifted constantly from post to post, and were ruthlessly purged at the slightest provocation." Espailat, op. cit., p. 39.

live in the most exaggerated form of terror.

In 1940, Alfred H. Sinks wrote what was not an exaggeration. He said that in ten years Trujillo had built the most thorough of all the dictatorships of the time. Dominicans "have considerably less liberty than Mussolini's or Hitler's subjects; their civil rights are approximately those enjoyed by inmates of a penitentiary under a particularly strong and unscrupulous warden."<sup>1</sup> For over three decades people lived in permanent fear, for no one knew when it would be his turn at the torture chamber and/or the firing squad. It could happen for the most mundane reason, such as the Benefactor's interest in your wife, daughter, or land; it could be a misunderstanding; it could be that you were a friend or relative of someone whom you had no idea was involved in political matters; or it could be that you were involved in a conversation against the dictator. Life and limb were precarious, and in the face of impotence the most cherished value was that of survival.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>He adds that Trujillo's system was "that of totalitarianism without benefit of ideology of any kind." Alfred H. Sinks, "Trujillo, Caribbean Dictator," The American Mercury, Vol. LII, No. 202 (October 1940), p. 164. If anyone cares to know what life was like in a Dominican prison at the beginning of the Era, see Juan Isidro Jiménez Grullón, Una Gestapo en América (Santo Domingo: Editora Montalvo, 1949, 1962).

<sup>2</sup>Those who have never lived in a dictatorship have difficulty in understanding the feeling of impotence and the corruption of all human values. Selfishness becomes a mode of life for slowly the survival of the skin becomes the preeminent value to which all others are sacrificed. People watch motionless while others are being abused or even killed, while others betray confidence and trust to gain favors or

Other caudillos in the history of Dominicana had been tyrannical, but they would only jail or shoot their political enemies.<sup>1</sup> There was not the sadism and torture characteristic of the Era of Trujillo in which there was pleasure in the manipulation and abuse of human beings.<sup>2</sup> The Father of the New Fatherland was also different from his predecessors in that he not only coveted power and glory, but in that he was also delirious with the pursuit of money.<sup>3</sup> To Juan Bosch, the political tyranny was only the instrument of the economic enterprise. "The government is only the legal servant of the firm; the army is the police of the firm; the territory of the nation is the contour

---

escape punishment. To grasp an idea of what happens to human beings under such conditions, the reading of Miguel Angel Asturias' novel, El Señor Presidente (Buenos Aires, Editorial Losada, 1930, 1952), is highly recommended.

<sup>1</sup> Jiménez Grullón, Una Gestapo en América, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

<sup>2</sup> Prisoners were tortured--from primitive beatings to the sophisticated electric chair. One thing that was common was the permanent attempt to reduce human beings to the loss of self respect, and this was not only for enemies, but for friends as well. The most loyal of Trujillo's coterie were continually abused by the dictator, who would publicly insult them and force them to obvious shows of total humility. See Galíndez, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-146.

<sup>3</sup> K. J. Silvert has labelled this type of political system as mercantilistic caudillism. "The Politics of Social and Economic Change in Latin America," in Paul Halmos (ed.), Latin American Sociological Studies (Staffordshire: The Sociological Review, Monograph No. 11, February 1967, The University of Keele), p. 55.

of the firm; and the people are the workers, the producers, and the forced consumers of the firm. "<sup>1</sup>

Through his political domination, Trujillo became the richest man in the country and one of the richest in the world. He would legally establish monopolies in his favor, sell to the government unprofitable enterprises, and buy or become a partner in any business that seemed profitable. No one could refuse to sell at the price fixed by the Generalissimo; everyone had to buy his products; wages were fixed in his favor; a kickback of 10 percent was officially his in all Government transactions; and to top it all, many of his enterprises were financed by Government banks, run with the labor of troops or prisoners, and the costs charged to the national budget. The Benefactor and his family were to own between 50 and 60 percent of the arable land of Dominicana in addition to 119 enterprises "accounting for about 80 percent of the volume of business in Ciudad Trujillo."<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Bosch, Trujillo . . . op. cit. , p. 149. He argues that the Generalissimo's compulsion for money was abnormal, because it was dictated, first, by a desire for vengeance of those who had humiliated him, and, second, as a means of power. Trujillo was from the "second" class and in Dominicana to be poor is in itself a humiliation. Ibid. , p. 55.

<sup>2</sup>Wiarda, op. cit. , p. 83.

In spite of the fact that Trujillo, his family, friends and associates, received the lion's share of the benefits produced in their pursuit of wealth, many changes took place in Dominican society.<sup>1</sup> For one, the incipient capitalism of previous years was strongly developed, and therefore there was an enormous increase of the productive capacity of the economy, and the beginnings of industrial development. Previously undeveloped areas were opened to the market economy, and thousands of people were newly related to rationalized patterns of production. The net effect of the social mobilization was the bringing of marginal groups to participate in society, and the creation of two new social groups.

One of these groups was the equivalent of an industrial proletariat, for they were no longer isolated peasants but urban workers. The other group was to rival with the traditional landed and commercial class, who had become allies of Trujillo, but were challenged in social and economic position by the Trujillistas nouveau riche.<sup>2</sup> It was not Trujillo's purpose to change the social order that had existed since the day of independence, but he was not to allow anyone to challenge his position. Whatever anybody had, including his life, was thanks to the Benefactor, for either he gave it or worse he could take it away. The

---

<sup>1</sup> For a numerical index of recent socio-economic change see Appendix.

<sup>2</sup> As early as 1951, Theodore Draper had already observed the occurring phenomenon. See "Trujillo's Dynasty," The Reporter, Vol. V, No. 11 (November 27, 1951), pp. 23-24.

fact that Dominicans had to say "Thank God and Trujillo" was not a joke by far; it was a reflection of a cruel reality.

The dictator's political and economic power reduced Dominicana to a fief. His word was law and his whims had to be pleased. He was surrounded by a coterie of adulators, criminals, loyal servants, unscrupulous businessmen, and, worst of all, by self-serving intellectuals who provided an eloquent defense of the existing barbarism. The family was to enjoy the honors due to royalty, and they were to live and behave as if they were the relatives of Xerxes, the Persian satrap, some 300 years before Christ.

There was no question at the time that "l'état c'est Trujillo." There were constitutions written to be observed in minute detail, such as having regularly scheduled elections, or to be violated flagrantly. It all depended on the desires of one man, and the Constitution was nothing but a piece of paper declaring that the government of the Dominican Republic was essentially republican, with a tripartite division of powers, and that it guaranteed human rights. "Huge government buildings were erected to house bureaus and officials which served no real purpose. . . . Trujillo was the Government and the Government was Trujillo."<sup>1</sup> Sometimes he chose to be "elected" president, which

---

<sup>1</sup> Espaillet, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

he invariably won for there was only one candidate or an opposition candidate chosen by him, but sometimes he allowed puppets to sit in the "Executive" chair.<sup>1</sup>

The centralization of Dominican began by the Marine dictatorship was actually accomplished in the Era of Trujillo. Roads were built, communications were expanded, electrification and irrigation programs were enacted, and most of the public buildings that exist today were built by Trujillo. He took pride in his fief, and he was concerned with its growth and beauty besides its profits. He was also very concerned with Haiti and Haitians living in the domain. During his time, Trujillo managed to dominate Haitian governments and there never was to be fear of military invasion, but there was the fear of encroachment through immigration. In 1938, some 20,000 Haitians were massacred in Dominican territory, in one of the world's most brutal genocides, and from there on a program of frontier

---

<sup>1</sup> From the beginning of the Era, the Executive chair was occupied in the following sequence: Trujillo, 1930-1934 and 1934-1938; Jacinto B. Peynado, 1938-1940; upon Peynado's death, the Vice-president, Manuel de Jesús Troncoso de la Concha became President, 1940-1942; the term of office was increased to five years and Trujillo became President again, 1942-1947 and 1947-1952; now brother Héctor Trujillo occupied the chair, 1952-1957 and 1957-1960; Héctor resigned to make way for the Vice-President, Joaquín Balaguer, 1960-1961, because due to foreign pressure it was convenient to have a non-family member as a nominal head of state.



colonization was established to forestall Haitian pressure for land and food.<sup>1</sup>

Trujillo was involved in many Caribbean intrigues. There were assassination attempts of heads of state, such as José Figueres of Costa Rica and Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela, and one which was apparently carried through, Castillo Armas of Guatemala.<sup>2</sup> The Generalissimo financed invasions and coup d'états, and he was the Dean of Dictators of Latin America. When they were toppled, Rojas Pinilla of Colombia, Perón of Argentina, Pérez Jiménez of Venezuela and Batista of Cuba, came to his fief for asylum. He was the most powerful, the most secure, the richest, and the most brutal of all Latin American dictators. Yet, as unchallenged as he was internally, those who had allowed him to rule decided that it was time for a change.

The United States had from its very beginnings the most cordial relationship with the Benefactor. In 1930 the Secretary of State cabled the North American representative in Santo Domingo informing him that

---

<sup>1</sup>For the massacres see Galíndez, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-202; and for the colonization program, see John P. Augelli, "Agricultural Colonization in the Dominican Republic," *Economic Geography*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1 (January 1962), pp. 15-27.

<sup>2</sup>Crassweller does not say that actually Trujillo did it, but he says that probably he had a hand in it for there is evidence that proves the heavy involvement of Dominican intelligence service in Guatemalan affairs, *op. cit.*, Chapter 22.

the "Department desires you to know that it expects to recognize Trujillo or any other person coming into office as a result of the coming elections and will maintain the most friendly relations with him."<sup>1</sup> The policy followed during the years of the Good Neighbor Policy was that "though Trujillo was an SOB, he was at least our SOB."<sup>2</sup> The Generalissimo was to respond with the knowledge of power, for he knew very well who was the ultimate boss in the Caribbean, and therefore the North American Legation could write to Washington that Trujillo's only main foreign policy was "that of maintaining friendly relations with the United States."<sup>3</sup>

He supported North American foreign policy in practically every issue. When the United States was anti-Axis, Trujillo was the first to declare war on them; when the United States was anti-Soviet, Trujillo became the palladin of anti-communism in the Americas; and when the United States was pro-democracy, he would create an opposition and a labor union. Yet, he was no fool, for he attempted to become the less dependent as possible for internal affairs. He not only paid the foreign

---

<sup>1</sup> Cited in Theodore P. Wright, Jr., "The United States and Latin American Dictatorship: The Case of the Dominican Republic," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (1960), p. 153.

<sup>2</sup> Crassweller, op. cit., p. 213. Underlining his.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

debt to the United States, but he bought many North American enterprises, particularly banks and sugar mills, in order to lessen his dependence and increase his profits. He built his own arms factory, a dry dock for ship repairs, and he did not allow North American military personnel to visit Dominican barracks. Trujillo would not only maintain paid lobbyist in Washington, but he would also bribe North American officials, in an effort to influence United States policies.<sup>1</sup>

The rise of Fidel Castro in Cuba, the rise of the democratic left in Latin America, the rise of internal opposition to the regime, and the assassination attempt on the President of Venezuela, not only raised the specter of turbulence in the Caribbean, but it signaled that the Generalissimo could no longer serve the function of maintaining order. He had lived too long, and he symbolized an anachronism in times of change. Trujillo would have to go, either by persuasion or assassination. The former would guarantee an orderly transition, and the United States suggested his retirement in three different occasions,

---

<sup>1</sup>Trujillo had a price list for United States officials. An ordinary Congressman cost about \$5,000.00. A House Committee Chairman, three times as much, depending on the committee. Senators were more expensive, and a chairman of a key committee would cost from \$50,000.00 to \$75,000.00. See Espailat, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

but since the Benefactor would not take the advice, contacts were made with Dominicana plotters and Trujillo was assassinated on May 30, 1961.<sup>1</sup>

It seemed that a new dawn would now appear in Dominicana, for the "evil-tyrant" was now dead, but unfortunately the causes that produced him were very much alive. The supreme power in the Caribbean would continue to rule the destiny of the nation, insisting as always in the maintenance of order, but now with the added ingredient of the maintenance of the socio-economic status quo. The oligarchic values of the society would maintain the same social structures founded in the days of the colony, and forces would be organized to prevent it from changing as well as to challenge it. Finally, the caudillistic political system with its inherent violence and instability would be maintained, for to change it would have meant the acceptance of new groups into political participation which would have brought about change in the social system.

With the legacy of the past, Dominicans were to face the new world of the 1960's, but more than anything else, they had to face themselves. For more than a hundred years a society existed which made no strives toward modernization, at least not consciously so,

---

<sup>1</sup>For the details, see Chapter III.

perpetuating anachronistic social structures, exploitative economic structures, and a high degree of political disorder which rendered the nation incapable to make a definitive stand on any issue or to defend its inhabitants from foreign domination. It is in the 1960's that men and women had to decide where they stood, for the weight of history and the promises of the future combined in a dramatic present: either the nation was to continue as it had, or it was to make new strides into an uncertain future.

## CHAPTER III

## IN SEARCH FOR AN HEIR

In a caudillistic political system, the sudden death of the ruler, the Jefe, is a paralyzing event. No one can possibly know what will happen next. The man who was the center of the political system, from whom orders, policies, favors, and decisions emanated, no longer exists, and there is no institutionalized mechanism for someone else to replace him. Unlike the case of a coup d'etat or a rebellion, where the challenging group to be successful had to prove their power superiority, and therefore they are able to fill the central stage of the political arena, in the case of the sudden disappearance of the ruling caudillo, the political system falls in a power vacuum.

A comparable situation in a more complex political system would be the simultaneous elimination of all the institutionalized legitimate heirs. For example, in the United States it would be comparable to the sudden disappearance of the President, his Cabinet, the members of Congress, and the justices of the Supreme Court, as it could happen, for instance, at a time when the President was delivering his State of the Union Address to all these people together and a bomb exploded in the Capitol building. Since all possible legitimate heirs

would be gone, who should take command? The Mayor of Washington? The Head of the Army? A Federal judge? No one knows.

In the traditional caudillistic system, the length of the power vacuum would depend on the abilities of one individual in becoming the ruling caudillo on his own. That is to say, the ability to gain control of the means of violence and cement his rule with the appeals of his own personality and the ties of family and friends. Although in general caudillos make provisions for passing their ruling mantle to a designated heir, a trusted friend, supporter, or relative, the fact is that they are usually not very successful, except in the very short-run. The reason lies in that personalistic power is not transferable, for it depends on one man and not on institutions, unless the designated heir can build a power base of his own.

To start out, the designated heir has some control of the mechanisms of the government and the dead caudillo's armed forces, but he must be extremely skillful to obtain the transfer of their loyalty to their former chief to himself. At the same time, the opposition groups, each headed by its own caudillo, would seize the opportunity to weaken the incumbent's position and maximize their strength at a time when there is no certainty of who is loyal to whom. No matter whether it is the incumbents, a very rare occasion, or one of the opposition groups which eventually rules, the period is marked by a high degree of instability, if not anarchy, until one of them can consolidate power and

exclude the others. This had been the process that occurred upon the deaths of Pedro Santana,<sup>1</sup> Ulises Heureaux (Lilís), Ramon Cáceres, and, although in many ways different, Rafael Trujillo.

Although the Generalissimo had made provisions for his son, Rafael Trujillo, Jr. (Ramfis) to take over upon his death, which he did for a short while, there had been changes which were to make this impossible. To begin with, even within the rules of the game of the traditional caudillistic system, the designated heir did not last very long in power. In Dominican history it had never occurred, although, for instance, in Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza's sons took over after the death of their father. Second, the political forces did no longer operate freely as they had in the 19th Century, for Dominicana had long ceased to be a sovereign nation. Even the Era of Trujillo itself had only lasted as long as it had had North American passive acquiescence if not active support, which meant that the heirs not only had to master local power but also obtain United States approval. Third, the Benefactor's assassination came at a time when Latin American nations in general were very concerned with the establishment of democratic regimes and

---

<sup>1</sup>The case of Santana is different because he died at the time when the nation was under the control of Spanish troops, but the ensuing developments after the restoration of the Republic were of the same nature of a power vacuum. Bueneventura Báez, Gregorio Luperón, Juan Isidro Jiménez, and Horacio Vázquez, all died when they were out of power, and therefore can not be considered ruling caudillos.



had already condemned Trujillo as a pariah, which made it more difficult for the heirs to obtain international approval and it limited their hands at destroying the growing opposition. Finally, the Generalissimo himself had transformed the caudillistic system by fulfilling the role of the autocratic unifier of Dominicana. He not only centralized all power into his hands in a substantially greater measure than any of the caudillos that preceded him, but he also integrated the nation into one whole, thus destroying the regional base of potential caudillos. The phenomenon as it had been known could no longer repeat itself.

The power struggle that immediately followed Trujillo's death took place in a traditional fashion, the search for loyalties and the control of the instruments of violence, but at the same time it was indicative of its anachronism for there had to be a constant appeal to legitimacy under the rubric of the establishment of democracy. The incumbents claimed that they were the means to bring it about and so did the opposition, and both were faced by an international demand that only those who established a democratic society, or appeared as if this was their intention, had the "right" to rule. The problem was and remains to this day that in order to be able to establish a legitimate political authority, the caudillistic system must first be liquidated.

The political system that had existed from the foundation of Dominicana to the death of Trujillo was not indicative that authority

could be established. In that political system force had been the mode of existence, not legal formulas, ideas, or morality. He who could control force made the rest obey, and the only reason for obeying was force. There were no normative restraints in the utilization of power and no democratic institutions to act as buffers between the governors and the governed. It was a system of political anarchy within a highly structured socio-economic system which survived throughout the centuries. It is not surprising that when Dominicans were asked to identify the personal attributes they believed most important in any President who might lead them satisfactorily, the "consensus was that the ideal President must, above all, be a kindly man with a 'good heart.'"<sup>1</sup> Obviously, his "good heart" would be the only restraint in the application of force, and his "bad heart" would lead him to abuse and terror.

According to Juan Bosch, the process by which the masses place their destiny in the hands of a caudillo has at the bottom a sexual content mixed with a political and social content.<sup>2</sup> The masses take a feminine attitude, of females in love, and since there can be no consummation of the sexual desire, it turns into idolatry of the caudillo. In

<sup>1</sup>T. D. Roberts, et al., Area Handbook for the Dominican Republic (Washington: DA Pam No. 550-54, United States Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 243.

<sup>2</sup>Juan Bosch, Trujillo: Causas de una Tiranía Sin Ejemplos (Caracas: 1961), p. 112.

this way the caudillo becomes all-powerful and begins to act according to his personal whims, which he places above country or party. Functionaries will be chosen for public service not because of their competence, but because they are more devoted than others or because they are more in the liking of the caudillo. At the end of this process, "the caudillo substitutes the country for his own image."<sup>1</sup>

Within this political system, political parties as defined by La Palombara and Weiner, did not really exist, for they could not even survive the life-span of their leadership.<sup>2</sup> They were personalistic groups for the only conceivable purpose of putting their caudillo in power by ballots, if possible, or by bullets. Which alternative they chose depended on the circumstances of the time, not as a matter of principle or belief in an electoral process. The end, putting so-and-so in power, could be achieved by any means, because that was their only reason for existence, and there were no institutional processes to mitigate that desire.

---

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, "The Origin and Development of Political Parties," in La Palombara and Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, N. J. : Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 6.

The type of political group was organized under what could be called the "Fuehrer" principle. The leader (caudillo) was all-knowing and supreme chief of the party. There was no need for conventions or anything of the sort; all one had to do was ask the caudillo what he thought on the matter and policy was laid. There were no party platforms and even less the necessity of choosing a candidate--the party existed for the candidate. Now, secondary positions, such as Senators or Mayors, were filled, in case of triumph, by the devotees of the caudillo who won his favor and he delegated them to run for office or to be installed in office in case they took the government. Every town had its group of "friends of the caudillo" who would run his affairs locally and were rewarded with positions and favors in case of triumph. At the bottom then, these political groups were tied together by bonds of personal attachment to the caudillo and the rewards to be reaped through collaboration.

These rewards varied according to closeness to the chief and to social position. Those who were with him in deciding the most important political matters could count on Ministries or other high governmental positions. The rest of the public service was filled with partisans and hombres de confianza. In turn, as Campillo Pérez excellently describes, the friends of the caudillo would obtain favors from the

President for their friends and relatives.<sup>1</sup> To the "friend" who was a businessman, the government would pay its debts and give him preference in the purchase of goods and equipment. If he had a son, he could be destined to a diplomatic post or to other positions in the administration. To a "friend" who was a worker or peasant would be given goods, firearms, or money, and maybe he would be honored by the caudillo, or by one of his principal hombres de confianza, visiting his home or being godfather to one of the children. Trujillo went through the procedure of becoming compadre with thousands of people, most of whom could not be found after his death, for he had public baptisms in the National Palace with a gift of \$100.00 for each child.

To be a friend of the caudillo or to be a friend of his close friends gave people power in the community. The chances of their being arrested or prosecuted for any offense became slim, for they could appeal to higher powers than local or minor officers or officials. The favors obtained from the government would increase their wealth and their social standing, but the drawback was that this lasted only as long as the caudillo was in power. The fall of the "chief" meant that all the blessings would instantly disappear, and that others were to be the

---

<sup>1</sup>Julio G. Campillo Pérez, El Grillo y el Ruiseñor (Santo Domingo: Editora delCaribe, 1966), pp. 118-119.

beneficiaries. Thus, it becomes understandable why people had such a desperate desire to be on top, and why they would go through every means in order to remain there. Some of the wiser had friends in every caudillo's coterie, never became openly identified with one chief, and remained reaping benefits all the time. Others just had the ability to change sides at the speed of lightning.

The caudillistic political system had the effect of preventing the development of modern political institutions, for in a sense, personalism had been institutionalized. As a result, a non-problem-solving political system survived more than a century with a facade of representative democracy which never existed, except on paper. Caudillos would be careful to select a constitution to their liking, maintain a Congress filled with supporters, and go through the procedure of being elected once in a while to "legalize" their regime. This semblance of legality was a convenience in dealing with foreign nations, as well as taking off some of the steam out of the opposition, but in the long run it was basically ineffective. At the first opportunity, the opposition would claim either fraudulent elections, which they usually were, or violation of the Constitution, which was always violated, and go to the hills in "revolution" against the government.

In many ways, "revolution" became a necessity, for control of the government was an assurance that the "ins" were going to stay "in"

in whatever elections were to take place. The work of the Marines and Trujillo made it impossible for "revolutions" to take place, for no rump-army was a match for the mammoth armed forces, and therefore the instruments had to be a coup d'etat within the armed forces or the assassination of the chief. Conspiracy was taken from the hills to the military barrack, and, obviously, the "ins" became extremely careful in rewarding with money and promotion the devout officers and getting rid of those of doubtful loyalty.

In spite of the institutionalization of the armed forces, they existed within a political system in which force was paramount and bonds were of a personal nature. After Trujillo, the armed forces became the supreme power within Dominicana, second only to the United States. Yet, commanders could only command if they held the personal tie of their lesser officers--a Chief of Staff was useless unless he had the support of the colonels in charge of troops. That support was gathered in bonds of friendship or through material "favors," and the gathering of superior force would keep the potential conspirators in check. Military hierarchy was of a tentative nature, valid only as long as there was control of superior force, otherwise a Colonel could give orders to a General.

This personalistic political system existed side by side with the framework of a legal-rational structure defined as representative

democracy and a set of laws based fundamentally on the Napoleonic Code. The eternal clash between the ought-to-be and reality was not only extremely pronounced, but it became a support for the personalistic system through corruption. The fact that laws were actually meaningless reverted those who believed in the rule of law to survive through personal ties and force, forgetting whatever idealism there may have been and utilizing the system to maximize their individual benefit. The law is applied for political reasons, otherwise officials can be bribed or pressure can be brought against them. This wide scale corruption has been labeled as a system of cleptocracy, valid for most of Latin America, but more so in some countries than others.<sup>1</sup>

The demands for political stability, the rule of law, and democracy, came from the most noble of Dominicans, many of whom suffered arrest, poverty, and even death, but their ideals found no basis of social support. The majority of the people lived in a world that resembled the era of feuding nobles, the middle ages and before, where their lives were basically untouched by warring factions and

---

<sup>1</sup>Stanislav Andresky, Parasitismo y Subversión en América Latina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Americana, 1967), pp. 92-101. There have been many cases of honest public officials, but they are the exception rather than the rule. What is tragic is to watch many honest young men converted into unspeakably corrupt human beings for they too become part of the system.



where they could not conceive that they could determine political affairs. The middle and upper crust depended basically on rural produce for internal consumption or for the external market, none of which were extremely affected by instability and corruption. Only the merchants dealing with imported goods were affected, for they had to sell locally, but bribery and "friends" helped to pay little or no customs duty. In essence, the society made no real demands for the establishment of a legal-rational democratic system. To the masses a "good king" was what was needed, for their primitive existence made impossible the conception of abstract political authority, and there was no industrial bourgeoisie to demand political stability in defense of their interests.

The result of this political system has been that in over a century of existence it has never solved anything. Whatever political question may have been raised in 1844 could easily be raised again in 1961, as if 117 years had not passed by. The system was stable to the utmost for it functioned basically untouched and with the same mechanisms of support, force and personal ties. Yet, it was unable to establish mechanisms of peaceful transfers of power, for it depended on violence, and it was unable to adapt the social system to changing circumstances. Its inability for growth and adaptation, and the structural changes brought about by Trujillo doomed it to a certain death, except that the agony was going to be longer than expected.

On the other hand, the Benefactor's death was rapid, he was only human, not a social system, yet it would take about six months to liquidate the regime. The death of any man may seem at first glance as circumstantial, but there are always several factors which bring it about. Trujillo was no exception, but it becomes important to analyze those factors because he was his regime. Like the system of which he was a product, and its most able manipulator, he too was incapable of adaptation. Tactical changes, yes; real changes, no.

The apex of the regime came in 1955 with the celebration of its 25th anniversary. The Generalissimo was then more powerful than ever and the regime most secure with only a minimal application of violence. "The nation's economy was both dynamic and sound. Imports during 1954 had amounted to 79 million, while exports had boomed to 112 million. . . . The 1956 budget would be about 120 million, a very different figure from the seven million of 1930."<sup>1</sup> The festivities were to include the naming of 1955 "Year of the Benefactor," and there was the construction of a World's Fair of Peace and Fraternity to honor Trujillo with the participation of 42 nations and the crowning of daughter Angelita as Queen of the Fair. The cost of the extravaganza has never been known with certainty, but it was over 30 million dollars; a great expense for a little country and for a regime

---

<sup>1</sup>Robert D. Crassweller, Trujillo (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966), p. 287.

prided on its fiscal prudence and solidity which was never again achieved.

In another sense, less tangible, the Fair foreshadowed the coming decline. There was about it an intimation of overripeness, of power too long and too excessively maintained now trailing off into megalomania and moral slackness, foretelling a tyranny whose constructive aspects would fade away and whose every despotism would endure and increase.<sup>1</sup>

The wave of the falling Latin American tyrants had begun with the overthrow of Juan D. Perón of Argentina in 1955. The tempo of running dictators increased, but the crescendo was reached with the fall of Fulgencio Batista of Cuba in 1959. It seemed then that a new era of democracy was beginning, but Trujillo was a symbol of the old order and a threat to the new. The Generalissimo began to spend heavily on arms, and Dominican exiles began to plan their triumphant return to free their homeland with the aid of friendly, and threatened, democratic governments.

On June 14, 1959, the expected invasion came from Cuba in the form of a C-46 airplane and two ships loaded with some 250 men. Apparently, the expedition had been launched with the aid, consent and support of the governments of Cuba and Venezuela, while most of the expeditionaries were Dominicans. Unfortunately, the plan failed completely--partly because the Benefactor's intelligence service had

---

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 299.

discovered the invasion plans, partly because overzeal had taken the place of careful planning and training, and partly because there had been no cooperation from the Dominican people as a whole. Except for four survivors, the invaders were massacred,<sup>1</sup> but they accomplished two things: one was to arouse Dominicans to conspire internally, and the other was that Trujillo in vengeance was to send a futile invasion to Cuba and attempted to assassinate the President of Venezuela.

An opposition underground movement was created with the name of 14th of June Movement in emulation of the Cuban 26th of July Movement of the 1950's. The group was basically composed of young middle class professionals and students, organized in secret cells of three men, and with the avowed intent of overthrowing the dictatorship. An assassination plot was contrived for January 1960, when the Generalissimo would be making a public appearance at a livestock fair, but it was discovered beforehand and hundreds of people were jailed, many of them suffering the most unspeakable tortures.

The fact that most of them came from families of high social and economic status, including some in excellent standing with Trujillo,

---

<sup>1</sup>The decision to execute systematically every prisoner who was taken alive was made between Trujillo, Intelligence Chief Johnny Abbes, and Rafael Trujillo, Jr. "Ramfis in person lent his hand to these savage executions." Ibid., p. 366.

was a shocker. The Church, which had for almost three decades silently remained reaping profits from the regime, decided to protest the arrests and abuses in the form of a Pastoral Letter. This was the first public criticism of the regime that Dominicans had ever heard since its very beginnings, yet, seeing the end not far away, the Church had been preparing for the eventual transition.

In 1954 the Dominican government and the Holy See had signed a Concordat, which among other things declared the nation Catholic, forbade divorce if a Roman Catholic ceremony had taken place, and provided the machinery for the settlement of disputes between Church and State. But, in the same year, the Papal Nuncio had begun to split the Archdiocese of Santo Domingo into five dioceses with the intent of weakening Trujillo's hold on the Church through the loyal Archbishop Ricardo Pittini.<sup>1</sup> Nothing really happened until the Pastoral Letter of 1960, but it must be taken into consideration that a new Nuncio, Lino Zanini, had come the previous October. The one to notice his significance was the exiled Argentinian dictator, Juan D. Perón, who was on good terms with Trujillo while he was resident in Dominicana. He told the Generalissimo to watch himself, because Zanini had appeared in

---

<sup>1</sup> Reverend James A. Clark, The Church and the Crisis in the Dominican Republic (Westminster, Maine: The Newman Press, 1967), p. 2.

Buenos Aires and the Church had soon turned against him. "It was that man who caused my downfall. Wherever that man puts his foot, he causes disturbances. Watch yourself carefully."<sup>1</sup>

The Benefactor was not an easy man to threaten, and he took the matter calmly. In March there was another Pastoral Letter asking for the release of political prisoners, and now Trujillo began to harass the Church. The lead in the anti-Trujillo proclamations was taken by the two foreign bishops resident in the country, Monsignor Reilly, North American, and Monsignor Panal, Spanish. Because they were foreign, they could not be threatened by taking their relatives as hostages, but also this way the Church maintained a segment in formally good relations with the government. No matter what the political turn, they were not about to be left out. After some intrigues and harassments, Zanini left the country, and church and state came to terms. As a sign of displeasure, the Vatican did not name a replacing Nuncio, but nevertheless Trujillo maintained the offensive by now demanding that he be given the title of Benefactor of the Church, which was never granted.

The Generalissimo had been able to quell the internal effects of the 14th of June invasion, at least temporarily, but he felt compelled to strike back at the source, Fidel Castro and Romulo Betancourt. In

<sup>1</sup>Cited in Crassweller, op. cit., p. 382.

August of 1959, the Father of the New Fatherland launched a Cuban-exile invasion, a forerunner of the Bay of Pigs, which turned out to be the work of double agents. Men and equipment were landed in an isolated spot which happened to be surrounded by Castro himself and 3,000 men.<sup>1</sup> The Cubans made a great deal of propaganda out of the incident, including the broadcasting of secret conversations, and Trujillo replied with a propaganda barrage of his own. Insults mounted upon insults and all kinds of accusations were formulated, but in the face of a growingly hostile United States, both sides decided that it was best to come to terms.

The first hint of a new Foreign policy appeared on the night of January 12, 1960. La Voz Dominicana, which had been assailing Castro in the most venomous terms, was now totally silent on this subject. Johnny Abbes [Trujillo's Intelligence Chief] and Castro's agents in the negotiations for the agreements had completed their work. The task of intimidating the United States through this implausible league against Yankee Imperialism had commenced.<sup>2</sup>

The case of Romulo Betancourt was much more serious and so were its consequences. The Venezuelan President had not only been a long time leader of the forces of representative democracy in Latin America, but he had been a personal enemy of Trujillo as well. In the 1940's, Betancourt had supported two ill-fated Dominican-exiles invasions, in addition to that of 1959, and he had already been the victim of

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., pp. 349-352.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 424.

an assassination attempt by Trujillo in Havana in 1951. The Benefactor was obsessed with personal hatred toward the President of Venezuela, and his propaganda machinery did not stop at the traditional accusations of leftism and communism, but it went as far as to include charges of homosexuality. As far as Betancourt was concerned, no compromise was possible, as there had been with Castro and the Church.

Trujillo first attempted to have him overthrown. Contact was made with two Venezuelan military officers, General Castro León and Colonel Tamayo Suárez, but it was to no avail. The attempted coup d'etats failed. The next step was to assassinate him. A plot was contrived in which a bomb was placed in an automobile parked in the presidential route, but in spite of severe wounds, Betancourt survived the attempt. This time, the Venezuelan government called for an urgent meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States (OAS) to deal with the matter of Trujillo.

Before discussing the meeting of the OAS, which took place in San José, Costa Rica, in August 1960, it is necessary to bring into focus the imperial power in the Caribbean, the United States of America. As the dominant nation, North America was concerned with the maintenance of order in its Mare Nostrum, which meant the maintenance of peace between the Caribbean nations and the maintenance of political



stability within each one of them, unless an "undesirable" group had come to power. If the latter case occurred, war and/or instability could be encouraged, resorted to, or tolerated, on a temporary basis until the "undesirables" had been thrown out, as it happened in Guatemala in 1954.

A democracy itself, the United States had welcomed the rise of democratic regimes in Latin America throughout the 1950's, for they were not only respectful of civil liberties but unwilling to challenge North American interests. It was the Cuban Revolution which upset the existing framework, for the new Cuban government did not seem eager to accept subserviency to Washington and it was becoming dangerously independent. No longer did the transition from a traditional caudillistic system imply the appearance of a democratic government, or a regression to some form of conservative dictatorship, but it could now be a nationalist revolution and worse with a socialist program.

Trujillo and Castro had become opposing symbols. The former an anachronism and the latter the possible wave of the future. To make certain that Castro would not be the winner, first Trujillo had to go and make way for some democratic oriented regime, and then it would be Fidel's turn. This way the United States could not be accused of being reactionary in the face of a changing Latin America, and its interests would be maintained. Even better than this would be if both Castro and

Trujillo went, leaving the viable symbol of change to Rómulo Betancourt and the so-called non-Communist left. Yet, it took some time to get to this point.

After the June 14th invasion, Trujillo called for an investigation by the Organization of American States which eventually turned, due also to other Caribbean turbulence, into the meeting of Foreign Ministers at Santiago de Chile in August 1959. Cuba and Venezuela were at the forefront of the battle against dictatorships in general and Trujillo in particular, while, at this time, United States policy was shielding the Generalissimo. The North American representative, Secretary of State Christian Herter, used the strategy of nonintervention in order to maintain the status quo. "He told his fellow delegates that nonintervention is the foundation stone of hemisphere relations and to weaken the principle in an effort to promote democracy would be self defeating."<sup>1</sup> The meeting ended with declarations of solidarity, hatred of dictators, and love of democracy, but no action.

In spite of the public position held by the North American government, it apparently became clear that Trujillo would soon go and contacts began to be made between the Ambassador, Joseph Farland, and the clandestine Fourteenth of June Movement. The United States

---

<sup>1</sup>J. Lloyd Mechem, The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960 (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1961), p. 416.

Embassy was instrumental in aiding the escape of some of the members of this movement during the round-ups of early 1960, particularly through the rapid issuing of entry visas. Detrimental stories to the regime were being passed to North American correspondents, but at the same time good relations were being maintained at the formal level.<sup>1</sup> Obviously, the United States was playing the same two-sided political game of the Roman Catholic Church, but by the summer of 1960, Farland was recalled to Washington and never came back. Up to this time an effort had been made to save the regime, but after this, Washington began to organize the succession.<sup>2</sup>

At the San José meeting in August, the Foreign Ministers of the Americas were presumably to deal with two unrelated matters: first, the case of Cuba accepting an offer of military protection from the Soviet Union, and its promotion of revolutionary movements in the Continent; and second, the case of the Dominican Republic government's assassination attempt of President Betancourt. For the United States, the real problem was Castro, not Trujillo, but in order to be

---

<sup>1</sup> Arturo R. Espailat, Trujillo: The Last Caesar (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1963), p. 7. See for instance the very critical series by Edward C. Burks, The New York Times, April 4, 5, and 6, 1961.

<sup>2</sup> Jean Zigler, "Santo Domingo, Feudo de Trujillo," Cuadernos, No. 46 (Enero-Febrero 1961), p. 102.

able to get at the former, it had to hit the latter. "Since it was clear that the Latins were determined to punish Trujillo, Mr. Herter decided to join them, hoping thereby to win their support in the forthcoming consultations on the Cuban problem."<sup>1</sup> All members of the OAS agreed to break diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic, establish an embargo on arms and all kinds of implements of war, sever trade relations, and maintain these sanctions until the aggressor ceased to be a threat to peace.

On March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower directed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to prepare a Cuban exile political front, on the one hand, and a military expedition to invade Cuba on the other.<sup>2</sup> The decision to rid themselves of the burden of Castro had been made, even at the price of invasion if necessary, but with Trujillo the matter was handled differently. According to Espailat, the Eisenhower Administration sent the Benefactor two ultimatums.<sup>3</sup> The first was an Embassy official who told the Generalissimo that a coup d'etat was being organized, including the landing of Marines, and that it was best for him to resign. Trujillo replied with a diplomatic protest, and the

<sup>1</sup> Mecham, op. cit., p. 420.

<sup>2</sup> Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 226.

<sup>3</sup> Espailat, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

official was not even removed from his post. The second ultimatum came in February 1960, with a visit of the Benefactor's long-time friends William Pawley, former United States Ambassador to Peru and Brazil, and the Senator from Florida, George Smathers. "They urged upon Trujillo a timely exit from power, free elections, and an evolution towards democracy, and they spoke of the pleasures of honorable retirement 'up there on the hill.'"<sup>1</sup> When the Generalissimo refused to comply, Espaillet says that the North American radio stations on Swan Island beamed subversive propaganda, and the CIA-controlled Cuban exile publications went on with a tirade against Trujillo.

Apparently the Eisenhower Administration decided that it was best to leave the problems of Castro and Trujillo to the succeeding occupants of the White House. President John F. Kennedy took office in January 1961, and in April he made a last attempt to solve the problem of Trujillo peacefully. This time the envoy was State Department troubleshooter Robert Murphy. He came secretly to the Dominican Republic accompanied by Igor Cassini, a friend of the Kennedy family, a newspaper columnist of society gossip with the nom de plume of Cholly Knickerbocker, and unregistered agent of the Benefactor.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Crassweller, *op. cit.*, pp. 425-426.

<sup>2</sup>In 1963 Cassini was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury for serving as Trujillo's agent without legal registration, and he pleaded nolo contendere. *Ibid.*, p. 430. In his book, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1964) Murphy does not mention this incident.

Again Murphy suggested that Trujillo had better retire, using the argument that, although he had done things very well, he would not be around forever: "What could happen, Excellency, when you are no longer available to the country?" In the light of today, the Generalissimo's reply seems prophetic, although at the time it was simply an act.

It is very simple. The Dominican laws provide for the succession of the Government, and I am not the President of the Republic. The President is this gentleman here (pointing to Dr. Joaquín Balaguer), and it's natural to expect that the matter will turn out successfully. There's no problem.<sup>1</sup>

A day or two after this conversation, the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba started, and contrary to its intentions, it not only strengthened the Castro regime, but it was a total fiasco for the new Chief Executive of the United States. This leftover from Eisenhower proved to be a failure, but the Trujillo case did not. Back in the San José meeting, the United States had agreed to sever diplomatic relations, but it maintained a Consul, Henry Dearborn, and a staff of some 25 men. Some of these had nothing to do with issuing visas or dispatching Consular Invoices: they were CIA agents.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Cited in Crassweller, op. cit., p. 431.

<sup>2</sup> The story linking Trujillo's death to the CIA was first told by Norman Gall, "How Trujillo Died," The New Republic, Vol. 148, No. 15 (April 13, 1963), pp. 19-20.

These men began to get in contact with Dominican plotters in the autumn of 1960, and by the end of the year the CIA had begun to supply the weapons for the assassination. The value of the arms, as Espaillat points out, was psychological, for this way the plotters knew for certain of United States complicity in the matter.<sup>1</sup> The middleman was a pleasant North American businessman, Lorenzo Berry, married to a Dominican, and commonly known as Wimpy, for he owned a supermarket with that name in what then was Ciudad Trujillo. The supermarket served as a place of contact between Dominicans and the CIA as well as the means to smuggle in the arms in specially marked food cans.

By February of 1961, the Dominican side of the plot was consolidated, for previously there had been different groups of conspirators which became united, while several other groups existed and were never included in the actual assassination. About 20 persons were directly involved, some for ambition, some for revenge, and some for ideals, in a three-part plot. "One group of eight men, the actual gunmen, would kill Trujillo. They would deliver his body to the second group at the home of [former General] Juan Tomás Díaz. This group would present the body to General José René Román Fernández, Secretary of State for the Armed Forces. General Román would take over

<sup>1</sup> Espaillat, *op. cit.*, p. 11. Many of the persons complicated in this plot had enough guns of their own.

the government."<sup>1</sup> It was now only a question of time.

The presumed heir to the Benefactor's throne, General Trujillo, Jr., was out in Europe playing polo and enjoying the company of some of the world's most glamorous women. Playboy Ramfis seemed to be no problem, for the United States had agreed to bottle him up in New York as he came back from France to Santo Domingo, and, besides, General Román could always count on the help of Marines, who were always stationed nearby.<sup>2</sup> Pupo Román, as the Secretary of State for the Armed Forces was better known, was married to a niece of Trujillo, and it was for him to deal with the rest of the family once he had things under control.

On the night of May 30, 1961, Trujillo left the National Palace in an unmarked car and without escort on his way to visit a mistress he had waiting in one of his houses in the nearby town of San Cristóbal. This was not unusual for the Benefactor, and it was one of the opportunities the plotters had been waiting for. Earlier in the evening, Lieutenant

---

<sup>1</sup>John Bartlow Martin, Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Crisis From the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil War (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1966).

<sup>2</sup>One account has it this way: "Trujillo's death came on schedule, but the rest of the plan did not. A contingency plan for some Dominican Army units to start a military revolt in the hills, and then broadcast a plea for belligerency status which the United States would honor, failed when the revolt was quickly squashed. I remember looking all over the Cibao for that revolution on the Sunday after the assassination." Sam Halper, "The Dominican Upheaval," The New Leader, Vol. XLVIII, No. 10 (May 10, 1965), p. 3.



Amado García Guerrero, of the Corps of Military Adjutants, had phoned Juan Tomás Díaz, telling him that the Generalissimo would be going to San Cristóbal that night. Two cars would follow as he entered the road and one would be waiting ahead to block it off. One of the trailing cars, driven by Antonio Imbert, pulled up next to Trujillo's car, and Antonio de la Maza fired his sawed-off double-barreled 12-gauge shotgun. The Generalissimo was wounded, but he decided to stop and fight. "Trujillo was able to handle his snub-nosed 38-caliber revolver, and he jumped out, blood spurting from his back. His driver remained in the front seat, firing the machine gun and then a Garand M-1."<sup>1</sup> After a little while, the Benefactor was dead.

The body was thrown into the trunk of one of the automobiles, not without some kicking and hitting, for the hatred of many years is not easily restrained, and taken to Díaz's house as planned. The former General and Luis Amiama Tío, the contact man with Román and United States Consul Dearborn, saw the corpse and began frantically to try to get in touch with the Secretary of State for the Armed Forces to show him the body.

Unfortunately, by fatal coincidence, General Arturo Espaillat, Trujillo's intelligence aide, had been nearby the spot of the assassination, heard the shots, quickly realized what had happened, and got to

<sup>1</sup>Crassweller, *op. cit.*, p. 439.

General Román before the assassins. Román did not know that was the night, and when Espailat told him that the Generalissimo had been killed, he hesitated, probably thinking that it was a trap. Dumfounded, he left his house with "Little Razor Blade," the nickname given to Espailat for obvious reasons, and the others could not get in touch with him. In panic, everyone scrambled and ran for hiding, for they knew the kind of fate that would ensue if found. The fact of Román's hesitation condemned not only the conspiracy to certain failure, but it also condemned him to an atrocious death. A few days later,

General Román was taken to "Kilometer Nine" [torture chamber] where he was left for days with his eyelids stitched to his eyebrows, beaten with baseball bats, drenched with acid, exposed to swarms of angry ants, castrated, and shocked for hours on end in the electric chair; fifty-six machine gun slugs put him out of his misery.<sup>1</sup>

Someone had called Ramfis in Paris, and instead of returning via New York, he flew directly to Ciudad Trujillo in a chartered Air France jet. The only member of the Trujillo family to get bottled up

---

<sup>1</sup>Selden Rodman, Quisqueya (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), p. 158. At first Ramfis could not believe of Pupo's participation in the assassination plot, but a few days after his arrival he dismissed him from his post and condemned him to death. Román's bodyguards, aides, and even farm overseers were killed. A brother was taken for "questioning" and then released. The second time they came to pick him up, he committed suicide. Pupo's wife and children escaped Ramfis' wrath miraculously, in part because they were Trujillo's by blood, and in part because they somehow were given protection by J. Arismendy Trujillo (Petán), one of the Benefactor's brothers.

in the United States was the tyrant's first daughter, Flor de Oro (Golden Flower) Trujillo. Before young Ramfis arrived to take command of the situation, the Military Intelligence Service (SIM), the dictatorship's Gestapo, had begun to make arrests and found the body of Trujillo. The first one to publicly announce the death of the tyrant was Pierre Salinger, President Kennedy's Press Secretary.

Due to these developments in the Dominican Republic, Secretary of State Dean Rusk delayed his trip to Europe, where the young President was conferring with President Charles De Gaulle. In New York, seven Dominican exile groups had met at the Hotel Belvedere and said that a revolution was going on under General Juan Tomás Díaz. The spokesman, Héctor Aristy, told reporters that regular communiques would be issued from the "liberation" force in the country.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, Ramfis took command by declaring himself Joint Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Army, and Navy. Since no position like that had existed before, or after, President Balaguer made him Minister Without Portfolio so that he would also be a member of the Cabinet.

The first bid for power after the assassination was now made: like father, like son. All that was needed was United States approval.

---

<sup>1</sup> New York Herald Tribune, June 2, 1961. Four years later Aristy would play a significant role in the events of 1965.

The top United States official in Dominicana, Consul Henry Dearborn, flew to Washington to meet Kennedy, who was now returning from Vienna after a summit meeting with Nikita Khrushchev. According to Arthur Schlesinger, the President assessed the situation realistically: "There are three possibilities," Kennedy said, "in descending order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we can't really renounce the second until we are sure that we can avoid the third."<sup>1</sup> Dearborn protested the decision,<sup>2</sup> for after all he had been plotting for almost a year for something better than a continuation of the same, but the decision was made: Ramfis would keep Dominicana.

Sheer nightmare ensued. All the hate, all the fury, all the contempt for the people and the feelings toward the *Jefe*, Trujillo, all the sadism and techniques of torture were vented now upon the assassins and their relatives. How many were killed is unknown. How many were tortured is unknown. The death agony of the Trujillo regime perhaps has no parallel. Men, women, and children were arrested. Of all those arrested around the nation, at least one hundred received the personal attention of high SIM officials at La Cuarenta and Kilometer 9 [torture chambers]. Throughout this entire period, the President of the Republic was Joaquin Balaguer.<sup>2</sup>

Although things were basically the same as before, a show of democratization had to be put on to maintain power. Ramfis invited Dominican exiles to return home, and Balaguer announced an investigation of Trujillo's death which he said would be completed in a few days

<sup>1</sup>Halper, *op. cit.*

<sup>2</sup>Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

and "one may be absolutely sure that there would be no excesses of any kind in police action, and those that are detained will be given fair treatment by the nation's courts."<sup>1</sup> The dreaded chief of the SIM, Johnny Abbes, was shipped out as Ambassador to Japan in fear of his power, for political expediency, as well as for personal dislike.<sup>2</sup> The Dominican government even agreed to the Organization of American States sending a fact-finding mission to investigate charges of terror and brutality following the assassination, but surprisingly enough, they found nothing.

The government of the United States knows how to take precautions. The day after the assassination, naval units were alerted presumably in case the evacuation of North American citizens became necessary. Without doubt, the government is responsible to its citizens, but perhaps those vessels were also there to insure the takeover by Román, as originally planned, or to insure the actual heir, Ramfis, as it turned out, or for any developments that could take place. Furthermore, all Dominicans were prevented from moving around in the

---

<sup>1</sup>The New York Times, June 4, 1961.

<sup>2</sup>Ramfis loathed Abbes, and once told him in front of several officers: "You, you prick, you're taking advantage of my father. You're exciting and deceiving him. But remember, if I catch you in the act, with your hands in the dough, I'll kill you like a dog." Cited in Crassweller, *op. cit.*, pp. 331-332. Years later, Abbes went to work for Haitian dictator, Francois Duvalier, who killed him and his wife and children for a presumed double-cross.

Caribbean or leaving the United States, while Flor de Oro was allowed to travel to Dominicana. For instance, Juan Isidro Jiménez Grullón was kept in the United States, but two exiles who had North American passports, Nicolás Silfa and Ramón Castillo, were able to move around.<sup>1</sup> This way time was given for Ramfis to consolidate his position without unexpected intrusions or interruptions. Finally, the policy supporting Ramfis was made public: "The United States has made it clear that it would like to see a quiet and orderly transition to democracy following the assassination . . ."<sup>2</sup>

General Trujillo, Jr., had about a month to consolidate himself. The armed forces were loyal to him as they had been to his father; the uniformed police and the secret police were also loyal and active; the bureaucracy was under control as was also the President; the United States was supporting him; and the people did not dare, as yet, to make a move. But, the caudillo system as modified by Trujillo

---

<sup>1</sup> Juan Bosch, Crisis de la Democracia de América en la República Dominicana (Mexico: Centro de Estudios y Documentación Sociales, 1964), p. 12. Later on, the influential French newspaper, Le Monde (November 1, 1961), reported that the State Department was opposed to the return of Juan Isidro Jiménez Grullón, because they wanted to keep control of the situation in Santo Domingo and were afraid that the exiled Dominican was a potential Castro. Ironically, Jiménez Grullón sided with the military in the coup against Bosch in 1963.

<sup>2</sup> The New York Times, June 9, 1961.

made it impossible to hold some power, it had to be absolute and total power. The crack came on July 5, when three exiled members of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) arrived in Ciudad Trujillo. Their presence "broke the spell of fear that separated Dominicans, each one from all the rest, and also all Dominicans from the rest of the world . . ." <sup>1</sup>

Apparently as part of the rapprochement between Castro and Trujillo, the Marxist group, Movimiento Popular Dominicano (MPD), headed by Máximo López Molina, had been allowed to operate as an opposition party, with due harassment of course, but it had not been able to convince many of its independence from the Generalissimo. On July 9, 1961, University of Santo Domingo students held the first open meeting in their lives, and it was broken up by the police. By July 16th, the PRD held the first real political meeting in Dominicana in three decades, and two other political organizations had publicly sprung up within the country.

One of these was the Fourteenth of June Movement (IJ4), which, as may be remembered, had been clandestine. The leader was Manuel

---

<sup>1</sup>Bosch, op. cit., p. 20. The PRD delegation was composed of Secretary General Angel Miolán and the two exiles with North American passports, Silfa and Castillo. Bosch remained in Costa Rica, where he was teaching at a political institute of the Latin American non-Communist left, which later turned out to be financed by the CIA.

Tavárez Justo (Manolo), a young lawyer who had been imprisoned in the early days of 1960, and who had presumably borne torture with a great deal of bravery. His wife and her two sisters, the Mirabal sisters, had been murdered by Trujillo while Tavárez was in prison, in one of the most shocking crimes of the Era. The Fourteenth of June was a youth movement in which "could be found the most radical youth and the most moderate."<sup>1</sup> The appeal to glory, nationalism, revolution, democracy, and martyrology were difficult to resist, and all its energies were concentrated in liquidating the regime.

Basically, the other group, Unión Cívica Nacional (UCN), was dedicated also to an end of Trujilloism, but it was composed of a respectable middle-aged leadership. The leader was Viriato Fiallo, "a big, elderly, graying, friendly man, politically naive, brave, once a foe of the Marine Occupation, later a foe of Trujillo."<sup>2</sup> Fiallo had lived in the country throughout the Era without becoming involved with the regime, and in many ways he was a symbol of honesty and purity.

Besides Trujillo's Dominican Party (PD), there was another party which was present and did not come out publicly, as yet. This was the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP), the Communist Party, which

---

<sup>1</sup>Francisco A. Avelino, Las Ideas Políticas en Santo Domingo (Santo Domingo: Editorial Arte y Cine, 1966), p. 101.

<sup>2</sup>Martin, op. cit., p. 69. In 1965, Fiallo would support the Marine invasion.



had been operating since 1944, but it had not gathered more than a handful of members. They did not have a strong, visible leader, and its leadership was composed of intellectuals such as Pericles Franco, Tulio Arvelo, and the Docoudray brothers, Juan and Félix. Their policy was to infiltrate all the other parties, particularly UCN and IJ4, which at the time seemed the most powerful. Later on, other political organizations would appear on the scene.

What at first seemed to be a simple matter--Ramfis' take-over--began to get more complicated as time went by. In the previous three decades of history, the political oppression had been so strong that not even when drunk did a man dare to criticize the regime. Anything that could be interpreted as a criticism of Trujillo would be paid for dearly, and therefore all Dominicans learned to exercise a great deal of self-control, to have absolute astuteness in sensing the power relationships of individuals, and to suspect everyone as a possible informer. Yet, once political organizations appeared, people began to scream as loud as possible and to pressure for an end of the nightmare.

At the time of the recently launched Alliance for Progress, the United States was not about to support an iron-fisted dictatorship, thus Ramfis had to go on with the democratic show, but the problem was that the secret to his power was the inheritance of his father--violence, money, and terror. The police and the military did not know how to

handle a crowd except by shooting at them, and they could not conceive the existence of opposition. In the caudillistic system any opposition is a threat to the existing power-holders, and therefore they would break up meetings and arrest opposition leaders. The fact that the President was more astute at handling such situations, releasing prisoners and so on, began to increase Balaguer's influence vis-a-vis Ramfis to which other members of the family would object, particularly the ambitious uncles Héctor (Negro) and José Arismendy (Petán).

It seemed somewhat logical that if the sanctions imposed by the Organization of American States (OAS) had been due to the Benefactor's attempt to assassinate President Betancourt, they would be lifted once the tyrant was dead, but actually these sanctions were kept for the democratic Latin American countries who wanted a liquidation of the Trujillo family. The sanctions hurt in many ways, for one it had the nation under diplomatic quarantine, but the real problem was in its economic aspect, particularly the United States sugar quota. Dominican has a one-crop economy--sugar--through which it can earn foreign currency reserves to be used in badly needed imports. The North American quota pays a higher price for sugar than that which is sold on the world market, thus it becomes highly desirable.<sup>1</sup> The sanctions had

---

<sup>1</sup>For the political workings of the sugar quotas, see Douglass Carter and Walter Pincus, "Our Sugar Diplomacy," The Reporter, Vol. 24, No. 8 (April 13, 1961), pp. 24-28.

caused Dominicana's economy to deteriorate rapidly, and without imports to pay customs duties, so had the government's income.

Thus we have that the United States was supporting Ramfis on the one hand, but it was not willing to pressure the Latin Americans too harshly on the matter of the sanctions. In the meantime, Balaguer asked the OAS for technical assistance on electoral matters for the scheduled general elections of Trujillo's constitution on May 16, 1962.<sup>1</sup> He suggested that a Trujillo should not run for President because the name would reduce the possibility of victory, but that he was available to head the ticket of the Partido Dominicano, the Generalissimo's party. "Unquestionably, the Partido was still the biggest, best-organized, best-financed, most powerful party in the Republic."<sup>2</sup> The sanctions kept eroding Ramfis' position and pushing forward Balaguer's, for, after all, the sanctions were basically anti-Trujillo.

From the point of view of the United States, there was awareness of the public antagonism against Ramfis and Balaguer, but "if they could maintain law and order, keep the military in line . . . and so carry the troubled nation through the elections . . . all would be well."<sup>3</sup> In Santo

---

<sup>1</sup>Henry Wells, "The Organization of American States and the Dominican Elections," Orbis, Vol. VII, No. 1 (Spring 1963), p. 153.

<sup>2</sup>Martin, op. cit., p. 77.

<sup>3</sup>De Lesseps S. Morrison, Latin American Mission (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965), p. 116.

Domingo, both the UCN and the LJ4 had taken a hard-line position against the regime, while the PRD was conciliatory. The latter party claimed that a coalition government could be made with Balaguer in order to start a social revolution from the top and forestall an upper-class take-over through the Unión Cívica Nacional.<sup>1</sup> This policy earned an accusation of pro-Trujillista for the PRD as well as that of being tools of the United States, because it seemed that the party headed by Juan Bosch was more concerned with gaining power than with liquidating the dictatorship.

As the month of August went by, things had not improved for Balaguer and Ramfis. There continued to be rioting and arrests. Disorders were blamed on Communist agitators, jails were placed under the jurisdiction of the Justice Department, and the SIM had presumably been disbanded. By the end of the month, a break came through the announcement of a forthcoming visit by a Committee of the OAS to study the matter of sanctions, and the public statement by the United States Ambassador to the Organization, De Lesseps Morrison, that the sanctions should be lifted if the Committee found it beneficial.<sup>2</sup>

The State Department proposed to continue with the policy of

---

<sup>1</sup> Bosch, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-29.

<sup>2</sup> *The New York Times*, September 1, 1961. Morrison had been decorated by the Generalissimo with the Order of Duarte, Sánchez y Mella, the highest award in the nation.

maintaining the status quo to which Kennedy agreed in a meeting in early September. "Balaguer is our only tool," the President said. "The anti-Communist liberals aren't strong enough. We must use our influence to take Balaguer along the road to democracy."<sup>1</sup> The fact that Balaguer was the President of Dominicana made the figure of Ramfis a little troublesome, but it was he who could keep the armed forces together. For fear of communism, which was the matter of most concern in the meeting, Kennedy was not willing to get rid of young Trujillo as yet.

The Director of the CIA, Richard Bisell, presented a list of twelve Moscow-trained Communists whom he felt ought to be deported from the Republic, because they were active on the political scene. Since OAS Ambassador Morrison was going to Santo Domingo a few days later, Kennedy told him: "Chep, please talk privately to President Balaguer. Tell him it's a message from me. . . . Tell him that I would very much like to see him expel at once the twelve men on this list."<sup>2</sup>

On September 6, the Consulate of the United States was raised in status to that of Consulate General, which obviously was a public

<sup>1</sup>Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 770.

<sup>2</sup>Morrison, op. cit., pp. 116-117. By 1965, the list increased to more than 50 persons.

gesture of support for the regime in view of the existing diplomatic sanctions. The OAS delegation, including Morrison, arrived by the middle of the month and was greeted by an "enthusiastic" crowd which had been trucked to the airport. In the city some 4,000 angry people were being held back by the police; there was shooting and tanks were rolled out into the streets.<sup>1</sup> It was obvious that if the sanctions were lifted, the dictatorship would remain. Balaguer received Kennedy's message and said: "If I deport them, the people will say I am acting as a dictator and confirm all their fears."<sup>2</sup> Yet, by the end of that week, eleven of the men on the list had been deported, while the remaining one, López Molina, could not be found.<sup>3</sup>

What seems logical in Washington sometimes does not make any sense in Santo Domingo. Presumably a dictatorship was to be ended by keeping the same people in power. A legal democratic government was to be had by arbitrarily sending Dominican nationals out of their own country. In order not to disrepute the whole democratic image of the Alliance for Progress in Latin America, Ramfis was being forced to the brink, yet he was supposed to stay around to hold things together.

---

<sup>1</sup> The New York Times, September 13, 1961.

<sup>2</sup> Morrison, op. cit., p. 125.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 127.

The strongest opposition at the time, UCN and LJ4, were supposed to cooperate with Balaguer, while their reason for existence was precisely to finish the regime. The concern for the Communists was of most importance when they did not have any power whatsoever. Eventually this policy was going to collapse, and so was the regime.

The first major sign of weakness was Balaguer's offer of a coalition government with the opposition, but only the PRD was sympathetic; the others wanted the Trujillos out. The future North American Ambassador, John Bartlow Martin, who had been sent to make a study of the situation, concluded that the policy of supporting Ramfis might gain some stability, but that the United States was bound to lose the people. "The Trujillo right, not the Communists, was the danger to Dominican democracy."<sup>1</sup> The policy to be followed "amounted to negotiating the Trujillos out if possible and, if not, throwing them out. I recommend sending a high-level negotiator immediately and sending the fleet to the horizon to back him up."<sup>2</sup> On October 5, Kennedy decided to follow this course, and Undersecretary of State, George McGhee, was sent to Santo Domingo to put the policy in operation.

Negotiating the Trujillos out did not include President Balaguer, for it was through him that "democracy" was going to be achieved.

---

<sup>1</sup> Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.

Although they agreed in principle, because they had little choice, the ruling family was not very happy with the prospects and they began to stall. Then "the violence exploded when bands of several hundred youths and older persons started marching down the main thoroughfare of the city chanting cries of 'Liberty!'"<sup>1</sup> The University of Santo Domingo, at this time the only one in the nation, had just been reopened to start the new academic year, and the students began to tear down the photographs and statues of the Generalissimo and his family. From there they decided to go into the streets and barricade themselves in Ciudad Nueva, a sector of the city, and declare it free territory. This would be done again in 1965 with the U. S. Marine invasion.

The police massacred the students, some killed and many wounded, but the pressure against the regime had increased to a higher level. The new heir apparent, Balaguer, made a speech to consolidate the armed forces behind him: "Let my first words be to congratulate warmly the National Police for its observed exemplary conduct during the explosions of violence that have occurred in different parts of the country in the last few days." Then he added that police agents "have tolerated all types of vexations and brutal aggressions without

---

<sup>1</sup>The New York Times, October 21, 1961.



committing a single act of reprisal and without committing a single act of abuse against the mutinied crowds."<sup>1</sup>

By the end of October, Balaguer had convinced the ambitious uncles that they had better leave for Bermuda while the heat was on, but some say that they had left for good through bribery, at one million dollars each, and a guarantee on their properties.<sup>2</sup> Immediately, Ramfis announced the gift of eight sugar mills to the people, offered to cut down on the size of the armed forces, and to resign if the OAS would lift the sanctions.<sup>3</sup> Sensing the impending doom of the dynasty, all opposition groups, this time including the PRD, asked that the sanctions be maintained.

On November 14th, Robert F. Woodward, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, proposed to the OAS Committee that the sanctions be lifted. Already in Washington were delegations of the UCN and 1J4, including Fiallo and Távarez Justo, negotiating the transfer of power. The PRD did not go, because, according to Juan

---

<sup>1</sup> Cited in Florángel Cárdenas, "La Universidad de Santo Domingo," *Renovación*, No. 142 (21 al 27 de Octubre, 1969), p. 11. This is the third installment of a series of articles dealing with the national university which will later appear in book form.

<sup>2</sup> Julio César Martínez, "Revolution and Counter Revolution in the Dominican Republic," *New Politics*, Vol. IV, No. 2 (Spring 1965), p. 48.

<sup>3</sup> Ramfis had actually previously agreed to this with De Lesseps Morrison. Morrison, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-142.

Bosch, they were expecting immediate developments and they considered that Dominican leaders had to be inside the country.<sup>1</sup> On November 15, uncles Héctor and José Arismendy returned to the country in a Dominican warship; they were not about to be left out of their "patrimony."

With this new development, the United States withdrew its request for the lifting of the sanctions. The Trujillos were going to make a fight to stay, even if it included defying the United States. The "Wicked Uncles," as they were sometimes called, were back home to make the third bid for power within the regime: Ramfis, Balaguer, and now Negro and Petán. The operation "Green Light" included the seizing of the state and all its repressive machinery as would be expected, but it also included the killing of some 3,000 people, including Balaguer and Fiallo, but not Bosch, because he was not considered to be dangerous.<sup>2</sup> This action would have marked a return to the Trujillo tyranny with all its splendor.

The problem was that Ramfis felt that they were already defeated, because, heir of the Benefactor or not, the United States was now

---

<sup>1</sup>Bosch, *op. cit.* It turned out as Bosch said, but the policy was not consistent with his behavior before or after that event.

<sup>2</sup>Humberto Riccio, "Entrevista con Rodríguez Echavarría," *Ahora*, No. 45 (2da Quincena Noviembre, 1963), pp. 11-12. This was a reprint from the New York Spanish language newspaper, *El Tiempo*, November 12, 1963.

against them. He resigned his office on November 18th and left the country on the yacht Angelita, "first killing the six surviving imprisoned assassins, and taking his father's body with him."<sup>1</sup> It proved to be the fatal end of the family dynasty, for then "Kennedy decided on a bold stroke: the dispatch of eight American ships, with 1800 Marines on board, to steam visibly off Santo Domingo just outside the three mile limit, ready to go in if the Balaguer government asked for them."<sup>2</sup> Actually, there were fourteen ships in total, quite closer and in better view than the three mile limit, and with United States airplanes flying over the city. The message was clear: the Trujillos had not submitted to being negotiated out, and therefore they were going to be thrown out of their own country.

---

<sup>1</sup> Martin, op. cit., p. 83.

<sup>2</sup> Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 771. The side story of this decision is very interesting. It was told by Robert J. Donovan, an experienced and well-connected newspaper reporter. On November 18th, Kennedy was in Texas attending the funeral of Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn, when Rusk called him on the telephone and the President authorized the sending of the naval task force. The Secretary of State had met that day at 3 p. m. with Robert F. Woodward, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, John H. Crimmins, Deputy Director of the State Department of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (and later Ambassador to Santo Domingo), and others. They decided on the naval task force, and at 4:17 p. m. Rusk called Kennedy for approval. Charge d'Affaires in Santo Domingo, John Calvin Hill, Jr., sent a cable at 9 p. m. recommending that the fleet appear at dawn on November 19, as it actually happened. New York Herald Tribune, January 18, 1962.

The same day as the North American show of force, General Pedro Rafael Rodríguez Echavarría, Commander of the Air Force base in Santiago, dropped leaflets in the Capital saying that he and a large part of the military stood for civilian government. This action was a rallying of the armed forces to support the United States and Balaguer now that the Trujillos had practically sunk. General Fernando Sánchez, a close crony of Ramfis and Commander of the infinitely more powerful San Isidro Air Force base, decided to send tanks against Rodríguez Echavarría, but everything was sinking too fast and nothing serious happened. One general, Miguel Rodríguez Reyes, who would later be the liaison between the PRD and the Armed Forces, held out at the city of Mao, but he came to terms after Rodríguez Echavarría's planes strafed his troops.

At the National Palace, President Balaguer was at a meeting with the Trujillo brothers and United States Charge d'Affaires John Calvin Hill, Jr. In essence, Hill told the "Wicked Uncles" that they had to go, because the fleet and the Marines were there to back up Balaguer. In view of the circumstances, Negro and Petán decided to pack up their suitcases. Balaguer went on the radio saying that the nation was on the brink of Civil War and he appealed to all Dominicans to unite behind the "legitimate" power, which presumably was him, to prevent a catastrophe and foreign "intervention." He was making a

move to consolidate himself in a new bid for power. He went on to announce the departure of the Trujillo brothers; the abolishment of Ramfis' Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff; the sending of Major General Virgilio García Trujillo, who had assumed the position of Secretary of State for the Armed Forces after the removal of Pupo Román, to the Inter-American Defense Board in Washington, and to be replaced by General Luis Román. He also replaced Chief of Air Force, Fernando Sánchez, with General Félix Hermida, Jr. It all appeared that he had everything under control, thanks to the North American show of force. That night, the entire Trujillo family, and associates too close for comfort, left for Florida.

Finally free of the Trujillos, the country went wild. Street signs with the Trujillo name were torn down, and Trujillo statues were destroyed. The name of the capital, which had been changed from Santo Domingo to Ciudad Trujillo under the dictator, was given back its original name. Thousands of exiles returned from everywhere. But despite the jubilation, the country had the glazed, shocked air of someone witnessing a miracle. It wept and laughed; it shouted for joy and immersed itself in suppressed hysteria, still conditioned by the silence demanded by Trujillo. Freedom is a complex thing, but to the Dominicans it was simple: an end to Trujilloism.<sup>1</sup>

Things were not that simple. The Trujillo family had left, but an entire apparatus which the Generalissimo had controlled for three decades remained there intact. Obviously, none of the heirs matched

---

<sup>1</sup> Dan Kurzman, Santo Domingo: Revolt of the Damned (New York: G. P. Putnam's & Sons, 1965), p. 53.

the Benefactor, and without him the whole system was bound to collapse. It was true that in Nicaragua the sons of the dictator Anastasio Somoza had been able, and still do, control the country after their father's assassination in 1956, but the Nicaraguan dictatorship never had the strength, the cruelty, and the reduction of everything to one man, as Trujillo had been able to do. Things had also changed in the five years of one assassination to the other, because in 1961 the United States was less willing to support outright dictatorships, in great measure thanks to Fidel Castro. Probably the Dominican people would have been less willing to demonstrate against the Trujillos had it not been an epoch of falling tyrants and the presumed beginning of an era of freedom for Latin America.<sup>1</sup> Finally, the Somoza brothers, particularly Luis, were better prepared to inherit a nation than was Ramfis or any of his relatives: they were better educated, less pampered, and more willing to concede some power and wealth rather than lose it all.

---

<sup>1</sup>For instance, Dr. José Fernández Caminero, a heart specialist who was later the liaison between the IJ4 and UCN, was jailed in the roundups of early 1960 and released after the death of the tyrant. Recalling his ordeal in prison, he said, "One thing gave me hope. Someone smuggled in a translation of President Kennedy's speech about the Alianza. From then on we came to think that at last and finally the United States was going to pay some attention to Latin America. It would be a fantastic hurt if those hopes were ever cast down." Martin, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

If the previous days of November had been hectic, what followed was no less. On November 20th, an investigating Committee of the OAS, composed by the United States, Panamá, Colombia, Chile, and Ecuador, was rushed to Santo Domingo, but it did not amount to very much. The United States kept its naval force in support of Balaguer, but interestingly enough, non-disclosed Kennedy Administration officials said that the landing of Marines would not have constituted an intervention if help had been requested by Balaguer. Apparently, at least for the public, they did not conceive that the presence of a naval task force in support of a particular regime as an intervention in the internal affairs of another nation. In 1965, the same excuse was used for the landing of more than 20,000 men in support of a previously made military junta.

However, at this time the only ones to seriously protest the United States intervention was the Cuban regime, which took the matter to the United Nations as well as to the Organization of American States. Juan Bosch issued a statement expressing gratitude to the United States for the support it was giving to democracy in the Dominican Republic, which in essence was an approval of the intervention. Viriato Fiallo, who had been a fierce opponent of the 1916 intervention, just as Bosch would be in 1965, wanted the warships there; he also wanted the OAS to continue with the sanctions as a pressure on Balaguer for concessions

on constitutional reforms, and to the UCN, and for the removal of Trujillo associates from the government. As far as the IJ4 was concerned, Manolo Távarez had been negotiating with North American officials at the time of the naval force, and therefore he was not about to protest, but he warned against it, as if it was not already happening.

At the United Nations, José A. Bonilla Atilés, a leader of UCN who is known for his Washington connections, was made a member of the Dominican delegation to the United States, in spite of the fact that his party was formally opposed to Balaguer.<sup>1</sup> He accused Cuba of stirring unrest and defended the presence of United States warships. The Cuban delegate, García-Incháustegui, replied that the North American action may have made a precedent for an attack on Cuba, and that the United States had acted without waiting for an OAS directive.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Bonilla Atilés would serve as Foreign Minister of the Council of State, and later on he would be at the OAS casting the vote endorsing the North American intervention in 1965. By November 28, 1961, four days after his defense of the United States at the UN, Bonilla Atilés would no longer be sitting with Balaguer's delegate, Carlos Sánchez Cabral, on the grounds that the President had gone back to his old tricks and was using North American warships against the Dominican people. The New York Times, November 29, 1961.

<sup>2</sup>The New York Times, November 25, 1961. Perhaps in order not to be accused of the same thing, the Kennedy Administration was careful to get an OAS endorsement before applying the quarantine in the Missile Crisis of 1962. Stevenson "saw no hope of mustering enough votes in the UN to authorize action against Cuba in advance; but the OAS offered an opportunity for multilateral support, and OAS approval could provide some protection in law and a great deal in public opinion." Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 810.



On the same day, November 24th, United States officials had said that the ships would remain as long as there was the danger of political disintegration, but less than a month later it would be calling for an OAS endorsement.<sup>1</sup> The Cuban charge came to nothing.

At first, the PRD and the UCN were willing to work with Balaguer, but the former party was willing to have the OAS sanctions withdrawn, while the latter was pressuring for them to be maintained. It seems likely that their differences lay in perceived popular support, for undoubtedly the UCN had at the time the vast majority of the people, at least the most vocal ones, behind them, and it stood to reap more benefits through sustained pressure. On the other hand, the PRD stood to gain now in coalition with Balaguer before it became swamped by the UCN. Only the 1J4 remained in an adamant position having its supporters demonstrating against the government and calling for the President's resignation. Yet, as the days went by, there was increased opposition to the government and growing resentment to the presence of foreign intervention.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>According to Rowland Evans, Jr., Kennedy was concerned with the Dominican situation, and the Senate Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield, called for an OAS endorsement for the use of naval forces in Dominican waters to guard against any emergency. The New York Herald Tribune, December 16, 1961.

<sup>2</sup>In its report, The London Times of November 24, 1961, suggested that the presence of the task force at first was fine, but that the longer it stayed, the more it was resented for it was an intervention in the nation's domestic affairs, and Dominicans wanted to settle their affairs alone after three decades of tyranny.

Since the departure of the Trujillos, Balaguer had not been idle. He allowed the mobs to ransack the homes of the former ruling family, only to impose a curfew on the nation and blame the disorders on Communist agitators. He had named General Pedro Rafael Rodríguez Echavarría as Secretary of State for the Armed Forces, which according to Trujillo's Constitution, made him the legal successor; his brother, General Pedro Santiago Rodríguez Echavarría (Chaguito) head of the Air Force, the strongest military power within the nation. Balaguer replaced Luis Román because Rodríguez Echavarría seemed more able to control the military in his favor. Finally, he announced the dissolution of the Dominican Party and of the SIM, once more; changed the name of the Capital back to its original name; he called for an end to the sanctions; and he said that his government was not going to protest the presence of the North American fleet because it was a healthy force for the preservation of order.<sup>1</sup>

By the end of the month a general strike had been called by all political parties except the PRD. They had formed a united opposition front which included the representatives of the social elite, the UCN, the nationalist revolutionary IJ4, and the Communist PSP and MPD. They demanded the resignation of Balaguer in favor of a seven-man

---

<sup>1</sup>The Christian Science Monitor, November 24, 1961, and The New York Times, November 24 and 25, 1961.

governing junta to be presided over by Viriato Fiallo, the head of UCN, and which would call for elections by December 1963. The procedure asked for was that Balaguer appoint Fiallo as head of the armed forces, thus making him the legal heir, and then the President would resign.<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately, this would leave out both Balaguer and Rodríguez Echavarría who were not about to be left out unless forced to. Apparently, the PRD did not participate in this joint effort because it was not interested in seeing UCN become the government, a position from which they could probably dominate future elections, as it had always been in the caudillo tradition, while Balaguer seemed to be too discredited at the time to be able to perform more than a transitory role.

On the other hand, according to Juan Bosch, the reason the PRD did not participate in the joint effort of the anti-Trujilloism opposition was that this would have meant the handling of the government by the upper-class in the form of UCN, who would have then forestalled any social reforms in the nation, while the existing government, particularly Rodríguez Echavarría, was inclined toward social reforms.<sup>2</sup> The General was apparently now making his own bid for power, and he was hoping to enter in a mutually profitable relationship with the PRD.

---

<sup>1</sup>The New York Times, November 28, 1961.

<sup>2</sup>Bosch, op. cit., p. 45.

The son of Trujillo's Senator José Rodríguez, the Secretary of State for the Armed Forces sent his Undersecretary into glorious exile at the Inter-American Defense Board,<sup>1</sup> fired the Chief of Police, and forced the resignation of several high officers, in an obvious attempt to keep only loyal soldiers.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, Rodríguez Echavarría expropriated several Trujillo properties and began to distribute them in two-acre parcels to landless peasants, a fact which earned him the accusation of trying to set up a Castro-type regime.<sup>3</sup> Although he kept referring to the Dominican upper-crust as the "whites," which is the name the masses use, and he accused them of being neglectful of socio-economic betterment for the population, it is doubtful that his reformism was anything more than temporary. For instance, in an interview the General said that "I believe that Sweden is a country with dangerous Communist tendencies;" that the armed forces were with the people, but if order had to be maintained it was for their own good; and that two thousand men were being trained in Cuba for an invasion of Dominicana,<sup>4</sup> an obvious play at Red-baiting for no such force ever existed.

---

<sup>1</sup> Although not an exile in the traditional understanding of the term, the appointment of troublesome officers in foreign posts is a policy with the same end, except that they enjoy a position and a salary which would make them less willing to wish an immediate return.

<sup>2</sup> The New York Times, December 4, 1961.

<sup>3</sup> The Christian Science Monitor, January 15, 1962.

<sup>4</sup> The New York Times, December 2, 1961.

Balaguer himself was not to be outdone by what was becoming a competitor. The President raised the pay of enlisted men, reduced the price of primary consumption goods by half, and declared an amnesty for the surviving few who had been involved in the killing of Trujillo.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, he did not agree to the demands of the opposition, who then proceeded with their strike. In spite of the deployment of troops throughout Santo Domingo, that soldiers were running the airport, seaport, and even gasoline stations, and that heavy censorship had been imposed, the strike was a success.

On November 30, two days after the beginning of the strike, the Armed Forces announced that they now wanted a council, which they did not before, but instead of Fiallo being the head of the new junta, the head was to be Balaguer. This was not too much of a concession, but they also included that they wanted protection from judicial action to all members of the Armed Forces for acts committed under orders during the Trujillo regime, an obvious recognition of guilt and the fear of punishment; that military spending be minimally maintained at the level set for the 1962 budget, which was an insurance that their power would not be curtailed by lack of funds; and that elections would be held within two years, which is a form of proving their "democratic" intentions and making the proposal more acceptable to the opposition.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The New York Times, December 3, 1961.

<sup>2</sup>The New York Times, December 1, 1961.

Balaguer soon endorsed the proposal, which after all would have kept him as Head of State, but the opposition would not accept it. Furthermore, the latter, whom a few days before had been praising the North American intervention, were now accusing the United States of supporting the regime against the wishes of the Dominican people.

The strike continued. It was basically a shop-keepers' strike, from which UCN drew its main support and which was now the major voice of the opposition. Air Force officers, brother Chaguito's men, and policeman led mobs to smash open the closed stores, and loot them, in an effort to break the strike, but it seemed to be of no avail. In a new move, Balaguer offered to the UCN a proposal for setting up a ruling Council of State in which they would name the members but Balaguer would remain the head.<sup>1</sup> Again this was rejected, but a new turn of events had occurred: on December 5th, for the first time in almost three weeks, there were no United States naval units present.

From the beginning of the strike, the United States had been publicly urging for moderation, which in essence meant that they were backing the Balaguer regime. The purpose of the strike was to force the fall of the government through a demonstration of force which would

<sup>1</sup>The New York Times, December 7, 1961. In the original opposition proposal for a governing junta, one member was to come from the military and one from the Church, but Balaguer's had no specific suggestions.

make obvious its non-representativeness, its inability to run the country, and its necessity to use crude force to stay in power. Moderation in a show of force plays right into the hands of the government by releasing the pressure on it, and this the opposition was not about to do, but instead, it began to make anti-United States remarks in order to force the interventionist power into a defensive position. The North American response was to pull the ships twelve miles out, for in this manner there was no public irritation at watching them while at the same time they were close enough for any armed intervention if needed. The strike finally ended on December 9th.

Without the pressure, it was Balaguer's turn for a show of force, for obviously he had not been toppled. He now not only refused to resign, but went back to the position of calling for elections on May 16, 1962, which would be a means to legitimize his position as Trujillo's heir without having to go through the intricate process of a governing junta or to wait as long for an election. Furthermore, in a conciliatory maneuver, he offered the opposition six out of twelve cabinet posts, and went into the offensive in the international realm by charging the OAS with intervention in the nation's domestic affairs for not lifting the sanctions until an agreement with the opposition was reached.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The New York Times, December 11-12, 1961.

The prolongation of disagreement in Santo Domingo was making the North American military presence more prolonged than expected and less likely that it would have served its purpose: the maintenance of the existing socio-economic order and the integrity of the Armed Forces with a public election in an effort at what they call democratization. On December 15, President Kennedy was to put an end to the situation.

He called for a meeting on the Dominican situation to be held in Puerto Rico. At the meeting with Kennedy were his Special Counsel on Latin American Affairs, Richard N. Goodwin; Assistant Secretary Woodward; Under Secretary of State George Ball; Charge d'Affaires Hill; and Arturo Morales-Carrión, a Deputy Assistant Secretary who has been closely involved with the Dominican Republic. The President of the United States "decided on a personal appeal to Balaguer and Rodríguez Echavarría. His intervention was the catalyst that made possible the establishment of a Council of State, committed to a program of political democracy and the preparation of elections."<sup>1</sup>

This time the message came in the form of a letter, not as informally as when De Lesseps Morrison was the oral transmitter. Kennedy told Balaguer and Rodríguez Echavarría, for Hill read them both the letter so that there would be no mistake, that they had better

---

<sup>1</sup>Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 772.



bring the opposition into a ruling council and set an election date. If they did this, the sanctions would be lifted, but if not, it warned that public sentiment would turn sharply against them.<sup>1</sup> Without question, the "friendly" suggestions of North America were accepted. In spite of the fact that the opposition was taken by absolute surprise, on December 17, Balaguer announced the formation of the Council of State with himself as President until the OAS sanctions were lifted, and that there would be elections within a year.<sup>2</sup>

"The plan announced by President Balaguer follows almost exactly that proposed by the opposition leader, Dr. Viriato Fiallo, except that he had demanded Dr. Balaguer's immediate resignation."<sup>3</sup> Actually, there were several more changes, the most important of which was that the Vice-President, and therefore later President,

---

<sup>1</sup>The details of this letter were revealed by reporter Robert J. Donovan in the same article in which the details of the sending of the naval task force were revealed. New York Herald Tribune, January 18, 1962. Donovan also reveals that Kennedy had set up bi-weekly meetings in his office on the Dominican situation, but he does not specify when after the death of Trujillo they started. Considering the manifold problems of the United States throughout the world, the fact of these meetings, and the importance of the people who attended, meant that the President gave the Dominican case a high priority. The people regularly present at the meetings were the top foreign policy planning group: Secretary Rusk, Robert F. Woodward, Arturo Morales-Carrión, Richard Goodwin, George Ball, George McGhee, and John Crimmins. Others also attended such as Bartlow Martin and the CIA representative, but were not regularly scheduled.

<sup>2</sup>The New York Times, December 18, 1961.

<sup>3</sup>The London Times, December 19, 1961.

would not be Fiallo, but a UCN associate, Rafael F. Bonelly. Apparently the reason was that a few days before UCN had ceased to be a "patriotic apolitical organization" to become a political party, and therefore Fiallo would have the possibility of being a presidential candidate in the forthcoming elections. Unexpectedly, two of the Council members were Antonio Imbert and Luis Amiama Tío, the only two survivors of the plot that killed Trujillo half a year before, and who had just come out into the open.

To make things legal, if one can conceive of such a thing under the circumstances, Trujillo's Congress, both houses of it, approved the plan on December 29th. Since nowhere under the "ruling" Constitution was a provision for such an occurrence, legality was maintained by Congress calling itself into a permanent recess, and a constituent assembly would be called by August 16, 1962, to draw up a new constitution. On the same date, Balaguer called a meeting of the Partido Dominicano, of which he was still president, and the Central Committee decided to dissolve it. On the first day of the new year, the Consejo de Estado, with executive and legislative powers, became the legal ruling body of the nation.

As to be expected, the Kennedy Administration hailed the new Council, promised support, and the lifting of OAS sanctions. Teodoro Moscoso, the pharmacist who had engineered the successful economic development program of Puerto Rico, Operation Bootstraps, would be

sent as head of an economic mission, while Felipe Herrera, the head of the Inter-American Development Bank, would go on an assistance program of its own. It seemed that things could not be better, but soon reality poured back in.

The PRD had decided not to become a member of the Council of State, perhaps for the same reason that Fiallo had decided not to head it: flexibility for an electoral campaign. Before the Council took office, word came from Balaguer to Bosch, via Rodríguez Echavarría, that if they had to give up their power, they would rather give it to the PRD than to the UCN. In essence, Balaguer was going to give himself a coup d'etat to put Bosch in through the device of naming him Secretary of State for the Armed Forces, then resign, and in turn, Bosch would put back Rodríguez Echavarría on his post. Although the plan never became viable, the reason Bosch says he did not accept was that this action would place the middle-class youth against him, and, on the other hand, "neither the PRD was sufficiently strong to maintain itself in power, nor did the armed forces have with us the ties it had with Balaguer."<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Bosch, *op. cit.*, p. 53. The whole thing may have been an attempt by Balaguer to keep the PRD from joining the more active opposition, but then it also explains why the PRD had been so unwilling to attack the regime. They went as far as to say that Trujillo had been a good ruler, because he had known how to remain in power, and also, that it was possible to have free elections with the Trujillo heirs in power. It is possible that Bosch was gambling on the PRD inheriting the armed forces, Trujillo's forces, and therefore he was not about to attack their representatives.

The President had promised that he would leave office by February 27, 1962, but neither were the opposition groups willing to believe him nor did his actions strongly indicate that he was going to make good his promise. Balaguer appointed PRD member Nicolás Silfa as Secretary of Labor, which was protested by everyone, including the PRD, for they said that the party was not participating in the government. The President bought taxi cabs from fleet owners with government funds and distributed them to the drivers in an attempt to win the support of labor groups.<sup>1</sup> On January 5, all the Trujillo family properties, down to the third generation, were seized by the government; and on January 8, Rodríguez Echavarría announced that Communists had mounted a campaign to discredit the armed forces in an effort to divide them so that a planned guerrilla action, which had been reported by military intelligence, would side up with the losers. Some military officers were fired.

After the announcement of a Navy plot to overthrow the government and the dismissal of several officers, riots started on the afternoon of January 16, 1962, with people demanding the ouster of both Balaguer and Rodríguez Echavarría. Air Force tanks were rolled out into the

---

<sup>1</sup>Washington Post reporter, Dan Kurzman, made a comment that later proved to be quite accurate. "As a result of such demagogery, he [Balaguer] became popular indeed, and even today, he possibly could win a free election." *Op. cit.*, p. 55.

streets under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Manuel A. Cuervo Gómez, and the military proceeded to take down the loudspeakers at UCN headquarters while the crowd watched. Vice-President Bonelly ordered the soldiers to stop, but they said that they only took orders from Rodríguez Echavarría. The crowd got restless, the soldiers panicked, and the shooting started, taking its toll in heavy casualties. A state of siege was decreed, and that night Balaguer resigned in a coup d'etat which placed in power a military-civilian junta.<sup>1</sup> The General was now making his own bid for power.

Antonio Imbert and Luis Amiama, the now national heroes, were passed on to the new junta. Also included were the civilians Humberto Bogaert and Armando Oscar Pacheco, both of whom held high posts under Trujillo. The military participants were representatives of the three branches of the armed forces: Major Wilfredo Medina Natal (Army), Lieutenant Colonel Neit R. Nivar Seijas (Air Force), and Rear Admiral Enrique Valdez Viduarre (Navy). Rodríguez Echavarría did not figure anywhere, except that he continued to hold his crucial post, had his brother as Chief of Air Force, and had rid himself of all officers that were not considered loyal to him. As it can be imagined, censorship was imposed immediately.

---

<sup>1</sup> See "La Dictadura Más Sangrienta Pero Más Breve en la República Dominicana," Ahora, No. 2 (31 Enero 1962), pp. 54-55.

The consejeros, including Bonelly, who was the "legal" successor to Balaguer, were taken to San Isidro Air Force Base and placed under arrest. Bogaert, the nominal president of the junta, declared that the reason for the coup was to foil an international conspiracy aimed at making Dominicana a second Cuba. He pledged support of the so-called "free world," and said that "once order is restored in all the national territory and the subversion which is presently shaking institutional life is dominated, elections will be held for the re-establishment of constitutional order."<sup>1</sup> In every coup, the three permanent ingredients are: that it was in reaction to a subversive plot of some kind, preferably international in nature; support of international agreements and Western democracy; and a call for elections.

The United States response was quick. North America was opposed to the coup mainly due to the fact, according to Bertram B. Johanson, that the Punta del Este Conference on the ouster of Castro's Cuba from the OAS was four days away, and therefore it would not look good to be supporting a military dictatorship.<sup>2</sup> In Santo Domingo, things were not easy for what proved to be a two-day junta. There was a general strike and more riots; newspapers submitted to censorship by

---

<sup>1</sup>The New York Times, January 18, 1962.

<sup>2</sup>The Christian Science Monitor, January 18, 1962.

publishing blank spots in their columns; Supreme Court Judges resigned; public employees walked out on their jobs boycotting government work; and Imbert and Amiama defected and went into asylum at the Brazilian Embassy.

That evening, Rodríguez Echavarría went to see the imprisoned Consejeros at San Isidro, but instead, he was arrested by Air Force officers, including Lieutenant Colonel Elías Wessir y Wessin and Major Rafael Tomás Fernández Domínguez, who in 1965 were to find each other in opposite camps. The counter-coup was effective, drawing the support of the Navy, and by eleven o'clock, January 18, 1962, the Consejo de Estado was again the Government. They now went through the formality of accepting Balaguer's resignation as valid, and Vice-President Rafael F. Bonelly became the President of the Consejo and the President of the Dominican Republic. The next step was the holding of free democratic elections.

In the few months that had gone by since the death of Trujillo, the power contenders within the regime had proved to be unable to maintain their positions. The rise of the Council of State signaled the end of the Trujillo regime as a new group, an opposition group which included those who had killed the Jefe, were now the governing body of the Dominican Republic. It seemed that after the original paralysis of June 1962, the Dominican people had rallied to put an end to the nightmare, to the bloody tyranny that had terrorized the nation for more than

three decades. However, the armed forces, the instrument of coercion as the repository of the means of violence, remained intact and without a strong leader. Power competition among political groups and personalities would not only be directed toward the coming elections, but also to gain the loyalty, or at least the support, of the armed forces. The Era of Trujillo may have come to an end, but the caudillistic system which produced it remained intact. No one had as yet questioned its basis, but only sought to manipulate it for different reasons: some for exclusive personal gain and glory, as had been the case traditionally; some for the realization of the ideals of legality and freedom in the form of constitutional democracy, as had been the struggle since independence; and some for the realization of socio-economic reforms but operating within the same structures that had always existed. The society, its structures and its values, had not as yet been put into question, nor had the dependence of the nation on the United States.



## CHAPTER IV

## FREE ELECTIONS

An event so common in stable democratic polities as the holding of free elections was a major event in Dominicana. It seemed more like a miracle than what the different twenty-odd constitutions had prescribed as the legitimate means of power ratification in the "democratic" republic throughout its history. That sort of thing had always been on paper, but hardly ever did it happen. Yet, it did happen, on December 20, 1962.

For the elections to take place, at least four ingredients were necessary. First and foremost, that the United States, the holding power in the Western Hemisphere, supported the occurrence. Had North America decided against free elections, for whatever reasons, it would have been highly unlikely, if not impossible, that they would have taken place. Second, the Trujillo dictatorship had been largely dismantled and the military found itself leaderless and afraid. It is possible to have elections in a dictatorship, but obviously they would not be free. People just go through the motions of casting a meaningless ballot into an electoral urn. The third ingredient was that the

Council of State remained faithful to the purpose of its creation, which was precisely the holding of free elections. They could have manipulated the electoral machinery in favor of Unión Cívica Nacional, since most of the Council members belonged to that party, or they could have opposed the electoral event, but they did not. Finally, most of the opposition was in favor of holding free elections, and therefore made no effort to block the occurrence. Had they been opposed, riots could have been started or conspiracies could have been worked with military officers in an effort to force the government into repressive policies which would have frustrated the electoral event.

There is something magic about the word elections. Many times it seems like the divinity that was associated with the rights of kings to rule was transferred directly into the "rational" conception of representative democracy. The people were to choose their leaders and the mechanism was to be elections, for in this manner the will of the majority would be observed, and the mechanism itself sanctifies the results. Therefore, William S. Stokes is correct when he affirms that the most important reason for the holding of elections is that "the techniques of the liberal-democratic state produces legitimacy in Western culture as nothing else can."<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>William S. Stokes, "Nonviolent Methods of Mobilizing Political Power in the Caribbean," in A. Curtis Wilgus (ed.), The Caribbean: Its Political Problems (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1956), Vol. VII of the Caribbean Series, p. 155.

Even in a political environment as the Latin American, where basically constitutions are pieces of paper, and force is the regulator of existence, the attraction of free elections should never be discarded. That is the reason why the well known revolutionary and theoretician of guerrilla warfare, Ernesto Guevara (Che), wrote that when a government has come into power through some form of popular vote, "fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted."<sup>1</sup>

In the case of Dominicana, the concept of elections was visualized in its most naive form, because after more than three decades of an opprobrious tyranny, elections seemed like the remedy for all previous evils. All that needed to be done was to hold the event, and the past would have been erased as if it had never existed. Just as many times revolutionaries believe that violence and blood is the sort of christening of a new order, so it seemed at the time that elections were the christening of a new era of freedom, justice, legality, and so on. It was only a year and a half after the fall of Balaguer and Rodríguez Echavarría that the constitutional government of Juan Bosch was deposed in a coup d'etat: the cruel reality poured back in.

---

<sup>1</sup>Ernesto Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, 1961), p. 2. It is possible that by the end of the decade he would have changed his mind.

Hardly anything else could have been expected, no matter who would have won the elections, for the caudillistic political system prescribes that power is to be held through force and not legal formulas. The latter can always serve as a facade for the former, but it is not its substitute, unless there is systemic transformation. Indeed some change had occurred, and that is why there were free elections at all, but it was not sufficient. Yet, the fact that the elections did take place was to influence the politics of Dominicana throughout the decade.

Due to a misunderstanding of Latin American politics or through a deliberate effort, the United States maintained a policy of supporting the caudillistic system. True it was that they were instrumental in the removal of Trujillo from the Caribbean scene and from the world of the living, but this never implied the destruction of the system which the Generalissimo had so aptly manipulated, controlled, and modified. At all times there was the effort to maintain in power the "legitimate" heirs of the Benefactor, but only as long as they were instrumental. Ramfis and Balaguer, first the former and then the latter, were accepted, but neither were the "Wicked Uncles" or the hoped-to-be caudillo, General Pedro Rafael Rodríguez Echavarría.

The stakes of the game were the maintenance of order, in the full sense of the word, not freedom or democracy. Disorders could be the mechanism through which an anti-United States government, something like Cuba's Castro, could get into power, because all-Communist

groups in Dominicana were extremely weak in numbers and not popular at all. Presumably, the Communists are extremely able in capturing power in disorderly situations, because, according to Bartlow Martin, "It is not names of Communists, or numbers, that is important. It is the process itself--the fusion process of the bloodbath."<sup>1</sup>

The presence of a Communist government in Dominicana would present several disadvantages to the United States, but, first and foremost, that North America would lose its control and probably have it substituted by that of the Soviet Union. To lose anything to a rival power is already a matter of concern, but this becomes more acute if it also involves strategic significance; Dominicana is in North America's mare nostrum, just as Hungary is within Russia's sensitive and "natural" Eastern frontier. Furthermore, another Cuba would have probably opened the door to lose more Latin American countries, or at least, for the Democratic Party to lose the next elections in the United States. Even more, a Communist government would have changed the established order, and the United States would have lost a market for its products and a source of raw materials, besides the nationalizing of North American owned investments.

---

<sup>1</sup> John Bartlow Martin, Overtaken by Events (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1966), p. 675. Actually, Martin was referring to the 1965 revolt, but nevertheless the statement is applicable to all disorderly situations.

To prevent all that from happening, order had to be maintained, but the maintenance of order is not such an easy matter in Dominicana. Trujillo had been excellent at it, but the price was high in view of changing circumstances. Without the Generalissimo, the only ones who could provide order were the military, even if their practices were abusive and perhaps dangerous in the long run. The only person who seemed capable of holding the military together, for if they split that is the end of order, was Ramfis Trujillo, and therefore he inherited a nation, at least for a while.

Yet, just the plain maintenance of order was not sufficient, for dictatorships were not popular at the time, neither in Latin America nor particularly in Dominicana. The holding of elections had to be scheduled to ease the fact that it was the son of the tyrant who was in control of his father's instrument of power, the military, and therefore the nation. Furthermore, it was possible that a slow and orderly process of democratization could be started in order not to end up with Castro, which was presumably what was trying to be avoided. This implied that the elections were not to be as free as the ideal would indicate, but elections were good to have in any case. For one, perhaps the democratic system would have taken hold with practice at the ballots; two, it would appease opposition leaders somewhat because at least things were not as bad as under the old Jefe; three, Latin Americans would also recognize that some progress had been achieved; and finally, the North American public would have another evidence of the

efforts being made under the Alliance for Progress, a fact which could be profited at the time of domestic elections.

Unfortunately, although Ramfis was able to hold the military together, he was incapable of holding the nation. There was pressure from within and from without, that he was unable to cope with. The sanctions from the Organization of American States kept him in the position of a pariah in the Hemisphere with a deteriorating economic situation. Dominicana may be important to the United States, but it is not the pivotal center for its policies, since they are not only the world's greatest power but also the dominant power of the rest of the Hemisphere. At the time, the Dominican situation was not critical enough to apply extreme pressure to the democratic Latin American countries who were for liquidating the power of the Trujillos. After all, the North Americans wanted to prevent another Cuba in all of Latin America, not only in Dominicana, and therefore they were in support of democratic regimes.

Ramfis' problem from within lay in the fact that the largest opposition parties, UCN and IJ4, were uncompromising: they also wanted the absolute liquidation of the dictatorship, not a meager show with promises for the future. On the other hand, the key to his power lay in the systematic application of violence to reduce all opposition to impotence and fear and therefore he would be the unchallenged caudillo

like his father had been. But in view of the OAS sanctions and North American desires, he had to allow the existence of an openly vocal opposition, with only some harassment, in order to survive.<sup>1</sup> In effect, this action was undermining his power, but he had to wait for the sanctions to be removed to really become a caudillo. In the gamble for time, he lost his power and some wealth.

Since Ramfis could not hold on and the opposition enjoyed a great deal of popular support, the next in line to run the nation was Trujillo's puppet President, Joaquín Balaguer. He proved to be shrewder than Ramfis and much more able to handle complicated situations, for Balaguer had the same pressures that the young General had save one: he was not a member of the Trujillo family. He was supposed to try to hold the military together and carry the nation into the magic event, elections, but as the President himself told the United States Ambassador to the OAS, De Lesseps Morrison, he needed Ramfis to keep military control. "The armed forces respect the Trujillo name, and probably are the only ones who do."<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>In a conversation with Bartlow Martin, "Ramfis said that there was no one and nothing of importance in the country but the Armed Forces, and only he could control them. As for the Communists, or the opposition parties, he could get rid of them whenever he wished, and he snapped the fingers of his right hand together sharply, a Dominican gesture, chilling when a Trujillo makes it." *Ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>2</sup>De Lesseps S. Morrison, *Latin American Mission* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965), p. 147. The date was October 13, 1961.



The fact that he was not a Trujillo was a handicap with the military, but it eased matters as far as the international pressure was concerned and some with the domestic opposition. Yet, Héctor and José Arismendy Trujillo were to try to make the name good in their own benefit, but unfortunately, their timing was too late, and furthermore, they double-crossed the United States. By the time of their bid for power, which had not been possible as long as Ramfis was around as the "legitimate" heir, the North American government had decided on a more democratic course of action in view of domestic and Continental opposition to the continuation of the Trujillo dynasty. The fact that the "Wicked Uncles" had not been convinced of the idea was evident in their desperate gamble for power, but the appearance of the naval task force was to change their minds quickly. Besides, respect for the Trujillo name or not, it was also made clear to the military that the United States was boss, and that they had better back up Balaguer.

The intervention in Dominican affairs through a show of force was cheered with wild enthusiasm in the streets of Santo Domingo, because it was considered a blessing that the country was rid of the Trujillos. This was the first physical intervention by the United States in Dominicana since the days of the Marine Occupation, and it also was the first open physical intervention in Latin America since the days of Franklin D. Roosevelt. As Arthur Schlesinger puts it, "Given the

ingrained Latin American hatred of gunboat diplomacy, this course involved obvious risks. On the other hand, it would be, for once, Yankee intervention to sustain a democratic movement rather than to destroy it, and the President [Kennedy] was prepared to take this chance."<sup>1</sup>

It was now Balaguer's turn to stall with the process of democratization, because, with the Trujillos gone, he wanted to keep power himself. In view of rising popular opposition to Balaguer and to the presence of the fleet, he was "invited" to compromise and form a coalition government with UCN, which by now was also desperate in its bid for power. The problem was that in the caudillistic political system, compromise is not a sign of magnanimity or of an effort to bring about a solution: it is a sign of weakness. Once Balaguer had to compromise with the opposition, he was doomed to fall from the presidency. Yet, he was not an easy man to give up and kept struggling to survive, but, at the same time, UCN, sensing his weakness, kept pressuring him out.

It was only a question of time, if everything remained the same, but now Rodríguez Echavarría was to make his own bid for power, because if Balaguer fell, he would also fall. Besides, he coveted the

---

<sup>1</sup> Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 771.

idea of becoming a new caudillo, and when Balaguer caved in under pressure, the Secretary of State for the Armed Forces appeared as the new heir. Unfortunately, he did not have the strength to remain on top and the United States was not about to support him, because, as it had happened with the "Wicked Uncles," Rodríguez Echavarría would more likely be the cause of disorder than order.

With most of the opposition uncompromising, there was no orderly solution possible, because they would attempt to create as much disorder as possible to make the government crack. To get rid of the opposition would have meant the establishment of a full scale dictatorship, and this was contrary to the already established United States policy. Thus there was no solution except to hand over the government to the anti-Trujillista groups, hold free elections, and keep the military together. In January 1962, UCN finally made it to the government through the Council of State, and the armed forces remained intact save the ouster of a few officers, including the Trujillos. As long as the military held together, there was a guarantee that there would be order, or no Communist government, and the holding of free elections was a guarantee that a democratic process had been started.

The policy of the United States since the end of the previous decade was to rid the nation of the dictatorship and to establish some form of democratic government, but at the same time it was not

willing to follow all the consequences of that policy for fear that it would get out of hand. Trujillo had become a problem and he had to go and ease the way for a more democratic form of government, but it was Trujillo's Secretary of State for the Armed Forces who was supposed to hold the military together, then it was Trujillo's son, and finally Trujillo's puppet President. The more time passed between May 1961 and January 1962, the more the Kennedy Administration was willing to support the democratic aspect of the policy in view of the inability of the "heirs" to provide order and a peaceful solution. It was not a policy, as Soviet writer Yuri Bochkaryov affirms, of an all-out support for dictatorship.<sup>1</sup> Had it been that simple, any of the "heirs" could have wiped out the opposition.

The Council of State enjoyed all-out United States support throughout its tenure, because the Consejeros were not about to create any serious problems to the North Americans and they were the vehicle to the holding of free elections. In spite of the fact that some officers were willing to back the Consejo, the military as a whole knew that the United States was supporting it, which meant that they had better remain quiet. The other political groups besides UCN were also aware of the same fact, but they also were hoping to win in the electoral

---

<sup>1</sup>Yuri Bochkaryov, "The Dominican Crisis--Highlights and Sidelights," New Times, No. 2 (January 10, 1962), pp. 11-13.

contest and there was too much popular support for the elections to begin to toy with the idea of torpedoing them. Thus the road to the electoral event was clear in spite of some minor crises here and there.<sup>1</sup>

By its very nature, the Consejo de Estado could not be a strong government with wide initiative and efforts to solve problems. It was only a lame-duck government by the simple fact that it was transitional and temporary. Furthermore, in a political environment where personality is the foremost asset, a collegiate government was abstract and without "face," which, in reverse, was an advantage for the Consejo, for it became more difficult to make accusations against them. To get the seven Consejeros to agree was a major task, each of them had one vote, and decisions were made by simple majority.

The President, Rafael F. Bonelly, was a shrewd, graying lawyer from Santiago. He had been Rector of the University of Santo Domingo, diplomat, Secretary of State for the Presidency, Secretary of State of Interior and Police, and attorney for Trujillo's sugar combine. The First Vice-President was Nicolás Pichardo, heart surgeon and former Secretary of State for Public Health, and the Second Vice-

---

<sup>1</sup>The period of the Consejo de Estado is covered with great detail by Bartlow Martin, *op. cit.*, Chapters V-XIV. Bosch's book is also very valuable and rich in interpretations of events. Bosch, Crisis de la Democracia de América en la República Dominicana (Mexico: Centro de Estudios y Documentación Sociales, 1964).

President was Donald Reid Cabral, a young auto dealer and replacement for the vacancy left by Balaguer.

The remaining four members of the Consejo were the two national heroes, a heart specialist, and a priest. Antonio Imbert Barrera had been Governor of the Province of Puerto Plata, where his brother, Segundo Imbert, had terrorized the population as military commander. Trujillo became suspect of the officer's loyalty, which meant that brother "Tony" was now in "disgrace" with the Benefactor. Luis Amiama Tío was a businessman involved with Standard Oil of New Jersey (ESSO) gas filling stations, but he was also involved in a moving and storage company and wood business with members of the Trujillo family. Amiama was known to be well-connected with political and military circles, was "compadre" to the ill-fated General José René Román, and had served as president of the Administrative Council of the National District of Santo Domingo. The medical doctor, José Fernández Caminero, had started his political involvement as a leading member of the clandestine 14th of June Movement. After he was released from jail by Ramfis, he also became a member of UCN and was the liaison man between the two political groups. He became a Consejero in January 1962, to take the place of Eduardo Read Barreras, who had resigned, and shortly thereafter Fernández

Caminero gave up his membership in 1944, remaining loyal to UCN.<sup>1</sup>

The seventh member of the collegiate body was Monsignor Eliseo Pérez Sánchez, who had been Trujillo's Senator for several years. Elderly and inconspicuous, he symbolized the Roman Catholic Church's support for the Consejo.<sup>2</sup>

The men who made up the Council of State were as a whole respectable members of the community, and most of them had collaborated with the regime. Without exception, they were either members of the oligarchy or were connected to it through association. The most notorious was "Donny" Reid, whose mother was a Cabral and whose wife is a Patoriza, just as Bonelly was the one with the most political and administrative experience. No one man dominated the Consejo, but Imbert, Reid, and Bonelly were its leading figures: it was always a seven-headed body, with one figure head, and no face, like collegiate governments are.

The Council of State had solid international support. The sanctions of the OAS, diplomatic and economic, had been removed; economic

---

<sup>1</sup> Why Eduardo Reid Barreras, who had been President of Trujillo's Supreme Court, resigned is not known, but the post that had been given to him had first been offered to the attorney José María Cabral Bermúdez, perhaps the most prestigious member of the Dominican oligarchy, who did not accept.

<sup>2</sup> In many ways, he also symbolized the change of sides of the Church, for as Espaillet wrote: "I can recall an election rally at which the most passionately pro-Trujillo speaker was Monsignor Pérez Sánchez." Arturo R. Espaillet, Trujillo: The Last Caesar (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1963), p. 1.

aid missions had been sent; and it enjoyed the support of the democratic Latin American nations. For the United States, "We had three policy objectives there that year," wrote Ambassador Bartlow Martin, "to help keep the Consejo in office, to help hold free elections, and to help get the winner into the palace alive and on schedule."<sup>1</sup> To make sure that the policies would be successful, a four-point program was worked out at the Embassy. This was done after some rioting had occurred, in which a policeman had been killed.

To maintain order, arrest the MPD members who killed the policeman, appoint courageous judges, and train the police to handle mobs.

To placate the impatient people and promote Alianza ideals, get on with tax reform, agrarian reform, and public works.

To let off steam, bring to trial a few calié for crimes committed under Trujillo and remove notorious Trujillistas from government.

To reassure the military, decree that military men could be tried in military courts only.<sup>2</sup>

True enough, so it came. Andrés Ramos Peguero, MPD member who had come to the country with López Molina, was arrested, tried, convicted, and still is in jail for the murder of the policeman. North American detectives were brought to the country, and they trained the police to handle mobs by creating an elite riot group, who wore white

<sup>1</sup>Martin, op. cit., p. 87.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 92. The word calié is absolutely Dominican, and it refers to people who had been spies, members of the SIM, or torturers.



helmets and were thus known as the Cascos Blancos. Without question, they did impose order, although the methods were something less than civilized; a great deal of beatings, but no killings which would create martyrs. Its most notorious commander was to be Francisco Caamaño Deñó, later President of the Constitutionalist Government in 1965.

A public trial with a great deal of publicity and live radio and television coverage was held for the presumed assassins of the Mirabal sisters. The trial dragged on for many weeks, holding a great deal of the attention of the public. The defense of the accused was basically that either they were innocent or that they had acted under orders, but there was also a subtle threat that they would blow the whistle on many people who were now high government officials. In the streets, mobs would persecute caliés, beating them with chains, sometimes to death, while accusing the United States Embassy for granting visas to protect them. The military were granted the privilege, which remains valid today, of having their men tried by military courts only, unless they felt that the offense committed was a matter for civilian courts to handle.

A great deal of public works were started and an income tax law was created. The former would put people to work, inject some money into the economy, and allow some to graft mercilessly; while the latter did not reduce direct taxes, except those on property, and

the heaviest burden was laid on the salaried group. As far as the agrarian reform law, which never amounted to anything, the story is interesting. Bartlow Martin found out that the real opponent to this law was Donald Reid, who had said: "I will fight it in the Consejo and if it passes anyway, I will fight it outside."<sup>1</sup> But then came Pierre Salinger, President Kennedy's Press Secretary, on a vacation trip, and Bartlow Martin asked him to tell Reid that "President Kennedy was very interested in the Consejo's progress, particularly agrarian reform. Salinger did it. In a few days the bill passed. Thus agrarian reform came to the Dominican Republic."<sup>2</sup>

The matter of courageous judges to try troublemakers was extremely delicate. No one really believes in the impartiality of Dominican courts, especially when related to political matters. Judges have always been appointees of the ruling chieftan to serve his purposes, but this corruption arrived at its zenith during the Trujillo era. Justice was handled through the telephone, for the Generalissimo or an aide would call the President of the Tribunal, tell him the verdict and the sentence to be imposed. It would also work in reverse, to get friends out of trouble, or sometimes it was all a show to let them sweat for a while. What was wanted were judges that could be counted

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 114.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

upon to follow the wishes of the government and would create no problems.

Besides, prior to Bartlow Martin's arrival, in March 1962, an Emergency Law had been passed which empowered the Council of State to deport Dominican nationals out of their own country. Whether the United States government was involved or not, there is no documentary evidence, although there is a good possibility since it had always been interested in the matter. All that was needed was an accusation of being a Communist affiliation, and out of the country they would be sent, particularly to Paris and New York. To keep them there, they were sent a monthly sum allowing them to live without working, a not too uncomfortable exile. Some created trouble just to get deported and receive a free trip and a salary.

As always, disorders were blamed on Communists, which many times they were, but not always. "An ordinary turba riot cost \$150, but if one wanted cars burned and store windows smashed, the cost went up to \$500."<sup>1</sup> The turbas, a crowd of people formed into a riot squad, started out in the protest against the Trujillos, but as time went on, the turba became a form of employment, bandits to serve whoever paid, who would also get some booty out of looting.<sup>2</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 97.

<sup>2</sup> Juan José Ayuso, "Dissección de las Turbas," Ahora, No. 14 (13 Agosto 1962), pp. 5-12.

turbas could be used for plain harassment of the government or to get United States concessions, since Washington is most charitable when the purpose is to avoid disorder. When there was desire to crack down on anyone, a turba provided the excuse, and this got to the ridiculous point that they were even used to get rid of business competitors, nothing to do with politics.

One of the problems that faced the Council of State was what to do with the Trujillos' properties. The state now was the largest landowner, the largest investor, and the largest employer in the nation. For instance, out of the total investment in industrial enterprises in Dominicana, \$306,833,025, the state had 50 percent, foreigners 42 percent, and private nationals only 7 percent.<sup>1</sup> This meant that the government had in its hands the capacity to do a great deal of reforms without alienating the powerful, but it also meant that a lot of people, nationals and foreigners, were interested in getting their hands on those properties. The Consejo decided to leave matters to the coming constitutional government as the elected representative of the people, because the properties were considered to be the patrimony of all Dominicans.

As can be seen in the small percentage of industrial investments by private Dominicans, there was no capitalist-oriented bourgeoisie as

---

<sup>1</sup>Franklyn J. Franco, República Dominicana, Clases, Crisis y Comandos (La Habana: Casa de las Américas, 1966), p. 136.

such, but only commercial and landowning interests. These people who had been relegated to secondary positions by Trujillo, only to be used by him and to make them serve him, were hungry for power and property after his death. Yet, they were more attuned to 19th Century patterns of commerce and feudal patterns of social relationships than to the times of the 1960's. This made them hold political attitudes that were totally atavistic. In many ways, the world had frozen in 1930, only to be opened again in 1961, and therefore many could not understand very well the changes that had occurred while Dominicana was in a state of hibernation.

The Dominican oligarchy can be considered in two groups, like any oligarchy: the old secure oligarchs and the new arrives. Santiago de los Caballeros, the second largest city in the nation, can be considered the seat of the established, with name and fortune, but it is not limited to this city--it runs in some of the major towns and in the Capital. On the other hand, the new oligarchs are basically concentrated in Santo Domingo, and their secret to social prestige lies in money. The first group is obviously more secure, but it is also better educated. The former is made up of families who have long held social status, while the latter is basically composed of nationals as well as immigrants, most of whom collaborated with the Trujillo regime.

Both groups are largely white-skinned, although there are exceptions, and they are intermingled with each other through marriages,

commercial, and social relationships. Access to the first group is not that difficult for the children of the second group, but there rarely is a direct climb to the upper crust. On top of the whole thing is the combine of the Cabral-Bermudez-Tavares-Viccini families, all interrelated by blood and business. There are also many other prestigious names such as Cáceres, Troncoso, or Peynado. All these people are extremely influential, far beyond their economic power, mostly due to their social prestige and political connections and know-how.

In a classification of power status in Dominicana, first comes the United States, second the armed forces, and third the oligarchy. During the Trujillo regime, the gap between the power of the armed forces and the oligarchy was much bigger than after the Era had closed, because the military found itself leaderless and more subject to manipulations and influence. It should not be forgotten, in view of later events, that the armed forces were quite opposed to UCN during the days of Ramfis-Balaguer-Rodríguez Echavarría, and that it was precisely during the Consejo that they began to join efforts, a process which culminated during the Donald Reid government. The military is independent of the oligarchy, and it is the latter who are dependent on the former. Later they joined efforts in an interest to maintain the status quo.

In many ways the process is similar to that of regal Europe.

The armed forces were loyal to the king and to themselves, not to the

upcoming bourgeoisie. The fact that they may have joined hands later is another matter, complicated by the fact of the establishment of stable republican rule. However, if in Dominicana there has never been the establishment of the latter, why should there be the occurrence of the former? Caudillo politics prescribe for the use of power and violence, with forces loyal to one man, not a social group. If Trujillo had decided to wipe out the oligarchy, he had the power to do it. However, it is the latter which have maintained the ruling values and structures of the society to which the military agrees.

The Dominican Republic is without doubt a garrison state. The presence of the armed forces is everywhere, and they are quite willing to remind the population of their power. Every town has a garrison, besides a police headquarters, and the military commander is the boss in the place, without a doubt. In the Capital, it is less physically visible, except at times of political turmoil, but in the interior it is absolutely clear. Particularly the area of the Haitian border, detested by military officers who are usually sent there for punishment, not a single move can be made without military approval. Of course, intermingling goes on between the three pillars of power in small towns: the military commander, the priest, and the influentials.

For a nation which, in 1961, had just over three million inhabitants, to have an armed force of some thirty thousand regulars was

somewhat out of proportion, because it amounted to about 1 percent of the entire population. Particularly when it is taken into consideration that no wars have been fought since the War of Restoration, a century before, and there was no likelihood that one would have been fought in the near future. In 1961, the Armed Forces consumed 36 percent of the national budget for the three services: army, navy and air force, but not including the National Police.<sup>1</sup>

The most powerful of the services was the Air Force, although the largest in numbers was, and is, the Army. The reason lies in the fact that at the time the service not only had airplanes, pilots, and so on, which is normal, but they also had tanks and infantry as well as artillery. No air force in the world was so equipped, for it can not be rationally conceived considering there was the army, but no other nation of the world had Trujillo either. The fact was that the Benefactor, who could do what he pleased, decided that Ramfis' outfit was to be the most powerful, perhaps thinking in the day of his demise, to leave the boy in control. Since Ramfis had always liked flying, he wanted to be in the Air Force, so he was made Commander of it. That was that.

---

<sup>1</sup>T. D. Roberts, et al., Area Handbook for the Dominican Republic (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, DA Pam No. 550-54, December 1966), p. 394.



Within the Air Force, the most powerful place was the base of San Isidro. Only 18 kilometers from Santo Domingo, and next to the Armed Forces Training Center (CEFA), which, by the way, at this time was commanded by the now full Colonel Elías Wessin y Wessin. As a whole the statement could be made that whoever ruled in San Isidro ruled the Armed Forces, and whoever ruled the Armed Forces ruled the country. The Navy was the smallest and the weakest of the services, although it also had some infantry in imitation of the United States Marines, whom Trujillo used to emulate and admire. The National Police was organized as a military force and dependent on the Secretary of the Armed Forces, but it somehow was always considered second-class military, not enjoying too much power.

The Dominican military have never been anything other than the instrument of a caudillo, whether it was in the days of the rump-armies of last century or after they had been institutionalized. "Far from being a professional institution dedicated to certain principles which impel its occasional entry into politics, the Dominican Armed Forces have never had any significant function beyond politics, except for plunder."<sup>1</sup> Without Trujillo, they have organically remained

---

<sup>1</sup>Abraham F. Lowenthal, "The Dominican Republic: The Politics of Chaos," in Arpad Von Lazar and Robert R. Kaufman (eds.), Reform and Revolution: Readings in Latin American Politics (New York: Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 1969), p. 40.

together, but split into cliques of different leaders and political opinions, and subject to influence from different political groups.

Without manifest functions--there have been no wars--the warlike apparatus of the Armed Forces has ended by being visualized by all political groups as a potentially useful instrument for the satisfaction of their own objectives. Thus, the recourse of the Armed Forces as a source of legitimation . . . has ended as a tacit rule of the Argentinian political game.<sup>1</sup>

The same statement is applicable to Dominicana, for all political groups have to deal with the armed forces. No political group can hope to achieve some measure of power without the support of the military, and the recognition of their power preponderance compels them to go and knock the doors of the military barrack. The only comparable image in developed societies is that of an occupied nation by foreign troops in which every political group has to come to terms with the military commanders, for in effect, Latin American states are occupied by their own military machine.

The greater the solidarity between the different military groups, the greater stability the nation would have. Any deviationist attempt would be considered a threat and dealt with accordingly in most severe fashion. Unfortunately, there is not always a caudillo to hold the organization together, and this is the opportunity for political groups to advance their own objectives. In this interplay of power and interest,

<sup>1</sup>José Luis de Imaz, Los Que Mandan (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1964), p. 84.

the consequences are of extreme instability, for no one knows for certain what group is going to come out on top and there are no restrictions as to what means are used in the search for power. It is a situation of internal warfare.

The Council of State appointed Major General Víctor Elby Viñas Román as Secretary of State for the Armed Forces. Exactly why he was chosen seems to be unknown. One version is that he was of a conciliatory nature and not forceful enough that he would threaten any of the military cliques or, what would have been worse, unify them to knock over the Council of State. The other version, less known and perhaps more unlikely, is that Román had been in contact with Dominican plotters against the Trujillo regime. In support of this version, it is pointed out that the Secretary had been the military commander in the town of Constanza in 1959, when the 14th of June invasion took place, and that the invading airplane had arrived without difficulty, the invaders taking the town with relative ease.

During the Consejo, there were three military cliques of real importance: the Eliás Wessin group in support of the Council of State and particularly UCN; the San Cristóbal group made up of those wishing the return of Balaguer, perhaps as a stepping stone for the return of the Trujillos; and finally, the Imbert group, for the national hero was now making attempts at becoming a caudillo. Besides these three groups there were officers who had sympathies with other political parties,

including the Communists, but, in general, they were never organized as a group. The majority stood on the sidelines, waiting to see which way the wind was blowing and supporting whoever came out on top.

In the year of 1962, these groups were not as solid as they would become two years later during the government of Donald Reid, but it is at this time that the seeds of the process were laid. It should remain clear that loyalty was not a commodity highly regarded by Dominican officers, and tactical change of sides for the group was as common as changes from one group to another for the members. It is mostly a question of personal advancement, and if one group could secure an officer a promotion, or a hand on graft, they would have his loyalty until some other group made a better proposition.

Promotion within the military establishment is basically due to political reasons, and this, in turn, can be interpreted through loyalty and services rendered to a particular chieftan. One spectacular rise within the forces was that of José de Jesús Morillo López.<sup>1</sup> He entered the National Army in 1947 as a private, with knowledge of shorthand, and left as a Sergeant Major in November of 1950. He re-entered the National Police as a Second Lieutenant on August 1, 1961. This was during the Ramfis-Balaguer period, and by December 8th, during the

---

<sup>1</sup>Miguel Angel Reynoso Solís, "Entrevista con José de Jesús Morillo López," Ahora, No. 122 (7 Marzo 1966), pp. 14-16.

general strike, he was promoted to First Lieutenant. On the first of January he was designated as an aide to the Chief of Police, making it to Captain on January 10, 1962. Now with solid ties with the Chief, General Belisario Peguero, he was promoted to Major on March 1st, to Lieutenant Colonel on March 15th, and to full Colonel by August 1st. In one year he rose from Second Lieutenant to Colonel without there being any wartime situation or anything of the sort.

The troubles for Morillo López started in 1965, when he and Belisario Peguero ceased to see eye to eye. He became involved in a maneuver with Colonel Francisco Caamaño Deñó to try to depose the Chief of Police, who really became upset about it and began to persecute them. Protection was given to them by the Navy Commodore Javier Rivera Caminero by locking them up in Naval Headquarters, out of the reach of Peguero, but since Rivera Caminero was neutral in the now bitter fight between Wessin and the Chief of Police, protection was granted by Wessin by taking them in as a transfer to the CEFA on February 15, 1965, and making Morillo López Inspector General.

After General Peguero had been shipped out of the country, Morillo was passed to the Army on October 31, 1965, as Inspector of the High Command, and twenty days later was made executive of the International Airport of Punta Caucedo. Since he had been linked with Caamaño, but had not gone to the Constitutionalist side of the civil war, he was acceptable enough to be made Chief of Police on February

10, 1966. He lasted there until the Balaguer Government sent him out of the country as military attaché to the Dominican Embassy in Mexico City. His good luck had run out.

The military cliques were not only worried about each other, they also worried about the United States, civilians in general, political parties, labor unions, the Consejo, the oligarchy, and even the Church. If an institution is to be involved in political matters, it has to deal with all the components of political life in a society, and if it is the pivotal center of politics, like the Dominican military is, then its involvement goes waist deep. Yet, the most critical group at the time was that related to the national heroes, Amiama and Imbert, for as Bartlow Martin said: "I probably spent more time in 1962 on them and their plots than on any other single problem."<sup>1</sup>

Their image had become tarnished as they became active in the Consejo, for instead of liberators, they had become suspected and feared by everyone as trying to become the same thing they had destroyed: Trujillo.

All that spring Imbert and Amiama had been quietly collecting power. They got up at 4 A. M. and drove around the city and countryside, talking to their network of private informers, visiting Army and Navy barracks. They assumed the role of protecting the Armed Forces from the people's wrath, hoping to gain its support. Repeatedly they resisted politicians' demands to purge it of Trujillistas. They kept pushing their relatives and friends deeper and deeper into the Government's power centers. They

<sup>1</sup>Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

tried to put a relative of Amiama in command of the Navy. General Luna, then close to Imbert, was Air Commander. They never stopped trying to get their own man in as Army Commander, but never quite succeeded. They did get control of the police, maneuvering the appointment of General Belisario Peguero, a big tough cop. Imbert also was believed to control the Attorney General, García Vázquez; the chief of the Immigration Service; and the head of the police security service, "Pupito" Sánchez, a soft man in a straw hat.<sup>1</sup>

Within the nation, the basic power center for Imbert and Amiama was the police. They managed to get a police autonomy law which in effect gave Belisario Peguero absolute control over the funds, as well as over promotions and discipline, and it included that the Chief of Police could not be fired unless convicted of a crime. Sometimes they overreached their hands and it backfired, as when they requested General Miguel Atila Luna, Chief of Air Force, to give them tanks and artillery for the police, which of course was denied, for Luna was not going to lose his power position, and instead joined the Wessin clique. "The police later got anti-aircraft guns from the Army."<sup>2</sup>

Although the intramural political warfare gets to be quite bitter, with permanent shows of force and even assassinations, when faced with civilian power, there immediately arises a sense of solidarity. In

---

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Norman Gall, "Dominican Republic: The Goons Again," The Nation, Vol. 198, No. 8 (February 17, 1964), pp. 160-161.

a very journalistic style, Laura Berquist wrote: "Suddenly, into the [National] Palace driveway roared a fleet of Army cars. Screeching to a halt, they disgorged officers, armed to the teeth, who dashed into the building." Then she adds, "The President [Bonelly], it later transpired, had tried to fire the Chief of Police, who refused to be fired. He then called the Army to carry through the firing. This unusual social visit by officers was to tell him, personally, that it wasn't the Army's business."<sup>1</sup> It was an obvious power play between Bonelly and Imbert in which the former lost out, because in spite of dislike for the latter in the Army, they were not about to give the edge of firing officers to the civilian authorities: that was their prerogative.

The Police was increased from 3,000 to 10,000 members, largely at the urging of United States officials who thought that (1) the police could be kept apolitical; that (2) because it would be United States trained and indoctrinated, the Police would be democratically oriented and would serve as a counterweight to the other Trujillista dominated services; and that (3) it could regain control of the streets from rampaging mobs . . .<sup>2</sup>

Actually, the National Police was increased, well supplied and trained, but it was all playing into the hands of Imbert and Amiama. The more powerful the Police became, the more powerful they became. Bartlow Martin wrote that although he shared everyone's misgivings

<sup>1</sup> Laura Berquist, "The Legacy of a Dictator," Look, Vol. 26, No. 13 (June 19, 1962), p. 41.

<sup>2</sup> Howard J. Wiarda, "The Politics of Civil-Military Relations in the Dominican Republic," Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. VII, No. 40 (October 1965), p. 477.



about Amiama and Imbert, he saw something else in them: for one, they had manhood, a highly prized commodity in the caudillistic system.

And I saw other things in them. They could laugh even at themselves. They did not botch things, as did so many Dominicans in government. It may be unpleasant but it is a fact that when I wanted to be sure a deportation would work smoothly, I turned to them. They were reasonable men, realistic men, not hotheaded patriots or melodramatic poseurs ready to fling themselves over a cliff. They would listen to me, at least up to a point, and they respected the power of the United States.<sup>1</sup>

Although they had lived like Siamese twins, tied together for mutual survival, Amiama remained mostly in the background, while Imbert came out to the forefront. Their cooperation with the United States was highly rewarded, but so it was with the Communists. Imbert has been accused of being the main provider of government jobs for the Communists as well as supplying them with money and weapons throughout the whole of 1962.<sup>2</sup> In return, the extreme left concentrated their attacks on the oligarchy, Trujillistas, and the United States, but not on them personally.

---

<sup>1</sup> Martin, op. cit., p. 205.

<sup>2</sup> Luis Homero Lajara Burgos, "Antonio Imbert and United States Anti-Communist Intervention in the Dominican Republic," in Dominican Republic: A Study in the New Imperialism (New York: Institute for International Labor Research, 1965), p. 63. Needless to say, Lajara and Imbert have not been the best of friends.

On the other hand, the United States was not only training the Police, and a training mission for the Armed Forces headed by Lieutenant Colonel David C. Wolfe, United States Marine Corps, had been sent in March to presumably cut the forces in half and make it into an effective anti-guerrilla organization. "The mission is encouraging discreetly the Dominican Armed Forces to win back a measure of self-confidence."<sup>1</sup> Only the second part of the program was partially put into effect, for some units were actually trained for anti-guerrilla warfare, which in turn reinforced the Wessin group, but the level of the Armed Forces was maintained the same.

While military squabbles were going on, with moves and counter moves for a coup, the pre-campaign maneuvering by the political parties were also taking effect.

All made a great deal of noise. But polls, my conversations and those of [the Chief of the Political Section] Schlaudeman and others, CIA reports, every sign we could read, showed indisputably that only two parties had a chance of winning--Fiallo's UCN and Bosch's PRD. We had no desire to influence the outcome. We could live with either. Neither was Castro-Communist-dominated. Neither was hopelessly rightist.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, since the outcome of the elections was more advantageous than vice-versa, the United States continued its policy in support of the event and preventing any coup, Imbert's or anybody else's, from occurring.

<sup>1</sup>The New York Times, June 9, 1962.

<sup>2</sup>Martin, op. cit., p. 206.

In mid-1962, there were 26 political parties, most of them what Dominicans call pocket parties or, later, mini-parties, which means that their membership is so limited that they become insignificant at the polls. The three most important parties remained UCN, PRD, and IJ4, with the first two even in membership and the latter trailing behind. While the PRD's membership was on the increase, the other two parties were losing members. Yet, for the general public, which thanks to Trujillo had had no experience with political parties, the situation was extremely confusing, for parties were making pronouncements of thousands of affiliated members and sure victories. It is not an easy matter to sort out what is going on with more than 20 political parties distributing leaflets, placing radio and newspaper ads, and everyone making comments on the political situation. But, experience teaches.

The Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) was founded in 1939 as a loose exile organization with branches in different Continental cities and ideologically located in the so-called democratic left. The party had a platform calling for the establishment of representative democracy with social justice, not unlike its fellow groups throughout Latin America: Venezuela's Accion Democratica, Peru's APRA, Bolivia's Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario, or Costa Rica's Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional. While in exile, a splinter group

was formed, Vanguardia Revolucionaria Dominicana (VRD), very similar in views and headed by Horacio Julio Ornes Coiscou, brother of the publisher of El Caribe, Santo Domingo's most influential newspaper.

Once the PRD had been established in Dominicana, two more splinter groups were to be formed. The Partido Progresista Demócrata Cristiano (PPDC) headed by Ramón A. Castillo, nicknamed Mon the Crazy One, who used to be head of the San Juan, Puerto Rico, branch and was thrown out for having accepted a Cabinet post from Balaguer without the PRD's permission. The other splinter came in the form of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano Auténtico (PRDA), headed by Nicolás Silfa, who used to be head of the New York branch and was purged out by Bosch and Miolán.<sup>1</sup> Surprisingly enough, this little party was to name Joaquín Balaguer as its presidential candidate, but participation was denied on obscure technical grounds.<sup>2</sup>

Juan Isidro Jiménez Grullón, when finally let out of the United States, joined UCN, but was soon to split with them and formed his own Alianza Social Demócrata (ASD), a more radical version of the European social democrats. General Miguel Angel Ramírez Alcántara, who had

<sup>1</sup> Actually, of the three men who came on that fateful June 5, 1961, none of them were to remain in the PRD. Miolán was also purged out in 1965.

<sup>2</sup> The Consejo said that the reason Balaguer could not be a candidate was because there were irregularities in the nomination papers, but the real reason was that his presence might lead to a coup or a violent election. The London Times, November 20, 1962.

fought in Costa Rica and in Cuba as part of the anti-dictatorship group known as the Caribbean Legion, revived the old party of Horacio Vázquez, the Partido Nacionalista Revolucionario Dominicano (PNRD), with a name more attuned to the times by including revolutionary in it. Another old veteran, General Virgilio Vilomar, just kept the same old name, Partido Nacional (PN).

Out of the IJ4 came a splinter group which was more moderate, the Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano (PRSC), and in turn out of this one came the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), headed by Mario Read Vitini. Both were at first linked to the social christian movement in Latin America and particularly to Venezuela's COPEI, but as time went by the monopoly of the ideology remained with the PRSC. The two Communist parties, MPD and PSP, were still around and had not split as yet, but they had been purged out of UCN and were still infiltrated in the IJ4. In the latter part of the decade there would be seven different Communist groups, all fighting and bickering with each other.

The rest of the parties were too insignificant in numbers and played no role in subsequent events, save the Partido Reformista (PR), which four years later won the elections with Balaguer as its presidential candidate. As incredible as it may seem, only the PRD and the PRSC, as well as the Communist groups, are the only ones to survive

through time. Basically, the reason was their ideological commitments rather than just being either the party for one man or a clientele political group. The fragility of the parties is reinforced by the instability that exists, because, for one, instead of working through an established political group, one creates his own, since anything may happen and high profits may be the reward. Yet, the same lack of institutional continuity easily breaks a political group in a sudden turn of events. One lucky chance may bring the party to power just as a bad break finishes it.

The former President was now living in exile in a small mid-town hotel in New York. After resigning, Balaguer took asylum at the Vatican's Embassy, which was, and is, next door to his home. There he was received by the Chargé d'Affaires, Reverend Antonio del Giudici, who would later be the Nuncio when he is again president. The Consejo had at first called for the prosecution of Balaguer and Rodríguez Echavarría, but later changed its mind and exiled both to Puerto Rico. While Balaguer always remained politically active, he soon had a political group called the Committee of Forty, which later became the Partido Reformista, working on his return and distributing taped speeches to high-ranking military officers, Rodríguez Echavarría decided to buy a textile factory and became a successful businessman

in New York.<sup>1</sup>

The Trujillos were all in exile, most of them still remaining in the United States, France, and Spain, particularly the latter. The problem for the Consejo was the influence Balaguer and the Trujillos had on many Dominicans, particularly in the Armed Forces, and therefore exile was a way of eliminating them as serious political contenders. For some, like Ramfis, a thirty-year jail sentence, the legal maximum in Dominicana, was pending after a court had declared him guilty of at least six murders, but for Balaguer there was no other reason than pure politics. The same happens with the Communists, which certainly do create restless situations, but most of those exiled, like Hugo Tolentino, Marcio Mejía Ricart, or Francisco Henríquez (Chito), have never been sentenced on anything. Exile was to please the North Americans and to try to prevent the formation of a radical power contender.

In spite of the fact that Communists and Trujillistas had been eliminated as strong political forces, only seven of the twenty-odd political parties were to participate in the elections scheduled for the end of

---

<sup>1</sup>Balaguer told reporter David Steinberg that the Committee of Forty was the spearhead of a new political party, composed of Santo Doming's most influential and civic leaders, which was to lead 80,000 supporters, who within fifteen days of his return would become 800,000. He added that his return, which he claimed was to be within a few months, would signal the end of dictatorship by having absolutely free elections. New York Herald Tribune, July 8, 1962. He had to stay in New York until 1965.

the year. But, before the Council of State had the honor of celebrating the event, it was to face two very serious political crises amidst the daily problems of a possible coup and/or riots. The first was the sugar crisis with the United States, and the second the Constitutional convention crisis with the opposition.

The Kennedy administration was to give the Consejo all kinds of political support, but basically this came through money and military power. The Agency for International Development (AID) had given a loan of twenty-five million dollars on February 6, 1962, to keep the Council of State afloat by meeting payroll datelines and putting people to work.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, the Kennedy administration wanted a new world sugar quota system, now that North American sugar producers were no longer in Cuba, instead of the previous country by country arrangement. This would have meant a net loss for Dominicana, since it now had a sugar quota covering practically its entire production, which was above cost in the world market price. Furthermore, twenty-two million dollars had been retained in the United States when the OAS sanctions were placed on Trujillo, and the Consejo was being pressured by every political group, UCN included, to get this money back.

---

<sup>1</sup>United States Embassy, "Summary of Alliance for Progress Activities in the Dominican Republic, 1962-1965," mimeographed report, p. 3.



President Kennedy was sympathetic to the Dominican case, but there was the United States Congress to worry about, and particularly the Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture, Representative Harold Cooley, who had also presented his sugar-quota bill. Furthermore, on the matter of the twenty-two million, "Senators preferred to look on it, if at all, not as a debt we owed the Republic but as an 'act of grace' on our part."<sup>1</sup> The Consejo, with Reid and Pichardo in the lead, decided that this was a double-cross on the promised North American support and began to stop all AID projects. "What it all amounted to was this: The Consejo had gone on strike against the Alliance for Progress."<sup>2</sup>

Without the overt North American support, the Council was doomed to fall in the sea of intrigues that is characteristic of Dominican politics. The whole sugar matter had to be resolved, and so it was, if there were to be elections at all. In the sugar bill, Dominicana received a basic quota of 190,000 tons plus about 215,000 tons of the formerly Cuban quota that was being redistributed. The matter of the twenty-two million was resolved by being received as a grant, and "Administration and Senate leaders hit upon yet another device for increasing the Dominican quota: Adding an amendment to a wholly

---

<sup>1</sup> Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 163.

different bill, giving the President discretionary powers to distribute a quota of 225,000 tons over the next two years among the Dominican Republic and two other Latin American countries."<sup>1</sup>

Militarily, the support came not only through the permanent recommendations of military attaches and training officers, but through the periodic visits of United States warships. The purpose was to remind everyone, military and civilians as well, of the power that lies to the North. To make sure that everyone understood that the United States was supporting the Council of State, the Consejeros would be ostensibly flown to aircraft carriers and/or a reception would be staged in which the Consejeros and military commanders would be photographed together to come out on the first page in the next day's press. The favorites at this time were the visits of the aircraft carrier *Boxer*, stationed in Caribbean waters, and the top military officer of the region, the head of the United States Army Southern Command, Lieutenant General Andrew O'Meara, stationed in the Canal Zone, Panama.

When the arrangement was made to set up the Council of State in December of 1961, Trujillo's constitution had been amended to allow the new government to have a legal basis and with the proviso that a constitutional assembly was to meet in the subsequent August 15, 1962,

---

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 171.

to draw up a new constitution. The problem was that an election had to take place for the members of the constituent assembly to be chosen, and this was an opportunity to measure the strength of the different parties before the time of the elections for the Executive and Legislative powers. Given the exclusively power-oriented nature of the caudillistic political system, whoever came out clearly as the winner would reap all the votes in December.

Since UCN was in control of the Consejo, it was not about to test its strength decisively with the PRD, which is precisely what the latter wanted to do. Thus the two major political parties took opposite view of the matter: UCN calling for a single election on December 20th and PRD wanting the August election. Another problem was that the legal span of the Consejo came to a close if the constitutional assembly had been operating, for it could no longer legislate legally if there were the presence of a body elected by the people.

Technically, nothing had been prepared to carry through the August election, in spite of the long presence of an OAS technical assistance team on electoral matters. If this election was postponed, it meant that the December election had to be postponed also, which placed in doubt the survival of the Council itself and the holding of any elections at all. But besides all this, there were some petty interests involved in the matter. The National District Committee of the UCN

was dominated by the PSP, who were still infiltrated there, and immediate elections would not only confirm their position, but it would also strengthen their hand vis-a-vis the rest of the party. This was intolerable for a basically upper-class oriented party of conservative views.

On the other hand, Juan Bosch was having his particular problems also. The ruling constitution specifically provided that to be President of the Dominican Republic, the candidate must have resided in the nation for at least the previous five years, which made Bosch and all the previous exiles ineligible. Given the circumstances, this problem was not unsurmountable, for after all, Trujillo had only been dead for a year, but there was another matter. The candidate also had to be not only born in Dominicana, but also at least one of the parents had to be Dominican born. The head of the PRD's father was Spanish and the mother Puerto Rican, which made Bosch ineligible.

Since everyone had his own little ax to grind, the matter was resolved peacefully through a gentlemen's agreement. There would only be a single election on December 20th, with the Congress elected at the time, writing its own constitution. The Council of State would act as a National Assembly, draw up a constitution, and stay in power until February 27th, when the elected President, Congress, and Municipal authorities would take office. The new Constitution was decreed on September 16, 1962, and Article 50 specified that to be President of the

Republic the candidate's requirements were: (1) to be Dominican through birth or origin; (2) to be at least thirty years of age; and (3) to be in full exercise of his civil and political rights.<sup>1</sup> The candidacy of Juan Bosch was now legally possible.

The United States Ambassador, John Bartlow Martin, whose arrival in the country had been interpreted by some as a North American switch from UCN to PRD,<sup>2</sup> had favored all along the UCN position, only one election, and he never forgave Bosch for this.

I thought one more thing had become clear: We could not trust Juan Bosch. For President he would not do. It was not that he had fought us now on this issue. It was, rather that he was a reckless political plunger, willing to risk everything, including the democratic system itself, to gain a personal political objective.<sup>3</sup>

Besides political parties, other groups had become organized after the demise of the Generalissimo. Students were the first, followed by labor and peasants, and, of course, their counterparts, landowners, industrialists, and businessmen. They were as weak and as

---

<sup>1</sup>Constitución de la República Dominicana, Gaceta Oficial No. 8693. As a whole, it was basically the same as the previous constitution.

<sup>2</sup>Presumably, President Kennedy had become dissatisfied with Calvin Hill, Jr., the Charge d'Affaires, and his support of UCN, and therefore at the time of sending an Ambassador he chose Bartlow Martin to support the PRD. Julio César Martínez, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution in the Dominican Republic," New Politics, Vol. IV, No. 2 (Spring 1965), p. 50. Martínez is the publisher of Santo Domingo's weekly newspaper, Renovación.

<sup>3</sup>Martin, op. cit., p. 201.

chaotic as the political parties themselves, and, as a whole, still remain so. But, this is understandable due to the fact that organizations were non-existent unless they were for the glory of the Benefactor, and if they were not, they had a very short duration. These organizations should not be visualized within the narrow concept of an interest group as they function in developed and stable societies, for besides their particular interest, they form part of the larger societal conglomeration of power and violence.

In the fusion, between the caudillistic political system, where there is a notorious lack of institutions, and the demands for structural organizations made by modernization, the interest groups play a dual role. On the one hand, they behave as interest groups do everywhere, channeling their demands through the powers that be, while on the other hand, they may work actively for the overthrow of the existing powers if their demands are not met. Just like the military cliques, the interest groups stand to gain or lose in any change of administration, and they may take positions of supporters of the existing powers or attempt to provoke its overthrow. Now, this is further complicated by the fact that there are class interests involved in the matter and the maintenance or the overthrow of the entire socio-economic order is also at stake.

To play politics in Dominicana is an extremely difficult matter that has to be handled with extreme care. One mistake may doom an

interest group to disappearance, through murder if necessary, needless to say of economic and political pressure. The heads of these groups know that their lives are at stake in any move they make, for their actions are political in the support or detriment of the existing powers. At the same time, they must defend the interest of their particular group, which may be the simple freezing or rise of wages to the complicated position of what to do in a chaotic situation.

The students were organized into the Federación de Estudiantes Dominicanos (FED), headed by Armando Hoepellman, which, at first, was exclusively formed by students from the national university, later to include high school students as well. As a whole, the students came from no lower than middle-class, for the University of Santo Domingo functioned exclusively for the interest of the upper-crust. Now, students were not acting necessarily to protect what the previous generation had granted to them as a privilege, but on the contrary, they were idealistic and egalitarian.

In alliance with the professors, who at the time were mostly UCN, the students participated in the liquidation of the Trujillo regime through the creation of pressure through disorder. Although they acted through their organization, as a whole they were basically working through the political parties, particularly IJ4. They were, and still are, the most vocal pressure group in the nation, taking enormous risks with the determination and faith and spirit of sacrifice that seems

to come only in early adulthood.

The fact that they were vocal and energetic was an enormous attraction for the political parties who needed to work from below the existing powers. UCN had worked with them until they took the Consejo, then they were no longer needed, and besides they were parting company because the more conservative UCN became, the more radical the students became. Three student organizations sprang up: the Revolutionary Democratic University Bloc (BDRU), connected with the PRSC; the Radical Revolutionary University Front (FURR), associated with the PRD; and FRAGUA, which in Spanish means forge, basically tied to IJ4 but also in connection with the MPD and the PSP.

The real struggle was between the BDRU and FRAGUA for control of the student federation, because then they would be able to put the organization to the service of their parties and their cause. From one point of view, the lineup was in terms of political right for the Social Christians and revolutionary left for the IJ4, or from the other point of view, democratic revolutionaries for the BDRU and Communists for FRAGUA. The PRD did not enjoy any substantial support from students in general nor from the FURR in particular, and real battles ensued between the other two groups, from pamphlets attacking each other to gunfights.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>This is not unusual in the Caribbean. See Orlando Albornoz, "Activismo Político Estudiantil en Venezuela," *Aportes*, No. 5 (Agosto 1967), pp. 11-41; or Jaime Suchlicki, "El Estudiantado en la Universidad



The students did manage to get the most notorious Trujillistas out of the university's administration and faculty, but most important, they managed to get autonomy for the university on December 31, 1961. During the Era of Trujillo, university administrators and professors were named by the Generalissimo, but now professors were to be chosen between administration, faculty, and students, and administrators were to be elected by faculty and students. The government's only concern was to supply the institution with money, and it could not legally have anything to do with university affairs. Most important, in the concept of autonomy is involved the sanctity of the campus, which meant that no police or troops could legally enter. The university was, and is, a sanctuary for political battles among students as well as for students against the existing national government.

Organized labor was just as attractive to the political parties as the students, but there is a major difference. Labor is significant at times of elections in terms of numbers, and it is also significant as a demonstration of power through numbers for a political party. This may take the form of a political rally, the press giving coverage to the numbers involved, or of a strike to give the government a real headache, if it is peaceful, and torment if it comes with violence. In the use of violence, the government responds in kind in an attempt to break the

de la Habana y la Política Cubana, 1956-1957," Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. IX, No. 1 (January 1967), pp. 145-167.

المنارة للاستشارات

workers' intent, which in turn arouses more people, and the military, to come to a peaceful situation even at the expense of deposing the government or killing workers, as the case may be.

During the Trujillo Era there had been only one workers organization, the Confederación Dominicana del Trabajo (CDT), which operated as part of the dictatorship. Only once did they have a strike, at the North American owned La Romana sugar mill. As it can be imagined, troops were sent, workers massacred, and the leader, Mauricio Báez, escaped to Cuba only to be assassinated there by Trujillo's agents. As soon as the dictatorship collapsed, so did the CDT.

The first free labor federation was the Frente Obrero Unido Pro Sindicatos Autónomos (FOUPSA), which rumor has it was a creation of the CIA.<sup>1</sup> People from the PRD, IJ4, and UCN were involved, and the head, Augusto A. Rodríguez, wanted to keep it from the hands of the parties, a non-political labor organization. This is very much in the North American conception of what labor groups ought to be, but in Dominicana that is impossible, thus Rodríguez was ousted, only to form another group: Central Sindical de Trabajadores Dominicanos (CESISTRADO).

---

<sup>1</sup>De Lesseps Morrison wrote that he suspected that the CIA was subsidizing the opposition parties and the proliferation of new organizations in order to further Balaguer's "progressive democratization." Morrison, op. cit., p. 133, ff.

More labor groups were formed, the most important of which was the Confederación Autónoma de Sindicatos Cristianos (CASC), controlled by the Social Christians. The old FOUPSA was now more radical, and therefore the United States Labor Attache, Frederick Somerford, in alliance with the representative of the North American labor group AFL-CIO, Andrew McClellan, founded a FOUPSA Libre. The Free FOUPSA became the principal labor group in mid-1962, primarily due to the "money, men, and materials provided by the United States working through the AFL-CIO and ORIT. The technicians, organizers, educational materials, teachers, and funds which the United States provided were too overwhelming for the rival labor federations to compete."<sup>1</sup> By the end of the year, they changed their name to Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Libres (CONATRAL), and it is still playing a part in Dominican politics.

The Fourteenth of June Movement (1J4) was able to gain control of La Unión (Unión Dominicana de Trabajadores Sindicados), and shared control with the PSP and MPD of the teachers' federation (FENEMA) and the public employees federation (FENEPIA). The UCN was linked to CONATRAL, but as a whole its participation in the labor movement was

---

<sup>1</sup>Howard J. Wiarda, "The Development of the Labor Movement in the Dominican Republic," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1966), p. 53. ORIT (Organización Regional Inter-Americana del Trabajo) is the regional labor organization tied to the North American AFL-CIO.

insignificant. The PRD was able to unite the old FOUPSA and the splinter CESISTRADO into a national labor confederation (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores FOUPSA-CESISTRADO), which controlled the sugar workers of government and private mills. In terms of votes, this was the most important labor group, for sugar is not only the principal industry in Dominicana, but it is a labor intensive industry.<sup>1</sup>

The PRD also moved into another vote getting direction, the peasants. Dominicana is approximately 70 percent rural, with the mass of the population living in the countryside, which is good for votes, but not for immediate power demonstrations. Sacha Volman, a Rumanian anti-Communist exile, who had worked with Bosch in Costa Rica, came to the nation to organize the peasants into a brotherhood called Federación Nacional de Hermandades Campesinas (FENHERCA). They received money from the United States government as well as money and technical assistance from Norman Thomas' Institute for International Labor Research and the Farmers' Union, which is associated with the Democratic Party.<sup>2</sup>

The counterparts to labor and peasants were not important in terms of numbers, but they were very important in terms of money and

---

<sup>1</sup>Franco, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-133.

<sup>2</sup>Howard J. Wiarda, The Aftermath of the Trujillo Dictatorship: The Emergence of a Pluralistic Political System in the Dominican Republic (Gainsville: Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Florida, 1965), p. 319.

influence. There was the National Council of Businessmen, the Dominican Association of Cattlemen and Farmers (landowners), the Industrial Association of the Dominican Republic, and the Chamber of Commerce in different municipalities, the most important being that of the National District. As a whole, they were all informally linked to UCN, as it would be expected.

Of the three major political parties in the country, only the IJ4 decided not to participate in the electoral event on the grounds that elections would not solve the problems facing the Dominican people, for the state was in the hands of the United States and its allies, the Armed Forces and the oligarchy. They had moved a long way from the early days of their belief in pure and simple representative democracy: they were prematurely concerned with systematic transformation. "The national liberation revolution is not a Communist revolution, but the national liberation revolution is a nationalistic, revolutionary, anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, and democratic revolution."<sup>1</sup>

It was too early to call for a major revolutionary movement, because representative democracy had not been tried out. Later, the IJ4 leaders would recognize that their attitude was an act of political infantilism, which cost them dearly in terms of affiliates and power.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Francisco Antonio Avelino, Las Ideas Políticas en Santo Domingo (Santo Domingo: Editorial Arte y Cine, C. por A., 1966), pp. 104-105.

<sup>2</sup>Franco, op. cit., pp. 125-126.

The result was that in spite of the IJ4 calling for electoral abstention, the majority of its members voted in the election and voted for the PRD. At the time it seemed that the vast majority of people considered that the democratic system had not functioned only because there had been "bad" leaders in power, and they were quite willing to try the elections, which were to be free, presumably to elect a "good" leader.

Both the PRD and UCN were extremely active in their campaign. Bosch directed his strategy to the masses through promises of social and economic advancement, while Fiallo was basically concerned with a tirade of anti-Trujillism. The former would call for the forgetting of the past and starting with a clean slate, "borrón y cuenta nueva," while UCN spoke of the need for morality through the purge and chastisement of Trujillistas. The Social Christians (PRSC) were just as active, with perhaps the greatest amount of young people of the parties contesting for the votes, and their campaign was somewhat middle-of-the-road between PRD and UCN.

The Bosch campaign was the most thoroughly professional of all political groups, handled by the able Secretary General of the party, Angel Micolán. It was well organized, covering all the areas of the nation. Bosch would dress just in simple clothes, as compared to UCN's business suit approach, to talk to the peasants about their needs and their problems. He revived the word tutumpote, meaning all-powerful, which clearly identified the rich of the upper-class, and as a

counterpart, referring to the masses, he used the expression los hijos de Machepa, which clearly meant the disinherited of the nation, those who did not have a prestigious ancestry. Without doubt, Juan Bosch is a master at communicating with the masses.<sup>1</sup>

He made promises of people eating three meals a day; land for the peasants and just compensations for the workers; employment for all. In an underdeveloped nation where the vast majority is hungry, landless, unemployed, or meagerly paid, people were willing to pay attention to what "Juan Bo" was talking about. There were also campaign smears, like accusing UCN of being only the party of the "whites," while they responded by accusing the PRD of being Communist and Trujillista.

The national conventions of the political parties reflected the traditional pattern of caudillism: the chief would choose and decide. For instance, in the PRD, without question, the presidential candidate was to be Juan Bosch, but there was some problem of choosing a vice-presidential nominee. At first the post was offered to a priest, Father Francisco Sicard, who did not accept; then the man chosen by the convention was Buenaventura Sánchez, which did not please the presidential

---

<sup>1</sup>A short-story writer by profession, one of the best in Latin America, and writing about the simple people of the continent, gave Bosch a great advantage in the knowledge of communications. See his article on the matter, "Algunas Ideas Acerca de la Comunicación de Masas," Ahora, No. 318 (15 Diciembre 1969), pp. 17-21.

standard bearer; thus on the grounds of technicalities he was rejected and the chosen vice-presidential standard bearer was the acceptable lawyer, Segundo González Tamayo. In the PRSC, which had no dominant figure, the chosen candidates were two lawyers, the soft-spoken Alfonso Moreno Martínez and a woman, Josefina Padilla. In this case, at least there was some dispute as to who would run.

There were two crises before the elections: one on the matter of colored ballots and the other with the church. The Electoral Board decided in November that all the ballots would be of the same color, to which both the PRD and the PRSC protested and threatened to withdraw if it was not changed. The problem is that in a nation of approximately 70 percent illiterate, the color of the ballot is the clue to the identification of the party and the candidate. It was now the Electoral Board's turn to threaten to resign on the grounds that they were being harassed and insulted by the parties, besides, they did not have colored paper. Due to the intervention of the North American Ambassador and the rushing of the colored paper from the United States, the crisis was resolved.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Martin, *op. cit.*, pp. 272-275. The matter was even more complex because there was disagreement as to what to do to split a ballot, but it was also solved by being able to break the ballot in two. Now, the colored ballot in which the name of the candidates for President, Vice-President, Senators, Deputies, and even Mayors and City Councilmen appear means that the party which wins the presidency fills up the rest of the offices, for it becomes extremely difficult to split the votes.



The Church crisis was much more serious. After the death of Trujillo, "Reflecting the political uncertainty of the times, the Church maintained a discreet silence."<sup>1</sup> Those who had been vociferous against the dictator had offered Te Deums and prayers for his soul, - which did not help to clarify on which side they were. By September, the Bishop of Santiago, Monsignor Hugo Polanco Brito, declared that Dominicans were free to join the party of their choice, save the Communists, but it was never made clear exactly what that meant.<sup>2</sup>

Significantly, in February of 1962 a new Nuncio was appointed, Monsignor Enmanuele Clarizio, "a hand picked selection of Pope John XXIII."<sup>3</sup> This is the same man who escorted Balaguer out of the country, for, as it may be remembered, he had been in asylum at the Vatican's Embassy. Clarizio was a man of wide political experience: he had been assistant to Pope John when the latter was Nuncio in Paris; he had been assistant to Monsignor Giovanni Montini, now Pope Paul VI, when the latter was Acting Secretary of State; and he had been appointed by Pope Pius XII as the Inter-Nuncio, first Nuncio, to

---

<sup>1</sup>Howard J. Wiarda, "The Changing Political Orientation of the Catholic Church in the Dominican Republic," A Journal of Church and State, Vol. VII, No. 2 (Spring 1965), p. 244.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 245.

<sup>3</sup>Reverend James A. Clark, The Church and the Crisis in the Dominican Republic (Westminster, Maine: The Newman Press, 1967), p. 6.

Pakistan in 1958.<sup>1</sup> This new Vatican envoy to Dominicana was of a much higher caliber than those who had preceded him, and he was to play a very important role in Dominican politics.

Exactly to what extent the Vatican Foreign Office controls the activity of local Church hierarchy and priests is impossible to determine, but, without doubt, they exert a great deal of influence. It is the same thing as with the Communist parties, where it is obvious that a great deal of influence comes from Moscow, Peking, and/or Havana, depending on ideological inclinations and source of funds, but the exact extent is impossible to determine. Sometimes these groups act somewhat independently, and sometimes they are obviously restrained and directed.

The crisis came a week before the elections, when a Spanish Jesuit Priest, Father Láutico García, wrote an article accusing Bosch of being a Communist, a fact which was picked up and widely advertised through Church-controlled radio stations such as Radio Santa María and Radio Sol. The implication was clear, for if Catholics could not vote for Communist candidates, the UCN would probably win the elections.<sup>2</sup> Bosch reacted by threatening to withdraw from the event,

---

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6-7, 157.

<sup>2</sup> Bosch, *op. cit.*, *Crisis de la Democracia . . .*, p. 116. Although admitting that probably they would have lost the election, the author-presidential candidate claims that it would have been by a narrow margin.

unless the Church hierarchy would publicly take back the accusation, a fact which they did not do, claiming that they were not responsible for the actions of individual priests.<sup>1</sup> The PRD withdrew from the electoral contest, knowing very well that this would invalidate the legitimacy of the results.

The United States Ambassador went to see the Nuncio and told him that the United States Government "had been checking on Bosch for some twenty-five years through our various intelligence agencies, and that--although anything was possible--so far as we could determine, Bosch was not a Communist."<sup>2</sup> Clarizio, although angry at the PRD's presidential candidate, talked to the bishops who were less conciliatory than he was. Bosch was now trying to milk the situation dry by trying to get a clean bill of health from the Catholic Church which would probably be interpreted as an endorsement of his party's candidates. A way out was found through a public debate between the accusing priest and Juan Bosch, on which Bartlow Martin commented to Clarizio, "I said I though we were on the verge of success and hoped that in tonight's television debate Father Lúatico García would be gentle.

---

<sup>1</sup>At least, the diplomatic community agreed that the Church hierarchy was not a party at labeling Bosch a Communist. Don Bonafede, "The Dominican Elections," The Nation (January 12, 1963), p. 28.

<sup>2</sup>Martin, op. cit., p. 286.

The Nuncio assured me he would."<sup>1</sup>

The debate was a total success for Bosch. The Jesuit admitted in front of the concentrated attention of the nation that the PRD leader was not a Communist.<sup>2</sup> Bosch managed to have everyone and the electoral process to depend on this debate and his person, which was of great political skill and it became an important factor in determining the victory of the PRD at the polls.<sup>3</sup>

Their slogan, "Dignity vs. Money," gave the PRD the sympathetic view of the underdog and defenders of the destitute, which is the vast majority of the people. The UCN was always on the defensive, believing in their imminent victory, while the PRD maintained the offensive, a fact which gave the latter a sense of calling and dynamism. Besides, the UCN strategy was not to push their own view, but to react to their opposition, and worst of all, badly, as for example, going to

---

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 294.

<sup>2</sup> For a summary of the debate, see "Juan vs. Lautico: El Debate del Año," Ahora, No. 24 (1<sup>ra</sup> Quincena de Enero, 1963), pp. 13-16.

<sup>3</sup> The Cuban Armed Forces magazine, Verde Olivo, visualized the debate in this fashion. "The gesture of Bosch, whose adherence to the policy of the United States, as well as his anti-Communist position, is most notorious, was interpreted in two ways: either as a last-minute act to enable his chief rival, Viriato Fiallo, whom the U. S. Embassy and the reactionary clergy support, to gain the victory in the electoral farce, or as a reflection of the pressure exerted by the masses of people so that he should not participate in the electoral trickery." Cited in Dan Kurzman, Santo Domingo: Revolt of the Damned (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1965), p. 73.

the city's shanty towns and talking about their "negritos," which means paternalistically "little negroes." The PRD managed to hang on UCN the label of being the party of the oligarchy--rich, white, powerful, and with social prestige--and they were never able to shake that image.

While the UCN appealed for the vote of those who were satisfied with the existing socio-economic status quo and the anti-Trujillistas, the PRD had the vote of those dissatisfied with existing conditions, including the Trujillistas. Thanks in great measure to the efforts of General Miguel Rodríguez Reyes,<sup>1</sup> who managed to convince the military that they were safer with Bosch than with Fiallo, who always talked about purges, the vast majority of the Armed Forces were on the side of the PRD. The strategy of not castigating Trujillo or the military paid off handsomely in terms of votes, for enlisted men and officers went around recommending to people that "Juan is the man." That meant that it was clear on whose side the military was and that people had better remember it.

Not all sectors of the military, however, were behind the idea of supporting the PRD. Some were concerned about its ideological motivations of democracy and social reforms, particularly the latter; others were concerned about the heavy backing of all those groups and personalities which had been influential or had profited from the

---

<sup>1</sup> A few days after the elections, General Rodríguez Reyes was killed under mysterious circumstances.

Trujillo Era, and therefore saw the PRD as the antithesis of the democratic oriented UCN; finally, others were concerned about their personal standing if the PRD came to power, for they did not have the proper ties or connections that would insure their permanence and status.

The day before the elections, there were rumors of an impending coup d'etat directed by Antonio Imbert, but it proved to be false. The military was already committed to the elections and hoping for guarantees in the possible victory of Juan Bosch, and to oppose the electoral process would have probably earned them reprisals from the public as well as from the United States, at least to the leading officers of the conspiracy.

On election day, December 20, 1962, Dominicans filed in rows at the voting booths to vote for the candidate of their choice. It was an orderly affair, that first free election since 1924, and it proved to be one of the cleanest, if not the cleanest, in all the history of Dominicana. Two days later, the Philadelphia Inquirer had the headline, "Leftist Leads in Dominican Voting." The Washington Post was more charitable, saying "leftist anti-communist," while the London Times called it a victory for moderation. Juan Bosch was the President-elect of the Dominican Republic, receiving almost 60 percent of the votes cast. He would take office in February, deposed and exiled in September.

In spite of all the conspiracies, intrigues, and bickering among the different political groups and personalities, the period of the Consejo de Estado was to have a profound influence in Dominican society. For one thing, there was a great deal of freedom of discussion and association, a condition that most Dominicans had never enjoyed in their lives. It also allowed for the formation of groups and associations which would have to be taken into account in the political system. The caudillistic political system no longer only depended on the allegiance to fulano or sutano and his rump-army, but a series of groups, sometimes contradictory in purposes, also had to be taken into account.

Second, the government was true to its purpose, and largely thanks to the United States, the Consejo was able to weather all the storms and carry out the electoral event, a very significant matter itself for those who had never enjoyed the privilege of choosing their rulers. The caudillistic political system had now to rely more than before on electoral consultation, which presumably meant that the rulers had to be, in order to be accepted, the expression of the "will of the people." The greater dependence on popular support meant that if the rulers did not enjoy this prerogative of the governed, they would have to rely on greater coercion than it had in the past, a matter further complicated by the rise of independent political groups and associations.

Third, the electoral campaign had provided the possibility for the PRD to begin the task of creating a populist movement with the support of the workers and peasants and anti-status quo oriented middle sectors. A new social strata had been mobilized for participation in the political system through the vehicle of the political party and their own organizations. Although there were other anti-status quo parties, such as the PRSC, 1J4, PSP, and MPD, they depended largely on youth and the middle sectors, but only the PRD had a major influence with the masses. Significantly, however, the polarizing events of 1965 would find them all together against the groups supporting the status quo.

Fourth, the policy of the United States of aiming toward a democratic regime in order to avoid Castro, once the support of the remnants of the Trujillo regime had been discarded, had proven to be quite successful. The fact that the Council of State had remained in power and was able to carry through an election in which none of the major contenders were particularly critical of North American policies or its dominating influence in the island, was exactly what the aims of the Alliance for Progress were all about. There was even some talk in Washington that the Dominican Republic was to be a showcase of that program. The Consejo had demonstrated that a democratic oriented regime was capable of working closely with the imperial power of the



Caribbean in matters of common interest, and this set the stage for the possibilities of a working relationship between the incoming Bosch Administration and the Kennedy Administration.

Finally, the Consejo de Estado was able to provide the time needed for these processes to develop, which would have been unthinkable had the Ramfis-Balaguer-Rodríguez Echavarría groups remained in power and restored the dictatorship. This task made possible that the socio-economic developments present during the Trujillo Era, but politically dormant due to the tyranny, would now come to the fore, in such a manner as to make the restoration of the traditional caudillistic system a practical impossibility. This would be further accentuated by the constitutional regime of Juan Bosch.

## CHAPTER V

## COUP D'ETAT

The English language really does not have a good word or phrase to express the circumstances of a violent overthrow of a government. Perhaps this is due to the fact that since the 17th Century, the English-speaking nations have been engaged in peaceful transfers of political power. In Spanish it is called, golpe de estado, which literally means a hit or strike of state involving the use of force, but not necessarily the occurrence of actual violence. Coup d'etats are normally somewhat peaceful affairs, with perhaps some arrests and beatings, but hardly ever any shooting. If to overthrow a government there is the use of physical violence, then it probably is a rebellion, if its only purpose is to capture the mechanisms of power, or a revolution, if in addition it involves changing those same mechanisms to new ones.

According to D. J. Goodspeed, three conditions are necessary for the violent overthrow of a government.<sup>1</sup> First of all, the active support of the Armed Forces, or as a minimum its neutrality. Generally, in Latin America, power resides in the military and for any

<sup>1</sup>D. J. Goodspeed, The Conspirators (New York: The Viking Press, 1961).

coup there is always the involvement of the Armed Forces. In other nations which have not successfully attained peaceful mechanisms for the transfers of power, such as the Soviet Union, it is conceivable that a coup is perpetrated by civilians with only the neutrality of the military, as was the case in the deposing of Premiere Nikita Khrushchev, but in Latin America it is not.

A second condition is that international circumstances are favorable. For example, in the case of an extreme foreign threat to the nation, the tendency is to forestall any coup on the grounds that in the show of division and weakness, the beneficiary would be whoever is threatening. In Dominicana the international conditions are basically limited to two possibilities. First and foremost, the position of the United States. If there is the active support, the arranging of, or at least the neutrality of the North Americans toward a possible coup, then whatever the government that is in question stands to fall, and vice versa. The other possibility is less paramount, but it is related to major friction with a Latin American neighbor, particularly Haiti with whom the shared frontier has been a cause of major squabbles for over a century.

The third and final condition proposed by Goodspeed is that there must be the active support, or at least the apathy, of public opinion for a coup d'etat to take place. It is practically impossible to conceive the North American military deposing the President of the United States,

dismissing Congress, and establishing a governing junta. The long tradition of constitutional and orderly procedures in the transfer of power has formed the public's mind to the point that such an occurrence would not be tolerated. In Dominicana, the reverse is true. The tradition has been that coup d'etats are a fact of life because ultimate power resides in the military, not in the system of government or its constitution. The public mind has been conditioned toward the acceptance of such occurrences with a certain degree of hope, sadness, or apathy, depending on the case, but in general no participation. However, there are notable exceptions, such as the immediate public reaction to the Rodríguez Echavarría coup of 1962 or the general feeling of intolerance for an usurpation of power during the government of the Council of State.

The Constitutional government of Juan Bosch was to find itself with hostility from a military sector, at best neutrality from the United States toward a coup, and no effective public reaction to prevent it from occurring. Under these circumstances, the government that had been elected stood to fall, and it did, on September 25, 1963.

The attempt to transform the traditional caudillistic political system into a liberal representative democracy dedicated to socio-economic change was to prove an untenable proposition in Dominicana.

The forces in favor of the status quo were not willing to permit the

erosion of their power into a populist government, democratic or not, and they chose to destroy the incipient democratic institutions in the name of anti-communism. A democratic government was only acceptable if it did not attempt to change the existing framework, which is to say that the caudillistic political system and its social and economic structures was to remain intact. Without change, there could be no democracy, only occasional democratic governments as had happened in the past, but this became a more tolerable alternative than accepting change.

After the death of Trujillo, the political issues in Dominican society were reduced to the simple dichotomy of freedom versus tyranny. Those opposed to the dictatorship and its remnants were presumably in favor of the former, while those attempting a direct inheritance of the power of the Generalissimo were sided with the latter. It was as simple as that, and it would have remained so if new segments of the population had not been mobilized during the electoral campaign to create the basis of a populist movement. The concept of freedom was now enlarged to include all the segments of the society, not only the privileged few, and it was also related to a socio-economic basis rather than the mere juridical affirmation of human rights which only the privileged could enjoy. Furthermore, the political spectrum was now enlarged to four basic choices: tyranny without social change

(Trujillo), democracy with limited participation (UCN), democracy with wide participation (PRD), and tyranny with social change (Communism). In a free election, Dominicans had chosen the third alternative, but this was to prove unacceptable to the existing powers.

The results of the elections of December 1962 were a surprise for those used to the traditional political systems which did not take into consideration the majority of the Dominican people: the workers and the peasants.

The leaders of the UCN, as well as their supporters on the Council of State and in the government, were stunned and depressed by the outcome. They had not really expected to lose the election, and they found it difficult to accept the implications of their defeat. Most difficult to swallow was the notion that family and wealth would thenceforth be treated not with deference but with hostility.<sup>1</sup>

The political campaign of 1962 had reopened a question that had been untouched since the days of Haitian Occupation: the social question. The dormant issue of political equality was added to that of political freedom; the issue of who is to be benefited by society, the few or the many, closed since the rebellion of Roldan, was again reopened; and the issue of the basis of social prestige, being "white" or being competent, was started. It was truly a shocker for those whose world had been closed in 1930 and thought that all that was needed was to

---

<sup>1</sup>Henry Wells, "Turmoil in the Dominican Republic," Current History, Vol. 50, No. 293 (January 1966), p. 17.

revive Horacio Vazquez. In spite of Trujillo, the world had changed and so had Dominicana, needless to say, at a slower pace than in many other areas.

Yet, the fact is that once the curtains lifted and the nation was opened to the rest of the world, the process of change was accelerated through communications and ideological discussions, many times demagogic, of the needs of the people, who immediately reacted in the pursuit of a better existence, frightening to death those who had always enjoyed a comfortable life. The Dominican oligarchy was and is afraid, more than that panicky, just as their fellows are in the rest of Latin America. Robert E. Scott put it this way:

In short, the one thing that most of the political elites seem to have in common is a sense of insecurity engendered by rapid change. The long dominant elites fear the threat to their power position from the surging new interests and reject the egalitarian pretensions of the challenging elites; the lower class leadership resents a situation in which they are denied effective access to the political process and feel a growing pressure from their constituents, who may not demand political change but are increasingly restive under social and economic deprivation.<sup>1</sup>

First, the Dominican upper-crust had been frightened of the military, for it was Trujillo's instrument of control, and if a new caudillo arose, it could again be used to keep them in line. Besides, they too

---

<sup>1</sup>Robert E. Scott, "Political Elites and Political Modernization: The Crisis of Transition," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari (eds.), *Elites in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 127.

wanted political freedom and democracy, but they were willing to sacrifice it in fear of what they perceived was a greater danger: social, political, and economic change; in essence, the process of modernization. This process would destroy their preeminent position, for it involves rational calculation for action, instead of whims, to be obeyed; it involves a redistribution of wealth and the efficient use of resources for the benefit of the many, instead of the entrenched monopoly of the few; and it involves the rearrangement of political power and social prestige through the acceptance of the many as equal participants in a society, instead of the limited and manageable intrigue.

Even during the days of Trujillo, the oligarchy had privileges. True it was he who busted the exclusive clubs, the most famous of which was the Centro de Recreo in Santiago, and he had no mercy for his enemies in spite of their oligarchic ties, but many were saved thanks to their last name and/or the connections that go with it. True it was that the Generalissimo took many of the lands and businesses of the oligarchs, but most of them became partners, their sons rewarded with government employment or contracts, and the diplomatic service as almost an exclusive preserve. On the other hand, the peasants lost their lands by being evicted or shot, and the workers had no rights to organize and demand compensations for their labor, not to mention what would have happened to them if they were involved in political matters-- prison, torture, or death.



The land problem in Dominicana is perhaps not the worst in Latin America, but it is certainly a very acute one. In 1963, one percent of all the farms of the nation comprised 54 percent of the total farmland,<sup>1</sup> which certainly is not a very equitable distribution of land just in terms of size and without taking into consideration its quality. To have a farm on good land and with access to the market is an entirely different matter from those who do not, and generally the rich manage to get the better lands. Furthermore, to the size and quality of the land, the problem of vassalage is added. It is not only that people are poor, but that they have to work for the landowner at meager wages, decided upon by the master, for there is practically an unlimited labor supply. The peasants have no security whatsoever for their family, even if they have a home and food. The peasants are dependent on the good graces of the landowners of the area, whom they must call Don, as a recognition of his social status and class differentiation. They can never displease the Dons, for to get on their bad side means that forever they will be unemployed. The landowners can ask for all sorts of favors without pay, sometimes even including the young women of the family; the Don Fulano of the area has the connections with the world of politics and the military, which could be used against the peasants if there is any trouble; and worst of all, the peasants must go

---

<sup>1</sup>T. D. Roberts, et al., Area Handbook for the Dominican Republic (Washington: DA Pam No. 550-54, United States Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 267.

to the Dons in case of need, for there is no one else who has the means of helping them. The word tutumpote--all-powerful--is very appropriate.

In the city, money is the medium, but employers and employees do have the traditional farm patterns of relationships, except in the very largest industries. The dependence of the worker, white collar or blue collar, is extremely pronounced, because to keep employed, the same recognition of social hierarchy and power must be maintained in spite of the employees' efficiency and dedication. Besides, there are something like one-half million unemployed, no one knows the figure for certain, desperately seeking work and ready to substitute for anyone who gets fired. Conditions have improved with the development of labor unions, but basically they remain the same.

In direct political matters, the influence of the well-to-do is very obvious, although not as great a determining factor as many seem to believe.<sup>1</sup> For instance, many military officers tell their wealthy friends that in case of trouble they should be sure to go out in the streets well-dressed, because the chances are that they will not be arrested, and if so, it is at least a guarantee that they will not be beaten or killed.

---

<sup>1</sup>For instance, Franklyn Franco makes the statement that up to the Trujillo Era, "presidents were the instrument of the oligarchy," which is somewhat exaggerated. República Dominicana, Clases, Crisis y Comandos (La Habana: Casa de las Américas, 1966), p. 137.

The clothes people wear is a dead give away of social status and prestige, and the inference is that if you wear good clothes, you are bound to be of the select few, or at least have good connections. The color of the skin also helps a great deal, for as a whole the whiter you are, the further up in the social scale you are located, and vice versa. If you are light-skinned and well dressed, you are a "white," which is a guarantee against repression and opens the doors in every place of business and pleasure, but if you are a North American, the guarantee is absolute, for everyone knows the power and the money behind the man.

It is understandable that those who have the opportunity to enjoy the benefits of society do not want to relinquish them, even in spite of the misery and the suffering of others, but those who are at the other end of the scale seem to have realized that they too want a part of the good life. This may take the form of joining the others through rapid social climbing, which is unusual, or by leveling the others to a more proportionate size. Considering, just in economic terms, that the yearly per capita income in Dominicana is about \$218,<sup>1</sup> and that a Volkswagen costs over \$4000, then the picture of needs and aspirations becomes clearer. This is without taking into consideration that the vast majority of the people live with a great deal less money to balance out with the rich in an average of \$218, or that something like half of

<sup>1</sup>Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 2. The figure is for the year 1964.

the population is under 15 years of age,<sup>1</sup> which means that generally they receive no income. A non-oligarchic Dominican family has a very difficult time making ends meet, if not surviving.

Those who live on the farms do not necessarily stay there, because they can always move to the city and vice versa, but the movement has been a large immigration pattern from the farms to the cities, particularly Santo Domingo. The reason for this migration of peasants to the cities "is not because the city promises well paid employment, but because in the country itself the conditions are worse."<sup>2</sup> They go to the cities to form part of the mass of unemployed and to live in the shanty-towns in the expectation that someday their lot will improve, which may be through a good job, through a lottery ticket, or through shooting if necessary. This is the most volatile group in the nation, less vocal than the students as well as less ideologically defined, but the storm-troopers for any political group that pays or promises to do so.

The only empirical statistics that exist on the matter of social stratification are of three middle-size Dominican cities, which are not

---

<sup>1</sup>In the year 1960, 44.6 percent of the population was under 15 years of age, 52.5 percent between 15 and 65, and only 2.9 percent over 65 years. It is a very young population. Ibid., p. 48.

<sup>2</sup>Andre Corten, "Cómo Vive la Otra Mitad de Santo Domingo: Estudio de Dualismo Estructural," Caribbean Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (January 1965), p. 15.

necessarily representative of the nation, but it gives an idea. Just by looking at Table 1, a prediction could have been made that whoever appealed to peaceful social change would have won the 1962 elections, and this is precisely what the PRD did. They told the peasants not to be frightened of landlords, to take their money if they tried to buy their votes, and to vote with the white ballot, the party's color, for the vote was secret and no one would know, except themselves, who was the candidate of their choice.

TABLE 1  
SOCIAL STRATIFICATION OF THE POPULATION OF THREE  
MIDDLE-SIZED DOMINICAN CITIES BY PERCENTILE<sup>a</sup>

Social Strata <sup>b</sup>	Bonao	Bani	Mao
Upper class	9.3%	10.1%	5.4%
Upper middle class	13.4%	13.1%	13.0%
Lower middle class	21.4%	23.3%	19.4%
Popular (lower) class	51.1%	47.9%	55.6%
Other	4.5%	5.3%	6.2%

<sup>a</sup>Eduardo Latorre, *et al.*, "Bonao: Una Ciudad Dominicana" (Santiago: 1969), Vol. II, p. 60. This work will be published shortly by the Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra.

<sup>b</sup>The results are in response to the question: "As you know, all countries are divided in different social groups: upper class, upper middle class, lower middle class, and popular class. Could you tell us where you think you are located?"

Two more things should be considered: first, that the nation is close to 70 percent rural, and second, that the heaviest urban congregation is in the city of Santo Domingo, approximately 10 percent of the total population.<sup>1</sup> This means that the peasant vote is crucial for the winning of an election, and that most of them could be located at the bottom of the social scale. If in middle size cities about half of the population considers itself of lower class, then the national proportion is even larger. The appeal to social change and the promise of benefits to be rewarded were to be handsomely remunerated in terms of votes.

On the other hand, the characteristic of the capital city is somewhat more complex. Here is the seat of the government and the center of the economy and culture, but even more, where it is simpler to mobilize people for political action. The fact that the population is clustered together makes it easier for political groups to have access to them than if they were dispersed in a large area. Furthermore, it is here where there is greater evidence of a middle sector between those at the top and those at the bottom, most of whom had been the direct beneficiaries of the Trujillo Era. The actual political life of the nation

---

<sup>1</sup>This will soon change, for in 1980 for the first time the urban population will equal the rural population, and this will increase to a proportion of 80 percent urban and 20 percent rural by 1985. Plataforma para el Desarrollo Económico y Social de la República Dominicana (Santo Domingo: Secretaría Técnica de la Presidencia, Oficina Nacional de Planificación, 1968), p. 7.

takes place in Santo Domingo. Here is where coups are hatched, where instant political demonstrations can be created, where everyone is more concerned with political matters, particularly with political rumors, and finally, where the most volatile groups, the urban masses, the unemployed, and the students, are found.

The fact that people are living in an urban area does not make them urban citizens. According to the findings of a recent study,<sup>1</sup> most of the people in the capital reflect a rural pattern of behavior rather than an urban one, largely due to the rapid population growth and migration. The political implication of this phenomenon is that as a whole even those living in the capital will reflect the caudillistic political pattern rather than a more modern model, which makes it even more difficult for a democratic political system to find supports, or to have a positive response to the call for social change unless it is accompanied by force. The fact that the PRD had a call for social change, a conception of a wide based representative democracy as a legitimizing factor, and the military behind it, was what gave it its outstanding victory in the elections of 1962.

---

<sup>1</sup>André Corten y Andrée Corten, Cambio Social en Santo Domingo (Río Piedras, Puerto Rico: Instituto de Estudios del Caribe, 1968). This study was made by a Belgian husband and wife sociologist team after residing for more than two years in the country.

The party with the white ticket headed by Juan Bosch won in 22 provinces out of 26 and the National District, polling twice the vote of UCN and gaining overwhelming control of both houses of Congress. It was a walk-over victory placing the rivaling party in a very secondary position. The third ranking party, the Revolutionary Social Christians (PRSC), only received about 5 percent of the total vote, not winning a single province or municipality. The other four participant political parties combined make about the same percentile of the total vote, but the PNRD, headed by General Ramírez Alcántara, won in the province of San Juan as what could be called favorite son. The Ramírez family had been supplying the area with local caudillos since the turn of the century, and it was somewhat a reasonable expectation that this would happen.

Interestingly enough, UCN won in the provinces where there are the most small landowners in the country and where traditionalism is most entrenched: the Cibao region.<sup>1</sup> The fact that the PRD won in La Vega, one of the provinces of the region, can be explained by the fact that due to heavy church influence in the area, the PRSC and UCN split the vote, making it possible for the PRD to come out ahead. It is in this

---

<sup>1</sup> All the electoral results data was compiled in two large sheets of paper by the Junta Central Electoral and it can be obtained by request. Junta Central Electoral, Relación del Resultado de las Elecciones Generales y Extraordinarias Celebradas el día 20 de Diciembre de 1962 (Santo Domingo).



province where the PRSC made its best show, some 13,000 votes out of a total of close to 70,000, for in the Capital, for instance, it was only able to poll close to 5,000 votes out of a total of some 200,000.

An election always has its peculiar results that do not fit the general pattern. Right in the middle of the Cibao, the PRD won in the municipalities of Tamboril and Villa Bísónó, in spite of the fact that they had lost heavily all around in the area. The most severe loss was in the Duarte province, particularly in the municipality of San Francisco de Macorís, but then it won all over the province of Puerto Plata, losing only the major city which carried the province for UCN. In the city of Santo Domingo, the PRD won by an enormous margin, some 150,000 to only 35,000, as was also the case throughout the regions of the South, except San Juan, the East, and the sub-regions of the Frontier, the North, except Puerto Plata, and Samana. These areas follow the sugar plantations and the landless peasants as well as the Capital's lower middle groups, the urban workers, and the unemployed.

The explanation for the large number of votes obtained by UCN, considering the geographical limitation of its victory, lies in the fact that the Cibao region is the nation's most heavily populated area. Furthermore, there is the fact that although the PRD won in the other provinces and in the National District, the UCN also carried some votes. For instance, in the province of Salcedo the PRD won by some

12,000 votes, but UCN received some 8,000 votes, which is two-thirds of its rival votes. Nevertheless, the PRD obtained close to 60 percent of the total vote, UCN 30 percent, PRSC 5 percent, and the other four parties obtained the remainder.

The control of the executive and legislative powers as well as 65 out of 76 municipalities plus the National District was a clear indication not only of the size of the victory, but that the PRD had an interest in making the government effective, for it was under its total control. If the party could survive in power, at least it had the machinery with which to make its programs and/or wishes put into effect. In addition to all this, provincial governors are appointed by the executive, now Juan Bosch, which was another factor adding to the PRD's political power. Obviously, if allowed to become entrenched in this overwhelming position, no party could defeat the PRD in an election, and therefore the opposition had to make sure to torpedo the governmental machinery and/or depose the PRD government. They were to choose the latter.

The policies of the newly elected government would basically be three: number one, survival; number two, reinforce the party's political position through making the government effective; and number three, to carry on socio-economic programs for national development and reform. The importance of the policies followed this same order, for without survival the other two were nonexistent, and without making the

government effective, there could be no developmental programs. The PRD's mistake in the short-run was to forget that survival had top priority, because they misjudged their power position through the illusion of governmental control and desires of socio-economic change.

Right after the debate with the Spanish Jesuit, Bosch exclaimed that he did not wish to be a candidate, "because I know the PRD will win the elections and if it does, the government . . . will be overthrown in a short time on the pretext that it is Communist."<sup>1</sup> This has been looked upon by some as a demonstration of the man's foresight and deep understanding of his country's politics, but some of his critics believe that the man is just ambivalent about power. "The plain truth is that Juan Bosch lacks the will to rule. . . . His vanity drives him towards it [power], but fear of responsibility (perhaps even physical cowardice as well) causes him to shy away from power if it is within his reach and to let it slip through his fingers when it is thrust upon him."<sup>2</sup>

The man who had been elected to serve as president of Dominica was very much like his country: complex. Vain and stubborn,

---

<sup>1</sup>Cited in Fred Goff and Michael Locker, "The Violence of Domination: U. S. Power and the Dominican Republic," North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA). Mimeographed paper (New York: August 1967), p. 7.

<sup>2</sup>Henry Wells, "The Dominican Experiment with Bosch," Orbis, Vol. X, No. 1 (Spring 1966), p. 280. Parentheses are his.

with a magnificent sense of drama; very intelligent, with a reforming zeal and deep concern for the underprivileged. After he had become President, Sidney Lens hailed him as "probably the most humanist head of state in this hemisphere."<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, the opposition accused him of stirring class hatred where there had been none, and in fact the mass of the people had learned basically through him that they were not necessarily condemned to misery and oppression, but that they also had a right to live like "decent" human beings. Bosch has replied to the accusation, saying that he is proud of what he has done for it was in the public's benefit. He adds:

After that campaign of 1962, the people know who in truth are their enemies and where they hide. The people learned to distinguish between a miserable calié that denounced for sixty pesos a month and the great señor that took enormous fortunes out of the regime maintained by the caliés; and they learned that between the tutumpte and the caliés, his real enemy was the tutumpte.<sup>2</sup>

One of the characteristics of Juan Bosch is that he talks and writes with much more zeal about reforms and venom about his enemies than he is perhaps willing to carry out. Without doubt, the man is embittered with class consciousness: "Too busy in acquiring

---

<sup>1</sup> Sidney Lens, "Tinder Box in the Dominican Republic," The Progressive, Vol. 27, No. 9 (September 1963), p. 35. This was written before the coup.

<sup>2</sup> Juan Bosch, Crisis de la Democracia de América en la República Dominicana (Mexico: Centro de Estudios y Documentacion Sociales, 1964).

'Cadillacs,' in taking their women to night clubs and fashion houses, in making business trips to New York and Europe, the men of the upper-middle-class and the Latin American bourgeoisie believe that they are going to stop the social revolution with anti-Communist propaganda."<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, he has managed to lose some of his closest aides and supporters, as well as to alienate many of those who do not see eye-to-eye with him because he forever must feel the boss and the prima donna. Nevertheless, his short-lived government has been the most peaceful, the least arbitrary, the most democratic, and perhaps one of the most honest that has existed in Dominican history.

The manner in which Juan Bosch claimed electoral victory is characteristic of his poignant style. Instead of calling for unity, or at least not offending the UCN, he said that his winning margin would have been greater had it not been for electoral frauds which cost him 100,000 votes. Even if it had been true, which apparently it was not, Bosch should have kept in mind that he was going to have to work with the tutumpotes if he wanted to stay in the government, and he should have been more conciliatory. But no, he decided to accuse the Consejo of fraud in a deal with a Standard Oil refinery project and refused to take his oath of office from the preceding government.

<sup>1</sup> Juan Bosch, "Panorama Político en 1961," Cuadernos, No. 53 (Octubre 1961), p. 15.

Both sides behaved like little children rather than statesmen. The President-elect decided that he was going on a trip to Europe, but first he stopped to see the national heroes, Imbert and Amiama, and asked them to keep things quiet for him until his return. This was an actual recognition of their power, because aside from the connections they had, they were now made brigadier generals on the grounds that this way they would be entitled to a military escort.

Actually, the Consejo was going to let Bosch have some trouble with these men, for military rank is of extreme importance in caudillo politics, and at the same time it was a guarantee that the former Consejeros would have some political power and protection. Obviously, both Imbert and Amiama were persecuted men, for the Trujillos occasionally hatched plots to have them removed from the world of the living, a situation that the two national heroes exploited fully, but this could have been solved by an act of the Consejo naming a permanent guard without giving them military rank.

It must be understood that all officers from colonel and above are entitled to a permanent escort for their protection. To ride in an automobile with high-ranking Dominican officers is an experience of itself. The cars are always large and preferably dark, with curtains in the back window to make it more difficult for a potential sniper. The driver as well as the officers carry a pistol, usually 45-caliber, and a

submachine gun in the front seat. Sometimes when things are a bit more tense than usual, there are more guns in the car with the officer having a submachine gun at his feet and trailed by a clearly marked military car with soldiers armed to the teeth.

Their homes are a military camp. Usually with high walls, heavy iron gates, and soldiers doing the gardening, serving as drivers for the family, and also being there for protection. Some of the more insecure have sentinel posts around the house, but they all have at least two soldiers sitting at the entrance, of course, with submachine guns. The officers manage to get absolute loyalty from their "private" soldiers by doing favors for them and their families, which eventually ties these men's lives to their benefactor. When things are more tense than usual, the officers do not leave their army camp, sometimes staying there for several days, where they have even more protection. This gets to the ridiculous point where even their mistresses are assigned one or two soldiers for protection, in addition to those assigned to take care of the officer's farm. The officers like to own land, perhaps thinking of the day of retirement, and they prefer to have their property protected and, if possible, have the government pay for the labor.

This insecure world of guns and protection is not only the prerogative of the military. The Consejeros, except Donald Reid, who used to drive alone, and the government officials that followed after

them, all have bodyguards. Sometimes in a movie theatre you see a Secretary of State walk in with his wife and two or three men who sit strategically behind and next to the couple. Their homes practically always have at least one soldier, dressed as a civilian or in military uniform, guarding the house. The more important political leaders also have their own hombres de confianza to protect them and shield them from a potential assassin. It is an incredible world of fear and insecurity produced by the politics of internal warfare, very difficult to understand unless one lives in it for a while.

The Consejo shuffled some of the military commands and promoted some officers in order that the retiring government would still have influence in the locus of Dominican politics, the military.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, the Trujillo properties were declared autonomous entities in order that the Bosch government would not be able to get its hands on it as a source of money and employment for political reasons, but it was to no avail: it happened anyway. On the other hand, the President-elect kept hammering with the Esso contract, heavily implying graft from the retiring government.

---

<sup>1</sup>Franco, op. cit., p. 140. The author says that these moves were in preparation for a return to power by making sure that Bosch would get into trouble with the new commanders, not only by the new appointments, but through the creation of special legislation on the immobility of the appointed commanders.



Actually, this contract had been negotiated between Balaguer and a North American peddler, Thomas A. Pappas, who was closely tied to the Kennedy family, and who had come to Dominicana with the hope of buying the Trujillo properties.<sup>1</sup> Instead of the Generalissimo's empire, he obtained a contract for the establishment of an oil refinery, which in turn he sold to the Standard Oil Company (ESSO). On September 16, 1961, the existing National Congress approved a clause in which it was explicitly stated that the rights and privileges granted in the contract could not be affected by subsequent legislation. Yet, the Consejo was able to eliminate this clause, which had granted a monopoly, and secured that money would be re-invested in the country and that Dominicans would own 25 percent of the stock. Later on, Bosch softened up, and even negotiated with Standard Oil representatives, but "in the end the ESSO contract was quietly cancelled."<sup>2</sup>

The President-elect went off on his European tour, not before stopping to see President Kennedy and North American high officials. He saw De Gaulle and Adenauer, among others, tried to track down the Trujillo's loot, to no avail, and negotiated a contract with a Swiss consortium, the Overseas Construction, Ltd. "In a deal calling for the

<sup>1</sup>Alvaro Montalvo, "¿Qué Hay en el Fondo del Famoso 'Affaire' de la Refinería de Petróleo?" Ahora, No. 26 (1era Quincena Febrero 1963), pp. 34-36.

<sup>2</sup>John Bartlow Martin, Overtaken By Events (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1966), p. 350.

expenditure of \$150 million for a series of hydroelectric projects, the company was commissioned to parcel out contracts to various firms. It obtained the services of the General Electric Company of England, then dissolved itself."<sup>1</sup> Just as he had attacked the Consejeros with the ESSO contract, Bosch was to receive the same treatment with the Overseas project.<sup>2</sup>

A labor strike was begun with a powerless Council in the government, the President-elect in Europe, and only the Secretary General of the PRD, Angel Miolán, to face the problem. The latter managed to persuade the workers to wait for the Constitutional government to take office on the grounds that if the strike continued, the new government would not even make it to the inauguration.

The University students were split between the social-christians (BRUC) and the mostly Marxist radical left (FRAGUA) with two different Student Federations, each claiming to be legitimate, but the students managed to get together in January 1963 for what was known as the Plan

---

<sup>1</sup>Dan Kurzman, Santo Domingo: Revolt of the Damned (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1965), pp. 83-84.

<sup>2</sup>A comparison was made by an economist between this contract and those of the previous century, finding them strikingly similar. See Julio C. Estrella, "Comparación de Dos Empréstitos: El Empréstito Hartmont de 1869 y el Convenio con el Consorcio Suizo de 1963," Ahora, No. 31 (2da Quincena de Abril 1963), pp. 7-8, 30-31; and "Los Empréstitos Extranjeros en la Epoca de Heureaux Hasta el Laudo de 1904," Ahora, No. 32 (1era Quincena Mayo 1963), pp. 11-12, 24, 28.

Cayetano. This plan, named in honor of student leader Cayetano Rodríguez del Prado, who was in the leadership of the MPD, called for the expulsion of Trujillista administrators and professors from the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo. Some were just asked to leave while others were physically kicked out of the university, and although the number was rather limited, only seven or eight people, it symbolically marks the beginning of student domination of the university from which it has never recovered.

The problem with student power was not the fact that they would have a say in the affairs of the university, which they already had, but that through the use of naked power they were to get their way through a frightened faculty and administration. Even the better educated Dominicans were practicing caudillo politics in what presumably is a temple for the search of truth and where all ideas and opinions are to be ventilated, listened to, and pondered upon. Worst of all is the fact that the politization of the University placed the institution at the mercy of the controlling student group, which in turn reflects the interests of a political party. Certainly, sometimes the interests of a party and those of a university are closely interrelated, but they are not necessarily always on the same side of the fence, and even more fatal, the interests of the latter were subsumed to those of the former.

Presumably, the Church's opposition to Bosch had ended with the famed television debate with the Jesuit priest, but this was not the

case. One indicator, as Professor Howard Wiarda has pointed out, was the nature of the materials published by the official organ, Fides, "which switched from reform, social justice, and democracy to anti-communism, the rights of the Church, and the evils of anti-clericalism."<sup>1</sup> When the draft of the new Constitution was leaked out in January, the Church was really incensed, for there were not specific recognitions of their privileges and power in Dominican society.

President Bonelly told the North American Ambassador that "it was a Communist Constitution and would ruin the Republic."<sup>2</sup> The President of the Consejo, who reflected the view of businessmen and landowners, went on to say that it would frighten away investments, for there was no protection for property except the right to enjoy private property; latifundios were forbidden, without making it clear what a latifundio was; concubinage was legalized and divorce made easy; no protection of civil liberties and no recognition of the Vatican Concordat.

Imbert joined vociferously. So did Reid. The country was a keg of dynamite with a very short burning fuse. Throughout the conversation flowed venom against the new regime. Reid showed Bonelly a letter he had received from the new mayor of San Cristóbal, requesting a thousand dollars to pay for the visit of inaugural dignitaries to San Cristóbal. Reid said with contempt that the new

---

<sup>1</sup>Howard J. Wiarda, "The Changing Political Orientation of the Catholic Church in the Dominican Republic," A Journal of Church and State, Vol. VII, No. 2 (Spring 1965), p. 250.

<sup>2</sup>Martin, op. cit., p. 316.

mayor was the garbage-truck driver in San Cristóbal; Reid would throw this letter into the garbage where it belonged. President Bonelly agreed--the people were ignorant and needed to be educated to own land and participate in business and in government.

This was the first outcry of the propertied class against the revolution.<sup>1</sup>

In the United States and in Europe, the President-elect kept talking of plans and projects, but someone had to do the planning. "After a good deal of pulling and hauling, Washington decided that Bosch, instead of working directly with AID or with the Consejo's left-ist infiltrated planning board, would set up a shadow planning board called CIDES, organized by Sacha Volman."<sup>2</sup> This man was a Rumanian-born, naturalized North American citizen, who had spent his life fighting communism. The head of the PRD had met Volman in Costa Rica and had brought him to the country to organize the peasants for the elections, at which he had been very successful. The money for CIDES was to come via the J. M. Kaplan Foundation, which was later exposed as a conduit for the CIA, and its head, obviously J. M. Kaplan himself, a sugar molasses magnate, was introduced to Bosch by labor leader Norman Thomas. "While maintaining his (i. e., the CIA's) financial support for CIDES, Kaplan served as Bosch's personal

---

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 316-317.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 309.

emissary to business and political circles in New York and Washington."<sup>1</sup>

The North American reaction to Bosch was somewhat mixed. Many times baffled by his erratic behavior, somewhat different from the accustomed docility, but in any case a man that could be worked with. Besides, the United States had a stake in the maintenance of the new government, for it could provide some stability and carry on some social reforms which, after all, was the best anti-Castro antidote. This was marked by the efforts of the North American Ambassador, John Bartlow Martin, not only to cooperate with Bosch after his election, but his calling the two leaders of the PRD and UCN to make an agreement before the elections that the loser would not conspire against the winner. Presumably Viriato Fiallo had said at this meeting that he knew for certain that if Bosch won, he would not have to go out in exile. "The Cívicos took power through the coup d'etat of September 1963; the signature of Dr. Fiallo was the first in the notarized affidavit that forms the usurping government, and I [Bosch] am writing these pages in exile."<sup>2</sup>

Before arriving in Santo Domingo, ten days before inauguration on Independence Day, February 27, 1963, Juan Bosch had managed to

<sup>1</sup>Goff and Locker, op. cit., p. 9. Parentheses theirs.

<sup>2</sup>Bosch, Crisis de la Democracia . . ., op. cit., p. 105.

alienate the Consejo, the oligarchy, the Church, and the more conservative elements in United States policy planning, who were not happy with the outcome of the election, with the Constitution being drawn by a Dominican Congress, by the President-elect's independent behavior, nor with seeking money in Europe rather than in North America. Miolán had been in charge of everything, inaugural and all, while Bosch had been traveling, and Volman had been in charge of securing a planning board, staffing it with capable Dominican and international personnel, and getting money for it.

On arrival, Bosch was received by a storming crowd which did not allow him to speak, and he had to be rescued by a military helicopter which delivered him and his wife, Doña Carmen, to the expectant hands of Antonio Imbert. Bosch was infuriated and humiliated by the incident, and he taped and delivered another speech than the one he had written for the occasion. A terrible mistake it was, for he not only attacked every one of the power centers, but he haughtily claimed that he had a "steamroller" in Congress with which he implied he could do what he pleased. Newspapers immediately reacted with apprehension, and the influential weekly magazine, Ahora, editorialized comparing the fateful phrase of the "steamroller" to Fiallo's ill-made comment on his return from a trip saying that he had "five whips in each hand," presumably to punish the Trujillistas, a fact that cost him dearly in the

electoral outcome.<sup>1</sup>

Bosch blamed the whole incident on an Imbert plot, and all that he needed now was a showdown with the military. He told Bartlow Martin that Imbert was a danger and that he had to go. "There are only three solutions--to kill him, put him in jail, or deport him."<sup>2</sup> The Ambassador replied that he had better find a fourth solution, for in spite of North American support, it would not be a good start for his Administration. After all, Imbert was a general, "and if Bosch moved against him, the other generals, though they disliked Imbert, might wonder who Bosch would move against next. Bosch had begun to listen."<sup>3</sup> The President-elect began to talk of deporting Imbert or just naming him Ambassador to Canada, but both knew that the national hero would not leave the country. Martin again reassured Bosch of North American support, but he offered some advice.

It must be kept in mind, that personal or not, it is the Ambassador of the United States who is talking; the representative of the most powerful nation on earth and the controlling power of the Caribbean. Given the fact that both nations maintain relations as if Dominicana were totally independent, the Ambassador cannot say, "My government

---

<sup>1</sup> Editorial, Ahora, No. 28 (1era Quincena Marzo 1963), p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Martin, op. cit., p. 322.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 323.



wants you to do this or that; it is an order," but that words have to be carefully selected, couching them as if there were no bossing involved and at the same time making the message quite clear. Perhaps Martin's advice was truly a personal matter, but perhaps it was not. Dominican leaders must always try to know the difference between one and the other.

My only suggestion--and it is a personal one, not an official one--is that, at least for the time being, you leave the military high command alone. I am not talking now about Imbert or the police. I mean the Armed Forces--Secretary of Defense Viñas, and the three service commanders, Hungria, Rib, and Luna. This is, in my opinion the single most dangerous--potentially dangerous--area. They are quiet now. They know we support you. They listen to us. Some day they may not, things may be different, who knows what will come. But for now, I would leave it alone.<sup>1</sup>

The crisis passed and the military was left alone, as Martin had suggested, but then for all the help that the United States government was to give Bosch, which was not very much in any case, they held the trump card with the military. Short of a North American show of force, the best means available are the native soldiers. So long as the United States had solid support for Bosch, a coup was highly unlikely, but if the North Americans were divided or indecisive, then the fate of the government was in the hands of the military.

For the inaugural ceremony and celebrations, there was the noted absence of the Secretary General of the Organization of American

---

<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

States (OAS), José A. Mora, who was not invited. For a while, the President-elect did not want to invite the Governor of Puerto Rico, Luis Muñoz Marín, but later changed his mind, and as fate would have it, Bosch was to go in exile to his home in San Juan. The representatives of the Latin American democratic left were all there to celebrate: President Betancourt of Venezuela, President Orlich and former President Figueres of Costa Rica, President Villeda Morales of Honduras, President Bustamante of Jamaica, and writers, poets, North American Senators Javits and Humphrey, and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson.

This was the new President's greatest political asset: his international prestige. He was not just anyone who could be tossed aside like a piece of paper. To give Bosch a coup was in many ways a coup against Latin American democracy, and many of his friends had a great deal of influence. The keynote to his inaugural address was that "While we govern, liberty shall not perish in the Dominican Republic," and he was true to his word. Jules Dubois, a North American journalist, reported that there was a notable absence in the speech of any mention of Communism or the Communist threat in Latin America, a fact that worried him.<sup>1</sup>

Also absent from the inaugural ceremonies was the entire Consejo de Estado, except for Imbert and Amiama, who attended as

<sup>1</sup>The Washington Post, February 28, 1963.

military officers. The same day, February 27, 1963, the outgoing Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Antonio Bonilla Atilas, left the country in self-imposed exile. Once in the United States, this man began to make his contacts in the slow process of undermining the Constitutional Government, and in 1965 he would be serving as Dominican representative to the OAS, casting his ballot there in support of an invasion against his country.

The President's first act of state was to name a Foreign Minister,<sup>1</sup> Andrés Freites, who had just been the Dominican representative in Washington and whose usual occupation was to be the head of the Standard Oil (ESSO) branch in Santo Domingo. Freites and the Labor Minister, Silvestre Alba de Moya, were the only cabinet members who were not identified with the PRD, the Foreign Minister coming from UCN and Alba de Moya from the Partido Nacional (PN). The new cabinet was composed mostly of provincial lawyers with little bureaucratic experience.<sup>2</sup> It was a contrast to previous cabinets for the names of the Ministers were not from the upper-crust, the oligarchy, and it

---

<sup>1</sup>During the Bosch government in 1963 and during the Molina Ureña, Caamaño Deñó, and García-Godoy governments in 1965, Secretaries of State were called Ministers.

<sup>2</sup>Alvaro Montalvo, "El Equipo con que Bosch Inicia su Gestión Gubernativa," Ahora, No. 29 (2da Quincena Marzo 1963), pp. 34-36.

was a symbol of the coming change if the government was allowed to govern. Many were not happy with the prospects.

Just as the conservative journalist of the Chicago-Tribune, Jules Dubois, was concerned with Bosch and Communism, it is significant to note what Havana's reaction to the new government was like. Lyndon B. Johnson, who had gone to the inaugural ceremony in representation of John F. Kennedy to wish the new President well, and who ironically would later send troops to prevent him from re-assuming his government, was photographed embracing Juan Bosch. The Cuban publication, Bohemia, ran the photograph with a caption reading: "He is one of us: This is what Yankee Vice-President Lyndon Johnson appears to be saying as he was embraced by the new puppet of Uncle Sam, the slippery Juan Bosch of Santo Domingo."<sup>1</sup>

In spite of the good auspices with which the new administration was to start its prescribed constitutional term of four years, without the possibility of presidential re-election, at least legally, it was only to last seven short months. Bosch was not going to live down the mistake he had made between the period of election and inauguration, which was to alienate too many of the powerful sectors in Dominican society. Perhaps if he had taken them one by one, presuming he had solid North American support, he could have survived, even with reforms, but he

<sup>1</sup>Cited in Kurzman, op. cit., p. 77.

moved to broadly with too little power to back him up, and he also needlessly frightened many groups by talking too much and then doing very little. Since Bosch did not have a solid populist movement which could be used as counterweight to the traditional powers of Dominicana, he had little alternative but to work with those same powers, divide them if possible in order to carry out reforms, but not make a frontal attack which united them and shortly after produced his downfall. After all, even though he desired to reform the system, he had chosen to work within the caudillistic political system, and therefore he had either to submit to the rules of the game or have had enough power to transform it. Since without sufficient power he did not submit, his government fell. However, the fact that he did not play the traditional game was what made the Constitutional Government of 1963 different.

In a series of studies of post-war coup d'etats, of which the September 1963 coup was the first pilot case study of three, Hoon Mok Chung summarizes the PRD's approach to government, as contrasted with the more traditional concept.<sup>1</sup> The losing party, UCN, believed that the first preference of the government should have been the building of order and economic stability within a democratic framework; the

---

<sup>1</sup>Hoon Mok Chung, "The Case of the Muffed Mission: The 1963 Coup d'Etat in the Dominican Republic" (Philadelphia: Preliminary Draft, The Caribbean Project, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, 1966), pp. 48-57.

laws of the Catholic Church should become the laws of the nation; and policies were to be enacted favoring private enterprise as the economic foundation of society.

On the other hand, the PRD stood somewhere between this approach and that of the Communist groups, but opposed to the latter because of their disrespect for representative democracy. The PRD wanted a secular, if not an anti-Catholic state; a welfare state; and a planned economy. Furthermore, the leaders of the white party differed widely with the military on the matters of Communism and the role of the soldiers in democratic society. For the military, left-wing minorities must be excluded from the political process, by coercive methods if necessary, while the PRD's position was that no one was to be persecuted. Of greater consequence is the fact that Dominican soldiers feel that they are entitled to judge when public order is seriously threatened and to take whatever measures are necessary for the restoration of tranquility.

In essence, this means that the military consider themselves a state within a state, with the right to judge and to act without any higher authority than themselves, a fact that is unacceptable for any government that wishes to govern. The PRD's position was that no military institution should be a decision-making organ for national politics, nor should they be aligned or identified with a particular political party.

The loyalty of the military was to be directed toward the government that had been elected by the people, thus making the latter the final and supreme authority in the nation.

Obviously, the position of the Bosch government was in the tradition of representative democracy, the same tradition that had, for over a century, been held as the legal form of government of the nation, but which had always succumbed to the naked power of caudillos. To have accepted this position, the military would have found itself no longer the arbiter of national politics, but subservient to a government and to the rules and regulations that go with it. They were not as yet ready to accept this role, nor was there any countervailing power to force them into it. The establishment of civilian authority would have marked the end of the caudillistic system, but unfortunately it remained very much alive in the minds and interests of the existing powers. The Constitutional Government of 1963 was not only dedicated to socio-economic reforms, which alienated those opposed to social change, but simultaneously the Bosch government was dedicated to eradicate the caudillistic political system through the establishment of legal-rational authority based on popular sovereignty. This alienated the caudillo oriented military. The government was also dedicated to make the State the final arbiter of Dominican affairs, which alienated powerful sectors within the United States.

The first clash was to come over the government's statement of intentions and the legal mechanism to carry it out: the Constitution of 1963. Since the PRD dominated the Congress, it was able to pass on its ideology into the new Magna Carta of the nation, proclaimed on April 30, 1963, the 100th anniversary of the Restoration of the Republic. Although by no means revolutionary, the document was a major break with tradition. A comparison with the more traditional constitutions, of which the one that had preceded it, promulgated by the Council of State, was a good example of the difference.<sup>1</sup>

Title XV, Article 93, of the 1962 Constitution, explicitly says that the Armed Forces of the nation would be regulated by its own Organic Law, which in effect gave the institution autonomy. Soldiers could not be removed from their posts nor have their rank taken away "without justified cause," which of course was to be decided by an Administrative Junta for the Armed Forces, presided over by the Secretary of State for that Ministry. Furthermore, it was explicitly stated that soldiers were to enjoy a retirement pension and other benefits accorded to them by their organic law. In Title XIII of the 1963 Constitution, which deals with the Armed Forces, all this was just ignored imposing in one innocent looking move civilian authority over the military. Even more, in Article 161, it was specifically stated that the

<sup>1</sup> The idea is borrowed from Chung, *Ibid.*, pp. 58-69. For the Constitutions of 1962 and 1963, see the Gaceta Oficial, Nos. 8693 and 8758, respectively.



Armed Forces could be called by the Executive Power to cooperate in the plans for socio-economic development of the nation, which in effect meant that soldiers could legally be put to work, a fact with which they were not too happy.

For the businessmen and landowners, the question of property rights was crucial, for their power and well being was dependent on the matter. In the 1962 Constitution, the right to own property was treated as part of the basic human rights in Article 8, Section 9, and it was specifically stated that no expropriation could take place except for extreme reasons and only after fair compensation. On the other hand, in the 1963 Constitution, property rights were included under Economic and Social-Ethical Relations, Section II. In Article 22, it is specifically recognized the right to own property, but it also legalizes expropriation for causes of social interest to be determined by law. Furthermore, in Article 23 it is declared that the private ownership of land in excessive quantity was against the collective interest, and therefore latifundios were forbidden, with Congress to determine what a latifundio was. Article 25 makes clear that only Dominican nationals could own land, except in some cases to be authorized by Congress, and Article 26 states that each Dominican family should own its own dwelling, which should also be comfortable and hygienic, and that if it could not be afforded by the family, it was to be given by the State in accordance

with the economic possibilities of the family. Finally, Article 28 consecrates the right of each peasant family to own land and to be aided by the state in achieving a measure of social and economic progress, which in effect was the same thing as saying aiding them to live like "decent" human beings.

The problem for the Church was somewhat similar to that of the military: it was the clear establishment of state superiority by just ignoring the famous Concordat of 1954 that had been negotiated with Trujillo and had been included in the Constitution of 1962, on Title III. Common-law marriage, which is probably the most common form of marital union in Dominicana, could be made legal, which, of course, is totally contrary to the Church's doctrine. The state was to protect all children, regardless of birth, which was a radical departure from the previous clearly differentiation between legitimate and illegitimate children, and the ground was laid for state control of educational facilities, which would have dealt a severe blow to the religious institution's excellent mechanism of indoctrination and recruitment.

In many ways the Constitution of 1963 was the symbol, and if effective, the mechanism for the establishment of a new social, economic, and political order in Dominicana. Contrary to what happened in the early 19th Century, this time the existing order was being questioned by Dominicans, not Haitians or Frenchmen, to impose a new one;

but the same mechanism of defense of the hateros was to be employed: the return to the past. Those groups which had been benefitted by the status quo were not about to watch it slip away into a new order without putting on a fight. To accept the supremacy of the state as the final arbiter of human affairs, which is what Kalman Silvert defines as nationalism,<sup>1</sup> was more than could be coped with. It would have been the acceptance of change as a mode of life, the reorganization of mental and social structures into a modern pattern, and the final establishment of authority in the nation. That was intolerable. Even if the past was not what one would have wished, to accept change was even worse.

It is symbolic that the 1962 Constitution said, "Constitution of the Dominican Republic," while the subsequent one said, "Constitution of the Dominican Nation," which gave it a more permanent character and an aura of accepting change, although it lasted less than the previous one. The problem was that it had more authority, not only that it was different, and if allowed to function it was bound to change the nation, since where authority was, the legally constituted powers were all in the hands of the PRD. Those against it quickly remembered Bosch's speech of the "steamroller" and they were even more

---

<sup>1</sup>K. H. Silvert, "Introduction: The Strategy of the Study of Nationalism," in the book edited by himself, Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 19.

frightened. Now, the real problem was with what could be done by the existing government rather than what it was doing, for besides the Constitution, it had not done anything really different from what had been done in the past.

True, there was liberty, but so had there been under Horacio Vázquez, and although unusual, it was not new. In foreign policy, it maintained a very close relationship with the United States, it defended democracies, it had no relationships with Cuba or any other Communist nation, nor did it attempt to change this pattern. True it was that it tried to borrow money from Europe rather than North America exclusively, but it did not exclude itself from the Alliance for Progress nor from receiving money or goods from North American sources, including the CIA as was the case with CIDES. One difference was that Communists were not persecuted for internal or foreign consumption, but even the great persecutor, Trujillo, decided not to do so in the latter part of his regime. Yet, Bosch had made it clear that in Latin America there was a choice, either democracy or Communism, and "Communism means death, war, destruction, and the loss of all our blessings."<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Cited in Theodore Draper, "The Roots of the Dominican Crisis," *The New Leader*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 11 (May 24, 1965), p. 7. The statement came out in Santo Domingo's daily, *La Nación*, March 13, 1963.

The only major foreign crisis the new government had was with Haiti. In essence, the problem was that the neighboring tyrant, Doctor Francois Duvalier, no longer felt comfortable as he had with the Generalissimo, and even more uncomfortable with the anti-dictatorial policies of Bosch. The United States Ambassador wrote:

In 1962, several Haitian-Dominican incidents had occurred . . . and the Consejo had somewhat reluctantly accepted our counsel of restraint. But Bosch was different. Bosch was the spearhead of democracy in the Caribbean; Duvalier was the last of its old-fashioned dictators. Bosch meant to set his stamp on Caribbean politics; Duvalier could not let him. Bosch had trouble at home; a foreign adventure was, in one sense, not unwelcome (though Bosch did not start it--Duvalier did). Finally, Bosch could scarcely fail to oppose Duvalier after Duvalier, as Bosch had told me, had in fact sent an agent to have him killed. Crisis was inevitable. It came on that day, April 26, 1963.<sup>1</sup>

The trouble started with an abortive coup in Haiti, with some of the participants taking refuge in the Dominican Embassy in Port-au-Prince, and the Haitian police running after them. Not only the rights of asylum were being violated and the sovereignty of the Embassy disregarded, but the Trujillo family was also involved in the matter with definite anti-Bosch plans to pave the way for their return. Furthermore, it was a good idea to keep the military busy with a crisis rather than sitting at home plotting, which they were already doing. National unity in the face of a foreign threat, particularly Haiti, was in the interest of the Administration.

<sup>1</sup>Martin, op. cit., p. 417. [Parentheses his.]

Bosch threatened with ultimatums unless Dominican honor was restored by paying homage to the flag, but at the same time he could not get the military to move, for they felt more comfortable conspiring than fighting. The soldiers had realized that the whole thing was to be a bluff, and therefore, that they were better off in the rear guard. Eventually, nothing came of it except public debates in the Organization of American States and in the United Nations,<sup>1</sup> but it became obvious that the President failed to command his troops even at times of national emergency.

The fiscal policies of the regime were absolutely conservative. A balanced-budget approach, with policies for the obtainment of a balance of payments surplus, and the increase of the monetary reserve from seven million pesos in February 1963, to twenty-eight million the following October.<sup>2</sup> The President behaved like a spinster with public funds, having all government transactions to be approved by him personally to avoid graft, although he was not entirely successful in the

---

<sup>1</sup> See "Haiti-Dominican Republic Dispute Considered by Security Council," United Nations Review, Vol. X, No. 6 (June 1963), pp. 35-37. The two governments debated about their official position, which actually had little to do with what was happening.

<sup>2</sup> Julio César Martínez, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution in the Dominican Republic," New Politics, Vol. IV, No. 2 (Spring 1965), pp. 52-53.

matter.<sup>1</sup> What is surprising, though, is that well noted North Americans were later to write in a report that Bosch was "an ineffectual administrator, a man with little feel for the economic realities of life."<sup>2</sup>

Certainly, the Administration was not very efficient, but neither has there been one efficient since Trujillo; so it was not the particular regime that was the problem. Dominican bureaucracy is thoroughly corrupt, save some marked exceptions, and the PRD government did not help to institute a civil-service attitude or requirements. Instead, it followed the traditional line of the spoils-system by placing party faithful or sympathizers in the administration of public affairs. It did not resist the temptation of collecting the traditional 2 percent of the public employee's salary for the benefit of the party. Of course, this is always a "personal contribution," but it is clear that if you do not pay, you will be replaced with some one that does, for, after all, competence is not the main criterion for employment. The result is

---

<sup>1</sup>Professor Wiarda wrote that administrative corruption under Bosch was of a different kind, quantitatively or qualitatively, than that which had been before or came after. No longer was public employment exclusively for personal gain, but graft took the form of the transfer of funds to the PRD. Howard J. Wiarda, The Aftermath of the Trujillo Dictatorship: The Emergence of a Pluralistic Political System in the Dominican Republic (Gainesville: Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Florida, 1965), p. 193.

<sup>2</sup>Dominican Action--1965: Intervention or Cooperation? (Washington: The Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, Special Report Series No. 2, 1966), p. 2.

inefficiency and corruption, which does not help any government to institute its policies effectively, and much less does it help the nation which has to suffer the consequences.

The policy of the Bosch government with the power-structure of Dominican society was the same as its fiscal policies: conservative. It took no action whatsoever to move around soldiers or to replace any commanders; no one's business or land was confiscated or even threatened, with the exception of the newspaper El Caribe for very peculiar reasons;<sup>1</sup> and the Church was left to act as it always had. In essence, not a single move, except frightening them, was made against the defenders of the status quo. Probably it would have been made later, once the government was entrenched and powerful, but the reality is that nothing was done.

Unfortunately for the government, it was not able to do anything to maintain the support that it had been given before, because, in great measure, it could not deliver on its promises to the destitute. For instance, during the electoral campaign many times it was said that Dominicans had the right to eat three hot meals a day, and this had the demagogic implication that if elected, the PRD government was to make

---

<sup>1</sup>The problem was that the editor-owner, Germán Ornes Coiscou, had obtained the newspaper from the Consejo with the claim that it was his and not Trujillo's. When he attacked Bosch, the President threatened with re-opening the question.



sure that this became a fact. The problem was that it could neither develop the nation in a few months, nor could it redistribute the national income, which certainly would have been insufficient, for all Dominicans to eat three hot meals per day. The result was a backfire, for the hungry had raised their hopes only to see them unfulfilled once more, and therefore became disillusioned with the Bosch government, a fact which ended support from the masses.

The students were thoroughly radical and maintained an open campaign of accusing Bosch of being the lackey of Yankee Imperialism. Although nowadays the PRD controls the Autonomous University student movement, FUSD, then it did not have any support whatsoever; for the student groups FRAGUA, Marxist, and BRUC, social-christian, were at the height of their power. At the last moment, just before the impending coup, the student groups were to throw their support behind the Constitutional President, more in fear of what was to come after him than for love of him or constitutional procedures.

Peasants can be mobilized for an election, but not to support a government. To vote is fine, but to go to the nearest town or to Santo Domingo to demonstrate is another matter, because by being openly identified with a political group could bring disastrous consequences. For this type of political support, Bosch had to count on the organized labor movement, and he was not faring to well with organized labor.

The President was facing two problems: one, he wanted control of the labor movement, and two, he was being undermined by the Communist groups and by the United States Labor Attache, Fred Somerford.<sup>1</sup>

As it may be remembered, just before the elections the PRD was able to merge FOUPSA and CESISTRADO into one large Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores. In essence this would have been the Dominican equivalent of the North American AFL-CIO or the Mexican Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM), and it managed to recruit La Unión into it. But, the Social-Christian CASC said it was a good idea to have workers united, but that it would not join, nor oppose, because of its ideology. The North American-influenced CONATRAL argued vehemently against a central labor front on the grounds that this could lead to a totalitarian merger, just like Russia or Trujillo, and that labor should concentrate on collective bargaining and be apolitical, except for being anti-Communist. The result was a bitter division in the labor movement with CONATRAL advocating for a coup, CASC in the middle, and the Confederación supporting Bosch.

While the Labor Attache was undermining the government, in great measure because he thought that Bosch and Miolán were thieves

---

<sup>1</sup>Howard J. Wiarda, "The Development of the Labor Movement in the Dominican Republic," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1966), pp. 55-59.

and gangsters and the PRD probably Communist,<sup>1</sup> the government was cracking down, the Marxist-controlled labor groups. Not as one would have expected, the IJ4 and the PSP had control, or a great deal of influence, on two white collar groups: the public employees and the teachers' federation. Bosch busted both groups and had the leadership replaced with PRD sympathizers in his efforts to unite a labor front in his own benefit, for it was the only political group that he could mobilize with the exception of some of his own party members. Besides, the only way to balance the existing power of the established power structure was through the creation of new power centers in society, which would either help to water-down the influence of the others or substitute them. Unfortunately, he was unsuccessful, and at the moment of truth, the day of the coup, he found little active support anywhere.

The United States Embassy relations with the Bosch government operated on three pivots, as was astutely realized by Sidney Lens before the coup took place.<sup>2</sup> First of all, the government had absolute support from the Ambassador, John Bartlow Martin, and his staff, but not from their superiors in the State Department or the Agency for International Development (AID). Requests for aid were delayed to the point

---

<sup>1</sup>This is what he said in an interview after the coup. Wiarda, The Aftermath of the Trujillo Dictatorship . . ., *op. cit.*, p. 296.

<sup>2</sup>Lens, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

that the Ambassador wrote that "We had committed something over \$50 million to last year's Consejo but not a cent for Bosch."<sup>1</sup> In spite of the fact that the Kennedy Administration viewed the government with sympathy, the more conservative policy-implementing apparatuses filibustered the support.

Furthermore, when Bosch attempted not to honor some sugar contracts that he had, as President-elect, recommended the Consejo not to make on the grounds that sugar prices were on the increase, the State Department pressured him to honor them, on which he had little choice.<sup>2</sup> There were not the periodic displays of North American military power in support of the regime, as had been done with the Consejo, and the Dominican military never got the picture clear that the Kennedy Administration was supporting Bosch.

On the other hand, Lens makes the point that on the other two pivots, the Labor Attache and the Military Attaches and Training Missions, the Bosch government was being thoroughly undermined. As we have seen, through CONATRAL, the government was under fire, and significantly, it was the only labor group to praise the coup as a patriotic gesture. The military aspect is a little bit more complex, for not all of them were so adamant against Bosch, nor did it all

<sup>1</sup> Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 451.

<sup>2</sup> Chung, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-80.

depend on one man as labor did. But, in essence, they were telling Dominican officers that Bosch was a Communist, or the government Communist infiltrated, and that something had to be done about it.<sup>1</sup> For Dominican soldiers to have North American military officers telling them what they wanted to hear was a clearing signal for the coup to go ahead, and this was interpreted as United States policy.

Part of the problem was that the North Americans did not have a clear policy, for if the United States had given the government full and open support for all to see, no one would have probably moved against Bosch as they had not done against the Consejo. President Kennedy "instructed our government to give Bosch full support, hoping that the Dominican Republic might become a democratic showcase in the Caribbean."<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, without taking into consideration the fact that the policy was not carried through by the different United States bureaucratic organs, the Kennedy Administration simultaneously trained and equipped the Armed Forces and the police, which in effect was pulling the rug out from under the government by making the military more powerful. It was not possible in the Dominican Republic to have a policy supporting a democratic government and, at the same

---

<sup>1</sup>Norman Gall, "The Fall of Juan Bosch," The Nation, Vol. 197, No. 13 (October 26, 1963), p. 254.

<sup>2</sup>Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 773.

time, train the non-democratic forces in the name of counter insurgency. The result was that:

. . . the United States trained police joined the Army in ousting President Bosch, following which both the police and the anti-guerrilla units, trained during 1963 by a forty-four man United States Army Mission, were used to hunt down Bosch's non-Communist partisans in the name of anti-Communism.<sup>1</sup>

In a caudillistic political system, to overthrow a government is not a very difficult affair, but to consolidate the forces to do it is an extremely delicate matter. When there is dissatisfaction with the existing political authorities, conspiracies begin, but this does not mean that they are necessarily put into effect. Some are discovered and thwarted; others just fail to find broad support; while others manage to carry the struggle until the end. Against Bosch were not only the losing political parties, except the Social Christians (PRSC) who claimed to be in constructive opposition, but all the groups and individuals who had a stake in the maintenance of the status quo. Furthermore, the supporters that the government had were not well organized, nor did they enjoy a great deal of political power vis-a-vis those who were against, and the President aggravated matters by failing to be more compromising and less vituperative with his tongue.

<sup>1</sup> Edwin Lieuwen, Generals Vs. Presidents: Neomilitarism in Latin America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1964), p. 127. Cited in Goff and Locker, op. cit., p. 10.

Ten days after his inaugural, Bosch learned of a coup against him. Another one "was scheduled for April, a very serious one barely failed to come off in July, a third miscarried in August, and the successful one was perpetrated in September."<sup>1</sup> Actually, conspiracies had begun as early as some envisioned the triumph of the PRD at the polls. It became more serious after it was a fact that Bosch had been elected to the presidency, but it took a serious form only after he had been inaugurated.

As Hoon Mok Chung has pointed out, the coup d'etat was carried out in three different stages: first, the civilian organization from April until July; second, the successful enlistment of the military; and finally, the actual overthrow.<sup>2</sup> The disgruntled losers, particularly from UCN, created a group known as Dominican Independent Action (ADI), whose sole purpose was to begin the snowballing process to "tumble" the government. It was an ultra-right-wing group, which charged the government with being Communist-infiltrated, if not plainly smeared as Communist, and rumor has it that ADI was receiving funds from North American reactionary groups, particularly the John Birch Society.

People such as the national heroes, Imbert and Amiama, who were no longer regarded with the esteem of previous days, were

---

<sup>1</sup>Draper, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>Chung, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-106.

active in the organizing of ADI; and so were Donald Reid Cabral, the would-be head of the forthcoming Triumvirate; Rafael Bonilla Aybar, the head of the slanderous conservative newspaper, Prensa Libre; and Mario Read Vittini, head of a small social-democrat party (PDC). This group had military allies, such as Colonel Eliás Wessin y Wessin, head of one of the military cliques, but it was not enough to carry a major sector of the military against the government. This came in July.

The President was summoned to a meeting at San Isidro Air Force Base by a group of military officers of the Wessin clique, urged to do so by their chaplain, Father Marcial Silva, to discuss the matter of Communist influence in the government. In a bluff, Bosch took them by surprise by offering to resign, which they did not accept, for they had not wielded enough support from the other cliques. Instead, the President took the issue to a televised speech in which he demanded, and obtained, the resignation of Silva and one officer, Major Rolando Roberto Haché. Yet, instead of softening down for a while, at least verbally, he went on the offensive. Bosch brought up the subject of the Confiscation Law, which was nothing unusual, Trujillo had one similar, but the timing was disastrous, July 22, 1963.

Business groups had been enlisted together with the landowning groups into the wear-out campaign of concern for the Communist



menace and the soft-on-Communism policy of the Bosch government. The Bishop of Santiago, Monsignor Hugo Polanco Brito, charged that Communism was infiltrating Dominican youth, and by July 25th, went as far as saying that the "forces of evil, though dressed in the skin of lamb are multiplying."<sup>1</sup> Bosch was popularly referred to as "the lamb," because of his white head, and the bishop's implication was absolutely clear: the Church was also in support of a coup. Labor groups, except CONATRAL, came out in defense of the Constitutional Government; so did students and professionals, but also the Communists, which did not help the government at all.

Bosch survived the crisis of the July coup, and the Chief of the Air Force made the comment: "He's won the first round. He better not try the second."<sup>2</sup> It was the President's moment to hold fast to a survival policy by making a public gesture of his democratic beliefs and his disagreement with Communism, but he chose not to do so. Valid though his reasons were, as he wrote later, he was overthrown, and then there was no liberty, no democracy, and not even the semblance of law. Bosch said that the same instruments of oppression that had been used by Trujillo, the Armed Forces and the National Police, were present in 1963 basically unchanged.

<sup>1</sup> Cited in Wiarda, The Aftermath . . ., op. cit., p. 141.

<sup>2</sup> Cited in Martin, op. cit., p. 490.

If I had used them against the Communists I would have ended as their prisoner, for they, for their part, would have completely destroyed the Dominican democratic forces. For those men, having learned from Trujillo, there was no distinction between democrats and Communists; anyone who opposed any of their violence, or even their corruption, was a Communist and ought to be annihilated.<sup>1</sup>

By this time, there is probably little that the President could have done to survive. The Wessin clique had managed to enlist the support of the Imbert group and the San Cristóbal clan, for the latter two may have been worried about later being overcome by the commander of CEFA, but accepting civilian supremacy and a populist government was perceived as a more threatening situation. Bosch did have some support from the younger officers and enlisted men, but the military hierarchy was set against him,<sup>2</sup> supported by the business and land-owning interests, the hierarchy of the Church, and some sectors of the North American government. However, the coup d'etat had not as yet been consolidated, for some officers were still hesitating whether it was a prudent policy to carry out.

<sup>1</sup> Juan Bosch, "Communism and Democracy in the Dominican Republic," Saturday Review, Vol. 48, No. 32 (August 7, 1965), p. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Wiarda, The Aftermath . . ., *op. cit.*, Table III, p. 121. In September, Lieutenant Colonel Rafael Fernández Domínguez attempted to organize younger officers to prevent the coup, but they were unsuccessful. José Francisco Peña Gómez, "Dominican Revolutionary Leader Refutes," in After Santo Domingo What? (Austin, Texas: University Colloquy on Public Issues, 1966), p. III-29.

Besides the barrage of anti-government propaganda, the conspirators were now embarked on a policy of public demonstrations to weaken the government and to convince those who were lukewarm of the necessity of the coup. The meetings were called in the name of Christian affirmation, the defense of religion, the Catholic religion, under the slogan "Jesús sí, Communism no." They began on August 4, 1963, gathering large crowds each time, until the coup had taken place, but not before sponsoring a Christian strike against communism which began on September 20th. The strike was successful, for businessmen did not open their stores in spite of government appeals, nor by its tampering for the first and only time with public liberties, the closing down of two radio stations. The fate of Bosch was sealed, for he could not find support anywhere, except students, most labor groups, the PRSC, the P.P.D, IJ4, and the Marxist parties, none of which were serious power contenders in the caudillistic political system.

Aware of his deteriorating situation, the day before the coup, Juan Bosch asked the Ambassador of the United States if the fleet could be sent to support him as the North American government had done with Balaguer in 1961. The dialogue that follows is interesting, for the question was asked by Sacha Volman in front of Bosch, who did not say a word, but Bartlow Martin understood what was happening. He

replied: "We have talked several times about bringing a carrier in and taking you aboard for lunch, Mr. President." Bosch asked if that could be done now, to which the ambassador said that he did not know, but then asked the crucial question: "Do you want the Marines to land?" The President replied with a flat no.<sup>1</sup> He was only willing to have a show of support, but not an invasion.

Martin cabled Washington on the matter of the aircraft carrier, suggested to Bosch that he declare a state of siege, and told his attaches to give the Dominican military the message that the United States was supporting the government. Neither did the President take his advice, nor is there any confirmation that the attaches did, for they had for long been very critical of Bosch. Besides, on the night of the coup there was a reception in the Armed Forces Officers Club for visiting North American Admiral Simon O. Farrell, who apparently did not make any attempt to stop it either. That same night, Martin received the State Department's reply to his cable:<sup>2</sup>

It said that the Department could do little more to save Bosch in view of his past performance despite all my efforts to persuade him to govern effectively. The forces arrayed against him were largely of his own creation. Now he must save himself. The Department did not oppose the moves I had already recommended to him but warned me not to tie such moves to any commitment by the United States. It suggested that perhaps he also should take some "positive" steps. (I wondered how). As for the

<sup>1</sup> Martin, *op. cit.*, pp. 564-565.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 570.

aircraft carrier, the Department refused to intervene militarily unless a Communist take-over were threatened.

At the party for Admiral Farrell there was the notable absence of Air Force Officers, who were already entrenched in their San Isidro bastion. The President had made an appointment to see some officers about the dismissal of Wessin as head of CEFA and therefore in control of the tanks. After the reception, the officers came to the National Palace for their appointment with the President, but they refused to accept Bosch's proposition.<sup>1</sup> Then the President asked if it was possible just to transfer Wessin, and the officers, who were exclusively from the Army and Navy, decided to call the Chief of the Air Force, Atila Luna, to ask him about it. Luna sent two emissaries from San Isidro, officers Guarién Cabrera and Álvarez Albizu, to tell the group that no changes were acceptable. Bosch dismissed all the officers, who went to discuss the matter at another wing of the National Palace. The President had decided to resign in front of the National Congress, as the Constitution prescribed. However, at 4:00 A. M., the group of officers returned to his office to tell him that he was under arrest. The coup had been perpetrated; the Constitutional Government had ended in those early hours of September 25, 1963.

<sup>1</sup>For the details of that night, see Rafael Molina Morillo, "Historia Intima de Cómo Se Desarrolló el Golpe Militar," Ahora, No. 44 (1era Quincena Noviembre, 1963), pp. 7-9, 56-57; and Max Álvarez, "Paliques de Actualidad: Luis Amiana Hace Declaraciones," Ahora, No. 113 (27 Diciembre 1965), pp. 14-15.

The first populist challenge to the traditional caudillistic system had met with failure, partly due to circumstances, personality clashes, and reactionary groups, but mostly due to its own paradox. The PRD government had come to power with the aid of the military, excellent political organization, and with the promises of democracy, reconciliation, and socio-economic reforms. If the leadership had been aware from the beginning of the need of the military to triumph in the ballot box, just as it had always been in the caudillistic political system, how in the world did they expect the military all of a sudden to recognize the government as the supreme arbiter of the nation? To achieve this, one of three possibilities, or a combination of them, had to be the case: first and foremost, absolute and unconditional North American support, not only from the Administration in Washington, but from all the agencies as well; second, that the government were in the hands of a caudillo having made the armed forces loyal to him before or after occupying the offices of the government; and third, that the government had been able to muster sufficient support from the civilian population, using the traditional power centers, the Church and the oligarchy, or the new power centers, political parties, labor unions, and interest associations, or both.

Although the populist government was on good terms with the Kennedy Administration, Alliance for Progress showcase and all that,

because the Bosch Administration was keeping order and hopefully preventing Castro, the government was being undermined by United States agencies dedicated to strengthening the armed forces for ideological warfare and by a barrage of propaganda in which socio-economic change is equated with Communism, and Communism as the enemy of the United States and its allies. In order to save democracy, the Constitutional Government had to be deposed in order to have a reactionary government, which by definition would be pro-United States and hopefully democratic.

The irony is that the populist government was pro-United States, democratic, and anti-Communist, a fact which the Kennedy administration understood, but it was not able to convince the more conservative sectors of the North American government. Juan Bosch made few moves without consultation with the Ambassador of the United States--the planning board of his government, CIDES, was staffed with careful ideological scrutiny and funded indirectly by the CIA. No relations were established, or even attempted, with Communist nations, and Marxist controlled labor unions were destroyed. True it was that the populist government attempted to secure loans outside the United States, and it did not persecute anyone for ideological reasons, whether in the left or in the right. The government also talked of reforms which would have been detrimental to established North American firms,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Franco, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-142. Particularly hurting was a price ceiling on sugar sales.

but this was what the Alliance for Progress was supposed to be about, at least at that time. The contradictory purposes of the United States as to the best way to maintain the empire was to serve for a lack of support to the Bosch government, giving a free hand to the Dominican military.

The PRD was able to enlist military support for its electoral victory, but it failed to maintain it for the President was not a caudillo, a product of violence and personality. The interesting point was that the opposition did not have a caudillo either, as had been the case of Trujillo's coup d'etat in 1930, thus all they could ask for was to enlist their support for the coup, just as Bosch had done for the elections, and they obtained it. The problem for the populist government was that to stay in power it had to recognize the supremacy of the military, unless their power could be counteracted by the civilian power centers and/or the United States. The Constitutional government not only failed to enlist the solid support of these powers, but it attempted to establish the supremacy of the government and its constitution. True it was that military privileges were not touched,<sup>1</sup> nor was there any

<sup>1</sup>Some have argued that if the President had come out in a clear anti-Communist position and would have suppressed the campaign of some of the leftist groups against the military hierarchy, there would not have been a coup, because there was "apparently no other reason for the Armed Forces to wish to depose Bosch, since they enjoyed the same privileges they always had." Alvaro Montalvo, "Las Ultimas Horas del Gobierno del Profesor Bosch," Ahora, No. 43 (2da Quincena Octubre 1963), p. 17.



change of personnel in the military hierarchy, except for the last minute demands for the dismissal of Colonel Wessin y Wessin, but the new constitution had not "sanctified" those rights, which meant that the government had the legal right to change them as it saw fit. In essence, it would have been the recognition of civilian supremacy, marking the end of the caudillistic political system, and the President, by not submitting to military demands in July had proven that this was precisely his intention. Paradoxically then, the PRD had recognized the supremacy of the military in order to get elected, but it was not willing to accept the rules of the game once it was in office.

With United States support at best neutralized and with the military against, the government needed solid civilian backing in order to remain in power, but this was impossible by its very nature. A populist government, representing the working classes and the anti-status quo middle sectors, was to have alienated the traditional power centers within the society. True it was that no moves were taken to confiscate property, to levy taxes on the rich, or to curtail Church activities, but there was the Constitution of 1963, a symbol of intentions and the legal authority with which to carry out reforms. In fear of change, business and landowning groups, the Church, and their associations were up in arms against the government, as it could have been expected, but then the PRD government failed to transform the populist organizations, labor unions, peasant brotherhoods, professional associations,

students, and anti-status quo political parties, into massive governmental support.

Part of the problem was that the traditional system was very much alive, groups being fragmented into several directions and petty squabbles rather than united in a common cause. The majority of the population, the peasant groups, had been allowed to disintegrate after electoral victory, for there had been no serious aid or reforms to maintain a disciplined mass organization. The labor groups, with the exception of CONATRAL, were supporting the government, but the ranks of the labor movement were somewhat apathetic, for the promised reforms had not been seen. Students, professional organizations, and supporting political parties, save the PRD itself, did not have any capacity for mass demonstrations of support, only small groups and written communiques and manifestos, simply because they did not have any mass following. The PRD itself had dwindled once in the government, the party machinery caught between rewarding its clientele with jobs and favors and maintaining mass leadership with promises of reform.

The weakness of political institutions and of the populist movement itself allowed for the grand conservative coalition to perform the coup d'etat. However, the defenders of the status quo had nothing else but the status quo: the caudillistic political system and all its characteristics, violence, instability, and the hegemony of oligarchic values.

## CHAPTER VI

## REBELLION AND REVOLUTION

In the early morning hours of the coup d'etat, United States Ambassador John Bartlow Martin had gone to the National Palace concerned about the safety of the deposed President of the Dominican Republic. He found him unharmed but under arrest. Shortly after the Ambassador would hear the Minister of the Armed Force tell him: "The military is in charge of the country. Soon we will designate one or several civilians to take charge."<sup>1</sup> The caudillistic political system had been saved from the brief challenge.

The nation had been plunged into a political pattern which could no longer sustain. On the one hand, the mobilized sectors from the middle groups and the urban working class could no longer be ignored as participants in the political arena. Weak as the populist movement may have been to defend the Constitutional government, it was strong enough not to be eradicated. The nation could not be restored to the 19th Century--it had become too complex. On the other hand, without a strong caudillo, such as Lili's or Trujillo, neither order could be

<sup>1</sup> John Bartlow Martin, Overtaken By Events (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1966), p. 578.

maintained, nor could the unity of the conservative coalition. They had no claims to legality or to popular support, only to naked power. They had nothing to offer but the caudillistic political system without a caudillo, the maintenance of social privileges and economic exploitation, and the perpetuation of these circumstances. In less than two years, they would be faced with a rebellion and an attempt at revolution, which would have as a result the invasion of Dominicana by the United States.

The military was again the supreme arbiter of Dominican affairs, but they were no longer united as they had been under the Marines and Trujillo. A few hours after the coup d'etat, radio stations began to broadcast a communique signed by 25 military officers, the entire military hierarchy plus the two national heroes, a full representation of the leading three military cliques. The communique said that the government had been overthrown because it had attempted against the Constitution; it had destroyed public trust; it had violated the rights of citizens, and it had been unable to place the country on the road to peace, by means of order, the respect for law, general security, peace, progress, and the common good. Furthermore, it proclaimed the outlawing of "the doctrine of Communism, Marxism-Leninism, or which ever way one wishes to call it, as well as the political parties

which openly or secretly profess it . . ."<sup>1</sup> The Constitution of 1963 was declared null, both Houses of Congress were dismissed, and the Constitution of 1962, the Consejo's Constitution, was put into effect.

Political parties, excluding the Social Christians, the 14th of June, the PSP, the MPD and, obviously, the PRD, were called to the National Palace to find the way of creating a civilian junta which would not include any major party leader. In this way, it would be possible for the called parties to agree on the people who would make up the new government, and there would be no principal civilian figure to threaten the Armed Forces. While deliberations were under way, mass arrests were being carried out, all radio stations seized, troops displaced everywhere, a state of siege declared, the airport was closed, the headquarters of the IJ4 was smashed and hurricane warnings were put out on account of the approaching storm, Edith.

Both Betancourt of Venezuela and Muñoz Marín of Puerto Rico called President Kennedy and "demanded that United States Marines be sent to the Dominican Republic to reinstate Bosch,"<sup>2</sup> but it was to no

<sup>1</sup>For the text of the communique, see Centro de Enseñanzas de las Fuerzas Armadas (CEFA), Libro Blanco de las Fuerzas Armadas y de la Policía Nacional de la República Dominicana: Estudios y Pruebas Documentales de las Causas del Movimiento Reindivador del 25 de Septiembre de 1963 (Santo Domingo: 1964), pp. 90-95.

<sup>2</sup>De Lesseps S. Morrison, Latin American Mission (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965), p. 264.

avail. The six political parties who were to form a new government, UCN, ASD, PDC, PPDC, PNRD, and VRD,<sup>1</sup> issued a joint communique in which it was declared that Bosch had betrayed the people and was the only one responsible for the coup. Later during the day, a three-man civilian junta, called the Triumvirate, was created. Heading it was the Chief of the Supreme Court, Emilio de los Santos, who, to make it even more ironical, had been the President of the Electoral Board which declared Bosch the elected President. The other two members, both educated in the United States, were Ramón Tapia Espinal and Manuel Tavares Espaillat. There were no diplomats present at the swearing-in ceremony of the first Triumvirate, because they had all been accredited to the Bosch government. The new Cabinet was composed of representatives of the participating political parties, with the exception of Major General Viñas Román, who had been left at his post.

There was some student rioting and threats of a strike by labor syndicates CASC and FOUPSA-CESISTRADO, but nothing came of it. Perhaps due to the weather conditions, coupled with the fact that more

---

<sup>1</sup>Unión Cívica Nacional, Alianza Social Demócrata, Partido Demócrata Cristiano, Partido Progresista Demócrata Cristiano, Partido Nacional Revolucionario Dominicano, Vanguardia Revolucionaria Dominicana.

than 700 persons had been arrested in Santo Domingo alone,<sup>1</sup> there were less demonstrations of support for the deposed government, but there is no way of telling.<sup>2</sup> The magazine Ahora came out with an editorial saying that they had been critics of the Constitutional government, but that they deplored the coup.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, the rightist newspaper, Prensa Libre, hailed the coup, saying that now the country would go on the path to democracy. "Today is a holiday for our Religion, the Fatherland, the Workers, the Employers, and the courageous Dominican business community. . . . Let's thank God for the triumph and let's dedicate ourselves to constructive work."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The Herald Tribune, September 28, 1963. Reporter Barnard Colliers adds that the new Foreign Minister, Donald Reid Cabral, was well liked by United States officials, but that there was concern with the Secretary of Interior, Angel Severo Cabral, who had recently called both Bosch and Bartlow Martin outright Communists.

<sup>2</sup>"A survey I made of some 500 people of all classes suggested massive disapproval of the coup." Dan Kurzman, Santo Domingo: Revolt of the Damned (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1965), p. 109. One rumor links Washington Post reporter Kurzman as sympathetic to the PRD.

<sup>3</sup>"Editorial de Ultima Hora," Ahora, No. 42 (1era Quincena Octubre 1963), p. 2A.

<sup>4</sup>Cited in CEFA, op. cit., p. 212. The editor-publisher of this paper, Rafael Bonilla Aybar (Bonillita), had been the nerve center of the campaign to paint Bosch and his associates as Communists. He was duly rewarded by the new government. Eleven of his relatives "were awarded some of the best positions. His uncle became Ambassador to the OAS; his father, Consul in Puerto Rico; a cousin, Ambassador to the United Nations; another cousin, Secretary of Industry; and still another, Director of Tourism." Kurzman, op. cit., pp. 93-119.

The new government had a few things to do rather quickly. The first was to promote Wessin to Brigadier General, as one would have expected, since, after all, thanks mostly to him they were the government. The second was to call for United States and Latin American diplomatic recognition, because even Mexico, where Bosch had been visiting just prior to the coup, noted for its immediate recognition of any government, had severed relations. The third step was to release the lesser political prisoners, to look humanitarian, and to exile the important ones as well as give safe conduct to those in diplomatic asylum. The fourth step was to derogate the Executive Decree dealing with a price-ceiling for sugar, which made it mandatory for private companies to turn over to the government any profits received above the fixed amount.<sup>1</sup> Finally, the exile of Bosch in a Dominican Navy frigate, accompanied by Imbert at the ex-president's request, to Port of Spain, Trinidad.

Although able to put themselves together for the overthrow of the Constitutional government and to form the Triumvirate as the representative of the conservative coalition, they were not able to keep

---

<sup>1</sup> According to Franklyn Franco, it was at the moment that this law was decreed when the Central Romana, a subsidiary of the South Puerto Rico Sugar Corporation, began to finance anti-government activities. Republica Dominicana: Clases, Crisis y Comandos (La Habana: Casa de las Américas, 1966), pp. 141-142.



united for they did not have a military caudillo. To stay in power they had to have the reverse of the conditions which make a coup d'etat possible: the loyalty of the armed forces, favorable international conditions (the United States), and the apathy or support of the public.

As far as the civilians were concerned, they had the support of the business and landowning groups and the hostility of the labor groups and professional associations. The peasants were neutral, for they did not mobilize against the new regime, and the Church had moved into a position of neutrality by not making pronouncements in support. In the military realm the matter is more complex. Fragmented into cliques without purposes beyond those of the personal success of their leadership and the rewards to be reaped by loyalty to one of these men or groups of men, it was inevitable that they would begin to squabble with each other, very much in the same manner as in traditional days when there was the absence of a strong caudillo. As Abraham F. Lowenthal put it, "Alliances among the cliques are formed for tactical purposes and splits develop quickly; the task of those in power is always to keep one step ahead of the groupings of plotters."<sup>1</sup>

Under these conditions, to survive in power the Triumvirate needed full North American support. This would be symbolized by

---

<sup>1</sup>Abraham F. Lowenthal, "The Dominican Republic: The Politics of Chaos," in Arpad Von Lazar and Robert F. Kaufman (eds.), Reform and Revolution: Readings in Latin American Politics (New York: Allyn and Bacon, 1969), p. 47.

diplomatic recognition, a sign of approval which would reduce the plotting among civilian and military groups, and it would increase the supply of money with which to conduct public works, to reduce hostility in the populist sectors, maintain profits for businessmen, and allow some influentials to graft.

However, the overthrow of the Constitutional government was an unwelcome problem for the Kennedy Administration because the central core of the Alliance for Progress was to stop Castro via the Latin American democratic left, of which Bosch was a prominent member. Military coups in alliance with the right-wing civilian elements not only destroyed the democratic idea, but they would prevent the necessary reforms to avoid a revolutionary struggle. Besides, the occurrence of coup d'etat seems to be a contagious affair, and a week later the democratic government of President Villeda Morales of Honduras was also overthrown under somewhat similar conditions and allegations.

According to Bartlow Martin, there were four policy alternatives open to the government of the United States: first, to bring Bosch back; second, to recognize the Triumvirate; third, to recognize the regime after considerable delay and much bargaining; and fourth, "we could decide to recognize and search actively for a way to replace the regime with one with a stronger claim to constitutional legitimacy."<sup>1</sup>

The United States Ambassador, who favored the last alternative, pre-

<sup>1</sup>Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 595.

sented this to Kennedy, who said, "I take it we don't want Bosch back." The Ambassador said no, and the President then asked why. The diplomat's answer was: "Because he isn't a President."<sup>1</sup> The idea then was to look for some constitutional alternative, but to leave the Constitutional President out. According to the Constitution of 1963, in the case of absence of the President or the Vice-President, who were both in exile, the line of succession fell to the President of the Senate, Juan Casanovas Garrido, and then to the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Jose Rafael Molina Ureña, both of whom were acceptable to the North Americans.<sup>2</sup>

The new Triumvirate was in trouble. The United States had pulled out its Ambassador and the AID mission, coupled with strong statements in Washington about the blessings of democracy and constitutional government, as well as adverse North American Congressional and newspaper reactions to the coup. The new Foreign Minister, Donald Reid, publicly said, on October 1st, that the absence of public protests or any attempts to restore Bosch to power amounted to a plebiscite giving legitimacy to the Triumvirate. This fell through a few days later when a demonstration in support was called by the six

---

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 601.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 595, 605.

political parties, called the golpista parties for their role in the coup, and no more than 700 persons gathered.<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, Bosch was now in Puerto Rico as the official guest of Governor Luis Muñoz Marín, and he was vowing that he would be back within 90 days. The outlawed Dominican Congress met clandestinely not only to denounce the Triumvirate, but also to publicly thank the United States government for withholding recognition as well as to elect Senator Casanovas Garrido as Provisional President as provided in the Constitution.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, requests for recognition were sent to Washington and to 11 Latin American countries, which put further pressure on the Junta, because it was a claim to legality. The Triumvirate responded by announcing a four-phase electoral plan, starting with a constituent convention, followed by municipal, then Congressional, and finally Presidential elections sometime in mid 1965. In this political struggle,

Casanovas had legitimacy but not power, while the Triumvirate had power but no legitimacy. President Kennedy suggested we [North Americans] point out to the regime that it had now an opportunity to find its way back to constitutionality and that it could take credit for having stopped communism. Thus it could save face and might accept Casanovas.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The New York Times, October 7, 1963.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., October 13, 1963.

<sup>3</sup>Martin, op. cit., p. 605.

Spencer M. King, the United States Charge d'Affaires, relayed the message to the Triumvirate, but instead of accepting the North American proposal, it accused the United States of intervention in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic! The Triumvirate also declared Harry S. Schlaudeman persona non grata on the grounds that this Embassy official was engaged in activities hostile to the new government. Apparently Schlaudeman was the Embassy's contact with populist leaders, and although the Triumvirate dropped this issue, it nevertheless took the matter of intervention to the Organization of American States.<sup>1</sup>

If one wonders what made the Triumvirate so courageous all of a sudden, the answer may be found in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). What was reported at first as a "mystery" North American, who had been telling the government not to worry about the recognition which was coming anyway, turned out to be a CIA agent, retired Marine Colonel Lear B. Reed, who was torpedoing the Embassy's efforts to topple the Triumvirate and put Casanovas in power.<sup>2</sup> Backed by the CIA, and one may suspect also by the Pentagon, the Triumvirate held firm. The PRD held a rally on October 27th which was broken up by the police, and soon thereafter Casanovas Garrido was found, arrested, and exiled.

<sup>1</sup>The New York Times, October 16, 1963.

<sup>2</sup>The Herald Tribune, October 22 and 27, 1963.

Within the Armed Forces, Lieutenant Colonel Rafael Fernández Domínguez had been organizing a Constitutionalist counter coup in order to restore the populist government and the Constitution of 1963, but the conspiracy was discovered and Fernández Domínguez sent to Spain as military attache of the Dominican Embassy.<sup>1</sup> Even within CEFA, 18 officers were canceled on the grounds of suspected loyalty to Wessin,<sup>2</sup> but more serious was the fact that the San Cristóbal clique had also begun the conspiracy game. This time it was led by former General Pedro Rodríguez Echavarría, the brother of Balaguer's former Secretary of the Armed Forces, in combination with the Commander of the Santiago Air Base, Colonel Danilo Ramón Simó Canó, and Colonel Guarién Cabrera Ariza, but the plot failed and all were arrested.<sup>3</sup> The Triumvirate had also won this round.

Since people could not be gathered to demonstrate in favor of the Triumvirate and those who were demonstrating were against, the

<sup>1</sup> Anonymous, "Primer Aniversario de la Muerte del Teniente Coronel Rafael Tomás Fernández Domínguez," Ahora, No. 133 (23 Mayo 1966), p. 14.

<sup>2</sup> The New York Times, October 18, 1963.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., November 1, 1963; and Herald Tribune, November 2, 1963. One version says that the plan included the bombing of San Isidro and the National Police Palace to put in power Casanovas Garrido. Hook Mok Chung, The Case of the Muffed Mission: The 1963 Coup d'Etat in the Dominican Republic (Philadelphia: Preliminary Draft, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, 1966), p. 110.

government decided, in early November, that it was best to ban all demonstrations, parades, or public gatherings.<sup>1</sup> The Triumvirate was never popular, but it had force on its side. In the meantime, Washington diplomats no longer knew what to do with the Dominican case, as reported by Bartlow Martin:

We tried everything. Secretly I met Miolan [PRD], who looked curiously out of place in a Washington office. Secretly Crockett [Caribbean Area Director of the State Department] met with Bonilla Atiles [Dominican Ambassador to the OAS]. The regime sent emissaries and secretly we saw them. . . . The Papal Nuncio [Clarizio] sent word to me from Rome by way of the Apostolic Delegate in Washington that he was concerned about the situation, wanted to know our position, and wanted to work closely with us. We talked to journalists, Latin American diplomats, United States Senators and Congressmen. We kept in touch with Bosch. We sent Colonel Simmons . . . up to New York to talk to his friend Rodríguez Echavarría, then down to the Republic to talk to the Dominican military. The White House sent other unofficial emissaries. . . . Nothing succeeded. Our every effort failed. The regime was unyielding.<sup>2</sup>

The problem for the North Americans was the fallacy of trying to have reforms under a democratic government while at the same time have the supremacy of the military. The restoration of the Constitutional government, preferably without the annoying personality of its President, Juan Bosch, was considered the best of alternatives, but only as long as the military would accept it. For the latter, to have accepted the return of the Constitution of 1963 would have meant

<sup>1</sup>The Herald Tribune, November 2, 1963.

<sup>2</sup>Martin, op. cit., pp. 612-613.

their defeat in the crisis and their subduance, at least momentarily, to civilian control. Furthermore, this also meant the restoration of the legal instruments for reform, which ran counter to the civilian allies of the grand conservative coalition, as well as to the conservative sectors within the North American government.

Unwilling to part with the caudillistic political system while wishing that somehow it could be reformed, the Kennedy Administration was only able to apply some pressure to the Triumvirate, and this policy was being undercut by other agencies of the United States. For the Dominican junta, if it could maintain itself together by holding the conservative coalition and repressing the populist sectors, all it had to do was wait, for North American recognition would be coming in the near future due to the State Department's policy of "the lesser evil doctrine." The idea is that in Latin America "the military are a stable, anti-Communist force and are increasingly enlightened as a result of associating with United States missions. Given a choice between a wobbly, idealistic democrat and solid soldiers, it is better to take the lesser evil and scuttle principle."<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Karl E. Mayer, "The Lesser Evil Doctrine," The New Leader, Vol. XLVI, No. 21 (October 14, 1963), p. 14. Reporter Barnard Collier said that the Bosch coup itself was a United States blunder as a result of this same doctrine. The Herald Tribune, September 29, 1963.



In late November, two major developments occurred which were to end the political impasse. On the one hand, the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, was assassinated in Dallas, Texas; on the other, a group of young men, basically from the 14th of June, went to the mountains to begin guerrilla warfare operations. The fact that the youthful President was slain, passed the mantle of Executive Power to the Vice-President, Lyndon B. Johnson, who was noted as a shrewd politician but not with the same broad political perspectives of his predecessor. The Triumvirate declared an official mourning on account of the death of Kennedy, in spite of the fact that it was this same man who had not diplomatically recognized them as the government of Dominicana. Changes were expected, and changes were to come.

Led by Manolo Tavárez Justo, six guerrilla fronts of about 20 men each were opened against the Triumvirate with the avowed purpose of fighting a war of national liberation and restoring the nation to constitutionality. It is ironical that those who had not participated in the elections of 1962 because it was a presumed farce were later to fight to restore the government which had come to power through that procedure. It is interesting to note, however, that the Moscow-oriented Communist party, Partido Socialista Popular (PSP), was absolutely against the insurrection, although it was they who, at this time, had

the best relationship with Havana.<sup>1</sup>

So far, so good. It does make sense that a political movement borne in martyrdom, with proclaimed revolutionary purposes, and somewhat imitative of Castro, would go to battle against what it considered a new reactionary tyranny. As one 1J4 leader put it: "It is the norm, or better, the history of our party."<sup>2</sup> Yet, the exact reason as to why they decided to go out into open battle is less clear, considering that what the Triumvirate needed to get North American recognition was precisely a "Communist-crisis." One account puts it this way:

According to these reports, Máximo Bernard, a 14th of June member, persuaded Tavárez Justo to begin the guerrilla struggle after convincing him that Imbert, who had had dealings with the 14th of June Movement in the past, would support the operation, if only for his own conspiratorial purposes. But Imbert and other junta backers, the reports say, saw to it, with the help of Camilo Todeman, a German-born technician at the San Cristóbal arms factory, that the guerrillas would receive defective weapons. In late November, the small band, whatever the basis of its decision, took to the hills.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Marcel Niedergang, La Revolución de Santo Domingo, Trans. Ramón Pina Acevedo y Martínez (Santo Domingo: Editorial Renovación, 1968), p. 171.

<sup>2</sup>Eduardo Sánchez Cabral, "Entrevista con Fidelio Depradel," Ahora, No. 75 (26 Septiembre 1964), p. 8. After Manolo Tavárez's death, Fidelio Despradel had become the head of the 1J4.

<sup>3</sup>Kurzman, op. cit., p. 115. One Santo Domingo rumor has it that the reason for going to the hills was based more on an internal struggle for control of the 1J4. The Communists were interested in taking the leadership from the nationalistic-revolutionaries, who were more moderate and were not Communists, which meant that they would not be at the service of foreign powers, and thus Manolo and his group were convinced of going into battle only to take the party away from him, since the chances of his success were almost nil.

No one really gave the guerrillas much hope, considering that in 1959 Trujillo had managed to wipe them out in less than a week. Furthermore, the mountains of Dominicana are quite arid and thus there is no food as there had been in the case of Fidel Castro in the Sierra Maestra of Cuba. There were no major acts of urban terrorism, save for a few homemade little bombs; the campesinos would denounce the presence of fighters due to their fear of military repression; it was wintertime and although in the tropics, it was cold and rainy in the mountains; and finally, the strict vigilance of the Armed Forces and the Police did not allow for anyone else to join them.<sup>1</sup>

On December 12, 1963, in a sudden decision, the United States recognized the Triumvirate. The cable to this effect had Bartlow Martin's signature on it, although he did not know of the decision, but he explains how it came about:

About 11 a. m. a rumor of counter-coup against the regime had come up from San Juan, Puerto Rico, through a United States military channel, had swept through the United States government, had reached President Johnson, and at twelve-fifteen the President had called five Senators, George Ball, and Ed Martin and said we would recognize. By this time Sowash [Dominican Desk, State Department] had telephoned King and learned that the rumor was false. No matter. And no matter either that a meeting called by George Ball for two-thirty to "consider," at long last, the recognition paper was also overtaken by events. President Johnson simply did it. I thought it a fitting ending, grotesque enough to be suitable to the Dominican situation.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Miguel San José, "Guerrillas en Santo Domingo," Ahora, No. 47 (2da Quincena Diciembre, 1963), pp. 11, 14.

<sup>2</sup>Martin, op. cit., p. 631.

Two days after the recognition had taken place, the guerrillas were finished. Apparently, of the six fronts that had opened the armed struggle, only one, the Manaclas group in which was Manolo Tavárez, was operative. The guerrillas were very poorly equipped and trained, while the military troops posted against them had been trained in Panama by the United States. They had modern weapons and equipment, airborne to the battlefield, and renewed up to twice a week.<sup>1</sup> According to Norman Gall, this Manaclas group surrendered to the Armed Forces, and then they were slaughtered and buried in mass graves.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, according to the Dominican military, 16 of the men had been killed in battle, and Manolo Tavarez had committed suicide before he was captured.<sup>3</sup>

The President of the Triumvirate, Ramón Emilio de los Santos, who had apparently received assurances from the Armed Forces that the guerrillas would not be slaughtered, resigned when presented with the massacre.<sup>4</sup> He was replaced by the Foreign Minister, Donald

<sup>1</sup>Miguel San José, "Un Análisis Técnico del Movimiento Insurreccional Dominicano," Ahora, No. 49 (20 Enero 1964), pp. 7-8.

<sup>2</sup>Norman Gall, "Dominican Republic: The Goons Again," The Nation, Vol. 198, No. 8 (February 17, 1964), pp. 159-161.

<sup>3</sup>The New York Times, December 23, 1963.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., December 25, 1963. A nephew of de los Santos, Tony Barreiro, was one of the guerrilla fighters killed by the soldiers.

Reid Cabral, the former Consejero, auto dealer, and oligarch. The second Triumvirate had begun, and the conservative coalition had stayed in power.

With United States recognition and the subsequent resumption of economic aid, the international conditions were favorable to the government. The military was quietly reaping the benefits of power, and no major splits had as yet occurred in the ruling cliques: they remained loyal to the government of their creation. In the civilian sector, the traditional groups felt secure with Donald Reid as their representative, and even the once persecuted Trujillista, under the Consejo, had blended into the conservative coalition in fear of reforms. The populist leaders were in exile, in jail, or persecuted. Labor demonstrations were forbidden, and populist political parties were unable to operate. True it was that four minor parties had withdrawn from the government after the Manacías affair, but they had been insignificant in any case. The conservative coalition was holding together, and Reid had become the undisputed leader of the Triumvirate with the resignation of two of its members, one of whom was replaced with another oligarch, Ramón Cáceres Troncoso. "Thereafter the 'Triumvirate' consisted of only two men--Reid and Cáceres. And Cáceres became

an almost silent partner. Reid ruled."<sup>1</sup>

During the almost two years of the Triumvirate, corruption reached a high point in Dominicana, both at the hands of civilians and military. Contraband liquor and cigarettes were seen everywhere, but there were also furniture, textiles, automobiles, and household goods of every kind. The Police even established what was presumed to be a cooperative, "Canteens of the National Police, Incorporated," importing goods tax free and selling them to the general public. Air Force planes and Navy ships were used in the importation of goods then to be distributed in the general market by civilians. It was a mad orgy of absolute thievery without restraints of any kind. Even the pavilions of the National Cattle Fair built by Trujillo were being dismantled and stolen.

The fruit of such corruption was painfully visible in the luxurious homes that many top officers built for themselves--using enlisted men for the construction work--while the living standards of the poor plummeted still further. Even Trujillo had never been as good to them. Nor did they have to be loyal now to anybody but themselves. Yes, the overthrow of Bosch had been a profitable act indeed for the military. But not for the country, which, within a few months after the coup, ran up a \$45

---

<sup>1</sup>Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 637. The first to resign was Ramón Tapia Espinal (April 8, 1964) in a dispute with the military in which he obviously lost. He was replaced with Cáceres. See Anonymous, "¿Se Cae el Triumvirato?" *Ahora*, No. 58 (20 April 1964), pp. 11-13. Manuel Tavárez Espaillat resigned (June 27, 1964) due to friction with Donald Reid's drive for power. This was interpreted as a loss to the government. See Ciriaco Landolfi, "Ponderación de los Factores Reales de la Política Dominicana," *Ahora*, No. 66 (10 Julio 1964), pp. 17-19.

million balance-of-payments deficit, partly because of the illegal importations, while payments in the astronomical commercial foreign debt halted completely.<sup>1</sup>

Donald Reid launched an austerity program in order to straighten out the declining economic situation, very much as Bosch had done, but it was also a move to get a \$25 million loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Unfortunately, the price of sugar plummeted from a high of 11¢ during the Bosch regime to an all time low of 2¢ during the Triumvirate. This, coupled with two years of drought and the unchecked illegal imports, was making the economic policies a sham, for the rate of unemployment went up while the cost of living was going up and the wages were frozen. Even the businessmen were seriously complaining of the economic situation, in part, because they had been outmaneuvered by their former allies, the military, "and many store-owners now wish that Bosch were still in office."<sup>2</sup>

The North American Ambassador to the Triumvirate, W. Tapple Bennet (Tap), was a State Department career officer, not like his predecessor, Bartlow Martin, who was a writer by profession. The

---

<sup>1</sup>Kurzman, *op. cit.*, p. 120. Joaquín Balaguer characterized the Triumvirate as an octopus for the economy and a vast employment agency for its sympathizers in UCN. "La Parálisis del Progreso," Ahora, No. 48 (10 Enero 1964), pp. 11-12. On the matter of contraband by the military, see "La Verdad Desnuda Sobre los Contrabandos," Ahora, No. 90 (9 Enero 1965), pp. 5-6.

<sup>2</sup>Howard J. Wiarda, "Trujilloism Without Trujillo," The New Republic, Vol. 151, No. 12 (September 19, 1964), p. 6.

Ambassador was very sympathetic to the government, and a very good friend of Donald Reid, to the point that people joked in Santo Domingo about Bennet being the third and missing member of the Triumvirate.<sup>1</sup> Unlike it had happened with Bosch, but resembling the policy with the Consejo de Estado, the United States was to give all out support to the Triumvirate.

Let us take, for example, a comparison of the Alliance for Progress in the Dominican Republic under the Consejo, Bosch, and Donald Reid.<sup>2</sup> In terms of grants, a total of \$54,954,000 was given between 1962 and April 24, 1965. Of this in AID dollars grants, the Consejo received close to \$8 million and Bosch close to \$23 million, with not a cent for the Triumvirate. On the other hand, on the grants under the Agricultural Trade and Assistance Act (Public Law 480), it

<sup>1</sup>One author claims that Tap Bennet did not involve himself very much in the internal affairs of the government, except for aiding it, but that the same cannot be said about the Embassy's agencies, the CIA and the military attaches. The latter ones were the ones who were suggesting military changes via Pancho Aguirre, "that for all practical purposes was the third member of the Triumvirate in the government." Antonio Llano Montes, *Barricadas de Odios* (Mexico: Editores Mexicanos Unidos, 1966), p. 72. The author is a Cuban exile linked to General Wessin y Wessin, who had him employed as a public relations man and as director of "democratic" indoctrination for the military. Francisco Aguirre (Pancho) is the head of the Miami Spanish-speaking daily, *Diario de las Américas*. In Santo Domingo rumor links him to the CIA.

<sup>2</sup>United States Embassy, "Summary of Alliance for Progress Activities in the Dominican Republic, 1962-1965," (Santo Domingo: mimeographed paper, 1965).



was Bosch's turn not to receive a cent, while the Consejo received just over \$27 million and the Triumvirate some \$20 million. The loans that were channeled through the Inter-American Development Bank went to \$6.5 million for the Consejo and close to \$4 million to the Triumvirate. Not a cent for Bosch. The same thing happened with the loans channeled through the United States Export-Import Bank which loaned \$3 million to the Consejo and over \$18 million to the Triumvirate. Only in the sales agreement on credit of Public Law 480 did Bosch receive over \$10 million, and the Consejo received close to \$5.5 million and the Triumvirate just over \$4 million. Furthermore, AID guaranteed almost \$9 million dollars in North American investments and transactions, and in an Exchange agreement with the United States Treasury, the Triumvirate received over \$6 million dollars.

The total United States assistance to Dominicana under the Alliance for Progress from 1962 to April 24, 1965 comes to \$164,144,000 which is a sizeable sum. Taking the population to be somewhere around 3.5 million, it comes to approximately \$46 dollars per capita. Now, of this total, the Consejo received about \$52 million, Bosch \$33 million, the Triumvirate \$75 million, and guarantees for private North American investors, such as the Central Romana Corporation and the First National City Bank of New York, the remainder.

In terms of total allocations, the Triumvirate received by far the greatest amount of United States assistance, and in addition to this

there also was the loan from the International Monetary Fund. On the other hand, in terms of months in power, each of the three Dominican governments considered were allocated approximately the same amount by the North Americans: an average of \$4 million a month. Yet, more important than actual economic assistance was the support of all the agencies of the United States government, which was enjoyed by the Consejo and by the Triumvirate, but not by Bosch. This solid support was maintained for Donald Reid until his overthrow, April 25, 1965.

It may seem surprising that the Triumvirate would be overthrown while it enjoyed the support of the United States and of the traditional powers within Dominican society. The reason may be found in the populist challenge, on the one hand, and the intrinsic weakness and instability of the caudillistic political system, on the other. The populist sectors were not only able to ally themselves in the common cause of restoring the government and the Constitution of 1963, but they were to find allies in the pivot of Dominican politics: the military. Some officers would begin the conspiracy because they were part of the populist anti-status quo ideology; others, to bring back a sense of legality and order in the midst of incredible corruption, cynicism, and abuse; others to prevent the consolidation of power of the Wessin clique and its civilian ally, Donald Reid, for it was perceived as detrimental to their interests and ambitions; and others, to restore the

Trujillista group to the government by bringing back ex-president Joaquín Balaguer and/or Ramfis Trujillo.

Once the United States recognized diplomatically the regime representative of the grand conservative coalition, the military cliques began to intensify their rivalries. The Wessin group had the upper hand, the reward of the coup d'etat against Bosch, but the Imbert group was rapidly acquiring more power. The 1964 police budget was doubled to a record \$37.8 million, its strength increased to 12,000 men, and its "efficiency greatly enhanced by \$400,000 in riot-control training and equipment supplied by United States AID. . . ."<sup>1</sup> The Trujillista San Cristóbal clan was resentful of Wessin's power, thus closer to Imbert's group, but also because of family alliances. The Inspector General of the Army, General Félix Hermida, Jr. (Felitico), one of the heads of the San Cristóbal clan, was the brother-in-law of the Chief of Police, Belisario Peguero Guerrero, and the new Army Chief of Staff, Salvador A. Montás Guerrero, a notorious "Balaguerista," was also the cousin of the Chief of Police.

The Dominican Armed Forces "were intensifying their internal struggles to the extreme that they were ready to engage themselves in an armed fight."<sup>2</sup> For instance, an Air Force Lieutenant, Pascual

<sup>1</sup>Gall, op. cit., p. 160.

<sup>2</sup>Llano Montes, op. cit., p. 66.

Arroyo Rosario, shot and killed Police Major José Rodolfo Urrutia Portes, but he was not turned over by his superiors to the competent judiciary authorities.<sup>1</sup> In another case, Air Force Pilot Román Peralta was taken to Police Headquarters where presumably he was threatened by police officers. When this was known in San Isidro, a group of heavily armed officers, including a truck with a 50 mm machine gun, showed up at Police Headquarters and demanded the return of the pilot.<sup>2</sup>

A group of younger officers, which will later be called Constitutionalists, were also forming a group of their own to bring back Juan Bosch and the Constitution of 1963. These men and the San Cristóbal Clan were eventually to work side by side in a series of conspiracies to overthrow the Triumvirate, but it seems that the beginning of this relationship had its origins as early as June 11, 1964. On this summer night, the 27th of February Military Camp was blown up in a plan which presumably included the assassination of Donald Reid.<sup>3</sup> Supposedly, the leadership of the plot was in the hands of San Cristóbal officers

---

<sup>1</sup> Anonymous, "Son Impunes los Militares o es Ineficaz Nuestra Justicia," Ahora, No. 89 (2 Enero 1965), pp. 9-10.

<sup>2</sup> Guillermo Perallón, "¿ Existe Unidad Militar?" Ahora, No. 85 (1 Diciembre, 1964), pp. 13-14.

<sup>3</sup> Llano Montes, op. cit., pp. 36-38.

allied with some Communist elements, such as student leader Asdrúbal Domínguez. The head of the Camp was Lieutenant Colonel Miguel Angel Hernando Ramírez, who would later lead the Constitutionalist coup d'etat. The plot obviously failed, the government blamed the whole event on Cuba, called for an investigation by the Organization of American States (OAS), and took the opportunity to raid the presumably Autonomous University of Santo Domingo.<sup>1</sup>

On the following September 8th, Donald Reid announced that general elections, that is for all elective offices, would take place on September 1, 1965. It became apparent that without some form of legality the position of the Triumvirate would be difficult to maintain, but Reid did not announce whether he would be a candidate or not. Opposition groups, including Luis Amiama's newly founded Liberal Evolutionary Party (PLE), the Social-Christians, and Ornes Coiscou's VRD, were soon accusing the head of the Triumvirate of continuismo, which means that he would try to perpetuate himself in office.<sup>2</sup> The only political group which accepted to participate in the announced elections was Balaguer's Reformista Party (PR), which at this time were outcasts of the Trujillo Era trying to come back into open political

<sup>1</sup>The New York Times, June 13-15, 1964.

<sup>2</sup>Anonymous, "Reid Cabral: Obligado a Carabina," Ahora, No. 85 (5 Diciembre 1964), pp. 4-5.

competition. The ex-president accused Donald Reid of trying to build popular support by using the office of President, as all the other parties did, but also that the people were not against him as a person, but "against what Reid represents as the voice of the coup of September 25th and as an instrument of the Dominican oligarchy."<sup>1</sup>

While the conservative coalition continued to fragment, the military and civilian plottings to restore the Constitutional government continued.<sup>2</sup> The most important military group was headed by Colonel Rafael T. Fernández Domínguez, who from his "exile" in Madrid made periodic trips to Puerto Rico to see ex-president Bosch and fellow officers. Another group, organized as a grass-roots movement in the rank and file, was headed by Captain Mario Peña Taveras. Although the two groups would later merge, they would maintain separate organizations. In the civilian side, the chief organizer was José Rafael Molina Ureña, the ex-President of the Chamber of Deputies. This group did not only include the PRD leadership, but also dissenters from other political parties, such as Aníbal Campagna and Jottin Cury, former Congressmen for UCN.

---

<sup>1</sup>Eduardo Sánchez Cabral, "Bosch, Balaguer, Reid: Entrevista con Joaquín Balaguer," Ahora, No. 93 (30 Enero 1965), p. 12.

<sup>2</sup>José A. Moreno, Sociological Aspects of the Dominican Revolution (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Ph. D. Dissertation Series, June 1967), pp. 24-29.

Shortly before the end of 1964, two Colonels from the National Police, Francisco Caamaño Deñó (Francis) and José de Jesús Morillo López, attempted to force the exit of their Chief, Belisario Peguero, who did not look upon the matter joyfully. He accused the Colonels of attempting to assassinate him; Donald Reid retired them from the Police and appointed them as Consuls in Kingston and Montego Bay, Jamaica, but they did not go. Instead, they were given protection by Wessin who returned them their rank and appointed Caamaño to the Air Force and Morillo to CEFA, further angering the Chief of Police.<sup>1</sup>

In January 1965, matters were going to come to a head, sealing the fate of the Triumvirate. With North American support,<sup>2</sup> Reid and Wessin attempted to consolidate power. The Chief of Police was replaced by Colonel Herman Despradel Brache, thus giving a severe blow to the Imbert group and throwing it into the conspiracy game. In the civilian sector, the populist parties, PRD and PRSC signed the Pact of Río Piedras in Puerto Rico in which they agreed to "build a common front to reestablish constitutional order and to act together if faced with any event that might bring a democratic solution to the country."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Llano Montes, op. cit., pp. 64-65. What their reasons were for trying to oust Peguero is not clear. Some say it was that they were not getting enough out of the graft, others for political reasons to be favored by Reid and Wessin.

<sup>2</sup>Luis Uchitelle, The Washington Post, February 28, 1965.

<sup>3</sup>Cited in Moreno, op. cit., p. 26.

Although not allowed to formally become a part of the front, "the 14th of June and the two real Communist parties, the PSP and MPD, took it on themselves to support this movement, though the five groups were by no means always in harmony."<sup>1</sup> In the military only the Wessin clique was supporting the Triumvirate, and in the civilian sectors, a populist front had been organized and publicised in Santo Domingo, while the more conservative groups were bickering among themselves whether Donald was going to run or was not going to run for election.<sup>2</sup>

When Reid and Wessin learned of plans for a military coup involving Peguero and the Army's quartermaster general, Colonel Neit Nivar Seijas [San Cristóbal], the latter was dismissed and retired. There was also teamwork when General Viñas [the Secretary of the Armed Forces], ordered three of Wessin's close aides transferred. Reid canceled the order, dispatched Viñas to Washington as a delegate to the Inter-American Defense Board, and took over Viñas' portfolio for himself. Reid then replaced General Salvador Augusto Montás Guerrero, the Army Chief. He was the first cousin of Peguero.<sup>3</sup>

Bartlow Martin wrote that although the head of the Triumvirate carefully concealed it publicly, nearly all Dominican political figures were convinced, and so was he, "that Reid himself intended to run for President--and without leaving the [National] Palace."<sup>4</sup> On the other

<sup>1</sup> Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 641.

<sup>2</sup> Balaguer will find himself in the same situation in early 1970.

<sup>3</sup> Kurzman, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-122.

<sup>4</sup> Martin, *op. cit.*, pp. 638-639. Llano Montes identifies the attorney Marino Cáceres as the head of Reid's electoral campaign. *Op. cit.*, p. 68.



hand, Reid had publicly stated that if political agitation continued, popular ex-presidents Bosch and Balaguer would not be allowed to return to the country, which obviously ruled them out as potential candidates.<sup>1</sup> As it later turned out, Reid knew about secret United States Information Agency (USIA) polls which had clearly shown that he had no popular support and which gave Balaguer 52 percent and Bosch 26 percent of the vote,<sup>2</sup> and therefore the only way that he could possibly win an election without extreme fraud was to maintain the other contenders outside of the country. The problem was that neither of the two ex-presidents wanted to remain in exile, and their followers and supporters, both civilian and military, continued at the plotting game.

The fact was that there was trouble in the air and everyone knew that a conspiracy of some kind was in progress in Santo Domingo, "a city renowned even by Latin American standards for the high quality of its grapevine and the inability of its inhabitants, whether plotters or friends of plotters, to keep anything confidential."<sup>3</sup> There was a heavy traffic of conspirators to and from Puerto Rico, and it was even

---

<sup>1</sup>The New York Times, February 28, 1965.

<sup>2</sup>The fact of the secret polls was disclosed by Max Frankel after officers from the CIA and the State Department had testified in a presumably secret report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The New York Times, November 14, 1965. It was also disclosed that Reid wanted help in cancelling the elections, but that the U. S. had said no.

<sup>3</sup>Tad Szulc, Dominican Diary (New York: Delacorte Press, 1965), p. 6. There is a popular saying in Dominicana that "Here, everything is known."

reported that in one of his trips Molina Ureña brought back two-hundred-thousand dollars for the financing of the coup.<sup>1</sup> While the PRD and PRSC were mounting their public assault on the Triumvirate through such devices as the gathering of two thousand signatures from professionals demanding the return to constitutional order, the Communist groups were active in the distribution of leaflets calling for the establishment of a popular front for the return of Juan Bosch and the Constitution of 1963.<sup>2</sup>

In early April, the United States Ambassador, Tappley Bennett, reported to Thomas C. Mann, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, that: "Little foxes, some of them red, are chewing at the grapes. It is impossible to guarantee a good harvest in view of many unfavorable aspects of local scene. It is however fair to say that a diminution of our effort or failure to act will result in bitter wine."<sup>3</sup> If one understands that the grapes are synonymous to Reid and Wessin, then the message is saying that they are in trouble and that the best course to follow would be to continue to support them for there is no alternative to these men. This rigid policy placed the United States in

<sup>1</sup> Llano Montes, op. cit., p. 75.

<sup>2</sup> Moreno, op. cit., p. 26, ff. 1; and Martin, op. cit., pp. 641-643.

<sup>3</sup> Cited in Kurzman, op. cit., p. 124.

an uncompromising position, which made it impossible for them to understand and less to negotiate with those opposed to the Triumvirate and General Wessin, and it would eventually lead to a military invasion in the absence of political enlightenment.

According to Franklyn Franco, since the month of March some 38 machine guns were carried around Santo Domingo in the back of automobiles or hidden at the garages of some of the highest PRD officials.<sup>1</sup> The three military leaders of the coup within Dominicana were: Lieutenant Colonel Miguel Angel Hernando Ramírez, Commander of the 27th of February Camp on the outskirts of the Capital and the base of the Sánchez Battalion; Lieutenant Colonel Pedro Augusto Alvarez Holguín, Commander of the 16th of August Camp about ten miles further west on the Duarte Highway and the base of the Duarte Battalion; and finally, Lieutenant Colonel Giovanni M. Gutiérrez Ramírez.<sup>2</sup> Fernández Domínguez was in Chile at the time as military attache, and it may be added that Caamaño, who later took over the leadership from Hernando Ramírez, joined the plot sometime in mid April.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Franco, op. cit., pp. 189-191.

<sup>2</sup> Dominican Action--1965: Intervention or Cooperation? (Washington: The Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, Special Report Series No. 2, July 1966), p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> Kurzman, op. cit., p. 126.

The date chosen for the coup was Monday, April 26, 1965, but Reid and Wessin were fully aware that a conspiracy was taking place, although they apparently did not know the date. The head of the Triumvirate later stated that:

In the past few months the political parties directed by the Communists had been working on the military, saying it was "unbelievable that a civilian could control them." The principal place where the coup was going on was at the February 27th Army Training School on the Duarte Highway to Santiago. Since I didn't want bloodshed, I went there on April 19th with Army Chief of Staff, General Marcos Rivera Cuesta and my military aide on the pretense of inspecting the school. This would give them a chance to take me prisoner, and bloodshed would be avoided. But they didn't do anything.<sup>1</sup>

On April 22nd, Donald Reid dismissed seven suspected Air Force officers; the next day Ambassador Bennet was en route to Washington for consultations; and on April 24th, the head of the Triumvirate sent the Army Chief of Staff to cancel four officers in the conspiracy at the 27th of February Camp.

Rivera Cuesta's visit triggered the plot prematurely. He called in an aide, Captain Mario Peña Taveras, and ordered him to arrest the conspirators. Instead, Captain Peña Taveras, himself one of the conspirators, arrested Rivera Cuesta and seized control of the camp. This was the beginning of the military rising. Early that afternoon, Saturday, April 24th, Peña Gómez of the PRD, formerly a radio announcer, accompanied by a few civilian and military friends, went to Radio Santo Domingo, barricaded himself in a studio, declared Reid overthrown, and called on the

<sup>1</sup> Cited in Jay Mallin, Caribbean Crisis: Subversion Fails in the Dominican Republic (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1965), p. 10.

people to go to the streets and hail the Bosch revolution. Reid's police cleared the streets. Reid himself appeared on television to announce that the golpe had been stopped and to deliver an ultimatum: He ordered the rebellious officers at the 27th of February camp to surrender by 5 a. m. Sunday or face attack. Washington--and the Embassy--believed the Reid government had regained control.<sup>1</sup>

The events of Saturday afternoon were crucial. The coup d'etat had failed and what the rebellious Constitutionalist forces had actually done was a pronunciamiento, which in effect is nothing else but to publicly declare themselves in rebellion against the government. To be able to counteract this situation, all that Reid had to do was to muster enough force against the rebels, who would presumably surrender in the face of overwhelming power. Peña Gómez had been removed from Radio Santo Domingo, the government's radio and television network, and, ironically, taken to Police Headquarters by none other than Colonel Morillo López, who had recovered the communications center for Donald Reid.<sup>2</sup> More or less at this time, the U. S. Air Force

<sup>1</sup>Martin, op. cit., p. 646. The officers to be canceled were Lieutenant Colonel Giovanni Gutiérrez, Majors Eladio Ramírez Sánchez and Juan María Lora Fernández, and Captain William Nobao G. Julio C. Estrella, La Revolución Dominicana y la Crisis de la OEA (Santo Domingo: Talleres de la Revista Ahora, 1965), p. 12. It must be pointed out that the 16th of August Camp, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Alvarez Holguín, was also in rebellion.

<sup>2</sup>Franco, op. cit., p. 191. The fact that the radio-T. V. network was in the hands of loyal troops is what allowed Reid to later broadcast his ill-fated ultimatum. It may be recalled that Morillo López was the companion of Caamaño in their attempt to depose the Chief of Police.

attache, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas B. Fishburn, went to the headquarters of the Chief of Staff to dissuade Captain Peña Taveras from the action he had taken.<sup>1</sup> U. S. Naval Attache Ralph A. Heywood was on a dove hunting trip in the interior with none other than General Antonio Imbert, while 11 of the 13 members of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) were in Panama for a routine conference.<sup>2</sup>

No one knew for certain what was happening until Reid in his public ultimatum that evening confirmed that a revolt was occurring. About 1:00 A. M. a clandestine unidentified radio station broadcasted an invitation to the public to join the Armed Forces in the effort to restore democracy and constitutionality, while at the same time people from the PRD and militants of the leftists parties went to the rebellious military camps where they received some weapons.<sup>3</sup> Another one to

---

<sup>1</sup>José Francisco Peña Gómez, "Dominican Revolutionary Leader Refutes," *After Santo Domingo What?* (Austin, Texas: University Colloquy on Public Issues, 1966), p. III-31.

<sup>2</sup>Furthermore, "William C. Ide, Director of the United States Economic Mission to the Dominican Republic, was in Washington attending a conference. And in Washington the office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Jack Hood Vaughn, was empty. Mr. Vaughn, as unaware of the Dominican situation as his subordinates in Washington and Santo Domingo, had gone to the Mexican resort town of Cuernavaca to attend a meeting of Western Hemisphere Intellectuals." Szulc, *op. cit.*, p. 8. At the time, Ambassador Bennet was in Georgia visiting his mother.

<sup>3</sup>Franco, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-195.

show up that night was Imbert, who asked to be named chief of the military movement, but the Constitutionalist High Command did not agree.<sup>1</sup> Troops were mobilized from the Sánchez and the Duarte Battalions to take over the Capital's strategic spots, while at the same time dispersing in case of attack.<sup>2</sup>

The head of the Triumvirate "found that he could rally only 550 troops in Santo Domingo to his side; about 1,200 were in the rebellion;" then he called Wessin, who at first was willing to back him, but then offered his regrets, because "to attack the rebel-held camps he would need more infantry than he controlled, Wessin said."<sup>3</sup> The other commanders "held their troops on base to protect their own personal positions. They would not enforce Reid's ultimatum. The Air Force and Navy were wobbling."<sup>4</sup> All interior garrisons were in support of the coup, except the one in San Juan de la Maguana commanded by Colonel Pérez Guillén.<sup>5</sup> The 5:00 A. M. deadline came and nothing happened, because Reid could not muster enough power. Even Wessin

---

<sup>1</sup>Miguel A. Hernández, "Entrevista con Peña Gómez," Ahora, No. 127 (11 Abril 1966), p. 9.

<sup>2</sup>Franco, op. cit., p. 195, and Kurzman, op. cit., pp. 132-133.

<sup>3</sup>Kurzman, op. cit., p. 132.

<sup>4</sup>Martin, op. cit., p. 647.

<sup>5</sup>Peña Gómez, op. cit., p. 647.

had joined the insurrection when faced with the odds against him.<sup>1</sup>

Without military support, it was obvious that the Triumvirate was doomed. "In desperation, we learn from Senator [William] Fullbright, Reid asked for U. S. intervention on Sunday morning, April 25th. The negative response was his coup de gr<sup>^</sup>ce."<sup>2</sup> The Triumvirate had fallen. Donald Reid resigned at about 10:00 A. M. , and the government elected in 1962 and ousted in 1963, was reinstalled in the National Palace at noon, being headed provisionally by the President of the Chamber of Deputies, José Rafael Molina Ureña, until the return of President Juan Bosch from exile, as prescribed by the Constitution of 1963.

That same morning, Belisario Peguero went to Police Headquarters to free Peña Gómez and to ask him two things: one, that he go on television and tell the public that he was on the side of the revolt; the other, that he be reinstalled again as Chief of Police and his cousin Montás Guerrero as sub-chief.<sup>3</sup> Peña Gómez replied that only Bosch could do that, but he also reveals that even General Atila Luna, the former Air Force commander, asked him whether the "old man" was

<sup>1</sup>Kurzman, op. cit., p. 132.

<sup>2</sup>Theodore Draper, "The Dominican Crisis," Commentary, No. 6, Vol. 40 (December 1965), p. 38.

<sup>3</sup>Hernández, op. cit., pp. 8-9.



coming back as soft as before.<sup>1</sup> Since Reid and Wessin had managed to alienate the San Cristóbal clan and the Imbert clique, they had found themselves alone at the time of the Constitutionalist rebellion, and therefore most of the high officers in the Armed Forces either supported or were neutral to the rebellion.

The return of a triumphant Bosch marked the fall of General Elías Wessin y Wessin and his supporters, for the military commander had been the prime mover of the coup against the PRD government, and therefore the Wessin clique had to oppose this from happening. Unable to support Reid, they allowed him to fall, but they wanted the formation of a military junta, which would prepare the country for elections within 90 days.<sup>2</sup> Obviously, this was unacceptable to the Constitutionlists, and even less to the PRD, but it was not a far-fetched idea to the Imbert and San Cristóbal cliques. It is in the waver within these two forces, Wessin on one side and Bosch on the other, that the conditions for civil strife arouse. For the bulk of the military hierarchy, to support the Constitutionlists meant the fall of Wessin, not an unwelcomed thought considering his predominant position and his

---

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Estrella, op. cit., p. 13. Franklyn Franco also reports the Wessin position, but also adds the Constitutionlist's as presented by Caamaño to the press about Sunday noon: "Our fundamental reason is only and exclusively to return to the people what was taken away on September 24, 1963." Op. cit., p. 199.

recent past behavior, but there was also the danger that the Bosch group would try to displace them considering that his military backing came from the younger officers. On the other hand, to support Wessin meant leaving him in his predominant position, but then there could probably be greater grounds for accommodation than with the PRD group. Worse even, it "was still unclear on early Sunday, which group would come out on top,"<sup>1</sup> and perhaps many officers were waiting precisely to see who was winning and make certain to be included in the triumphant coalition.

The problem for the Constitutionalist group, both civilian and military, as well as for the Wessin clique, was to make certain that the undecided would decide in their favor. "The PSP's leaders met early that Sunday morning and decided to try to seize control of the rebellion. . . . The MPD's leaders, also apparently caught by surprise, instructed their followers not to become involved. . . . As for the 14th of June, it became involved early."<sup>2</sup> These groups had armed themselves and were asking that weapons be distributed to the people, but the Constitutionalist military was not ready to do it.<sup>3</sup> They did,

---

<sup>1</sup>Kurzman, op. cit., p. 134. He adds that some "officers offered their support to the highest bidder."

<sup>2</sup>Martin, op. cit., pp. 647-648.

<sup>3</sup>Franco, op. cit., p. 198.

however, emplace three cannons in front of the Duarte bridge in case Wessin's troops decided to march on the Capital, for there had been no positive reply from San Isidro.<sup>1</sup>

For the public at large, it seemed that the revolt had been a success and that the Constitutional government was safely installed in the National Palace.

Santo Domingo went wild. But while members of the lower classes were out celebrating on the streets, those of the urban elite sat at home and watched television in horror. Across their screens they saw parading a constant stream of shouting, weeping, laughing men, women, and children, most of them raggedly dressed or wearing parts of uniforms, all of them pathetically seeking an outlet for their suddenly unleashed emotions, emotions which, except with their brief experiment with democracy, had been suppressed for decades under the Trujillo heel.<sup>2</sup>

In San Isidro matters were not faring very well for Wessin. The Air Force, under General Juan de los Santos Céspedes (Pimpo), was still undecided. Two officers, Major Salvador Lluberes Montás (Chinino) and Lieutenant Colonel Juan René Beauchamps Javier, placed a tank in front of the building where the Air Force High Command was meeting, entered with machine guns in hand, and told de los Santos Céspedes: "General, either you give the order to bomb the National Palace, or we will all die right here."<sup>3</sup> The order was given, and

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., pp. 199-201.

<sup>2</sup> Kurzman, op. cit., pp. 133-134.

<sup>3</sup> Llano Montes, op. cit., pp. 119-120.

World War II P-51's began to bomb at 5:00 P. M. , Sunday, April 25th. By that time, the United States Embassy team had agreed that "Bosch's return would not be in the U. S. interest because of the increasing organized Communist support evident on the rebel side. . . ." <sup>1</sup>

A few minutes after the air attacks had begun, a delegation of the Molina Ureña government went to the U. S. Embassy to ask for their good offices in halting the bombing. They were received by the Embassy's second secretary, Arthur E. Breisky, who "called the rebels 'irresponsible' and charged that they were part of a 'Communist movement.'" <sup>2</sup> The delegation was composed of Máximo Lovatón Pitalugga, Minister of Foreign Relations, Silvestre Antonio Guzmán, former Minister of Agriculture under Bosch, Enriqueillo A. del Rosario, former Dominican Ambassador to the United States, and Antonio Martínez Francisco, Secretary General of the PRD, <sup>3</sup> hardly a possible group of men leading a subversive movement, considering that all of them are extremely well established in Dominican society, and

---

<sup>1</sup> Dominican Action, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

<sup>2</sup> Szulc, op. cit., pp. 20-21. This report comes from Dominican sources present at the meeting. The North American version is that "Embassy officers replied by asking PRD leaders to persuade their rebel military colleagues to negotiate in good faith the the loyalists, saying that the United States feared bloodshed might create a situation favorable to a Communist takeover, and offering to facilitate talks between the two sides but refusing to support either." Martin, op. cit., p. 650.

<sup>3</sup> Estrella, op. cit., p. 10.

whose political views are quite moderate. The bombing had a determining effect on the public.

Infuriated rebel mobs which earlier in the day had consisted of singing, shouting, banner-waving demonstrators were now converted into civilian armies determined to destroy and kill despite the radio pleas of rebel leaders that they "must not loot, must not destroy the patrimony of the Dominican Republic." The mobs attacked the homes of Trujilloist and Reid supporters, set fire to the headquarters of three anti-Bosch political parties, and machine-gunned several Latin American embassies.<sup>1</sup>

The short meeting in the United States Embassy made somewhat clear the fact that the North Americans were not very enthusiastic about the return of the Constitutional government, or at least Juan Bosch, and most likely both, since they came together. During the bombing of the National Palace, an arsenal was discovered, and in spite of the fact that some 300 civilians were already armed, the indiscriminate distribution of arms to the population began in the early evening.<sup>2</sup> The Embassy was under Charge d'Affaires William Connett, since the Ambassador was out of the country, and he, "who had first suggested that the U. S. government not impede Bosch's return, then had suggested it do so, now recommended we [U. S. ] stay neutral, adding that

<sup>1</sup>The burned party headquarters were UCN, VRD, and Amiama's PLE. Bonilla Aybar's Prensa Libre was also burned down.

<sup>2</sup>Franco, op. cit., p. 201.

nobody seemed to want the return of Reid or Balaguer and the best hope seemed to be a military junta, already proposed by the loyalist [Wessin] forces."<sup>1</sup>

The claim to neutrality by supporting the proposal of one of the parties in dispute is at best a far-fetched idea. In Washington,

. . . officials who had at first been ready to accept the information that Reid Cabral had "weathered the storm" were now receptive to the suggestions from the Santo Domingo embassy that Bosch's return would mean extremism or Communism "in six months" and must be prevented at all costs. According to persons in Washington familiar with the hectic hours of late Sunday afternoon, it was then that the initial discussions about a United States military intervention in Santo Domingo began to be held.<sup>2</sup>

On Monday, the bombing was resumed in the early hours of the morning. The Constitutional government counted on the support or

---

<sup>1</sup>Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 649. The problem of how to label the two forces in dispute is not easy. Certainly there were no loyalist forces, for no one was backing the fallen Triumvirate, yet there were rebel forces, but then on Sunday everyone was a rebel. Later the bulk of the military would go to Wessin's side, and thus no longer be the General's clique. For the sake of simplicity, the Wessin side will be referred to as loyalist, for at least to the status quo they were loyal, and the opposing group as rebels, in the same context, or Constitutionalists, which is what they called themselves.

<sup>2</sup>Szulc, *op. cit.*, p. 21. A Soviet writer claims that the intervention was planned as soon as the North Americans knew of the Pact of Río Piedras creating an anti-Triumvirate front. He links the dropping of 1,700 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division on the Vieques Island on April 9, 1965, and the landing of 3,000 marines, some from the aircraft carrier Boxer, in the operation Quick Kick, as a rehearsal for what was to come later. Vadim Listov, "Big Stick Against a Small Nation," *New Times*, No. 20 (May 17, 1965), pp. 8-11.

neutrality of practically all important military garrisons, with the exception of San Isidro and the Air Force Base in Santiago, and it had the pledged support of the Chief of Police, General Herman Despradel, and the Navy Chief, Commodore Francisco Javier Rivera Caminero.<sup>1</sup> This meant that the San Cristóbal clique, which basically draws its men from the Army, and the Imbert clique, which does draw its men from the Navy and principally the police, were at least verbally supporting the Constitutionalists. Yet, it is significant that none of them made a move: the Navy pulled its ships to the sea, and the soldiers and policemen were kept in their barracks. Most likely, they were still waiting to see who was going to win this one out. At about noon, the bombing stopped, probably thanks to the efforts of Archbishop Octavio Beras and the diplomatic corps who jointly appealed to Wessin to cease the air attacks.<sup>2</sup>

The crucial battleground was now limited to the Duarte bridge, which provides the major link from the Capital to San Isidro. On the Villa Duarte side of the Ozama river were Wessin's tanks and some infantry, while on the other side was a combination of civilian and

<sup>1</sup>Moreno, *op. cit.*, p. 33. The former Naval Chief, Commodore Julio Rib Santamaría, had been sent to London as naval attache in Reid's military shakeup. "La Semana Dominicana," *Ahora*, No. 105 (24 Abril 1965), p. 39. He did not leave.

<sup>2</sup>Szulc, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

military Constitutionalists. Warnings were being made from the San Isidro radio station that the bridge was going to be bombed and that people should clear the area; while from the government controlled Radio Santo Domingo broadcasts were being put out to search for the relatives of the pilots, in order to take them to the bridge so that it would not be bombed.

It is not clear whether the embassy recommended actual help to the Wessin forces as early as Monday. But a long telegram from Charge d'Affaires Bill Connet that afternoon told the State Department that while direct United States intervention in the Dominican civil war might be inadvisable because of Dr. Bosch's popularity, the pro-Bosch movement had to be stopped by other means--or there would be "extremism in six months" in the Dominican Republic.<sup>1</sup>

On Tuesday morning, April 27th, the evacuation of United States citizens and foreign residents began, and at 9:00 A. M. sharp started the bombing of the Duarte bridge. Wessin had 600 men with the tanks, many of them clerks and typists, with which to attempt to cross the bridge,<sup>2</sup> but significantly, the previous night the San Cristóbal Clan and the Imbert clique had verbally offered their support to the Commander of CEFA, thanks to the efforts of the United States attaches.<sup>3</sup> It now seemed that the Wessin forces would turn out triumphant in the end.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Llano Montes, op. cit., p. 129.

<sup>3</sup> Moreno, op. cit., p. 33; and Szulc, op. cit., p. 32.



The evacuation was under way when, later on Tuesday, Ambassador Bennet returned to Santo Domingo. He had rushed from Georgia to Washington during the weekend and had participated in high-level discussions there before leaving for his post. A presidential jet flew him to San Isidro Air Base, but, unable to cross besieged Duarte Bridge, he went by helicopter to the Boxer [U. S. military carrier], which now lay offshore, and from there to the Embassy. . . . He was to press for the establishment of a military junta, as his subordinates had advised during his absence. Such a junta, the Administration [Johnson] felt, could best bring about law and order, protect American lives, and prevent a Communist takeover of the country.<sup>1</sup>

The battle for the bridge was ferocious, with heavy casualties on both sides, and the Navy had now started shelling the National Palace. Again the Foreign Minister, Lovaton Pittaluga, went to the U. S. Embassy to seek a halt in the bombing. Again he was received by Second Secretary Briesky, for Connett was presumably too busy with the evacuation of nationals, only to be told this time that the Embassy had no contact with San Isidro.<sup>2</sup> Although the Wessin forces had not been able to cross over into Santo Domingo, in early afternoon it was reported that a military detachment, under the command of General Salvador Augusto Montás Guerrero, had arrived in the opposite side of the city from the town of San Cristóbal, and therefore at the rear

<sup>1</sup>Kurzman, op. cit., p. 148. "The six-ship Caribbean Amphibious Task Force led by the U. S. S. Boxer, a helicopter carrier, had moved to the vicinity of Santo Domingo Saturday [April 24] night. The 1,500 Marines aboard the ships, which also carried tanks, armored vehicles and artillery, were in readiness." Szulc, op. cit., p. 29.

<sup>2</sup>Estrella, op. cit., p. 14.

of the Constitutionalist forces.<sup>1</sup> To fight a two-front battle was more than they could handle, considering also that this meant that the San Cristóbal clan had also gone to Wessin's side.

It was also at more or less this time that Ambassador Bennett called the Chief of Police and "told him that his first duty was to restore public order. Despradel said he was already at work and the streets 'would be cleaned tonight.'"<sup>2</sup> The police had also abandoned its neutralist role shortly before, and "in Bennett's judgement, the 'mop-up' should be successful though it might be 'rough.'"<sup>3</sup> Finding themselves practically defeated, the Constitutionalist officers headed by Hernando Ramírez went to the Embassy to seek a settlement, and this time they were received by the Ambassador.<sup>4</sup>

Ambassador Bennett told all of them that the time had come to end "this senseless slaughter," that regardless of politics women and children had the right to live in peace, and that the massacre of which the PRD complained had been started by its own followers. He emphasized that the United States wanted a

---

<sup>1</sup> Szulc, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

<sup>2</sup> Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 653. According to Franklyn Franco, the police abandoned its neutrality as CEFA troops had managed to cross over about two hundred meters into the Capital and Constitutionalist officers were already at the Embassy. *Op. cit.*, pp. 202-203. Wessin troops were moved back later.

<sup>3</sup> Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 654.

<sup>4</sup> There is some confusion about the exact sequence of the meetings by the different authors. See Kurzman (148-151); Franco (201-202); Martin (653-655); Estrella (14); and Szulc (36-38).

cease fire so that a new provisional government could be formed, that the rebel government of Molina Ureña which now held the Palace was not governing effectively, and that the extreme leftists were taking advantage of the situation. Reminding them of previous efforts to arrange postponement or avoidance of the air attacks, Ambassador Bennett said this now seemed useless. Since, in Bennett's view, San Isidro now held superior force, the rebels should capitulate and permit reconstruction to begin.<sup>1</sup>

Third Secretary of the Embassy, Benjamin J. Ruyle, went to the National Palace, accompanied by some Constitutionalist officers, to bring Molina Ureña to the Embassy for the arrangement of the settlement. This time Colonel Caamaño, now Minister of Interior, came to the negotiations accompanying the President. Close to evening on that Tuesday afternoon, Ambassador Bennett spoke to the Constitutionalist government and military. Kurzman reports some details of this crucial meeting as recollected by Caamaño:

I'll never forget how your Ambassador laughed at us when we asked him to help us end the bloodshed. Imagine, we were ready to agree to peace on any terms just to stop the killing. And the Ambassador laughed at us. It is because of that we decided, in our shame, to fight to the death.

"Mr. Ambassador," one of us said, "we have come here to ask you to mediate between Wessin's troops and ourselves. We would agree to the formation of a military junta, though we think elections should be held soon."

But Bennett replied: "You should have realized before you started the trouble that you couldn't hold out. Now it's too late. You started this, you are responsible for all that has happened. You hold the solution in your hands. Go and see Wessin yourselves. You are finished."

<sup>1</sup> Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 653. Among those present were Captain Peña Taveras and PRD Secretary General Martínez Francisco.

After we got through, Bennett dismissed us, saying that there was nothing more to talk about. One of the officers present, Lieutenant Héctor Conde, took off his military cap and ripped off his insignia, saying, "I can't endure this shame."<sup>1</sup>

After the meeting, Molina Ureña and many Constitutionalist officers, including Hernando Ramírez, who by now had a severe case of hepatitis, headed for the Colombian and other Latin American embassies for asylum. In Washington, "Administration officials were expressing relief over the apparent collapse of the insurrection led by young army officers supporting the return of former President Bosch."<sup>2</sup> The latter, in Puerto Rico, was dismayed with the news, but said that "the people in Santo Domingo will go on fighting anyway."<sup>3</sup> It turned out a correct assessment, for Caamaño headed for the Duarte bridge with other Constitutionalist officers;<sup>4</sup> Wessin's troops, still unable to

---

<sup>1</sup>Kurzman, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-153. The Embassy's version is related by Martin, practically the same, save for the arrogance of Bennett. *Op. cit.*, p. 654. Bennett later declared that he did not demand a surrender nor insult the rebels. Szulc, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.

<sup>2</sup>Szulc, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

<sup>3</sup>Bosch was entering a television studio in Puerto Rico when the news reached him. "He turned pale, told the station officials he was canceling his appearance and left for his home in Río Piedras." *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>There is some question as to whether Colonel Caamaño headed immediately for the bridge or went into asylum first. According to Jay Mallin, "on April 25 he [Caamaño] ducked into the Salvadorean Embassy and asked for asylum; then he ducked out again and returned to the rebels." *Op. cit.*, p. 21. Perhaps it was on that Sunday or on the crucial Tuesday, but there is no question that he did go into asylum.

cross; Montás Guerrero and his troops camped in the rear at the other end of the city; and the police quartered in headquarters with the Cascos Blancos, Caamaño's old outfit, at the Fortaleza Ozama in the colonial section of Santo Domingo. Being the highest ranking officer left in the Constitutionalist camp with the determination to continue in the struggle, Caamaño assumed the leadership of the movement, and that night he called the newspaper El Caribe and said that Santo Domingo was under his control.<sup>1</sup>

Perhaps because they were aware that negotiations had taken place in the U. S. Embassy, and that the original rebel leadership had gone into asylum, the San Cristóbal Clan and the Imbert clique forces were not thrown into battle, but, on the contrary, they seemed to be willing to have Wessin do the fighting so that he would weaken himself and they would come out in a better bargaining position in the end. Certainly the Navy had fired, but the ships were still at sea and it had only been a few symbolic shells. Certainly Montás Guerrero had moved from San Cristóbal, including the elite troops of the Mountain Battalion trained by United States Special Forces, but he sat on Trujillo's former Fairgrounds to wait for developments in spite of frantic calls from Radio San Isidro. Certainly the Chief of Police had sent some men out in the afternoon, but the bulk of his forces were kept in quarters. Certainly all the interior garrisons kept order and control, but

<sup>1</sup> Franco, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

not one man was moved to Santo Domingo.

For all practical purposes the battle was the same as the beginning: the Constitutionals versus the Wessin clique. What did make a difference in the four days that had gone by since the fateful April 24th, was the distribution of arms to civilians, now wholesale from the two rebellious military camps. Not since the Marine Occupation (1916-1924) had the Dominican people enjoyed the right to bear arms. This was a climactic experience. "They realized for the first time that they possessed a strength they had never before imagined could be theirs."<sup>1</sup>

By noon of April 28th, the garrison at the Ozama Fortress was at the hands of the Constitutionalist forces, 700 prisoners,<sup>2</sup> but also by noon the long awaited junta was created. According to Senator Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania, the three-man junta, one for each branch of the Armed Forces, had been formed "at the instance of the C. I. A.," headed by Colonel Pedro Bartolomé Benoit, and confined to the San Isidro area.<sup>3</sup> Since the Constitutionalist government was in asylum, the only existing government was the San Isidro junta. "Everyone knew that

<sup>1</sup> Kurzman, op. cit., p. 167.

<sup>2</sup> Franco, op. cit., p. 205.

<sup>3</sup> Cited in Draper, op. cit., p. 46.

behind this Junta was General Wessin y Wessin."<sup>1</sup>

In spite of the newly created government, the Constitutionals had now tipped the balance in their favor. The junta head, Colonel Benoit, called "the Embassy to ask the United States to land twelve hundred Marines 'to help restore peace.'"<sup>2</sup> A San Isidro version claims that Benoit also told the North Americans that "the capacity for resistance of his troops was ready to crack, due to exhaustion, numerical superiority, and because there was the risk that Cuba would send reinforcements to the rebels."<sup>3</sup> Benoit himself later declared that the reason for asking a United States intervention was, "Because we were beaten. Sí, señor, completely routed, derrotados. You should have seen the place here [San Isidro], the faces, the disorder. There was nobody left who could be relied on to go out and fight."<sup>4</sup>

While the conversations between the Embassy and the Junta were going on, "Marine Corps path finders from the Boxer were landing at

---

<sup>1</sup> Marcelino Zapico, O. P., Revolución en Hispanoamérica: Lo Que Vi en Santo Domingo (Madrid: Escelier, S.A., 1966), p. 51. Colonel Benoit was a trusted officer of the Wessin clique. In the late 1960's, after he had been "retired" from the Air Force by President Balaguer, he turned up as a high official in Wessin's political party, the Partido Quisqueyano Demócrata (PQD).

<sup>2</sup> Martin, op. cit., p. 656.

<sup>3</sup> Llano Montes, op. cit., p. 138.

<sup>4</sup> Cited in Leo Sauvage, "Distorting the Dominican Revolution," The New Leader, Vol. L, No. 2 (January 16, 1967), p. 19.

the port of Haina so the Marines could measure the beach for amphibious landings."<sup>1</sup> At 3:16 P. M. on that Wednesday afternoon, the cable reporting a request for a United States intervention was received in the State Department, and Ambassador Bennett had added to the cable that "he did not believe the situation at that time justified a landing by U. S. Marines. . . . The attaches considered the outcome still in doubt. Bennett recommended contingency planning to protect U. S. lives."<sup>2</sup>

Both forces in battle had turned for unforeseen aid when faced with a possible defeat or stalemate. The Constitutionalists had turned to the civilian population, some controlled by political parties or organizations and most without any particular attachment, and armed them to fight against the Wessin forces. The latter turned to the United States, at first for equipment and then for rescue, when it seemed that they no longer could hold the situation. If the coup had been swift, as in September 1963, everything would probably have remained normal, but its failure led to a state of rebellion which soon turned into an attempt at revolution only to be detained by foreign military intervention.

The flight into asylum of many of the moderate leaders of the

---

<sup>1</sup> Szulc, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-45. He adds that, "This, incidentally, was even before the junta's intervention request was formalized and before President Johnson took the official decision to have the Marines go ashore at all."

<sup>2</sup> Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 656.



Constitutionalist government and military placed Caamaño in the position of having to associate himself with anyone who would give him support. This gave the more radical elements greater influence, since they had stayed in the battle, but the moderate elements "continued to hold the leadership of the movement."<sup>1</sup>

As the Wednesday afternoon advanced so did the victory of the Constitutionlists. As Bartlow Martin narrates the events of that crucial day, at about 3:00 or 3:30 P. M., the junta formally requested in writing the intervention of North American military forces "to put down the rebellion which, the junta declared, was directed by Communists armed to 'convert the country into another Cuba.' Benoit said nothing about protecting American lives."<sup>2</sup> In the White House, President Lyndon B. Johnson was meeting with the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, Undersecretary George Ball, and McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, to review the Vietnam situation, when, at 5:30 P. M. he received a cable labeled "critic," the highest priority, from Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett. He said that the situation had deteriorated rapidly and that "the time had come to land the Marines." This cable was followed quickly by another one, and this time Bennett recommended that the United States government "give serious thought

---

<sup>1</sup> Estrella, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 656.

to 'armed intervention which goes beyond the mere protection of Americans' and not only seek to establish order but to prevent 'another Cuba' if the San Isidro forces collapsed, as seemed likely."<sup>1</sup>

With an extremely brief discussion of the matter, "By 6:00 P.M. President Johnson had taken his decision: To land the Marines to protect American lives." A few minutes later, Undersecretary of State Thomas Mann telephoned the Ambassador in Santo Domingo, "and instructed him to ask Benoit to put in writing for the record Benoit's earlier request for Marines on the grounds that they were needed to protect U. S. lives which he considered were in danger." That night, Bennett asked the Colonel for the request, with which he complied, and then it was cabled "to Washington after midnight."<sup>2</sup> When later asked his opinion about the danger to North American lives, none of which had been lost so far, Benoit responded: "Of course they

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 656-657. The former ambassador does not mention Bennett's telephone conversation with President Johnson, in which he presumably was talking from under his desk as bullets were being fired into the Embassy. "But embassy officials said later that at no time had the embassy building been fired upon by machine guns. For that matter, despite many subsequent sniper firings, there were never any bullet marks on the embassy's walls." Szulc, op. cit., p. 45.

<sup>2</sup>Martin, op. cit., p. 657. The President had gone on a national radio and television special broadcast to tell the North American public, and the world, at 8:40 P.M. that "The United States Government has been informed by military authorities in the Dominican Republic that American lives are in danger. These authorities are no longer able to guarantee their safety, and they have reported that the assistance of military personnel is now needed for that purpose." Szulc, op. cit., p. 50.

were in danger, like everybody else, for the Communists were winning and we had nobody left to fight them. That's why we needed the Marines. Wasn't it reason enough?"<sup>1</sup> At about 7:00 P.M. some four hundred Marines went ashore and took up positions around the Hotel Embajador to safeguard evacuation. Foreigners of all nationalities were being helicoptered out, but so were influential Dominicans and their relatives who had so requested it.<sup>2</sup>

After deciding to send the Marines to influence the political outcome in Santo Domingo, the Johnson Administration not only decided to inform North American Congressional leaders, but also the Council of the Organization of American States (OAS). The charter of the Inter-American organization is rather specific on the matter of intervention: "No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State."<sup>3</sup> In spite of the flagrant violation of the Charter, at 10:30 A.M., Thursday, April 29th, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker "reported formally to a special meeting of the OAS Council that

---

<sup>1</sup> Sauvage, op. cit. No North Americans were ever killed until the Marines arrived. However, there had been an incident at the Hotel Embajador on Tuesday in which an armed rebel mob had come looking for Bonilla Aybar and frightened the evacuees.

<sup>2</sup> For a Dominican to get evacuated, he either had to know a North American diplomat, or know someone with influence who did, or prove that somehow he was related to United States interests.

<sup>3</sup> Charter of the Organization of American States, Article 15. Underlining is the writer's.

Marines had landed to protect U. S. lives."<sup>1</sup> The Council did nothing about the intervention, and it "approved a message to the Papal Nuncio in Santo Domingo [Monsignor Enmanuele Clarizio], asking him to arrange a cease fire."<sup>2</sup> As this meeting went on in Washington, Ambassador Bennett was telling a group of reporters in Santo Domingo that "advance elements of the 82nd Airborne Division from Fort Bragg, N. C. , would begin landing at the San Isidro Air Force Base at midnight."<sup>3</sup> While the number of Marines had increased to 1,700 by Thursday evening,<sup>4</sup> "Two Battalion Combat Teams of the 82nd Airborne Division did land at 2:30 A. M. on Friday, April 30."<sup>5</sup> The military buildup of the United States was to reach eventually more than 20,000 well trained and fully-equipped men on Dominican soil, plus a few more thousands manning the fleet off shore, which was more than any

<sup>1</sup> Martin, op. cit., p. 658. United States Ambassador to the OAS, Ellsworth Bunker, would later head the mediation committee of that organization in the Dominican Republic.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. Clarizio had been in Puerto Rico on April 24th. The next day he asked U. S. authorities for military transportation back to Santo Domingo, but on the recommendation of Ambassador Bennett, who feared Clarizio as a liberal, it was denied. (Szulc, op. cit., pp. 24-25.) The Nuncio managed to corral a single-engine plane, loaded it with medicine and plasma, and set off for Dominicana. They landed in an open field. See Rev. James A. Clark, The Church and the Crisis in the Dominican Republic (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1967), p. 163.

<sup>3</sup> Szulc, op. cit., p. 73.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Martin, op. cit., p. 660. The two battalions totalled 2,500 men. Szulc, op. cit., p. 73.

of the competing Dominican forces could cope with. The supreme arbiter of Dominican affairs had made its presence felt in full-once again.

The United States government was now committed to run the entire affair in Santo Domingo.<sup>1</sup> The Marines created a Security Zone supposedly to protect most of the accredited embassies, including the North American, a zone which happened to grow occasionally only at the expense of rebel held areas.<sup>2</sup> Then a Security Corridor was established uniting the Security Zone and San Isidro through the Duarte Bridge, which also happened to split the Constitutionalist forces in two, the Northern part of the city and the Ciudad Nueva area, and provide a direct land link between the Marines and the paratroopers.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The day by day account can best be followed in the already cited works of Martin and Szulc, but the works of Mallin, Kurzman, Draper, Zapico, Niedergang, Llano Montes, and Estrella should also be consulted. For interpretative analysis, see Jerome Slater, Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970).

<sup>2</sup>The zone itself, which was labeled the International Security Zone, was taken from Constitutionalist controlled territory. The creation was authorized late Thursday night, April 29th, by the Council of the OAS, while they were unaware that paratroopers were being landed in San Isidro. It was more or less rectangular in shape, covering the exclusive residential sectors of Santo Domingo, with rebel held Ciudad Nueva at one end and Montás Guerrero's troops at the other. Its first growth was on May 3rd, and its last on June 16th, when an area of some fifty blocks was newly included. The Zone never grew into other areas of Dominican territory save the Constitutionalist.

<sup>3</sup>The Security Corridor was established on May 3rd. "To link up with the Marines the paratroopers advanced nearly three miles across the city." Szulc, op. cit., p. 110. This too was through Constitutionalist held territory.

Then a bigger junta was created on May 7th, the Government of National Reconstruction headed by Antonio Imbert, and including Colonel Benoit and three civilians.<sup>1</sup> Just over a week later, an attempt was made to replace Imbert's government with a Constitutionalist provisional government headed by Antonio Guzmán, as recommended by a top level mission headed by McGeorge Bundy.<sup>2</sup> Then Imbert was kept around

<sup>1</sup>The three civilians were Carlos Grisolia, a lawyer from Puerto Plata, and former UCN Senator; Alejandro Zeller Cocco, a hydraulic engineer also from Puerto Plata who had greatly impressed Ambassador Bennett "by his technical knowledge and willingness to work." (Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 684); and Julio D. Postigo, a bookstore owner and publisher from Santo Domingo who was a close friend of Bosch. Incidentally, Imbert is also from Puerto Plata. Postigo suffered the pain of having his sons denounce him from the Constitutionalist side. He resigned shortly before the collapse of the five-man junta. This government was created at the home of Naval Attache Heywood, and Martin describes its creation rather clearly. *Op. cit.*, pp. 680-684.

<sup>2</sup>The Bundy mission began in Puerto Rico on May 15th where they discussed the matter with Bosch. They arrived in Santo Domingo secretly on the following day, and so did Colonel Fernández Domínguez who had gone from Chile to Puerto Rico, and who was brought in through San Isidro by the North American military. On May 19th, the Colonel was killed under dubious circumstances, but the "only certain thing is that Colonel Fernández died at the moment, shot in the back by U. S. Marines." (Szulc, *op. cit.*, p. 248.) The reason for the Bundy mission was that the Johnson Administration "now swung to a Boschist formula. I can only surmise," says Martin, "that it was reacting to harsh U. S. press criticism. In any case, now in Santo Domingo, Bundy started the Guzmán move." (*Op. cit.*, p. 695.) "The Guzmán plan was presented to the top Dominican air force, navy, and army commanders on May 18th. As might have been expected, they were not happy with it and saw no reason to replace Imbert's setup." (Draper, *op. cit.*, p. 63.) Antonio Imbert himself said: "First the Americans talk me into putting together a government and now they tell me to quit." (Szulc, *op. cit.*, p. 229.) Zeller, says Martin, "accused me of double-crossing him and Imbert--of putting them into office nine days earlier and now dumping them." (Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 696.)

for a while only to depose him in September.<sup>1</sup> Theodore Draper made the comment that if Mr. Bundy had had his way, "American representatives would have been able to take credit for having stage managed the creation of Dominican juntas at the rate of one every ten days."<sup>2</sup>

The Constitutionalist side had been headed by the "Constitutional Military Command" since the asylum of Molina Ureña, but on May 3rd, most members of the 1963 Congress met and elected Caamaño as President, as provided by the Constitution.<sup>3</sup> But this government

<sup>1</sup>The Guzmán formula failed on Monday, May 24th. "Acting on instructions that had been cabled to him the day before from Washington, Mr. Bundy told Mr. Guzmán that the United States could not support him as president unless he agreed to commit himself to expel from the Dominican Republic a number of known Communists along with certain other persons in the rebel movement who were objectionable to the [Johnson] Administration." (Szulc, op. cit., p. 273.) This was unacceptable to the Constitutionlists, as was well known ahead of time, for the Constitution of 1963 specifically forbids the deportation of Dominican nationals. Division within the North American government, and the fact that Imbert had managed to take over, with the connivance of the U. S. military, who allowed Imbert's troops to leave San Isidro, to pass through Security Zone check points, and given communication aid from helicopters (Kurzman, op. cit., pp. 248-249, 272-273), of the Constitutionalist northern side of the city while the rest of the rebels were bottled up in Ciudad Nueva. The Sunday May 23rd instructions to Mr. Bundy, "had made it plain that the [Johnson] Administration was no longer interested in the Guzmán formula. And well informed officials insisted to me [Szulc] that it was Under Secretary of State [Thomas] Mann who was the principal force behind this latest switch in U. S. policy." (Op. cit., pp. 273-274.)

<sup>2</sup>Draper, op. cit., p. 52.

<sup>3</sup>The move had been approved by Bosch over the telephone and presumably Caamaño was to serve the rest of the constitutional term, until February 27, 1967. The Constitution of 1963 says in Article 126 that in case of absence of the elected President and Vice-President, a General Assembly, composed of at least one half of the Senators and

was somewhat dubious from a legal point of view, since the 1963 Constitution does not provide for the election of members of the armed forces, and the Colonel had not resigned his commission.<sup>1</sup> At the time of the McGeorge Bundy mission, the Constitutionals had been willing to agree to the Guzmán government, but as the unfruitful negotiations were going on, they lost the northern part of Santo Domingo to Imbert.<sup>2</sup>

---

Deputies (Article 105), can elect a president to fulfill the rest of the term. Caamaño was elected by 49 out of a total of 58 votes. Moreno, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

<sup>1</sup>Article 124 of the 1963 Constitution specifically points out in Item 3 that to be President of the Dominican Republic the person must be "in full exercise of his civil and political rights." Article 156 deprives members of the armed forces and police from the right to vote, which in essence means that Caamaño was not in the full exercise of his rights. It could be argued that this is legal technicality, which in essence it is, but the Constitutionals were presumably struggling for the establishment of a legal order under the Constitution of 1963, and that means the respect for technicalities under the law.

<sup>2</sup>"Mr. Bundy was negotiating with Mr. Guzmán, who in turn was speaking for the rebels, but at the same time the United States was tolerating the anti-rebel offensive by the Imbert forces and assisting them more than anyone cared to admit" Szulc, *op. cit.*, p. 247. After a week of negotiations, the Constitutionals had agreed on the composition of the Guzmán government, which would be installed under the 1963 Constitution, and it would include in the cabinet five PRD members, two conservative independents, and one member of the Imbert junta, Julio Postigo. "Rebel leaders were jubilant, despite doubts that the proposed government could ever be really independent." Kurzman, *op. cit.*, p. 277. In several days of hard fighting, Imbert "moved past the cemetery and on toward the great curve in the Río Ozama. When he reached it, he would have to turn south. That turn would bring him down to the corridor we [U. S.] had opened between the International Zone and the [Duarte] bridge." Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 694.



Now they were left surrounded by foreign troops in Ciudad Nueva, the Government of National Reconstruction in control of the rest of the country, until they were forced to capitulate in September.<sup>1</sup>

In the rebel zone there were 1,800 regular troops including officers and enlisted men, and to these were added some 5,000 men distributed in 117 "commando" organizations.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, there were thousands of civilians, including women and children, who had not fled the area, while the Constitutionalist government was under the control of the rebel military and under the political guidance principally of the PRD.<sup>3</sup> As the LJ4 later pointed out, the political representation

---

<sup>1</sup>The Constitutionalist government was left in control of only the downtown area of Santo Domingo, a few hundred blocks. Actually, it included several districts other than Ciudad Nueva, such as San Carlos or the colonial section, but the name stuck due to the fact of its symbolism. It may be remembered that it was in this area where the students battled with the Ramfis-Balaguer police in 1961 and with the Triumvirate police, including Caamaño, after the coup in 1963, and therefore it stood for rebellion and struggle in the name of freedom and constitutionality. Although they were surrounded at first only by North American troops, later troops of other Latin American countries (Nicaragua, Honduras, Paraguay, and Brazil, all with military dictatorships at the time) were added. The Costa Rican policemen were not in the line of fire.

<sup>2</sup>Moreno, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-53. For a list of the "commandos," see Moreno's Appendix 3.

<sup>3</sup>Although people from different parties and ideologies participated in the government, the PRD maintained the political leadership. It is noticeable that all of those involved in the Constitutionalist government leadership became members of the PRD in the subsequent events. One exception was Héctor Aristy, who created his own 24th of April Movement, but nevertheless he remained linked to the PRD.

of the Constitutionalist state was in the hands of the representatives of the bourgeoisie. "It, by the number of its representatives in the directive organisms, by its strength, and by the inexistence of a proletarian, communist, party, imposed its decisions and dominated the government."<sup>1</sup> However, the IJ4 also points out that "the revolutionary sectors" had the control of the "commandos," for they were composed of people from the working class and lower middle-class, and in effect this constituted "a dual organ of power with respect to the State."<sup>2</sup>

The "commando" was a para-military organization created during the revolt for the defense of the Constitutionalist movement, and nearly 80 percent of the rank and file was made up of people from the "barrios altos," the lower class.<sup>3</sup> Moreno describes two types of "commando" organization: one without political affiliation and the other PSP controlled.<sup>4</sup> In both the "commandos" relationships were informal, but discipline was stronger in the latter and there was an ideological emphasis. The recruits were of the same socio-economic structure,

---

<sup>1</sup> Thesis presented to the Third Conference of Political and Social Science in the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo by the 14th of June Revolutionary Movement, Dictadura y Democracia en Santo Domingo (mimeographed paper: December 1967), p. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., pp. 8-9.

<sup>3</sup> Moreno, op. cit., p. 132. The figure was based on interviews.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., pp. 57-85.

the unskilled laborer and the unemployed. The politically unaffiliated "commando" was made of people from the same neighborhood, or a group of friends and relatives, and had no formal organization. On the other hand, the PSP controlled was more the organization that previously existed in public life transposed into a para-military situation.<sup>1</sup>

There always was the possibility that in the end the "commando" organizations would all come under Communist control and that they would become the controlling power of the revolution, but it was also possible that the relationship of power would have been maintained basically the same, under the control of the constitutionalist military and the political parties, PRD and PRSC.

The rebel group was in a way a cross section of Dominican society, and as such, the largest numerical representation in the Constitutionalist zone belonged to the lower class. Yet, "All the social classes, strata, groups, occupations, educational levels, religious denominations, and political ideologies were represented there."<sup>2</sup> What they had in common, according to Moreno, was "a certain ideological frame and a high degree of alienation."<sup>3</sup> He reduces the ideo-

---

<sup>1</sup>This "commando" of the Partido Socialista Popular was probably the first one to be started, as early as April 26, and it was lead by Manolo González and some party members. Ibid., p. 52.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 117.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 119.

logical frame to five propositions: (a) In Dominicana, there is need for greater participation of all classes of people in the life of the nation; (b) this greater participation will imply new redistribution and development of the economic and cultural wealth of the nation; (c) to achieve the latter, it is necessary to remove the "old Trujillista oligarchy" from the sources of political, military, and economic power; (d) to carry out the removal, graft and corruption in the government, particularly in the armed forces, must be eliminated; and (e) to eliminate graft and corruption, it is imperative to return to Constitutional Democracy with Juan Bosch as President.<sup>1</sup>

The fact of a high degree of alienation from the existing social system partially led to the acceptance of violence as a means conducive to the implementation of such an objective. Using Ted Gurr's theoretical model of "social patterns that dispose men to collective violence,"<sup>2</sup> Bryant Wedge attempts to determine how prone to violence were the students during the crisis.<sup>3</sup> Based on "one of the most firmly

---

<sup>1</sup>Moreno adds that for the illiterate masses, "such concepts as constitution, freedom, human rights, education, employment, and others, do not seem to mean anything real unless they are embodied in a person or leader who has actually implemented them." *Ibid.*, p. 124.

<sup>2</sup>Ted Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," *World Politics*, Vol. XX, No. 2 (January 1968), pp. 245-278.

<sup>3</sup>Bryant Wedge, "The Case of Student Political Violence: Brazil, 1964, and Dominican Republic, 1965," *World Politics*, Vol. XXI, No. 2 (January 1969), pp. 183-206.

established, experimentally and clinically validated propositions in the psychological study of behavior," the frustration-aggression hypothesis, Wedge found that in Dominicana, "every variable disposing to frustrated anger was at a very high level, moreover, conditions of threat were extreme and conducive to aggressive response."<sup>1</sup> Violence in Dominicana has been a way of life.

The ideological groups supporting and opposing the revolution were essentially the same as those supporting and opposing the coup d'etat of September 1963. Not only were the political parties of the Río Piedras Pact (PRD and PRSC) and those who backed it (PSP, MPD, and IJ4) in support of the revolutionary movement, but so was organized labor (FOUPSA, POASI, ASOCHOIN, and CASC), except for the ORIT's labor affiliate (CONATRAL),<sup>2</sup> all the students' organizations and youth movements (including Balaguer's Reformista Party Youth),<sup>3</sup> and many professional organizations such as the Dominican Lawyers Association. In opposition to the revolution were the political parties which supported the coup, such as UCN, the military structure, the

---

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 188-197. The Brazilian students were less prone to violence than the Dominicans.

<sup>2</sup>Theodore Draper, "A Case of Defamation: U. S. Intelligence vs. Juan Bosch," The New Republic, Vol. 154, No. 8 (February 19, 1966), p. 14.

<sup>3</sup>This was called the Action Front of the Reformista Youth (FAJURE), which by early 1966 had been pushed aside of the Party. "Entrevista con el Dr. Víctor Hidalgo Justo," Ahora, No. 126 (4 Abril 1966), pp. 28-29, 60.

Catholic Church,<sup>1</sup> the oligarchy and the upper middle class, and the United States Embassy. It was again the struggle between the populists and the supporters of the status quo.

The Dominican situation in late May of 1965 was characterized by the existence of two clearly defined camps: the Constitutionalist group, with Communist support, in an effort to change the existing conditions of the nation by the establishment of a populist constitutional government under the control of the PRD and which would be committed to a program of social reforms; and a conservative front, supported by the United States, seeking to maintain the socio-economic status quo by the maintenance of the same forces and political balance which had practically always existed in Dominicana without regard as to the nature of the government. The first was represented by the government of Caamaño and the second by the government of Imbert. In between, there were those individuals, governments, and international organizations searching for a political solution to a divided Capital which symbolized a divided nation.

The United States "military intervention shaped not only the course of the upheaval but also the responses of the Organization of

---

<sup>1</sup> José de Brouker, "¡La Verdad Desnuda Tras la Pólemica Actuación del Nuncio Clarizio!" Ahora, No. 132 (6 Mayo 1966), pp. 12-18, 59-62. The article is a reprint from Informations Catholiques Internationales, No. 62 (15 Abril 1966).

American States (OAS) and the United Nations (UN)."<sup>1</sup> At first the OAS had only been informed of the invasion, then it was asked to mediate the Dominican conflict once the North Americans had re-grouped the Dominican military, and finally, it was asked to internationalize the intervention to give some legitimacy to the presence of North American troops in Dominicana. With the opposition of most Latin American democratic regimes, an Inter-American Command was established to be headed by a Brazilian General and with the contribution of troops by the conservative military regimes of Brazil, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay, and a few policemen from Costa Rica. The bulk of the forces, however, were North Americans.

Because of its dominant position in the OAS, the United States opposed the presence of the UN in Santo Domingo, which could only complicate matters for it was not subject to its overwhelming influence or control. With the arrival of the UN mission, the Ambassadorial Commission from the OAS which had been present as a negotiating team, left for Washington. The UN delegation, presided over by José Antonio Mayobre, the head of the UN Economic Commission for Latin American (ECLA), became favorable to the plight of the surrounded populists, and, as it could be expected, "the rebel forces continued to

---

<sup>1</sup>Linda B. Miller, "Regional Organization and the Regulation of Internal Conflict," World Politics, Vol. XIX, No. 4 (July 1967), p. 591.

press for an enlarged UN role rather than OAS mediation, which they regarded as partial to the Dominican military forces manipulated by the United States."<sup>1</sup> However, it would be the United States through the OAS who imposed the final settlement.

"As far as the future was concerned," Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett suggested on May 9, 1965, two days after the Government of National Reconstruction had come into power, "the real solution might well be found in the person of Joaquín Balaguer."<sup>2</sup> It may be remembered that the ex-president represented the biggest threat to Antonio Imbert after the Trujillo family itself.

Mr. Bennett said he believed that in any free election at this juncture [May 9, 1965] Balaguer would most likely win. This was unquestionably a very sound judgement. And the Ambassador added that the United States would not be unhappy if events turned out that way. He said that the State Department had been in touch with Balaguer, who was living in exile in New York, but that the former President had made it clear that he would return to the Dominican Republic only to be a<sup>3</sup> presidential candidate and not to participate in any new juntas.

In the meantime, the available junta was that of General Imbert. "The Government of National Reconstruction paid the corresponding part of the salaries of public employees on May 15th out of a loan of \$3,200,000 that it received from AID, charged to account 517-K-006,

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 593.

<sup>2</sup> Szulc, op. cit., p. 169.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., pp. 169-170.



and approximately \$1,500,000 derived from tax revenue."<sup>1</sup> Even more, "The payment of the members of the armed forces was entrusted to members of the Inter-American Peace Force with the assistance of OAS officials."<sup>2</sup> The money at the disposal of the inter-American organization was coming from the United States government: a loan of 32 million made by AID on June 30, 1965 and \$16,000 dollars provided by USIS for the use of the radio station and newspaper "La Voz de la OEA."<sup>3</sup> In fairness, the OAS money was being made available to both sides, but the heavy bulk of the government employees and armed forces just happened to be on Imbert's side.

Since the fall of the Benoit junta, General Elías Wessin y Wessin had to play a secondary role to Imbert's claim to political leadership, the new Dominican caudillo by the grace of the United States. The North Americans had the double edged problem of building up the Government of National Reconstruction's position to hold the conservative coalition together and in Dominican hands, although

---

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Secretary General of the OAS Regarding the Dominican Situation: Activities from April 29, 1965, Until the Installation of the Provisional Government (Washington: Pan American Union, 1965), p. 27.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., Appendix 3, pp. 32-34 and p. 68, Doc. 405. The radio station "The Voice of the OAS," was established on May 29th and the newspaper on June 8th, substituting "La Voz de Seguridad" and "La Voz de la Zona de Seguridad," respectively, which were apparently run by USIS.

once during the crisis there was thought of having a group of three foreigners rule the country,<sup>1</sup> while at the same time keeping a "liberal" image for the rest of the world and particularly the United States electorate. One solution found was to strengthen the Imbert clique, not only by putting their own men in the commanding positions, but also by purging some officers on the grounds of pro-democracy and anti-corruption. However, since Wessin was entrenched in San Isidro, the purge would be basically carried out at the expense of the San Cristóbal clan, although some concessions were made. As Bartlow Martin wrote:

Wessin listed those who should go. It was virtually the same list that Caamaño had given me and that Imbert had given me, except that it contained the names of General de los Santos and Commodore Rivera Caminero . . . and the name of a Colonel who was a close personal friend of Imbert's. Imbert at first balked at the Colonel, then gave in. He balked at the other two flatly. And he insisted that Wessin go, too. He got rid of the rest, including Hungria, Rib, Rivera Cuesta, Belisario Peguero, Hermida, and Luna--lured them to the Haina naval base, disarmed them, put them aboard a Dominican warship, and sent them to sea [Puerto Rico].<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The three "wise men" formula included former presidents Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela and José Figueres of Costa Rica and former governor Luis Muñoz Marín of Puerto Rico. They would have set up a temporary OAS trusteeship under their leadership with the blessings and support of the North American government, but the plan did not go through due to the opposition of conservative Latin American governments and sectors within the United States government. See Slater, op. cit., pp. 67-70.

<sup>2</sup>Martin, op. cit., p. 684. Other officers, such as Montás Guerrero were also shipped out, but Wessin did not fall in the trap.

In the early days of June, the Government of National Reconstruction seemed to be at its strongest point. The junta had all the appearances of a functioning national government, controlling practically all Dominicana except downtown Santo Domingo, but then a new three-man negotiating ad-hoc committee of the OAS arrived. This time it was headed by Ellsworth Bunker, the United States Ambassador to the inter-American body, and accompanied by the representatives of two of the interventionists nations, Ilmar Penha Marinho of Brazil and Ramón de Clairmont Dueñas of El Salvador. Meanwhile, the Johnson Administration "now favored a plan for Dominican elections within six to nine months. The authorship of this idea was ascribed to Assistant Secretary Vaughn, with the explanation that the State Department was now hoping for a victory at the polls by Joaquín Balaguer. . . ." <sup>1</sup>

On June 18th, the OAS committee proclaimed its "Declaration to the Dominican People," in which they said that: "We have not come to take sides in the struggle. The re-establishment of peace is what we seek. Our mission is not intervention, but rather conciliation." <sup>2</sup> Concretely, they proposed an end to the conflict through the establishment of a provisional government which would hold elections, and thus the political struggle would continue, "but that it be decided by ballots,

<sup>1</sup> Szulc, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

<sup>2</sup> The Report of the Secretary General . . ., *op. cit.*, p. 44.

not bullets. Let the will of the people, freely expressed, determine the destiny of the nation."<sup>1</sup> In essence, this proposal meant the demise of Imbert and his government, for the junta, which had barely survived the Bundy mission in May, was to be a provisional government after all.

In a note delivered to the OAS on July 9, the Constitutionalist government protested the imposition of Héctor García-Godoy Cáceres by the negotiating committee, complaining that Ambassador Bunker had stepped "out of the role of mediator and becoming the arbiter of the Dominican people."<sup>2</sup> Actually, the position of the populist government had deteriorated continuously as more time passed by. Surrounded by hostile forces, limited to a few hundred blocks of territory, another government de facto ruling the rest of the country, did not leave the Constitutionalist government more alternative than to come to terms with Mr. Bunker. However, the acceptance of a provisional government and new elections, which, incidentally, had been Wessin's position since April, finished completely whatever claims to legality they had had as the legitimate government of Dominicana, to become only one party to a dispute.

---

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 46.

<sup>2</sup>Moreno, op. cit., p. 55.

The Provisional President-to-be, Héctor García-Godoy Cáceres,<sup>1</sup> a member of a prestigious family, diplomat for most of his life, had served as Foreign Minister in the latter part of the Bosch government. At the time of the negotiations, García-Godoy was Vice-President of Balaguer's Reformista Party as well as Vice-President of the state owned tobacco company, where he had been appointed by Donald Reid. Ex-president Joaquín Balaguer had arrived from exile in late June, accompanied by Colonel Neit R. Nivar Seijas, on the pretense of visiting his dying mother. Immediately he announced his candidacy for the presidency as soon as elections took place, his mother still living in 1970 and in good health. Much to the sorrow of Imbert and the Constitutionalist, Balaguer was back and in the running. "The man who could not live down his past in 1962 had become the United States' man of the future in 1965."<sup>2</sup> But first the more immediate problem had to be settled:

The circumstances under which the September settlement was ironed out were almost identical to those that prevailed in May. Colonel Caamaño's "constitutionalists" were willing to accept a provisional regime, while "Tony" Imbert, in September as in May, opposed it with all his resources. General Imbert finally caved in after the United States refused in July

<sup>1</sup> There were many names mentioned in the negotiations and even talk of different political arrangements, but it was eventually decided on García-Godoy as a one-executive government and his Cabinet to choose a vice-president. See Estrella, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-57.

<sup>2</sup> Draper, "The Dominican Crisis," *op. cit.*, p. 65.

and August to go on financing his junta, a step that Mr. Bundy already knew in May to be necessary as the only way of forcing the acceptance of a settlement.<sup>1</sup>

On August 30th, the Government of National Reconstruction resigned, opening the way for a provisional government, but refusing to sign the Reconciliation Act that had been worked out in the negotiations and promising a "white book" as explanation of the efforts that they had made "in defense of the principles of our [Dominican] self-determination, and in defense, also, of the fundamental basis on which rests the Interamerican Juridical System."<sup>2</sup> On the Constitutionalist side, the formula was put to a vote: the PRSC and the IJ4 said no; the PRD, the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, and the Cabinet accepted; the High Command of the Constitutionalist National Army abstained. With four votes in favor, two against, and one abstention, García-Godoy was accepted.<sup>3</sup>

On the Third of September, 1965, the Provisional Government was installed. It was to govern under an Institutional Act and to hold elections in no less than six and no more than nine months. It seemed like an innocent document for a conciliation, integration, and a provisional government to hold elections, yet Article 54 clearly stated

<sup>1</sup> Szulc, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

<sup>2</sup> Cited in Danilo Brugal Alfau, Tragedia en Santo Domingo: Documentos para la Historia (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, C. por A., 1966), pp. 209-213.

<sup>3</sup> Franco, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

what the armed forces of the Republic were, and, surprisingly, Wessin's CEFA was no longer an independent command.<sup>1</sup> One of the first moves of the Provisional Government was to place the CEFA under the control of the army, which in effect, left Wessin without any troops and under the direct control of the Army chief, General Martínez Arana. On the 9th of September, the Armed Forces Training Center "was surrounded by more than five thousand North American soldiers with heavy artillery, machine-guns, helicopters, mortar emplacements, and bazookas."<sup>2</sup> In the afternoon, General Elías Wessin y Wessin was forced aboard a United States Air Force plane, taken to Panama, and then to Miami, where he had been named consul by the Provisional Government. From Florida he bitterly wrote to García-Godoy that "a basic military sense of honor prohibits me from accepting the post of Consul General in Miami for a government that has used foreign troops to force me into exile."<sup>3</sup>

The man who had spearheaded the coup of the 25th of September, 1963, was now in exile charging that García-Godoy was the leader

<sup>1</sup>The armed groups of the Republic are the Armed Forces, which includes the National Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the National Police, in charge of public order. This left out CEFA as an independent command, while it also added that no new armed forces could be created. Gaceta Oficial, No. 8944 (4 Septiembre 1965), p. 20.

<sup>2</sup>Llano Montes, op. cit., p. 198.

<sup>3</sup>Cited in "Bitter Salt of a Stranger's Bread," National Review, Vol. XVII, No. 42 (October 19, 1965), p. 911.

of the Dominican Communists, and that the only one who was not a Communist in the Provisional Government was the Minister of Interior, Manuel de Jesús Castillo.<sup>1</sup> Again, as under the Council of State, Dominicana was under a provisional government whose presumed main purpose was to hold free elections, except that the nation was under foreign occupation and the previously elected government had been overthrown.

Again the populists had challenged the caudillistic political system, and again they had been defeated. In both cases, elections in 1962 and a miscarried coup d'etat turned into rebellion in 1965, the populists had used the same avenues to power of the caudillistic political system: the military. It was only by circumstances that they turned to civilian aid, the arming and organizing of whom were the beginnings of a revolutionary movement. The weakness of the caudillistic political system had been clearly exposed as the Constitutionalists had been able to utilize the conservative coalition's fragmentation into several competing groups to their advantage, but even more significant that the existing system had to be saved by an invasion of the imperial power in the Caribbean. The United States did not only prevent a populist victory, but it reorganized the conservative coalition by

---

<sup>1</sup>The charge was made in a presumably secret testimony on October 1, 1965, before Senators Thomas J. Dodd and Roman L. Hruska, members of the Senate Internal Security Committee. The Washington Post, November 19, 1965.



pulling the regular military together, who would then be supported by their civilian allies. However, some of the leading personalities, such as Imbert and Wessin, were to suffer the consequences after they had performed their role and the North Americans needed to present a "liberal" image.

As far as the populists themselves, even if close to triumph, it became evident that the movement did not have any maturity as yet. In the first place, the fact that they had to use the military as an avenue, indicated that they did not possess enough power to overcome the caudillistic system itself. Second, even if successful, the best hopes of the movement lay in the loyalty of some officers who would accept civilian supremacy. Third, the lack of support from the peasantry indicated a major failure of organization for other than electoral purposes, which points to a fourth weakness and that is the absence of a consistent revolutionary ideology. The leadership of the populist movement, basically the PRD, to a lesser extent the Social Christians, and the Marxist groups as clinging appendixes, were reformist in nature, not revolutionary. Finally, the eclectic nature of the movement made it as weak as the conservative coalition, for it could only achieve unity of purpose in dramatic circumstances.

## CHAPTER VII

## ENFORCED STABILITY

The caudillistic political system was once more maintained when the United States rescued it from the populist challenge and reunited the forces that sustain it. This was to have a dual effect in Dominicana. On the one hand, the traditional patterns of behavior were reinforced, making the resistance to change more entrenched than ever before. On the other hand, the polarization of the socio-political groups was qualitatively increased, the populist forces radicalizing from their liberal democratic ideology to an indigenous revolutionary concept, the Dictatorship with Popular Support.

The North American occupation of 1965-1966<sup>1</sup> was not conducive to the amelioration of the social cleavages that had produced the political struggle that led to armed conflict, but, on the contrary, it led to the continuation of the same paternalistic, personalistic, and chaotic

---

<sup>1</sup>There is little point of talking about an OAS presence, for the United States had the overwhelmingly largest contingent of troops, paying all OAS operations, including the other Latin American troops, was financing the Provisional Government, and the OAS Committee with the authority for decision was headed by the North American Ambassador Eilsworth Bunker. At best, the OAS acted as the organism for the implementation of United States policy.

political pattern that has been characteristic of the nation, to the acceleration of social polarization and disintegration, and to the abandonment of representative democracy as the ideal political system for Dominicana from the groups that most staunchly had supported it. Needless to say that the invasion also led to a wave of anti-United States sentiment not present since the occupation of 1916-1924.

As far as the United States was concerned, once the caudillistic system had been saved by the invading troops, the next problem was to disengage as quickly as possible, at least from the public view. The Provisional Government of García-Godoy existed for the simple reason of holding free elections, just as the Consejo had done before in 1962. The existence of a government gave an apparent sovereignty to the occupied nation, and it provided the means for a settlement between the conflicting parties. Even supposing that the North American expectation of an electoral victory by Joaquín Balaguer had been mistaken, there was nothing to fear, because the new government would still have to deal with the reunited Dominican armed forces. The imperial power of the Caribbean had solved its problem, at least in the short run.

For the Dominicans it continued to be the same as it had been in April 1965, but with the difference that this time the populists and the conservatives presumably were to solve their differences through ballots instead of bullets. Again, as in 1962, the "will of the people"

would be taken into account, with little consideration for the fact that in 1963 it had been absolutely disregarded. The elections were only a valid alternative as long as the populist candidate lost, for in a caudilistic environment, "he who bears the bayonet of armed insurrection or of the organized army has decided the outcome of the elections, before or after the electoral act."<sup>1</sup> In 1962 Juan Bosch had won with the aid of the armed forces, and in 1966 it would be Balaguer's turn.

To have elections, the Provisional Government of Héctor García-Godoy had to be kept afloat, monetarily as well as militarily. The situation was very similar to that of the Council of State, but there were significant differences. One, the amount of economic aid was to be much higher, for there was now a higher degree of United States involvement. Prior to the creation of the Consejo, the North American intervention had been limited to a naval show of force, no troops were landed, and it had been fairly well received by public opinion in Dominicana and in the world at large, since it had been in support of democratic forces. Now, the intervention had been full-scale, with the involvement of other nations, lengthy, and with the adverse response of internal and external public opinion, since this time it had been in support of reactionary forces.

---

<sup>1</sup>Julio G. Campillo Pérez, El Grillo y el Ruiseñor: Elecciones Presidenciales Dominicanas (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, C. por A., 1966), p. 11.

Another difference was that to keep the Council of State in the National Palace there were the periodic visits of North American dignitaries, naval units, and a great deal of public relations. Now, there were the troops of the so-called Inter-American Peace Force (FIP) as the highest military power within the nation. No coup could be carried out without the neutrality or the support of these troops, which happened to be committed to the maintenance of the García-Godoy government. This time the control was more direct.

Finally, the times had changed. The Consejo headed by Rafael Bonelly was starting with a clean slate after the Trujillo tyranny, while the Provisional Government already had a free election, a legal government, a coup d'etat, and a populist rebellion. Furthermore, there was the return of the political heir of the Benefactor, Joaquín Balaguer, as a candidate for President once again, opening the spectrum of electoral competition to a wider range than had been possible in 1962. Neither was the Trujillo dictatorship the incarnation of evil anymore, nor was there the same faith in elections and the democratic process for which so many people had once hoped.

The government of Héctor García-Godoy Cáceres was started out in September of 1965 with a twenty-million dollar grant, followed by a grant of five million in November, both channeled through the OAS

under the heading of budget support.<sup>1</sup> By December there was apparently no need to continue the use of the OAS as an intermediary, and the Agency for International Development (AID) began to channel the funds directly to the Provisional Government. It was a grant of 12.9 million dollars, five of which went for budget support and the remainder basically to community development projects and highway maintenance. There was another grant of \$7.5 million for budget support in February 1966, but by May the budget had to be supported by borrowing the money, a 10 million dollar loan. This gives us a grand total of 55.4 million dollars of direct assistance, practically all of which went for budget support. In addition there were a \$5 million loan for the National Housing Bank, a \$9.5 million loan for agricultural credit, and unspecified amounts of grants for food and technical assistance,<sup>2</sup> not taking into account indirect assistance through North American sugar purchases above the regular quota and above the world market price.

Again we are back to a period like that of 1905-1916, when the United States was in charge of the customs collection, paying the

<sup>1</sup>All the figures are from United States Embassy, "Summary of AID Assistance to the Dominican Republic Since April 24, 1965," (Santo Domingo: Mimeographed report, April 24, 1968), pp. 1, 3, and 6.

<sup>2</sup>In 1966 there were 8.4 million dollars granted for technical assistance, but no specific date for each grant. The same problem occurs in the Food for Peace Program, \$18 million in grants and \$14.3 million in sales on the basis of dollar repayments, but this is from April 24, 1965 to December 31, 1967.

Dominican government 45 percent of the revenue obtained, but with the power to withdraw payments if its wishes were not met. As it was then, without money the government would collapse, for it could not pay the bureaucracy and, more important, the military. The Provisional Government of 1965-1966 was absolutely dependent on the United States, if only from the monetary point of view, but it did have the leeway of knowing that the North Americans needed it in order to have the elections. Nevertheless, as former AID official David Fairchild has disclosed, the Director of AID in Santo Domingo, Alexander Firfer, had the enormous power of deciding whether to give or not to give money to the Dominican government. Furthermore,

He also had to decide issues involving the operation of ongoing projects which had been funded. And these issues revolved largely around AID withholding further support for something the Dominicans were doing that the Americans didn't like. The Americans' sole bargaining device was to say, Well, we'll have to consider not refunding you, or not continuing your money, or delaying your money.<sup>1</sup>

Again, as if history insisted in repeating itself, the United States was directly involved with the building of greater military power in Dominicana, on the grounds that it was needed for the maintenance of order. Almost a half-a-century before, the Marines had built the Constabulary supposedly to deal with this problem, and it had been quite

---

<sup>1</sup>"U. S. A. I. D. in the Dominican Republic--An Inside View," NACLA Newsletter, Vol. IV, No. 7 (November 1970), p. 5.

successful during the three decades of the Trujillo Era, but now it was the turn of the 82nd Airborne Division. "Viewing the role of the Dominican Army realistically as that of an expanded police force equipped to deal with large-scale violence, Americans are training it company by company in a camp located in the mountains . . .," and to follow up the training, "a U. S. lieutenant is assigned to each Dominican company completing the course, a captain is attached to each batallion, and a major to each brigade headquarters."<sup>1</sup>

The maintenance of order is a problem for every society. Disorders do interrupt continuity in the lives of everyone as well as of the government, but it must be kept in mind that order does favor a particular group of people within a society. Order serves the interest of the status quo, may it be in the Dominican Republic, in the United States, in the Soviet Union, or in Cuba. The training of the Dominican military should not be interpreted as if it were the training of a politically neutral police force to deal with delinquents who trespass the existing code of law, but, on the contrary, the reinforcement of the military's power within Dominican society. The maintenance of order is synonymous with the maintenance of the North American empire, for disorder can only weaken an already dominant position. The same is true with the Russian empire in Eastern Europe, and both super-powers act identically: a local military to maintain order, and if it

---

<sup>1</sup>Paul D. Bethel, "The Dominican Republic Goes to the Polls," The Reporter, Vol. 34, No. 11 (June 2, 1966), p. 25.



fails, to invade and restore the status quo.

Furthermore, the military high command had been a party to the dispute of the previous months, for not one officer, except Wessin, had been removed after the fall of Imbert. Rivera Caminero was still the Secretary of State for the Armed Forces, now Minister under García-Godoy; Commodore Ramón Emilio Jiménez, chief of the Navy; General Martínez Arana, head of the Army; and de los Santos Céspedes, the man who gave the orders to bomb the National Palace, remained at his post in the Air Force. On the other hand, the Constitutionalist officers and rank and file, who according to Article 8 of the Act of Reconciliation were to have been reintegrated into the Armed Forces, without discrimination and without reprisals,<sup>1</sup> were not only not reintegrated to their previous positions, but quartered in the 16th of August Camp surrounded by troops of the Inter-American Peace Force for protection as well as vigilance.

To the casual observer of the Dominican political scene, it may have seemed that the Provisional Government had been a compromise solution between two claimants to be the government of the Dominican Republic, and that the problem would be solved once elections were held, but this was not the case. The status quo had been

---

<sup>1</sup>Acta de Reconciliación Dominicana, Gaceta Oficial, No. 8944 (Santo Domingo: 4 Septiembre 1965).

maintained, the equilibrium of forces returning to what they had been since September 1963, except for a few moments in April 1965. The military was once again in a position of supremacy, the populists in a position of power inferiority.

Given the fact that in the caudillistic political system the vote generally follows the control of force, the holding of superior power, political contenders had to demonstrate their power superiority or disguise their inferiority. However, the balance of forces would not become entirely clear until the beginning of the new year. Part of the problem was the very confusing situation impairing in Santo Domingo. The United States invaded to prevent a populist victory, but now it was supposedly neutral. The Benoit junta and Imbert's Government of National Reconstruction had been praised and then ignored. Even General Elías Wessin y Wessin had been deported, the man who had led the counter-coup which restored the Consejo, and who led the coup against the populist government. To add insult upon injury, Joaquín Balaguer was back, running for elections--the man who three years before was supposed to have been so anti-democratic. There were to be elections again, but part of the problem now was that the winners of the last one had not been allowed to govern. The nation had a government, but there were those foreign troops in occupation, all under the "authority" of the OAS, even a Brazilian General as commander, but then who

spoke, who decided, was Mr. Bunker, from the United States.<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore, although under the auspices and financing of the United States, the García-Godoy government was basically staffed by the "revolutionaries," people who had participated in the populist side. Although the government was supposed to be politically neutral, the cabinet composed of practically all non-Marxist persuasions, to insure this neutrality, García-Godoy, like Bonelly before him, could not run in the forthcoming elections. However, there was a particularly close connection between the PRD and the Provisional Government, and the fact that a prominent Constitutionalist, playwright Franklyn Domínguez, was the press officer helped to reinforce that view.

When later accused of having won the elections by fraud, Joaquín Balaguer made his defense by pointing out the close relationship between the government and the leading populist party. He argued that for all practical purposes the PRD had been the official party, controlling the public bureaucracy, the identity card offices (*cédula*), the central electoral board, the judiciary, and the autonomous state

---

<sup>1</sup>As a note of black humor, General Imbert's two dogs are named Bunker and OEA, the Spanish initials for OAS.

organisms.<sup>1</sup> The reasoning is that the party which controls the apparatus of the government is the one in position to be able to commit frauds, for the out party has no means with which to do it.

The fact that the Provisional Government was closely associated with the populist groups was an advantage for the coming elections, but an advantage for the populists. In late November there was a weak revolt by 300 peasants, with the involvement of undisclosed senior military officers, who had the avowed purpose of replacing the "far-leftist" García-Godoy.<sup>2</sup> Whether there had been any seriousness to this movement is hard to determine, for the day before it happened the Inter-American Peace Force had occupied the Air Force bases of Barahona and Santiago, thus preventing any major occurrence while not displacing the officers either.

Government or no government, there was a wave of political terrorism directed against the populists, many of whom, such as Commando leader E. R. Mejía del Castillo (Pichirilo), fell in the streets as victims of machine-gun fire. Furthermore, the

<sup>1</sup>Carlos Núñez, "Entrevista con Balaguer," Ahora, No. 138 (4 Julio 1966), pp. 17-18. In order to vote in Dominicana the citizen must present his identity card which is stamped in order to avoid double voting, but false cards may be issued by disreputable officials. The autonomous state organisms are the former Trujillo family properties and it is the largest employer in the nation.

<sup>2</sup>The New York Times, November 22-24, 1965. The new President would have been Alcibiades Espinoza, a member of the national directorate of UCN and a well known right-winger.

Constitutionalist military was confined to Santo Domingo while the rest of the military was throughout the nation, obvious signs of power inferiority. To redress this image, the Constitutionalist military had to prove that they were also powerful in other places, not only the Capital, and that they could move around the interior in defiance of the regular military. The occasion chosen was a posthumous act in the memory of the fallen Colonel Rafael Tomás Fernández Domínguez which was to take place in Santiago on December 19, 1965.<sup>1</sup> After the services in the cemetery, where some machine gun fire was heard and a bomb was found, the officers and civilians headed by Colonel Francisco Caamaño took the opportunity to parade in the streets of the city where the crowds cheered and the regular military allowed them to go unmo-  
 lested. Yet, at the return to the Matum Hotel for a scheduled memorial breakfast, the loyalist military surrounded the place and opened fire.<sup>2</sup> A few minutes later tanks arrived, a shot of one them cost the life of Colonel Juan María Lora Fernández, cousin of the deceased, and the shooting continued until noon, when the North American Consul managed to get a cease-fire in order to try to evacuate United States citizens

<sup>1</sup>For details, see "Raíces y Proyecciones del Suceso de Santiago," Ahora, No. 114 (3 Enero 1966), pp. 6-22.

<sup>2</sup>According to Pedro Manuel Casals Victoria the attack was headed by officers Malagón, Marmolejos, Coradin, and Ortega Piñero. Ibid., p. 17.

from the besieged hotel. Instead, they were retained inside, including the Consul, as a guarantee from Air Force bombings. There was more shooting in the afternoon with casualties on both sides, the loyalist group taking the heavier toll, until the Inter-American Peace Force arrived in helicopters at dusk. The Constitutionalist were either helicoptered back to Santo Domingo or their automobiles escorted by foreign troops.

While the Constitutionalist had attempted to make some political capital by proving that they were "on top," the loyalist military had not only called their bluff, but attempted to wipe them out in one stroke. The fact that Santo Domingo had been aware of the occurrence since the morning and the foreign troops had been so delayed to arrive was another indication that the Inter-American Peace Force was on the side of the loyalists and that the latter were "on top." As a corollary to the happenings in Santiago, the Provisional Government carried on a presumed investigation, the findings of which were never revealed, but which had as a result of the "exile" of the Constitutionalist high command and the Chief of the Armed Forces Francisco Rivera Caminero, all of which were appointed in foreign embassies.

The original "exile" list was made up of 34 officers, of which only three were loyalists, but this included the chiefs of army and air force besides the Minister of the Armed Forces. On January 7, the

military rebelled against García-Godoy in protest for having their top officers "exiled," and according to Robert H. Eastbrook, United States military attaches were advising these officers not to leave the country while the State Department was presumably supporting the President.<sup>1</sup> After the Constitutionlists had left, some rioting, clashes, and a general strike, Rivera Caminero left for Washington to be the Dominican delegate to the Inter-American Defense Board. He was replaced by the man who headed the loyalist offensive in mid-May 1965, General Enrique Pérez y Pérez from the Army. Pérez was sympathetic to the San Cristóbal clan but basically a neutralist. De los Santos and Martínez Arana were made Deputy Ministers, which relieved them from direct control of troops, but they never left the country. They were replaced by General Juan Folch Pérez from the Wessin group and by General Osiris Perdomo from the San Cristóbal clan in Air Force and Army respectively. The chief of police, Herman Despradel Brache, was replaced with a loyalist officer who was sympathetic to the Constitutionlists, Caamaño's old friend Colonel Morillo López, who stopped the rampant terrorism.

By mid-February the way for elections had been cleared. The Constitutionalist military was out in exile and there was little doubt that

---

<sup>1</sup>The Washington Post, January 19, 1966. See also "García-Godoy Enfrentando el Poder Militar," *Ahora*, No. 116 (17 Enero 1966), pp. 7-8.

the loyalists had won the game. It was true that some top officers, such as Wessin, had lost their personal power, but the corporate establishment had been the clear winner of the challenge they had faced in April 1965. Again, the role of the United States should not be underestimated.

As Bunker now saw the problem, basic military reform had to be treated as a continuing rather than an immediate program; it could not be accomplished merely by changing the chiefs, for their attitudes were shared by most of the officers corp as a whole. As a result, Bunker thought, fundamental changes could be brought about only by the virtual liquidation of the existing military establishment, a course precluded by the need to preserve a bulwark against Communism.<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore, at the end of February 1966, Mr. Bunker insisted to the Provisional President that the solution to the Matum crisis had to be accepted as permanent, "and warned that for the duration of the provisional government the United States would not be disposed to support any further personnel shifts, let alone more far-reaching reform."<sup>2</sup> With the status quo maintained, the primacy of the Dominican military and above them the United States, the stage was set for the elections.

From the moment of his arrival on June 28, 1965, "Balaguer put himself forward as an advocate of peace, order, and

<sup>1</sup>Jerome Slater, Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970), pp. 161-162.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 162.



reconciliation."<sup>1</sup> He was the personification of the Trujillo regime and of the continuity of Dominican life as it had always been known. His campaign strategy was based on these facts, underscored by the presence with him of many prominent members of the Trujillo Era in his political tours and rallies, which reminded everyone of less demanding days as well as of the price to be paid for opposition. By May 1966, the Dominican Association for Human Rights claimed that over 200 Constitutionals had been killed and perhaps twice that number tortured and wounded since the Provisional Government had taken power.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, Bosch arrived on September 25, 1965, the second anniversary of his overthrow, and said then that the United States ought to be sued in the World Court at the Hague for one billion dollars in damages to Dominicana, which clearly put him from the start as the advocate of struggle against the existing powers. Balaguer meant peace with repression and Bosch meant change with war, a choice between the certainty of the past versus the uncertainty of the future.

Again as in 1962, Bosch was accused of being a Communist, and peasants were told that if the Communists came to power they would burn their homes and make them slaves. This was told to them

<sup>1</sup>Henry Wells, "The Dominican Search for Stability," Current History, Vol. 51, No. 304 (December 1966), p. 330.

<sup>2</sup>Sidney Lens, "Santo Domingo: The Unfinished Revolution," The Nation, Vol. 202, No. 18 (May 2, 1966), p. 522.

by the same groups that had made the charge in the previous electoral campaign, but this time the soldiers and the police were added. "The Voice of America verified what the priests, the soldiers, and the police had said; on further questioning, it turned out to be the CIA radio station," operated clandestinely in Dominicana with the aid of Cuban refugees.<sup>1</sup> With the covert backing of the United States, the open backing of the military and some of the landed and business groups, with his own personal appeal as the ghost of Trujillo, the peace candidate, and the man who had lowered the price of basic consumer goods in his previous administration, Balaguer had a certain victory to be reaped at the polls, which was precisely what the United States had wanted since May-June of the previous year.<sup>2</sup>

The man who had won the elections in 1962 no longer counted with the sympathy of the armed forces, but on the contrary, their most adamant hatred for now they saw him with the same eyes they had before seen Viriato Fiallo; a threat. He no longer counted with two of his trusted aides who had been the engineers of the 1962 campaign, Angel

---

<sup>1</sup>Donald Grant, "The Dominican Tragedy," The Progressive, Vol. 30, No. 9 (September 1966), pp. 20-21.

<sup>2</sup>"It was obvious to all Dominicans that the United States was backing Balaguer and that a Bosch victory was unacceptable." Fred Goff and Michael Locker, "The Violence of Domination: U. S. Power and the Dominican Republic," North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), Mimeographed paper (New York: August 1967), p. 16.

Miolán and Sacha Volman. The former had been ousted from the PRD after the civil strife for presumably having slandered Bosch as working with the Communists, but actually their differences began during the 1963 government, when Miolán was Secretary-General of the party and was making sure to put his own men in government jobs. The differences continued during the Triumvirate when Miolán opposed the conspiracy approach and favored participation in Donald Reid's elections.<sup>1</sup> Miolán went to work for Balaguer and Volman, who in 1962 had organized the peasant support for Bosch, "had agreed, in accordance with U. S. State Department wishes, to remain outside the country during the campaign."<sup>2</sup> Bosch's greatest support in 1966, as in the previous time, lay "among the workers of the cities and the state-owned sugar plantations,"<sup>3</sup> but the absence of supporting peasant organizations was to prove fatal.

The electoral contest became a race of three ex-presidents when the former head of the Consejo, Rafael Bonelly, headed a coalition of

---

<sup>1</sup>The New York Times, November 30, 1965; and "Entrevista con Angel Miolán," *Ahora*, No. 113 (27 Diciembre 1965), p. 9.

<sup>2</sup>Goff and Locker, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16. Subsequently, the man who had headed CIDES and was ousted in 1963 as a Communist, was working in the Balaguer government.

<sup>3</sup>Paul D. Bethel, "The Dominican Republic Goes to the Polls," *The Reporter*, Vol. 34, No. 11 (June 2, 1966), p. 18.

small political parties under a Movement of National Integration (MIN). He became the presidential nominee of the Partido Acción Revolucionaria (PAR), a party created exclusively for that purpose, but the candidate also of Luis Amiama's PLE, and the old UCN, VRD, and PNRD. These pocket parties were in reality hoping for no more than a cabinet seat in case of victory, or even defeat, just on the grounds that they had participated. In many ways, the coalition was the representative of the upper-strata which had been in power with the Consejo and the Triumvirate, opposed to the populists represented by Bosch, and to the old Trujillo regime represented by Balaguer. The MIN was also the civilian political expression of the interests of the Wessin and Imbert military cliques.

In terms of political parties, Juan Bosch was the candidate of his PRD as well as of the Social-Christians, holding together the leadership of the populist movement. The Fourteenth of June Movement (1J4) had decided to participate in this election in order to redress the mistake made by their absence in 1962.<sup>1</sup> Their participation was limited to the National District and one province, La Romana, and they had offered to have Bosch as their presidential nominee, but the PRD leader

<sup>1</sup>Florángel Cárdenas, "Entrevista con Fidelio Despradel," Ahora, No. 133 (23 Mayo 1966), p. 56. The leaders of the 1J4 always made the point that they were not a Communist party, but a "national liberation movement, that is an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal movement of the popular masses." Miguel A. Hernández, "Entrevista con Rafael Taveras (Fafa)," Ahora, No. 116 (17 Enero 1966), p. 18.

refused and they ran without a presidential candidate. Nevertheless, the different Marxists groups were supporting Bosch's candidacy, as they had done during the abortive revolution, on the grounds that a PRD victory meant a "forward step against the candidates of the extreme right."<sup>1</sup> Outside of his own Reformista Party (PR), Balaguer was also the candidate of Mario Read Vitini's PDC, a former social-christian who was in the coup against Bosch and was opposed to the Constitutionalists but not to the Trujillistas, and of Ramón Castillo's (Mon the Crazy One) pocket party, the PPDC. Perhaps best of all was the endorsement of the San Cristóbal clan and of the military in general, for, as Bosch pointed out as early as February 1966, there were "many areas of the country where the members of the PRD can not even say that they are members of the party, because immediately they are threatened with death."<sup>2</sup>

The presidential nominee of the PRD and PRSC only left his home twice throughout the campaign, and while his two opponents were

---

<sup>1</sup>"Entrevista con Narciso Isa Conde," Ahora, No. 131 (9 Mayo 1966), p. 14. Isa Conde was the head of the old PSP which by now had changed its name to Dominican Communist Party (PCD). At this time he was 23 years old.

<sup>2</sup>Miguel A. Hernández, "Entrevista con Juan Bosch," Ahora, No. 119 (7 de Febrero 1966), p. 11. Ironically, in 1962 the military recommended to the peasants that they vote for Bosch, and four years later they threatened their lives if they did.

touring the country, Bosch campaigned by radio with tapes of speeches.

Bartlow Martin believed that:

This circumstance, no doubt prompted by legitimate fear of assassination, established an advantageous political position for him--underdog, clandestine--and, in a campaign devoid of issues--even Balaguer, sometimes considered rightly or wrongly "the U. S. candidate," was demanding the withdrawal of foreign troops--created an issue for Bosch: his own safety.<sup>1</sup>

It seems very doubtful that the populist candidate was doing this deliberately. On the other hand, to Selden Rodman this circumstance and the fact that Bosch had not returned immediately from Puerto Rico in April 1965, hurt him because it was a demonstration of a lack of machismo, manhood, which is a virtue well regarded in Hispanic cultures.<sup>2</sup> In the caudillo system leadership is gained by violence and personality. For whatever reasons, if Bosch was not safe this meant that the control of violence was out of his hands, and this was to work adversely for him, for if the Presidential candidate felt he was in danger, how would a common citizen feel for having the same views?

Truly, the campaign was superficially devoid of issues for the programs of the three candidates were practically the same: economic

<sup>1</sup> John Bartlow Martin, Overtaken by Events (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1966), p. 702.

<sup>2</sup> Selden Rodman, "Why Balaguer Won: Anatomy of a Revolution That Failed," The New Republic, Vol. 154, No. 25 (June 18, 1966), pp. 17-18. Rodman claims that the charisma that Bosch had back in April 1965 had been lost by election time. In a way, more or less the same had happened to Viriato Fiallo in the period between the ouster of the Trujillos and the elections.

austerity, tax reforms, education, agrarian reform, and the exit of foreign troops.<sup>1</sup> But the difference lay in its possible implementation as the representatives of particular political forces and social groups within the nation. Certainly the Bonelly group was not noted for its reform zeal, as evidenced by their experience in the Consejo and Triumvirate; Balaguer perhaps, for he had the military and the United States and did not depend on the upper groups which had ousted him once before; Bosch had no alternative, for in the aspiring groups lay his support, yet the probability was that the other forces would not allow him to govern if he won, as happened once before.

For their running mates, Bosch had the faithful Antonio Guzmán; Balaguer the organizer of the PR, Francisco Augusto Lora; and Bonelly an associate of Amiama's PLE, eye-doctor Tabaré Álvarez Pereyra. A merry-go-round of threats to withdraw from the race was started in mid-May. The first one was Bosch, claiming that there were no guarantees for elections due to military persecution, but the problem was settled when García-Godoy ordered the soldiers to be quartered in their barracks until election day. Recalling that the PRD leader had capitalized heavily with the tactic of withdrawal in the previous election, it was Balaguer's turn to threaten to withdraw unless

---

<sup>1</sup>One exception was that the PRD called for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops rather than just their exit and the restitution of the 1963 Constitution. See "Los Programas de Gobierno de los Partidos y Candidatos," *Ahora*, No. 133 (23 Mayo 1966), pp. 5-12.

women were allowed to vote without identity cards, and this demand was granted.<sup>1</sup> Finally, on May 27th, three days before elections, Bonelly's running mate resigned and announced his support of Balaguer. It had all become now a great anti-Bosch coalition, just like in September 1963, the populist leader telling his followers to go to the polls with "sticks and stones," further underscoring his helplessness.

In a heavy, peaceful turnout, Dominicans went to vote on June 1st 1966. Half an hour before the polls closed, Army Chief Osiris Perdomo sent a coded telegram to all bases in the Cibao: "We have been informed that the Leftists, as soon as they know Juan Bosch has lost the election, will attack the Army camps. Take extreme measures accordingly."<sup>2</sup> No attack took place, but Balaguer won the elections with a 56.3 percent majority, practically the same percentage of Bosch in 1962. As the UCN had implied before, it was now the PRD's turn to claim fraud, which Bosch said they had expected, up to 100,000 votes, but not the 300,000 that occurred.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, the PRD

---

<sup>1</sup>Balaguer's supporters argued that most women in the rural areas would have been disfranchised for they seldom obtained an identity card although required by law to do so after reaching 16 years of age, but his opponents argued that this favored the PR candidate, since he made a special appeal to women, and also increased the possibilities of fraud.

<sup>2</sup>Cited in Norman Gall, "The Strange Dominican Election," The New Leader, Vol. XLIX, No. 13 (June 20, 1966), p. 7.

<sup>3</sup>"Entrevista con Juan Bosch," Ahora, No. 136 (20 Junio 1966), p. 9.



settled quickly to a role of "constructive opposition," but no participation in the elected government.<sup>1</sup> On June 4th, the home of Héctor Aristy, Caamaño's close aide, was attacked by soldiers and one of his bodyguards was killed.<sup>2</sup>

In spite of the fact that there was a committee of poll watchers, headed by North American Socialist leader Norman Thomas, who testified to the legality of the elections at the polls, even when they had favored Juan Bosch, there were many suspicious things about the elections as particularly Norman Gall has pointed out.<sup>3</sup> For one, the presence of a large number of Cuban exiles, at least 310 of them who entered the country without visas, with such notable personalities as Santiago Rey and Miguel Suárez Fernández who were noted for their abilities with electoral problems in Batista's Cuba.<sup>4</sup> The head of the

---

<sup>1</sup>Penn Kemble, "No Joy in Santo Domingo," New America, Vol. V, No. 21 (June 15, 1966), p. 1.

<sup>2</sup>The Economist, June 11, 1966.

<sup>3</sup>Gall, op. cit., pp. 3-8.

<sup>4</sup>Santiago Rey had been Minister of Government for Batista and Suárez Fernández a Senator from Santa Clara. The former spent two months in Santo Domingo "before being deported by Dominican Immigration officials for 'intervening in political affairs.' Before Rey could be put aboard a plane, though, he was whisked away by a group of Balaguer supporters, led by vice-presidential candidate Francisco Augusto Lora, who presented a Presidential order from García-Godoy for Rey's return to the capital." Ibid., p. 4. The story is also in the Economist, June 11, 1965.

electoral board, Angel Liz, was an old UCNER appointed to the job after the Bosch coup, no OAS observers were allowed, and the computers were run by Cuban exiles. Finally, it was surprising that in 1962, when the votes were counted by hand, the results were known the day after the vote, while in 1966 with the aid of computers, "they were still being counted and the results were being revised five days after the election."<sup>1</sup>

Whether there was actual fraud or not will probably never be known, but in any case there is no escape from the fact that Joaquín Balaguer did have a substantial number of supporters, and, in effect, he probably won the majority of the voters.<sup>2</sup> He ran an aggressive and well financed campaign, covering the entire nation, exposing himself to the possibility of being assassinated, and with the majority of the voters believing that he had the backing of the powers that exist, the military and the United States. Balaguer took office on July 1st with a broad

---

<sup>1</sup>Gall, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup>It can be recalled that in the early months of 1965, more than a year before the elections, Balaguer had approximately 52 percent of the voters according to the secret USIS polls conducted at the time, a fact that was probably influential in North American calculations to decide to have elections instead of another more manageable junta than Imbert's. It could also be recalled that one of the factors influential in Bosch's victory in 1962 was the backing of the Trujillistas, who now had switched to a genuine representative of the Era. It is possible that there was a heavy change of mind due to the events of April 1965, but it was also possible that many voters were convinced by Balaguer's campaign and subsequent events to the abortive revolution.

based cabinet, which included two high officials of the PRD, General Pérez y Pérez retained as Armed Forces Chief, and payoffs to supporters of his own party as well as others.<sup>1</sup> The keynote of the inaugural speech was that he had not been elected to put on the boots of Trujillo, which implied that he was not going to be a dictator, only Trujilloism with democracy.

The election results showed a total of 1,345,404 votes cast, of which the PR obtained 759,887 and the PRD 494,550; in other words, three quarters of a million to half a million votes.<sup>2</sup> This gave Balaguer a splendid majority in both houses of Congress, the PRD obtained only five senate seats and twenty-one deputies, out of a total of 27 and 74 seats, respectively, and none of the other parties obtained one seat in the legislature.<sup>3</sup> Balaguer had won in all the provinces save four and

<sup>1</sup>From the PRD, former Secretary-General Antonio Martínez Francisco was appointed Secretary of State for Finance; José A. Brea Peña Secretary of Commerce; and former President of the Senate Antonio Casanovas Garrido, Secretary of State without Portfolio. From the other parties, Bonelly's running mate from the PLE, Tabaré Álvarez Pereyra, Secretary of State for Public Health and Welfare; and Ramón Castillo (PPRD) Interior and Police. From his own supporters, Balaguer appointed people such as Gilberto Herrera Báez in Foreign Relations and Fernando Álvarez Bogaert in Agriculture. Even Tomás Aicibiades Espinosa, the man who was to replace García-Godoy in an attempted coup in November of 1965, was appointed as Secretary of State without Portfolio.

<sup>2</sup>All the data is from Junta Central Electoral, Relación General de las Votaciones de las Elecciones del Iero de Junio de 1966 (Santo Domingo: 1967). The small book can be obtained on request.

<sup>3</sup>The controversial PRD "steamroller" of 1963 had now become the PR's "avalanche." See "Azúcar y Política," Ahora, No. 148 (12 Septiembre 1969), p. 8.

the national district, which includes Santo Domingo, but significantly, Bosch had won precisely in those places where the heaviest concentration of organized labor lies: the capital, which also includes the Río Haina sugar mill complex; La Romana, San Pedro de Macorís, and Barahona, all three with sugar mills, light industry, and port towns; and in Pedernales, where lies the bauxite complex of the Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA). The other parties received a total of 90,997 votes, of which the Social-Christians received the largest number to finish in third place, 30,660, but none of them managed to get even a city councilman elected.<sup>1</sup> It was either Balaguer or Bosch, as in the tradition of caudillo politics, and with the status quo enforced, Balaguer won. The symbol of his party, the red cock.<sup>2</sup>

The first problem to be faced by the new government was the presence of foreign troops in Dominicana; the second problem was the same as of any government, how to stay in power. Any other area of concern remains in a secondary category, for what good can a government do if it is out of power, and in Santo Domingo that in itself is a

<sup>1</sup>UCN had dropped to fourth place with the insignificant number of 16,152 votes. VRD surprisingly obtained 13,855; PDC 9,378; PLE 6,540; PAR 5,484, IJ4 4,834; and PNRD 4,039. It is incredible how in five years the UCN and IJ4 had managed to eliminate themselves as serious contenders.

<sup>2</sup>The cock is not only in the tradition of the politics of the early part of the century, but it is highly prized in the rural areas as probably the major form of entertainment, cock-fighting, in which there is one winner and a dead loser.

major achievement. Considering that all the candidates had been calling for the withdrawal of the troops, that once a government had been elected their presence in Dominicana was even less justifiable, and that Balaguer and not Bosch had been the winner, the Inter-American Peace Force finally left by September 20, 1966, "five years earlier than the time the U. S. commanding general in the Dominican Republic told President [Lyndon] Johnson it would be safe to leave, assuming his assignment was the pacification of the country."<sup>1</sup>

However, before the troops left, President Balaguer had to attempt to gain control of his own Dominican troops, because even if they had been sympathetic to his winning the elections he did not control them. The San Cristóbal clan was on his side, and it was from this group that he had to draw his main support, but those in the Wessin and Imbert-Rivera Caminero cliques had their own ax to grind, besides the Constitutionals, who were still not reintegrated back to their posts. In his struggle for survival, Balaguer started out in a series of intricate maneuvers aiming at control, but without destroying the equilibrium of forces, only modifying it in his favor.

First of all, a group of officers who requested of the Constitutional President that Rivera Caminero be brought back from Washington found themselves canceled from the military, transferred to the interior,

---

<sup>1</sup>Grant, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

appointed in diplomatic posts in Central America, or simply retired.<sup>1</sup> For the Constitutionalists, a list was drawn, with the aid of García-Godoy, of those who were leaving in diplomatic posts, those who were going to "study" abroad, and those who would remain in Dominicana, as civilians.<sup>2</sup> Imbert was publicly told to stop visiting military camps; Chief of Police Morillo López was changed for a San Cristóbal officer, General Ney Tejada Álvarez; and the head of the Air Force, Folch Pérez, was replaced with Salvador Lluberes Montás (Chinino), presumably of the Wessin group.

In the military high command, the Chief of the Armed Forces Pérez y Pérez was neutralist but loyal to the government; in the Navy, Ramón Emilio Jiménez (Milo) was sympathetic to Imbert-Rivera Caminero, but he could be co-opted into support; in the Army, Osiris Perdomo was loyal; so was the police with Ney Tejada; and in the Air Force, Chinino Lluberes was sympathetic to Wessin but could be co-opted into support. All of these were anti-Constitutionalists, "loyalists" from the civil war, with the others simply never reintegrated into the military, no matter what the Act of Reconciliation had said. In a meeting of Latin American army chiefs in Buenos Aires, Osiris Perdomo

<sup>1</sup>"Balaguer Enfrenta el Problema Militar," Ahora, No. 141 (25 Julio 1966), pp. 8-9.

<sup>2</sup>See "La Integración: Asperas Negociaciones y Soluciones a la Inversa," Ahora, No. 139 (11 Julio 1966), pp. 26-27; and "La Segunda Visita de García-Godoy al Dr. Balaguer," Ahora, No. 141 (25 Julio 1966), p. 21.

made a declaration that can be considered representative of the high command.

The insurrectionist movement initiated on April 24, 1965 [was] . . . marred by the disposition of some frustrated and neurotic military officers to give arms stolen from arsenals of the state to bums, thugs, loafers, gangsters, eager to sack and destroy the human person and private property. To these destructive ends they were urged on by unscrupulous politicians through demagogic preaching. This made it clear that the revolution was not inspired by patriotic ideals or by well-understood nationalism, but by political passions of a distinct reddish color.<sup>1</sup>

To have the military high command loyal was an insurance that the type of coup given to Bosch would not happen, but then there was the type from below, the Colonels, as it had happened to Donald Reid. In this area, Balaguer demonstrated the same deal of astuteness that has been his greatest asset as a politician. It must remain clear that in Dominicana orders are only obeyed during those times when nothing else can be done about them if one disapproves, and the President was keenly aware of this fact. Thus he proceeded to reorganize the military into his own favor, always making it more difficult for a coup to occur against him.

In a general sense, the key to prevent a coup, or to carry out one, is to have a greater control of force than the opposite side.

---

<sup>1</sup> Cited in Norman Gall, "Struggle in Santo Domingo," The New Leader, Vol. L, No. 1 (January 2, 1967), p. 3.

Ideally, the President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, followed in hierarchy by the Secretary of State for the Armed Forces, then the Undersecretaries and Chiefs of Staff for the three services, eventually to the officers according to rank, and finally to the non-commissioned officers and the rank and file.<sup>1</sup> In reality, the commander of each military camp or garrison is his own man, for it is he that has troops under his direct control. Soldiers obey their commander because it is he that is in a position to grant them favors or arbitrary punishment. Therefore, loyalty moves to the direct commander, and in turn, the commanders' loyalty is sought by higher officers, with promises of rewards or subtle threats of arbitrary punishment. These punishments may include distasteful assignments, such as being sent to the frontier area where there are no major cities, cancellation from the military, removal from position of control of troops, bypassing them at the times of promotions, scheduled or not, or, in case of a serious threat, jail, exile, and, rarely, assassination.

Not all commanders have equal shares of power, even assuming for the moment that they have equal control of the number of men. Personality plays a great role in developing a particular officer into a local caudillo by the amount of favors he can secure for his men or the

---

<sup>1</sup>For the organization of the Dominican Armed Forces, see T. D. Roberts, et al., Area Handbook for the Dominican Republic (Washington: DA Pam No. 550-54, United States Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 392-410.



severity of the punishments that he inflicts. Non-political, or only semi-political officers, do not get the ear of the higher officers who are in a position to dispense him with greater deal of military hardware or better housing for officers and men. To be located near the major cities, particularly Santo Domingo, gives the commander more political pull by being closer to the locus of power than those isolated in distant and rural areas. The more blatantly an officer defends the political positions of his superiors, the more is he to be rewarded from above, and, of course, vice versa. Furthermore, personal ties of friendship, family, or sometimes, but seldom, ideology, gives a particular officer a power base far superior to others of similar rank or position.

Formally, the Dominican Armed Forces are divided into the three traditional services, Army, Navy, and Air Force, but the National Police is as much a part of the military as any of the other three, even though they come formally under the Secretary of State for Interior and Police. Although theoretically they basically exist to defend the Fatherland in case of war, the last one of which was fought against Spain in the 1860's, a whole century before, their time is spent in political squabbles against each other or sometimes against the population in general, and these political affairs the police are always included. Far from being a professional organization, "the Dominican Armed Forces have never had any significant function beyond politics,

except for plunder."<sup>1</sup> However, the different services do receive different types of hardware, like airplanes for the Air Force and ships for the Navy, which do have different political applications.

An airplane is very good to bomb something with, or even better, to threaten to do so, but airplanes can not take the National Palace, communications centers, or a military garrison. Ground troops are needed to carry on the basic steps of a coup, the actual physical takeover of a nation, very much in the same manner as if it were a foreign conquest. The same limitation is involved for the Navy, for they can always shell near to shore cities or installations, but they can not physically take them over. In other words, no coup can be carried out by the Navy or Air Force or both unless they have the support or neutrality of the Army and the National Police. Total manpower strength, even assuming that each man would be physically opposing another man of a different service, reflects this reality. From close to 30,000 in total, the Navy has 3,603 men; Air Force, 3,872; Army, 11,036; and Police, 9,617.<sup>2</sup>

Now, firepower does establish the difference between the Army and the Police, the latter enjoying far less equipment and training per

<sup>1</sup>Abraham F. Lowenthal, "The Dominican Republic: The Politics of Chaos," in Arpad Von Lazar and Robert R. Kaufman (eds.), Reform and Revolution: Readings in Latin American Politics (New York: Allyn & Bacon, 1969), p. 40.

<sup>2</sup>El Caribe, December 28, 1967, pp. 1, 10.

man, while the former has tanks, cannons, assault-cars, mortars, more heavy-caliber machine guns, and other equipment in addition. It all comes down to that in terms of usable force, the real power lies in the Army. Yet, even within the Army there are differences to be established, and here is where President Balaguer made his mark while the Inter-American Peace Force was still present in Dominicana.

As it may be recalled, Wessin's power base lay in his control of CEFA, which had tanks, artillery, equipment, elite troops, and autonomous status. To get rid of Wessin, the Training Center had its autonomous status taken away in the Institutional Act establishing the García-Godoy Government, and when Balaguer took office, it was safely under the jurisdiction of the Army, now under the loyal Osiris Perdomo. The Army itself had been reorganized into four brigades, each with jurisdiction over a geographical area, old CEFA becoming the Fourth Brigade, based in San Isidro, and in charge of the eastern part of Dominicana. The Third Brigade, based in San Juan de la Maguana, has jurisdiction in the western part, covering the frontier area. The Second Brigade covers the north and the center based in Santiago, the heart of the important Cibao region. Finally, the first Brigade, based in the outskirts of Santo Domingo, with jurisdiction over the south-central area and, more important, the capital, the nerve center of the nation and the seat of the government. Politically, this is the key brigade, for it is over it that troops have to march to take over the government,

or, if they wish to do so, they are there already.

Balaguer's move was to transfer what used to be Wessin's firepower to the First Brigade, now making it even more powerful than before, since it already was the largest in numbers and with attached "Transportation, Support, Communications, Medical, and Reconnaissance companies, and six assigned batallions, three of which are regular infantry, and one each is mountain infantry, engineer, and transportation."<sup>1</sup> The other brigades were limited to three infantry batallions each and a great deal less firepower. Besides, United States Marine Colonel Henry Van Joslin, Commander of MAAG, and 13 North American Lieutenants were assigned to the First Brigade for a three-year period to make it the Dominican Armed Forces elite unit.<sup>2</sup>

The concentration of military power into one unit has its obvious implications. If one controls the First Brigade, one controls the military, and if one controls the military, one controls the nation. At the very least, control of this elite unit meant that no coup could occur, but this did not bar the possibilities of a pronunciamiento in other military quarters, nor the collusion of all the others against the First Brigade, in which case it would probably come to terms with the rest of

---

<sup>1</sup>Roberts, op. cit., p. 395.

<sup>2</sup>The Washington Post, November 3, 1966.

armed forces. The loyalty of the First Brigade becomes an element of absolute priority for the Dominican government, for if they cease to be loyal a coup may occur by their neutrality or by their own opposition. This means that the choice of commander has to be an officer of absolutely proven loyalty and who in turn can command the loyalty of the officers and men under him.

The man chosen for this important position was Colonel Neit Rafael Nivar Seijas, one of the leaders of the San Cristóbal clan. The officer had been in the Rodríguez Echavarría two-day junta in 1962, remained in permanent contact with the then ex-president Balaguer, participated in the Bosch coup, and conspired permanently against the Triumvirate on Balaguer's behalf until exiled by Donald Reid a few days prior to the April Revolution. The ex-president joined him in Puerto Rico, and both of them returned together on June 28, 1965. Since then, Nivar Seijas guarded and protected Balaguer throughout the electoral campaign and after, which included being head of the Presidential Guard. To this day the Colonel remains as the commander of the First Brigade, which in effect makes him the most powerful military officer in Dominicana even if there are others of higher ranks and there is formal hierarchy.

The survival of the Constitutional Government elected in 1966 depended on the loyalty of this elite unit and its commander, and that

loyalty was not to any abstract or legal principle, but to the person of Joaquín Balaguer. In turn, the officers and men under Nivar Seijas were directly loyal to their commander and only derivately to the President, although they may be sympathetic to his person and his policies.

With Balaguer, the San Cristóbal clan had returned to its pre-eminent position within the military, which had been lost with the previous fall of this man and the rise of the Consejo de Estado and the Wessin clique. The Imbert group had been "on top" only for a very short while, and it was now in decadence and disintegration with the return of San Cristóbal to power. At best, the Constitutionalists had been preeminent for the three or four days prior to the United States Marines' arrival, but now they were without troops, dismissed or in "glorious" exile. Only the Wessin clique retained some strength, but they were slowly being dismissed from the Armed Forces or co-opted into loyalty to Balaguer. Even Colonel Bartolomé Benoit, the former junta-head who formalized in writing the request for North American troops, was retired.<sup>1</sup> Rivera Caminero returned from Washington but

---

<sup>1</sup>From Miami, Wessin protested this cancellation as well as that of the following officers: Lieutenant Colonels Martínez Polanco, Tati Núñez, Granpolver Medina, and Pimentel Eusebio; Major Fernández Collado; Captain Holguín; Lieutenants Afromano, Wagner, Pimentel, and Frank Romero. Listín Diario, April 25, 1968, pp. 1, 4.

was given no command of troops; he was made naval advisor to the President, a post with no influence.

Although Nivar Seijas was the most powerful, Balaguer also depended on the loyalty of other officers who would be used in different assignments. The most noted of these were men such as Manuel de Jesús Checo, Santos Mélido Marte, Braulio Álvarez Sánchez, Osiris Perdomo, and Ney Tejada Álvarez. For example, General Mélido Marte was in charge of the President's personal intelligence unit, keeping track of conspiracies within and without the armed forces and acting as a secret political police. Marte had been a trusted aide of the Generalissimo, living in exile until the return of Balaguer. His son, Mélido Marte Jr., (Cuqui) was an officer in the President's escort.

Another officer, Colonel Braulio Sánchez, had been "exiled" in a diplomatic post by Donald Reid. The President brought him back from Spain to place him in charge of the Fourth Brigade, the converted CEFA. From here he became Chief of Police, to replace Colonel Ney Tejada Álvarez, who in turn was sent to command the Santiago Air Force Base, but when not accepted, he was named Special Assistant to the President and created a parallel intelligence unit to that of Mélido Marte. Eventually, Braulio Álvarez was dismissed from the Police and passed on to be Military Advisor of the President. His son, Pedro

Braulio Álvarez, was also an officer in the President's escort. Tejada's intelligence outfit was later publicly dismantled and the Colonel sent as Ambassador to Nicaragua, apparently other officers had become resentful of him.<sup>1</sup> His son, a Lieutenant, left with him as First Secretary of the Dominican Embassy in Managua. About a week later, Tejada returned briefly to Santo Domingo for the wedding of a daughter: the "godfather" was none other than Joaquín Balaguer.<sup>2</sup>

In spite of the fact that the President had loyal men as commanders in most places, that he continually promoted officers and gave them decorations, for example, 689 officers were decorated on January 5, 1968, there still were conspiracy rumors all the time. Sometimes they were true and sometimes not, but it is difficult to know which is which. At times, the President himself would publicly recognize the existence of a conspiracy, like in February 1968,<sup>3</sup> but unless a person

---

<sup>1</sup>It is not as yet known exactly what happened. Publicly he was dismissed for being involved in an arms contraband supposedly for conspiratorial purposes. See "La Destitución de Tejada Alvarez," Ahora, No. 271 (20 Enero 1969), p. 9.

<sup>2</sup>In Hispanic cultures, the godfather, padrino, of a wedding is closely equivalent to the Anglo-Saxon "best-man."

<sup>3</sup>Balaguer said he was facing a conspiracy from the same forces that carried out the coup of 1963. El Caribe, February 5, 1968, p. 1. On another occasion, the President was asked by reporters whether there was a conspiracy afoot, and he replied that he did not doubt it, for in Dominicana "people have lived in conspiracies from 1844 until the present day." Listin Diario, June 27, 1968, p. 1. The National Police confirmed that there had been one. "Conspiraciones Otra Vez," Ahora, No. 242 (1 Julio 1968), p. 8.



is involved directly in these affairs, there is no way of telling. However, no matter how many there were in the four years of Constitutional Government, Balaguer managed to survive them all. That was and remains a major achievement.

The President not only had the support of the military, but of the United States of America. The North American Embassy had become the second largest in Latin America, with nearly 900 employees, and additionally 128 members of the Peace Corps and a host of private welfare agencies. "United States advisors backstop the work of every government bureau, and the Balaguer Administration does not even try to hide its dependence on them."<sup>1</sup> Prior to the elections, Ambassador Tapley Bennett had been replaced by John H. Crimmins, formerly the officer in charge of Caribbean Affairs in the State Department. The size of the embassy and the importance of its head were significant of the interest the Johnson Administration had in Dominicana and the maintenance of its government.

In terms of economic aid, 132.2 million dollars had been made available to the Balaguer government from July 1966 to November 1968,<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Nicholas Raymond and Winthrop P. Carty, "Balaguer's Burden: The Trujillo Holdings," The Reporter, Vol. 37, No. 9 (November 30, 1967), p. 27.

<sup>2</sup>John Hugh Crimmins, Ambassador of the United States of America in the Dominican Republic, "Speech Before the American Chamber of Commerce" (Santo Domingo: mimeographed paper, November 1968), Table I, p. 17.

an average of close to \$7 million a month, a sum far above anything given to the Consejo, Bosch, or Reid. In addition, some \$25 million had been earned in special sugar purchases above the allotted 450,000 tons a year.<sup>1</sup> The immense role of the United States in the government was underscored by the fact that the Ambassador was a regular attendant to the weekly meetings of the National Development Commission, until Crimmins himself admitted that his participation there was unjustified.<sup>2</sup>

With the support of the Dominican military and the North Americans, the Constitutional Government survived. The fact that it was able to be there largely accounts for the many constructive works that are to its credit. In terms of economic infrastructure, Balaguer managed to begin the works on the Taveras Dam and the Valdesia Dam, which will provide water control and irrigation as well as hydroelectric power. A great deal of public housing has been built, which was badly needed, but so were many facade ornamentations and fancy avenues, such as one named Winston Churchill in Santo Domingo, which were not. Yet, the fact was that construction provided expenditures in the economy as well as employment.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Listín Diario, June 26, 1968, p. 1. He did add, however, that his role had been as an observer.

The national economy indicated a general level of improvement, such as an increasing rate of production and lesser balance of payments deficits,<sup>1</sup> but the greatest credit of the Balaguer government has been to reduce the production costs of the state sugar enterprises from about 8¢ a pound to 5¢. This, of course, was at the price of laying off more than 5,000 workers, and still Dominican sugar costs were above the world market price, just below 3¢ a pound.<sup>2</sup> Thanks to the United States sugar purchase, it was possible for these state enterprises to stop losing money, but at the same time, it further increased the dependence of the Dominican economy on the workings of the North American sugar quota. However, the Constitutional Government has been strenuously working to obtain a permanent quota of 700,000 tons, which in effect would practically cover the total sugar exports of the nation.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, the foreign debt of the nation had gone up to \$222.2 million at the end of 1967, compared to \$14.2 million in 1961, payments for which had to be made to the tune of \$39 million in 1969.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>El Caribe, January 31, 1969, pp. 8-9.

<sup>2</sup>Raymond and Carty, op. cit., p. 26.

<sup>3</sup>As the Governor of the Central Bank, Diógenes Fernández put it: if the country sells 700,000 tons of sugar in the world market it would obtain 46 million dollars, while the same amount in the U. S. market would obtain \$90 million, practically twice the benefit. El Caribe, January 31, 1969.

<sup>4</sup>El Nacional, October 11, 1969, p. 1.

Soon after having come to power, the Balaguer government embarked its Congress in the promulgation of a Constitution largely similar to that of 1962. It was proclaimed on November 28, 1966,<sup>1</sup> and it contained no social advancement over the Bosch Constitution, but on the contrary, it was less concerned with the socio-economic functions of the state and, significantly, it did not forbid presidential re-election. On the other hand, there was no mention of the 1954 Concordat with the Vatican, a matter which had brought Bosch a great deal of stress with the Church, and Articles 93 and 94, dealing with the armed forces, were exactly the same as those of the 1963 Constitution.

In terms of the government itself, Balaguer had one of the most complex arrangements probably in all of Latin America.<sup>2</sup> There were 14 regular Secretaries of State with specific functions, such as Foreign Relations, Agriculture, or Armed Forces, but then there were an unspecified changeable number of Secretaries of State without Portfolio, which ranged from just an important personality, like Luis Amiama, a political supporter, like Miguel Angel Jiménez (Cuchico),

---

<sup>1</sup> Constitución de la República Dominicana, Gaceta Oficial No. 9014 (Santo Domingo: November 29, 1966).

<sup>2</sup> For the organization of the Constitutional Government of 1966-1970, see Presidencia de la República, Secretariado Técnico, Oficina de Administración y Personal (ONAP), Manual de Organización del Gobierno (Santo Domingo: 1969).

or the Director of Tourism, former PRD leader Angel Miolán. Then there were numbers of Special Advisors to the President, without specific functions except in name, and a large number of Undersecretaries of State, some with specific functions and some without. The most extreme case was the Ministry of Agriculture with 17 Undersecretaries of which only 3 had specific functions to deal with.<sup>1</sup>

Many of these men were efficient and dedicated public functionaries, with and without specific functions, whose aim was to move the government bureaucracy in the interest of serving the public and the President's policies, but many were there just to collect a pay check once a month and to use the prestige of their position in their own personal interest and/or the particular political interest of the governing party and of their leaders. The strategy seems to have been to co-opt many former opponents into government support, as well as to benefit supporters and their friends, all at public expense. In 1968 there were close to 68,000 people drawing a paycheck from the government, this is not including the so-called autonomous state enterprises, and if we subtract the number of men in the armed forces and police, it still remains close to 40,000 public employees.<sup>2</sup> This mammoth

<sup>1</sup>The Undersecretaries with specific functions are those for Production and Marketing, Natural Resources, and Research and Extension. *Ibid.*, p. B-10-1-2.

<sup>2</sup>*El Caribe*, December 28, 1967, pp. 1, 10.

bureaucracy meant that about one percent of the total population was a government employee, a fantastic windfall in the spoils system and the "voluntary" two percent of the salary for the PR, and all of this dependent on the will of one man, the President.

In addition, there were at least 16 out of 20 decentralized organisms of the State, which, in spite of the title, were actually run by President Balaguer in different forms or arrangements.<sup>1</sup> For instance, the State Sugar Council (CEA), in charge of administering 12 of the nation's 16 sugar mills,<sup>2</sup> has a Governing Council of 11 members, 4 of which are indirectly appointed and 7 directly, including even the labor representatives!<sup>3</sup> The Dominican Corporation of State

<sup>1</sup>See, Manual de Organización . . ., *op. cit.*, pp. C. 1. 1. 1-- C. 20. 1. 7. The most independent of all is the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo (UASD).

<sup>2</sup>Secretaría Técnica de la Presidencia, Oficina Nacional de Planificación, Plataforma Para el Desarrollo Económico y Social de la República Dominicana, 1968-1985 (Santo Domingo: 1968), Chart No. 5, p. 200. They account for about two thirds of the total sugar production in Dominicana.

<sup>3</sup>To be more specific, the Council of the CEA has as members: 1) the Secretary of State for Finance, who presides; 2) the Secretary of State for Agriculture, who is the vice-president; 3) the Executive Director of the Sugar Mills, who is the secretary and directly appointed by the President of the Republic; 4) the Governor of the Central Bank, who is appointed to that position by the President; 5) the Executive Director General of the Dominican Sugar Institute, who is appointed to that position by the President; 6) a representative of those who sell sugar cane to the mills (*colonos*) chosen by the President; 7) two labor representatives, one from the fields and one from the factory, both chosen by the President; 8) and three more members freely chosen by the President. Result: everyone was chosen by the President. They are directly

Enterprises (CORDE), which owns, controls, or has an interest in 46 different enterprises for a capital investment of almost \$46 million,<sup>1</sup> has a directing board of five members, one appointed directly and four indirectly. The Dominican Electricity Corporation has all the seven members of the Council of Directors appointed directly by the President of the Republic. Other organisms range in diversity from four State banks, Central, Reserve, Agricultural, and Housing, to a national institute of hydraulic resources (INDRHI), and the Dominican Red Cross.

President Balaguer runs this entire operation which affects every area of the nation in an extremely personalistic fashion. Actually, decisions seem to be taken by a group of chosen advisors and then implemented throughout the regular bureaucracy and the state

---

responsible to him in order to keep their positions, which in effect means that they will do what he wants. See, Manual de Organización, op. cit., p. C. 4. 1. 1.

<sup>1</sup>Plataforma Para el Desarrollo . . ., op. cit., Chart 1-d, p. 555. CORDE directly owns seven industrial and one mining enterprise for an investment of \$8,837,151.54 pesos; it has a majority interest (control) of eleven industrial and eight commercial enterprises for an investment of \$29,680,050; it has indirect majority interest in two industrial and one commercial enterprise for an investment of \$267,900; and it has minority interest in nine industrial, five commercial, one recreational, and one mining enterprise for an investment of \$7,080,120. They deal with things ranging from cotton and peanut oil production, salt mines, insurance company, hardware store, to a country club. See charts 1-a-b-c, pp. 552-554.

organisms. Most influential, apparently, are José A. Quezada, the Administrative Secretary of the Presidency, and Luis Julián Pérez of the National Development Commission. The latter Commission, which included a number of figures from the industrial, commercial, and land-owning groups, seemed to be generally responsible for the overall policy planning in Dominicana in the socio-economic sphere. The political problems were apparently in the concern of private advisors, such as Virgilio Álvarez Pina (Don Cucho), a long-time Trujillo associate and the father of General Braulio Álvarez Sánchez. In the military realm, the closest advisors seem to have been Mélido Marte, Neit Nivar Seijas, and Manuel de Jesús Checo. In any case, Balaguer was a man known for making his own decisions while keeping an open ear to all possible advice, including that of those who oppose him.

In traditional caudillistic fashion, the Chief Executive practically has unlimited power to do as he wishes in Dominicana. Even from the legal point of view, the constitutional limitations on presidential power are not great. "They are derived chiefly from several provisions that require him to obtain Congressional consent in making certain appointments, exercising emergency powers, negotiating treaties, and entering into certain contracts."<sup>1</sup> The fact that Balaguer

<sup>1</sup>Howard J. Wiarda, The Dominican Republic: Nation in Transition (New York: Frederick a Praeger, Publishers, 1969) p. 159.



had an enormous majority in both houses of Congress, men who in the first place had been elected thanks to the President's ability to get votes, rendered those limitations nil. In fact, only once did the Senate reject an Executive bill,<sup>1</sup> and a year before the 1970 elections, both houses in separate resolutions passed the same day, asked Balaguer to run for reelection.<sup>2</sup>

With the maintenance of the caudillistic political system there was little else to be expected. On several occasions, the President cynically referred to the Constitution as being only a piece of paper, presumably the legal basis of his rule, and once even publicly admitted having violated it, in none other than the sensitive area of freedom of expression.<sup>3</sup> The problem arose with the showing of the film The Comedians, based on the novel by Graham Greene and severely critical of the Francois Duvalier dictatorship. The reason why it was not shown, Balaguer said, was "because I do not want friction with the

---

<sup>1</sup>El Caribe, December 5, 1968, p. 1. The President had vetoed a bill allowing the establishment of "one-armed bandits," and the Senate overrode the veto.

<sup>2</sup>El Caribe, May 21, 1969, pp. 1, 12. The resolutions were passed with the presence of only one member from the opposition in the Chamber of Deputies, none in the Senate.

<sup>3</sup>El Caribe, July 2, 1968, pp. 1, 10.

Haitian government."<sup>1</sup> Needless to say that the faithful Commission on Public Spectacles, the Congress, or the Judiciary did not say anything on the matter.

The leadership of President Balaguer depended on his ability to manipulate the caudillistic political system. He was not a caudillo himself, for he did not have any appealing qualities of machismo, nor was he in control of the armed forces as Santana or Lili's had been. However, Balaguer did possess the extreme cunning to hang on in power and make everyone dependent on him, on his person. Cabinet members would be moved around incessantly, always rumors of crack-downs in the personnel at this or that ministry, the President appearing permanently on the public media doing something as a special concession on his part, or inaugurating some new industry, or photographed with the entire military hierarchy. A less capable figure would not have been able to survive, but the strengthening of caudillo politics further destroyed the democratic legitimacy that he might once have enjoyed.

Besides the support Balaguer enjoyed from the United States and the military, which does not necessarily mean that they always agreed with him, the President generally had the support of the traditional

---

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. There had already been some friction with Duvalier on account of Balaguer having closed the national frontier, presumably to prevent contraband.

groups in Dominicana; the oligarchy and the Church. The former group was practically unconditional, save those who opposed him on personal or political reasons, as demonstrated by paid political advertisements by the National Council of Businessmen, the Industrial Association of the Dominican Republic, the Employers Confederation of the Dominican Republic, and the Chamber of Commerce, Agriculture, and Industry of the National District, in support of the Constitutional government.<sup>1</sup> The Secretary of Labor addressed the workers on Labor Day in terms indicative that the Government was well aware of that support: "The employer is the motor that pushes the idea with his money and the worker is the muscle that makes it a reality; that is why the employer ought to be your best ally. . . . Do not permit that demagogic chants, foreign to your class and your interest, throw you to claim unreasonable rights, nor to use other means than those pointed out in the legal instrument that rules labor relations."<sup>2</sup> Generally, worker strikes were repressed, outdoor labor rallies were forbidden, and at least on one occasion, members of the armed forces and the police attacked a syndicate headquarters.<sup>3</sup>

Matters with the Church were not as smooth. Although generally the hierachy supported the government, they were more flexible than

<sup>1</sup> El Caribe, October 18, 1968, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> El Caribe, May 2, 1968, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> El Caribe, November 13, 1968, p. 1.

before in allowing clergy members to make pronouncements against the existing socio-economic status quo. The Church hierarchy even came to the fore in a Pastoral Letter on the matter of private property, which they defended as a sacred right, but "if sacred is the right to property, more sacred is, if it is possible to say it this way, the right to live."<sup>1</sup> The Dominican Episcopate condemned the high level of social inequality, the fact that a few lived in luxury while the majority lived in poverty, and they added that the Church was not going to exist for only one class of Dominicans, but for all.<sup>2</sup> Eventually matters came to a head with the government prohibiting the re-entry of two priests who had gone to Puerto Rico, apparently a measuring of forces, until the government allowed them back and the Church hierarchy ceased to be as militant.<sup>3</sup> However, the young clergy was on the offensive, not only against the government, but the existing social order as well.

---

<sup>1</sup> El Caribe, February 5, 1968, p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> In general, the Latin American clergy were taking more avant guard positions with respect to the socio-economic and political conditions in their respective countries. As an example, see Sergio Figueredo, "Medellín-Santo Domingo: Eje Peligroso?" Ahora, No. 307 (29 Septiembre 1969), pp. 14-16, 77. On the other hand, Pope Paul IV, prior to his Latin American visit, rejected violence as a means for change, which in effect took issue with the rebellious priests, such as Camilo Torres, who advocated guerrilla warfare as the only solution. El Caribe, August 22, 1968, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> The two priests, Sergio Figueredo and Gratiano Varona, were not Dominican nationals, but both had been making pronouncements in favor of peasants and against the landowners. After several

The most militant were neither the peasants nor the workers, but the students. The workers limited their demands to labor problems, such as when ten labor federations asked for the immediate end of the austerity program which froze salary increases while the cost of living rose steeply,<sup>1</sup> but only occasionally were there disturbances. On the other hand, the students were in a permanent assault of protests against government repression and terrorism, and needless to say that many were the times in which members of the armed forces and national police attacked the schools and jailed the students. On one occasion, only a week after having assaulted a secondary school in Santiago, the police broke with tear gas and arrests a sports event of the three universities and the only junior college in the nation, and the Vice-Rector of one of the universities, who also happened to be a priest, was slapped in the face by a police officer in front of reporters and television cameras. Asked about the incident, the President said, "It was not an error. It was a stupidity."<sup>2</sup>

proposals, such as the transfer of the priests from their regular posts, and the Church's intransigency as well as public statements and a wave of public protests, the government capitulated. See, "Prohiben Entrada a Sacerdotes," Ahora, No. 293 (23 Junio 1969), pp. 73, 77; "La Iglesia y el Gobierno," Ahora, No. 294 (30 Junio 1969), pp. 4-5; and "El Presidente y el Nuncio," Ahora, No. 298 (28 Julio 1969), pp. 3-4.

<sup>1</sup>El Caribe, August 26, 1968, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup>"La Destitución del Jefe de la Policía Nacional," Ahora, No. 285 (28 Abril 1969), p. 5. The incident cost General Braulio Álvarez his post as Chief of Police.

A wave of terrorism was present in the years of the Constitutional Government, taking a toll of over 350 lives from 1966 to 1969.<sup>1</sup> Most of these were directed against populist groups, particularly the young men of the lower income brackets, but some of the victims were men in military uniform. Some of the most notorious cases, none of which has yet been solved, were the death of newspaperman Guido Gil, the machine-gun wounding of General Antonio Imbert, the disappearance of MPD leader Henry Segarra, and the burning with a phosphorous bomb of PRD Senator Casimiro Castro.<sup>2</sup> Balaguer recognized the existence of "incontrollable" forces within the military, but added that he did not know who they were. When a dismissed Air Force officer of the Wessin clique offered to name the ten top leaders, Balaguer quickly said that he knew who the "incontrollables" were, but could not

---

<sup>1</sup> Although with an obvious political intent, the Committee of Mothers, Wives, and Relatives of the Dead and Disappeared published a paid ad in the newspapers with the names of those who had died or disappeared through apparent political violence. El Caribe, November 25, 1969, p. 18. About ten of the presumed disappeared later appeared.

<sup>2</sup> An intelligence officer went into exile at the Mexican Embassy until taken out of the country. Ciriano Castro Fañas declared to the press before his departure that: 1) Máximo Fiallo, appointed Dominican Consul in New Orleans, had been responsible for the acts of terrorism against Constitutionlists; 2) Guido Gil had presumably been murdered in La Romana and he placed the responsibility on Colonel Tadeo Guerrero; and 3) the murder attempt against Imbert was done by two Cubans who received \$100,000 from Ramfis Trujillo, but also connected with the case were a Haitian Deputy and Colonel Neit Nivar Seijas. "Las Revelaciones de Castro Fañas," Ahora, No. 276 (24 Febrero 1969), p. 5.

prosecute them for lack of evidence, as it happens to the North American government with the Mafia leaders.<sup>1</sup>

There was relative freedom in Dominicana, and, for instance the press and the radio could be critical of governmental action, but there was a high degree of personal insecurity due to the unending presence of political violence. Reporters were occasionally beaten, cameras broken; opposition groups were free to talk, but they could not hold open rallies, nor were they absolutely free from police harassment, including arrests, and particularly the MPD, the only Communist group which decided to leave the city and the Autonomous University campus to go and work with the peasants, were permanently persecuted and many times killed.

The orgy of violence reflected the same pattern of societal breakdown that had occurred during the abortive revolution of 1965. First, the generational breakdown, with the young in a relentless opposition to the existing status quo forces, and being the overwhelming majority of the victims. Second, the social group breakdown, with those in the lower classes in opposition to the existing order, and also the overwhelming majority of the victims. The old and the rich were not necessarily in agreement with what was happening, but neither were

---

<sup>1</sup>"Las Fuerzas Incontrolables," Ahora, No. 282 (7 Abril 1969), p. 2.

they the victims of persecution, and they condoned the occurrences with their silence. Furthermore, the higher frequency of violence seemed to occur particularly in Santo Domingo, followed by some of the larger cities, and only very seldom in the smaller towns and villages, which, in effect, is another indication that it was being directed against the politically active and up-coming groups, the populists.

President Balaguer put the blame for the wave of violence as a consequence of the events of 1965, and thus he seemed to interpret the problem more as an effort to overthrow him than as a systemic breakdown. For instance, after one of the police raids into a secondary school in which a dedicated teacher, non-political, was killed, he called for a purge in the National Police. He said:

Within that institution [the Police] there seem to remain elements that respond to other interests; to interests foreign to those of the Government and contrary to those of a corps that has been created to safeguard order and to guarantee the correct exercise of human rights. There are evidences that some political cliques, those who have not yet changed their military mentality for another that is fundamentally civilian, have infiltrated the Police with agents that act as instruments of inconfesable designs. Without doubt, the purpose is to create the sensation in the citizenry that there are not sufficient guarantees in the country, and that anew it is needed the hand of a warden to impose order on everyone like a straight jacket.<sup>1</sup>

Certainly, many of the acts of violence were an effort to disrepute the government, to make it look "weak," unable to control the

<sup>1</sup> El Caribe, October 29, 1969, p. 16.



means of violence, and therefore bring about its overthrow. However, some of the violence also came as a result of feuds within the conservative or populist camps, in the former particularly in the military cliques and in the latter particularly in the Communist factions, but, nevertheless, most of the violence came from the conservative camp and directed against the populist groups.

A military coup was in the interest of all who opposed the rule of Joaquín Balaguer. Within the conservative coalition, the President was a stumbling block in the way of the politically ambitious, for, according to the rules of the caudillistic system, he would stay in control until brought down. For others, Balaguer was not effective in preventing another populist challenge; for some because he was too weak, not like Trujillo, and for others because he was not making any minor reforms which would serve as appeasement. Within the populist camp, the fall of Balaguer would have signified the total breakdown of institutional procedures, further weakening the forces sustaining the status quo, and therefore opening the possibility for revolutionary action.

An example of the many times the Government and opposition groups, both from the conservative and populist camps, were locked in violent incidents as a measure of strength, was the transportation workers strike of August 1969. The opposition would try to provoke the

fall of the government, and Balaguer would try to prevent it.

On August 15, 1969, the National Union of Independent Syndicalized Drivers (UNACHOSIN) announced a strike for the forthcoming August 27th unless a series of demands were met.<sup>1</sup> Some of the demands were specific and they had already been agreed to by the President the year before as a settlement to a strike by the same labor union, but they had not been implemented. These included a drop of two cents per gallon in the price of gasoline, no import taxes on 900 automobiles for UNACHOSIN members, and the fixing of a maximum number of 3,200 taxicabs for the city of Santo Domingo. Other demands were of a general nature, such as the repair of streets and roads, an end to the terrorism of the "incontrolables," and an end to the Austerity Law, one of the first enactments of the regime.

In the days following the UNACHOSIN announcement, Balaguer supporters and government figures denounced the projected strike as politically motivated. Paid political advertisements appeared in the newspapers from such organizations as the Chamber of Commerce, the Industrial Association, and even from the supposedly autonomous State Sugar Council (CEA). A smaller rival union, the Revolutionary Front of Democratic and Progressive Drivers (the Front), denounced

---

<sup>1</sup>El Nacional, August 26, 1969, p. 7.

the strike as an effort to overthrow the government,<sup>1</sup> which, of course, was denied by UNACHOSIN. However, support for the strike came only from anti-government sources, such as the Dominican Federation of Students (FED), other labor syndicates, such as FOUPSA-CESISTRADO, and non-Marxist political parties, which expressed their sympathy while making clear, at least publicly, that they were opposed to using the strike as an effort to overthrow the government. The Marxist groups, such as the MPD, just declared their support for the strike.

Four days before it was supposed to begin, Balaguer began to make his moves. The Secretary of Labor, Polibio Díaz, declared the strike illegal, for it was not only in transportation but it was political. Next, based on this declaration, the President signed his decree No. 4044 declaring a state of emergency.<sup>2</sup> Balaguer gave himself the power to assume control of national transportation, to close down radio stations that cooperated or made "false" reports, and he made it legal for the forces of "public order" to enter the headquarters of any

---

<sup>1</sup>The leadership of UNACHOSIN was basically composed of PRD sympathizers, and the leadership of the opposing Revolutionary Front of Democratic and Progressive Drivers was composed of sympathizers of Balaguer and his reelection. "Huelga: Evaluación del Conflicto," Ahora, No. 304 (8 Septiembre 1969), pp. 3-4.

<sup>2</sup>El Caribe, August 25, 1969, pp. 2-A, 14.

institution that cooperated with the strike. By noon of that same day, Saturday, August 23rd, the police broke into UNACHOSIN's headquarters and arrested some thirty members who were present.

On Sunday, the Secretary of State for the Armed Forces, Major General Enrique Pérez y Pérez, declared that the coup d'etat had been buried forever in Dominicana, and that it remained "only as a dream of the opposition to the Government, although I should not say expressions that belong to the politicians."<sup>1</sup> As the arrests continued, the Santiago members of UNACHOSIN declared that they were not going to strike, because it was of a political nature and because they had reached an agreement with President Balaguer. On Monday, four radio stations suspended their news programs in fear of being closed down, while the PRD and PRSC were critical of the emergency law. The Secretary-General of the Autonomous Confederation of Christian Syndicates (CASC), Henry Molina, called the Emergency Decree a monstrosity, an "abuse to the elemental liberty of the people and in particular to syndical liberty."<sup>2</sup> On Tuesday, members of the armed forces and the police began to patrol the Capital, occupying the headquarters of the dock-workers union (POASI), and making some arrests. That night, the President went on nation-wide radio and television and asked peasants not to pay attention to the agitators of the MPD who wanted to lead

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> El Nacional, August 25, 1969, pp. 1, 5.

them to violence, and that in face of the strike, "the government will act with all the necessary energy, without omitting any measure, to crush it from its beginnings." <sup>1</sup> On the 27th of August, Wednesday morning, the strike began.

It was to last exactly 72 hours, leaving a balance of 7 deaths, dozens of wounded, at least 200 arrested, many vehicles destroyed and burned, and one radio station closed down. Public vehicles were taken from private garages by the police, as well as many new automobiles were distributed without license, to be operated by "volunteer" veterans of the armed forces whom had previously been called to duty. <sup>2</sup> On Thursday the President denied rumors that the Chief of the Air Force, General Salvador Lluberes Montás (Chinino), had been removed from his post, yet on Friday two Lieutenant Colonels, Teófilo Ramón Romero Pumarol and Gildardo A. Pichardo Gautreaux, were suddenly sent as military attaches to the Dominican Embassies in Panama and Spain, respectively. <sup>3</sup> The day before, the Chief of the Armed Forces,

---

<sup>1</sup> El Caribe, August 27, 1969, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> The Director of the Department of Urban Transportation, Nelson Sánchez, declared that he did not know that unlicensed cars were circulating in the streets, but that he would investigate. When asked what measures he could take, he said that nothing more could be done except to appeal to the police department. El Nacional, August 27, 1969, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> The rumors on Friday had increased to include the removal of the Navy Chief and that Colonel Pedro Medrano Ubiera had been sent as Dominican representative in the Inter-American Defense Board in Washington. El Nacional, August 29, 1969, pp. 1, 8.

Pérez y Pérez, had declared that the military was monolithically united in their backing of the Civilian Power, and that once more he had manifested his "loyalty and unconditional support to the Government presided by Doctor Joaquín Balaguer."<sup>1</sup>

On Saturday morning the strike had ended in failure. The "voluntary" armed forces veterans and other drivers had put public transportation closely back to normal, and whatever were the expectations, a coup did not materialize. UNACHOSIN said the strike had demonstrated that the organization was "the legitimate and authentic representative of the drivers," but no word was mentioned as to the failure to obtain any of their demands.<sup>2</sup> The same day the President attended graduation ceremonies for 25 military officers, and he was duly photographed with the entire military high command. The speaker on the occasion was the Commander of the Artillery Battalion, attached to the First Brigade, none other than Colonel Manuel Antonio Cuervo Gómez, the officer who in 1961 had attacked with tanks a crowd at the headquarters of UCN in Independence Park. He said that his battalion was in vigilance, day and night, "to crush any unconstitutional push, coming from any extreme, that would tend to inculcate ideas contrary

---

<sup>1</sup> El Caribe, August 29, 1969, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> El Nacional, August 30, 1969, p. 3. Also in a paid advertisement (p. 4), the opposing drivers union claimed victory and that they were the legitimate driver's representatives.

to those which we today obey, or that would pretend to detour the tracks drawn in this period of peace and progress."<sup>1</sup> Santo Domingo was back to normal.

The political forces opposing President Balaguer became increasingly divided as time progressed from July 1966, only to be briefly united in the latter part of 1969 on the issue of reelection. The military leaders of the civil strife of 1965, General Elías Wessin y Wessin and Colonel Francisco Caamaño Deñó (Francis), were kept in exile but allowed to return in January 1969, the latter failing to do so since he had disappeared from his post in London and according to rumor was residing in Fidel Castro's Cuba. The leader of the PRD, Juan Bosch, had gone into self-exile in Spain and France shortly after his defeat at the polls. Héctor García-Godoy was sent to Washington as Dominican Ambassador, and the interim Constitutionalist President in April 1965, José Rafael Molina Ureña, had accepted the position of Dominican Ambassador to the United Nations in New York.

After originally deciding to play the role of "constructive opposition," the PRD decided to change its course after the younger "hot heads" rebelled in October of 1966, putting the party in an internal crisis which was never actually solved, but that gave the opportunity to the more radical leaders to gain control of the Executive

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

Committee.<sup>1</sup> They expelled those who had accepted positions in the Balaguer government, taking the party into a more radical course to the point that its declared main purpose was, in the words of its Secretary General, José Francisco Peña Gómez, "to make the revolution," not resting until the people are in power.<sup>2</sup>

The old formal ally of the populist revolution, the Social Christian PRSC, soon took a different road. Smaller than the PRD, to have gone on the same course would have been to continue as an appendage, which is what they had been since the Río Piedras Pact, and therefore they chose to stay on the policy of "constructive opposition," hoping to become the populist leaders by gaining the masses which were presumably going to be lost by the PRD in its radicalization.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See, "División en el PRD," Ahora, No. 155 (31 Octubre 1966), pp. 5, 75; "Ante la Convención del PRD: Se Levanta el Telón," Ahora, No. 155 (31 Octubre 1966), pp. 6-7; and "La Crisis del PRD," Ahora, No. 167 (23 Enero 1967), pp. 34-35, 45. It was Molina Ureña who had been elected as President of the Executive Committee in October, thanks largely to Bosch's influence who wanted an intermediary course, but Molina Ureña resigned when faced with internal opposition from the "hot heads." Ironically, his replacement, Manuel Fernández Mármol, was also a moderate but with less personal prestige, which made him a less powerful personality and more amenable to go with the majority in the Committee.

<sup>2</sup> El Caribe, January 15, 1969, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Caonabo Javier Castillo, "El PRSC y la Oposición Constructiva," Ahora, No. 172 (27 Febrero 1967), pp. 4-5, 75. He argues that any deviation from "constructive opposition," meant necessarily to fall directly or indirectly in the coup d'état or revolution. Caonabo Javier, who was the Secretary-General of the PRSC, also had some personal



The informal allies of April 1965, the Communist groups, became weaker and more divided than ever before, to the point that there were at least seven or eight groups, and with no grand strategy except publishing pamphlets and infiltrating other political organizations, particularly the PRD.<sup>1</sup> An exception was the MPD, which began to gain some strength under the leadership of Maximiliano Gómez (El Moreno), calling for revolutionary war and working with the peasants. Yet, it remained quite small, even if it probably was the largest of all the Communist groups, when compared with the Social Christians, needless to say with the PRD.

disagreement with Juan Bosch, a factor which may have been influential in the split. See, "Acercamiento Socialcristiano al Gobierno?" Ahora, No. 171 (20 Febrero 1967), pp. 4-5, 80; Juan Bosch, "Mensaje a la Juventud Dominicana," Ahora, No. 182 (8 Mayo 1967), pp. 13-16; and Caonabo Javier Castillo, "En Torno a un Mensaje . . . Respuesta a Juan Bosch," Ahora, No. 186 (2 Junio 1967), pp. 4-5, 78.

<sup>1</sup>The old Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) became the Partido Comunista Dominicano (PCD), and it remained as always; weak, small, and subservient to Moscow. The Movimiento Popular Dominicano (MPD) split, with Maximo López Molina forming the Partido Comunista Ortodoxo (PCO), and Pin Montás, a youth leader, forming the Partido Comunista de la República Dominicana (PACOREDO). The MPD became a mixture of Maoist and Castroite, gaining some strength in recent times to become the strongest of the Communist groups. The PACOREDO was Peking-oriented and active only in the Autonomous University Campus, while López Molina's group was practically non-existent. The old 14th of June Movement (1J4) lost part of its leadership to the MPD, such as Rafael Taveras (Fafa), suffered a split, with a Maoist group creating the Red Line of the 14th of June, and the party itself became practically extinct. Other groups were the Flavio Suero Committee or the Jacques Viaux Committee, but they were even smaller. For some of the divisions see, Floránel Cárdenas, "División Entre los Comunistas Dominicanos," Ahora, No. 194 (15 de Agosto, 1966), pp. 13-16, 60.

Instead of becoming smaller or ineffectual, the PRD remained at the helm of the populist movement and the strongest political force outside of the government. The more radical it became, the more it seemed to captivate the attention of Dominican youth, a very important matter in a nation in which nearly three-fourths of the population is under 30 years of age.<sup>1</sup> Even if he was in Europe, having resigned his position as president of the party and remaining presumably only as an advisor, Juan Bosch maintained the leadership. This was partly because of the caudillistic pattern of organization, the leader writing letters to the followers and party commissions going to Europe to see him, but also because Bosch had been the leader of populism and the ideological focus of Dominican politics. The North American invasion of 1965, the failure at the polls in 1966, and the increased demands of the masses, were in need of explanation in order for the PRD to leave its traditional membership of the so-called democratic left. Furthermore, a new mechanism had to be invented if representative democracy was no longer a viable alternative for Dominicana, considering also that the latter alternative had been captured by Balaguer, not Bosch.

---

<sup>1</sup>See Plataforma Para el Desarrollo . . ., op. cit., Table 3, p. 343.

The first problem to be analyzed, the locus of Dominican politics, was the United States. Bosch argued that the reason for the April 1965 invasion, as well as the war in Indo-China, was due to a new phenomenon called pentagonism, a substitute of traditional imperialism.<sup>1</sup> The North American colossus had entered into a stage of super-developed capitalism with a collusion of power in the military-industrial complex, which eroded traditional civilian democratic processes in favor of the interests of those who controlled the war machine. Bosch argues that, contrary to traditional imperialism, "pentagonism does not exploit colonies: it exploits its own people."<sup>2</sup> The reason lies in that thanks to technological development, there is no need to search for a place in which "to invest surplus capital with a profit; what is looked for is to have access to the large amount of economic resources that are mobilized in the industrial production for war; what is looked for are the profits to be obtained in the production of weapons, not where they are employed . . ."<sup>3</sup> War is no longer made to conquer colonial empires, but it is made to "conquer power

---

<sup>1</sup> Juan Bosch, El Pentagonismo: Sustituto del Imperialismo (Santo Domingo: Publicaciones Ahora, C. por A., 1967). The thesis was presented to the Third Latin American Conference of Political and Social Science held in the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo in November-December 1967.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

positions within the pentagonist nation, not in a faraway territory."<sup>1</sup>

From Bosch's point of view this explains why the United States invaded the Dominican Republic, although the case seems to be better suited for Indo-China, at least from the angle of the profits to be made not the power positions to be reaped. The erosion of the democratic process by the predominance of the military explains why the democratic revolution was suppressed by force, but it fails to explain why the troops were not kept in Dominicana wasting war material indefinitely, nor why the domestic armies in Latin America are maintained in power precisely to avoid the necessity of invasion.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, Bosch identifies clearly that the United States is opposed to revolutionary changes in the underdeveloped world, although the reasons are not clear, because it deems it as against its interests: revolutionary change for the United States "is the equivalent of a subversive war against North American order, and, in consequence, it is a war of aggression against the United States that ought to be responded with the military might of the nation, just as if it was an armed foreign invasion into the national territory."<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> See his explanation of pentagonism and Latin America, Ibid., pp. 41-46.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 36. He claims that this is the essence of the Johnson Doctrine.

The fact that pentagonism has established a dual authority, the civilian government and pentagonism itself, the armed forces of the United States being obedient to the latter, the Latin American armies in general "will obey the pentagonist power, not their national governments."<sup>1</sup> Since the former and the latter will oppose revolutionary change, disregarding the authority of civilian government, Bosch's argument leads to the conclusion that representative democracy ceased to be a viable alternative for the organization and development of Latin American societies. He then proceeds to analyze why they have already failed and proposes what he believes is the alternative, the Dictatorship with Popular Support.<sup>2</sup>

Latin American societies, and consequently Dominicana, have been organized according to the rules of the capitalist system, but they have failed to develop because the bourgeoisie was never in power, as it happened in Europe. Instead, they have been dominated by what Bosch calls the oligarchic front, which is composed of five sectors: (1) Latifundists; (2) export-import merchants; (3) banks, particularly Latin American; (4) sectors of the Petit Bourgeoisie; and (5) imperial-

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 45.

<sup>2</sup> Juan Bosch, El Próximo Paso: Dictadura Con Respaldo Popular (Santo Domingo: Imprenta Arte y Cine, 1970). The book first appeared in a series of 18 articles in the magazine Ahora, starting with No. 292 (16 Junio 1969) to No. 320 (29 December 1969).

ism, recently substituted by pentagonism.<sup>1</sup> He argues that these groups were never able to produce viable societies, as the state of Latin America in the world evidences, because "the position of each of the classes and each of the sectors which compose the oligarchic front in the social sphere and in their relationship to the means of production correspond to epochs which have been totally overtaken by modern economy and society."<sup>2</sup> Thus, in order to have viable societies that are stable, provide liberty, work, and justice, and are independent, the Dictatorship with Popular Support, which he argues is not the same as proletarian dictatorship,<sup>3</sup> is what is needed.

In the new form of government advocated by Bosch, there are some of the old goals from the French Revolution, liberty and equality for all, but also some of the newer ones, a guarantee of employment, health, and education for those who lack it.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, it would presumably prevent hunger, official terrorism, and the exploitation of men by his fellowmen, and it would insure national independence through the nationalization of foreign-owned companies with compensation. The Dictatorship with Popular Support would be poly-classist in nature, in

---

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., pp. 29-46.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 46.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., pp. 107-115.

<sup>4</sup> For what it is supposed to be, see Ibid., pp. 51-54.

the same tradition of the Latin American non-Communist revolutionary parties. However, latifundias would become peasant cooperatives, the former owners being compensated for the loss of their properties. All banks in the nation and all enterprises dealing in the export-import field would be nationalized, declared social property, and the owners compensated. These enterprises would then be run by those who already work there but with state supervision and profit-sharing. The owners of large enterprises not in the export-import field can continue to own and operate them, but in association with their workers. Small property owners would be untouched as long as the profits are not obtained through the exploitation of the work of others, otherwise they too would have to share. "No one will have his capital confiscated, but the investment of capital will be regulated by law,"<sup>1</sup> except for those who conspire against the Dictatorship, for in that case they would be prosecuted and their property confiscated.

The concept of the Dictatorship With Popular Support is obviously a mixture of different things. It is not anti-capitalist, perhaps moderately socialist, for it calls for a regulated capitalism, not communism. It would end the political power of the traditional oligarchy, confiscating the latifundias, the banks, the export-import enterprises, and regulating the others, but it does allow for the existence of an

---

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 53.

entrepreneurial class dedicated to industry and commerce. Perhaps they would no longer receive as much profits, but they could still keep their capital.

None of this is very different from the regular Latin American democracies, which presumably were instituting these reforms and generally have not. However, there are significant differences, the first one being the willingness to carry out the reforms itself. More important, that political representation would be organized in a corporatist basis, by organizations instead of parties, and that there is no word about organized opposition: a dictatorship is a dictatorship. Another difference is the state control of the export-import sector, reducing the influence of the metropolis, the United States, by having to deal directly with the government in the buying and selling of products, and eliminating the intermediaries who were the advocates of a colonialist mentality. There is no word, however, about the Church nor the military as groups, and presumably they would be left alone if loyal, or at least neutral, and persecuted if not.

Bosch does not explain how the new type of regime is going to gain power, which leaves the door open to all possibilities, including elections, but he calls for the formation of a Front of the Dictatorship with Popular Support.<sup>1</sup> Everyone is welcomed, but he says that they

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 189-205.



can not count with the oligarchy and bourgeoisie as groups, nor the upper sector of the petit bourgeoisie, which leaves as supporting groups the working classes and what he calls the middle and lower sectors of the petit bourgeoisie.<sup>1</sup> He does not explain either how the Front or the Dictatorship itself are going to be organized, nor, more important, how the popular control is going to be verified. It is easier to know that there is a dictatorship than to know that it continues to have popular support, if it ever did.

The new concept is a radical departure from the Constitution of 1963, the previous statement of purpose of the populist movement as a whole and the PRD in particular. No longer democratic, it calls for a new organization of Dominican society in its social, economic, and political relationships, within the nation and to the world outside, particularly the United States. It remains to be seen whether the Dictatorship with Popular Support will ever exist, but the proposal has created a great deal of public discussion as well as controversy. Furthermore, it has been conceived as an instrument to give the populist movement more than occasional unity and a specific programmatic direction, but the Dictatorship has also served as a vehicle for Juan Bosch to remain the undisputed populist leader after his defeats in April 1965 and June 1966.

<sup>1</sup>To follow Bosch's class divisions in Dominican, see Ibid., pp. 125-175.

Armed with a new ideological offensive, the position of the populists has been greatly improved from the days following their defeat at the polls. For President Balaguer it was an undesired burden in addition to the opposition from within the caudillistic political system itself. Former General Elías Wessin y Wessin had formed his own political party, the Partido Quisqueyano Demócrata (PQD), which kept Balaguer under constant pressure.<sup>1</sup> Interestingly, the PRD and the PQD, which had been in opposite camps in 1965, now refrained from attacking each other and concentrated their efforts exclusively on the PR and the President. In the municipal elections held in May 16, 1968, both groups abstained from participation, which was a form of eroding the Constitutional Government's legitimacy, and, consequently, the President's power.

Balaguer was not very happy with the prospects, and not only did he complain that there were no valid reasons for electoral abstention, but that to pronounce oneself against the elections was to act not like a democrat, but like a Communist.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, he not only accused Bosch's Dictatorship of being Communist, but he threatened Wessin with auditing the use of public funds since 1961, which included

---

<sup>1</sup>See, for instance, "El 'Pleito Casao' Entre Balaguer y Wessin," Ahora, No. 200 (11 Agosto 1967), pp. 4-5.

<sup>2</sup>El Caribe, May 16, 1968, p. 8.

the old CEFA. The tactic was of smear, the PRD red and the PQD graft, but nothing came of it except for nasty replies. However, the President did have the warmest praise for the Social Christians, the only national party to participate in the elections, thus giving a semblance of opposition and some legitimacy and credibility to Balaguer's democracy.<sup>1</sup>

A new opposition group would sprint out of the government and Balaguer's party, headed by Vice-President Francisco Augusto Lora. The man who had run the PR while Balaguer was in exile had presidential ambitions of his own, and presumably there was no controversy involved as long as the President did not decide to run for reelection, an issue on which the Chief Executive astutely did not make any comments. Lora was in charge of the party, and up to the second anniversary of the Constitutional Government had the warmest praises for the system, the party, the government, and Balaguer in particular.<sup>2</sup>

Matters changed as it became increasingly clear that the President had no intention of leaving the National Palace. In his address to the nation on Independence Day, February 27, 1969, Balaguer said that

---

<sup>1</sup>There were local political groups participating in the elections as well as the PRSC, but in 25 out of 77 municipal districts, the PR ran unopposed. The official party won in 73 of the districts with substantial majorities. See "Elecciones," Ahora, No. 237 (27 Mayo 1968), pp. 4-7.

<sup>2</sup>El Caribe, July 1, 1968, p. 6.

he would run again for elections if, and only if, it was "sanctioned by a national clamor of extraordinary proportions . . ." <sup>1</sup> Few now doubted that he would not continue in the best tradition of the caudilistic political system, the policy of continuismo.

In spite of conspiracies, rumors, and more terrorism than the usual dosage, the elections came in May 1970 with Balaguer winning a second term as expected. The PRD abstained, Lora's MIDA came in far behind second place, followed by Wessin's PQD, and the Social Christians, who ran the same presidential candidate of 1962, Alfonso Moreno Martínez, came in a very poor fourth. Héctor García-Godoy Cáceres, who had resigned his position of Ambassador to the United States and founded a party to run him for president, the Movement of National Conciliation (MCN), unfortunately died of a heart attack during the campaign. Another potential rival for Balaguer also had an accidental death, this time an automobile accident in Spain. His name, Ramfis Trujillo, the Benefactor's heir by blood, now probably terminating the family's aspirations for a political comeback in Dominicana. <sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> El Caribe, February 28, 1969, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> The Trujillo family had created a political party in New York in 1969, the Partido de Acción Dominicana (PAD), and were holding masses in Santo Domingo for the memory of the slain Generalissimo. See, "Resurrección de los Trujillo," Ahora, No. 293 (23 Junio 1969), pp. 8, 73. Ramfis died in December 1969 and the party has been taken over by his younger brother, Rhadamés.

The Generalissimo's undisputed heir had been Joaquín Balaguer. He took office again on August 16, 1970.

Within the rules of the caudillistic political system, Balaguer will stay in power until one of three circumstances occur, or a possible combination of them. First, that he willingly steps down for whatever reasons he may choose. Second, that he is forced out of power either by a coup d'etat or a rebellion from within or a revolution from without. And third, that he dies, either of natural causes or by assassination. From Pedro Santana until Rafael Trujillo these had been the alternatives, no matter what the more than twenty-odd constitutions of the Dominican Republic may have said, and unfortunately in 1970 they remained the same.

The caudillistic political system has not only prevented the establishment of a politically stable society, but it has led to the social disintegration of the nation. Incapable of organizing the state for other purposes than to reward the personal ambitions of one man and his clientele, it could have hardly been expected to serve as the instrument of socio-economic reforms. Rooted in the past, in the social and economic structures of a colonial society, the caudillistic political system has been rendered an anachronism by the process of modernization. Incapable of change and adaptation, it has only served to increase the deep cleavages of Dominican society, polarizing forces and groups

beyond compromise. Whether the populists will be more successful in the organization of Dominicana, remains to be seen, but no matter what the defenders of the status quo could offer, the populists could always offer one more: hope.

## CHAPTER VIII

## CONCLUSION

This study of Dominican politics leads to the conclusion that the nation's chaotic pattern in the decade of the 1960's is the result of: (1) a crumbling social order; (2) the inability of the traditional caudilistic political system to maintain either order or a meaningful state, let alone to serve as the instrument of socio-economic change; (3) the political and military meddling of the United States in fear of losing part of its imperial domain; and (4) the conflict between the groups challenging the status quo and those which have come to its defense. It has been a period of social disintegration, violence, and political polarization, perhaps it is also the prelude to a major transformation.

The small Caribbean nation, chosen by Columbus to be the seat of the New World, was still five centuries later searching for the way to organize itself. The colony founded by the intrepid navigator not only killed the Indians and brought in black slaves, but it was a society of Spaniards, with the political legitimacy of monarchichal Spain, the structures and the values of a feudal age. The whites were in control and the non-whites were to work for them.

In spite of wars, revolutions, empires, foreign occupation, abortive independence, the liberation, and the chaining of the slaves, the independent Dominicana that emerges in the mid-19th Century was very similar to that which it had always been, a colony of Spain. However, two major casualties had occurred: one, the end of slavery, thanks to the Haitian occupation; the other, legitimate political authority, which went back to Europe with Spain. The existing feudal, colonialist order was not compatible with the new form of political organization, representative democracy, while simultaneously the latter remained as the norm of political legitimacy. The result was the caudillistic political system.

This political system was the living contradiction of an European society on paper and a Latin American society in reality. Unwilling to break the colonialist pattern in which the social order and the economic well-being of the oligarchy depended, it was impossible to organize society in the French, English, or North American models. Since the paper was not fitted for the society, nor was the society willing to change to fit the paper, we then have the series of dichotomies that have been characteristic of independent Dominicana: constitutions and caudillos, liberty and tyranny, equality and oligarchy, elections and violence, and independence and colonialism. However, the caudillistic political system did have some use--it maintained the socio-economic



system intact in spite of all the political turmoil, for politics was not tied to social questions, but only to the reward of those who with guns and machismo would sit in the presidency until overthrown by someone else.

The rise of the United States as a world power was accompanied by the transformation of the Caribbean into a North American lake. The implication for the Dominican Republic was that since the end of the last century the new metropolis has served as a substitute for Spain, except that in the new arrangement nominal sovereignty and the caudillistic political system were kept. The nation had two major requirements to maintain: that the native governments kept order and were friendly to the United States. Otherwise, the North Americans would get rid of them, invade, and/or govern themselves.

There were never unfriendly governments, for, on the one hand, there was an acute awareness of the power of the United States, and, on the other, this was also the ideal model, the nation to emulate. However, the only possible similarity between the two was on paper, barring little differences such as federalism, because the United States was a modern, industrial society, with a working democratic system, and Dominicana was the reverse. The second requirement was more complex because, caught in the caudillistic political system, order was a difficult matter to maintain. Neither willing to annex the colony, nor

willing to let the empire go away, the North Americans would be forced into a policy of permanent intervention. The landing of Marines became not only the most symbolic, but also the most concrete manifestation of this situation: on the one hand an empire and its satellites, and on the other sovereign and independent nations. No wonder then that once the United States Department of the Navy carried on diplomatic correspondence with the Department of State during the Marine Occupation of 1916-1924, the fiction was kept even then.

The Trujillo government was friendly, maintained order, and did not give any trouble to the United States. The Benefactor continued the task of national centralization and improving the armed forces begun by the Marines, but he also increased economic output, political control, and the rate of modernization. However, although new social groups began to appear, the Generalissimo was indistinguishable with the state, because the old caudillistic system was maintained. The dictatorship was too long, too harsh, and too sadistic, and when the tyrant was shot Dominicans did not want Trujillo's heirs. They organized, mobilized, and agitated, first getting rid of Ramfis Trujillo and then Joaquín Balaguer. Although at first reluctant, they eventually were aided by the United States.

To have free elections was a desired common end. For Dominicans it was a delirious hope, the chance to have democracy,

the opportunity to break the caudillistic chain. For North Americans, as long as the armed forces were kept intact, and as long as no "unfriendly" was elected, to have elections would give the nation some democracy, some legitimacy, and a tangible proof of the benefits of association with the United States. Although not very clear at first, the problem was that two different concepts of democracy were advocated during the electoral campaign: a paternalistic oligarchic democracy, with freedom as the end, and a populist mass-based democracy, with freedom and social change as the ends. The questioning of the old order, the legacy of Spain, was begun then and it has not as yet ended.

The populists got elected, a fact which struck like lightning those who had privileges to maintain, and they began crying communism in fear of social change. The caudillistic political system was preferred to a democracy in which the masses would participate, since after all, that had always been the case in the "good old" days. A coup d'etat was engineered, and a conservative Triumvirate was put in the Constitutional government's place. The fragile legality was broken, and so were the hopes of orderly socio-economic change. As it had always happened, neither the conservative coalition nor order could be maintained, for the caudillistic political system needed a caudillo to put things in their places, at least for a short while, but the fact that the

social order had been questioned, that newly mobilized groups had had some power to taste, made it now impossible to return to the "good old" days.

Always concerned for order, and now also worried about social change, the United States had mistakenly believed that the conservatives in power and the caudillistic political system was the best policy to keep "undesirables" away. Divided as to who was the better man, Imbert, Wessin or Balaguer, the armed forces were not about to help Donny Reid when a new populist challenge occurred. The people were enthusiastic, chasing soldiers away, but the United States, to the surprise of everyone, invaded. The old Constitutionalist President was considered an "unfriendly" by this stage, some say because he talked about reforms, others because he was "soft" on the present day enemies of the United States. The North American President, apparently not one of the best, had been overly worried since a few years earlier one of the members of the empire had chosen to go another way. So, Marines were landed once again, the armed forces were saved, and governments were created almost every day, but then it was decided for the OAS to call for elections and to run Joaquín Balaguer.

In the meantime, the populists radicalized, questioning not only the Spanish order, but also the imperial rights of the United

States. The new elections could not mean the same, for after all, the basic fight had been to reinstate the previously elected government. It was clear to everyone that what had happened had been the maintenance of the caudillistic political system, and as such, the only possible reason the elections would have would be to elect Trujillo's heir. If Juan Bosch were elected, he could only govern through the presence of foreign troops, and these had come to prevent him from returning to power in the first place. So Balaguer was elected, and Dominicana returned once again to the "good old" days.

If the social order was questioned in the elections of 1962, and if the colonialist situation was questioned as a response to the North American invasion, the next one to come into question was the concept of representative democracy as the ideal pattern for the nation. It was simple. Even the most conservative would deplore the caudillistic political system and the necessity to make democracy work: ideologically, there was no question about the model, except for the Marxist groups, for even Trujillo had been a public admirer of the democratic system, and under his rule all the procedures of the system were religiously kept. The problem was that to make democracy work, the society had to change.

The populists were willing to orderly change society and under the rules of the democratic system, until faced with the evidence that

this was not to be the case for either the conservatives or the United States. Democracy was only permitted if, and only if, North Americans certified a candidate as friendly, and if the armed forces were left in place. In other words, gradual change in the social order, but the "satellite" status and the caudillistic system maintained. When it became clear after the invasion and the election of Balaguer that neither democracy was to be had nor any social change, then it was obvious that the only solution was to move to the left. Now the three interlocking systems are being questioned and put as one and the same: the Spanish social order, representative democracy without social change, and the United States empire. To perform this major revolutionary change, the populists movement was ideologically armed with the Dictatorship with Popular Support in a call for independence and social change through a meaningful state. Whether they will succeed or fail is only for the future to tell, but for the first time it is really Dominicans searching for a way to organize themselves, rather than Europeans in the New World.

When one questions why it took so long for Dominicans to discover what the roots of their problems were, part of the answer lies in accelerated modernizing tendencies in the last three or four decades. Also, another part is the age, the increase of nationalism in the world, the thrust of the Cuban revolution, and the responses of the United

States. Still part of it can be found in the chaotic pattern of political life in Dominicana in the 1960's: the hope of the elections and the shock of the coup d'etat; the enthusiasm of the revolution and the military invasion of the United States; again to go through elections to end up with Trujillo's heir. Obviously, something was very wrong in the place. But some fault lies also in the social science literature, which did not seem capable of explaining these phenomenae to them.

The single most misunderstood problem is that of the caudillis-tic political system, believing that it was a democracy in the making only if the society would mend its ways. The caudillos who worked with it knew the rules of the game perfectly:

1. Invoke the principles of democracy, have elections if you are "in" and call for elections if you are "out," for this gave some political legitimacy and legality to your claims.
2. Make certain that you hold the loyalty of your army, associates, and followers by rewarding them, or promising to do so, out of public expense.
3. Make everyone believe you are a real macho, a real man, carry guns and wear a uniform, step hard when you walk, speak with a loud, authoritarian voice, keep company with women--at least one public mistress--and drink a lot with your friends.
4. Make certain that everyone knows that you have the last word, that there is no higher authority than yourself.
5. If in power, maintain public order, terrorize the opposition, give the bureaucracy to friends and associates, and improve the firing power and salary and equipment of your men.

6. If out of power, create as much chaos as possible to make the "ins" look weak, say they are violating some democratic principle, recruit an army with friends and followers, and/or join the conspiracy game.
7. Do not tamper with the social system.
8. Pay homage to the Church.
9. Do not involve yourself with international problems, follow the lead of the United States.
10. Under no circumstances what so ever anger, displeas, or worse, double-cross, the United States.

This political system had rules of its own, none of which had anything to do with the establishment of democratic systems except on paper. The problem was that the system was visualized in terms of European models, transplanting not only the political model, but ascribing to the society causal patterns which were not in its experience. It was not that the army intervened in politics as it may have happened in republican Europe, the army was the center of all politics for there was nothing else but force. It was not that the bourgeoisie organized a "democratic" government to maintain its class rule, for there was not even the minimum of government, only a caudillo, whose rule was temperamental and arbitrary.

It seems that the basic failure lies in not perceiving the achievement of independence as the perpetuation of the colonial society without the political legitimacy of Spain. There was no change in the social order and there was chaos in the political, a matter disguised by the



existence of constitutions, procedural democratic processes, and nominal independence. It was not a question of oligarchic class rule by design, it was by default. It was not a question of strengthening the democratic system with more frequent elections and less army interference, for it was not a democratic system, it was a caudillistic political system. So you could have all the civic education in the world, more practices at the ballot box, "enlightened" armed forces through association with foreign democracies' military missions, and you would end up in the same place unless the social order and circumstance of colonial dependence changed.

The weakness of the disorderly, illegitimate, and corrupt caudillistic political system lies in that it has only violence and the personality of one man upon which to depend. It has not been able to face the onslaught of modernization, and it is obviously crumbling away. In the Dominican Republic it has been maintained by the United States, which, ironically, has sought the maintenance of order through the perpetuation of disorder, has sought the establishment of democratic process by making anti-democratic the nation's only democratic forces, and has sought to maintain its empire by driving into an anti-colonialist nationalism the nation's populist forces.

If it is on the populist forces that change and transformation depend, what are their weaknesses and strengths? In other words,

given the opposition of the United States, the oligarchy, and most of the armed forces, what are the possibilities of the populists coming to power? On the positive side, they have ideology, youth, most of organized labor, the unorganized urban poor, some strength with the peasants, and sizeable segments of the middle sectors, including professional groups. Furthermore, they have a one-party leadership, with trailing smaller groups both of the Marxist and the Social Christian variety, a reform oriented changing Church, and the weakness of the caudillistic political system itself. The divisions between the followers of fulano and sutano, their conspiracies, and petty rivalries, is a major asset, for they divide their strength.

On the negative side, they have only a major leader, Juan Bosch, who is also the ideologue and who when in power was more timid with his actions than with his words. Furthermore, he seems dogmatic with his thoughts, needlessly antagonizing sources of support, and caudillistic about having the last word. The parties outside the PRD, only the Marxists now that the Social Christian PRSC has remained democratic with Balaguer, continue in needless ideological quarrels with each other, more virulent each day, and provide little support to the populist movement itself. It is possible that without going through periodic elections as a measure of strength, the PRD has probably lost more people from the approximately half-a-million they

had in 1966, for there is no noise, no campaigning, no personal contact between leaders and followers throughout the nation.

At the last resort, the major weakness lies in the failure to organize the peasants, from which the caudillistic political system draws some strength. This becomes particularly acute with the opposition of the United States, for if the traditional system collapses and Marines invade again, the only way to resist the occupation forces would have to be with the support of the peasantry. Barring North American invasions, as in 1965, the populist forces could wait for the divisions in the caudillistic political system and defeat them again, or, with the organization of the peasantry, city workers, the unemployed, and the middle sectors, challenge them directly and defeat them.

The prospects of a coming struggle are never cheerful events. Many innocents will be hurt. But at the moment, violence is a matter of everyday existence, innocents get hurt, both with bullet wounds and deprivation, and the only promise of the future is that it will continue to be the same. Sometimes people choose to struggle in order to change their fate; sometimes they are successful and sometimes they fail. The one certainty about Dominican politics is that there is violence present and that there is violence on the way. Hopefully, Dominicans will finally be able to organize themselves and decide what is to be their fate.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Official Publications

- Acta de Reconciliación Dominicana; Acto Institucional. Santo Domingo: Gaceta Oficial, No. 8944 (4 Septiembre 1965).
- Centro de Enseñanza de las Fuerzas Armadas (CEFA). Libro Blanco de las Fuerzas Armadas y de la Policía Nacional de la República Dominicana: Estudios y Pruebas Documentales de las Causas del Movimiento Reindivificador del 25 de Septiembre de 1963. Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe (1964).
- Charter of the Organization of American States. Washington: Pan American Union (1948).
- Constitución de la Nación Dominicana. Santo Domingo: Gaceta Oficial, No. 8758 (30 Abril 1963).
- Constitución de la República Dominicana. Santo Domingo: Gaceta Oficial, No. 8693 (17 Septiembre 1962).
- Constitución de la República Dominicana. Santo Domingo: Gaceta Oficial, No. 9014 (29 Noviembre 1966).
- Junta Central Electoral. Relación del Resultado de las Elecciones Generales y Extraordinarias Celebradas el día 20 de Diciembre de 1962. Santo Domingo: Two large printed sheets.
- Junta Central Electoral. Relación General de las Elecciones del lero de Junio de 1966. Santo Domingo (Febrero 1967).
- Organization of American States. Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Washington: OEA Series F/11. 10, Pan American Union (1965).
- Presidencia de la República. Secretariado Técnico. Oficina Nacional de Administración y Personal (ONAP). Manual de Organización del Gobierno. Santo Domingo (1969).

Report of the Secretary General of the OAS Regarding the Dominican Situation: Activities from April 24, 1965, until the Installation of the Provisional Government. Washington: Pan American Union (1965).

Roberts, T. D., et al. Area Handbook for the Dominican Republic. Washington: DA Pam No. 550-54, United States Government Printing Office (December 1966).

Secretaría de Estado de Interior. White Book of Communism in Dominican Republic. Ciudad Trujillo: Editora del Caribe (1958).

Secretaría Técnica de la Presidencia. Oficina Nacional de Planificación. Plataforma para el Desarrollo Económico y Social de la República Dominicana (1968-1985). Santo Domingo (1968).

Secretariado Técnico. Oficina Nacional de Planificación. Bases Para el Desarrollo Nacional: Análisis de los Problemas y Perspectivas de la Económica Dominicana. Santo Domingo (Diciembre 1965).

United States Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Background Information Relating to the Dominican Republic. 89th Cong., 1st sess., October 18, 1965.

United States Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Testimony of Brigadier General Elías Wessin y Wessin. 89th Cong., 1st sess., October 1, 1965.

United States Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Testimony of Juan Isidro Tapia Adames. 89th Cong., 1st sess., October 18, 1965.

United States Congress. Senate. Congressional Record. 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, 111, pt. 18:23855 (speech by Senator William Fullbright).

United States Congress. Senate Inquiry Into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo. 67th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess., 1922, 2 vols.

United States Department of State. The Dominican Crisis: The Hemisphere Acts. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965.

- United States Embassy. "Discurso de S. E. John Hugh Grimmins, Embajador de los Estados Unidos de América en la República Dominicana. Pronunciado Ante la Cámara de Comercio Americana, Santo Domingo, 21 de Noviembre de 1968." Santo Domingo (Mimeographed Report).
- United States Embassy. "Summary of Alliance for Progress Activities in the Dominican Republic, 1962-1965." Santo Domingo: November 14, 1966 (Mimeographed Report).
- United States Embassy. "Summary of AID Assistance to the Dominican Republic Since April 24, 1965." Santo Domingo: April 24, 1968 (Mimeographed Report).

Books, Monographs, and Pamphlets

- Alfau Durán, Vetilio J. Trujillo and the Roman Catholic Church in Santo Domingo. Ciudad Trujillo: Editora Hanicapp, 1960.
- Alvarez, Federico C. Ideología Política del Pueblo Dominicano. Santiago, R. D.: 1929.
- Augelli, John. "The Dominican Republic." Focus, Vol. X (February 1960).
- Avelino, Francisco A. Las Ideas Políticas en Santo Domingo. Santo Domingo: Editorial Arte y Cine, 1966.
- Baciu, Stefan. Juan Bosch: Del Exilio a la Presidencia. Santo Domingo: Librería Dominicana, 1963.
- Balaguer, Joaquín. Dominican Reality: Biographical Sketch of a Country and a Regime. Mexico: 1949.
- \_\_\_\_\_. El Cristo de la Libertad. Buenos Aires: Editorial Americana, 1950.
- \_\_\_\_\_. El Pensamiento Vivo de Trujillo. Ciudad Trujillo: Impresora Dominicana, 1955.
- Barnet, Richard J. Inervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World. New York: World Publishing Company, 1968. pp. 153-180.

- Berle, Adolph A., et al. The Dominican Republic. San Juan, Puerto Rico: Inter-American Center for the Study of Contemporary Latin America, 1964.
- Betancourt, Rómulo. Golpes de Estado y Gobiernos de Fuerza en la América Latina: La Dramática Experiencia Dominicana. Caracas: Editorial Arte, 1966.
- Bonetti, Mario. Hacia Una Teoría del Caudillismo Dominicano. Santiago, R. D., Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra, Agosto, 1970 (Reporte Mimeografiado).
- Bosch, Juan. Composición Social Dominicana: Historia e Interpretación. Santo Domingo: Colección Pensamiento y Cultura, Vol. II, 1970. (Originally appeared as a series of 11 articles in Ahora, May-August 1968.)
- \_\_\_\_\_. Crisis de la Democracia de América en la República Dominicana. México: Centro de Estudios y Documentación Sociales, 1964.
- \_\_\_\_\_. De Cristóbal Colón a Fidel Castro: El Caribe, Frontera Imperial. Madrid: Ediciones Alfaguara, 1970.
- \_\_\_\_\_. El Pentagonismo: Sustituto del Imperialismo. Santo Domingo: Publicaciones Ahora, 1967.
- \_\_\_\_\_. El Próximo Paso: Dictadura con Respaldo Popular. Santo Domingo: Impresora Arte y Cine, 1970. (Originally appeared as a series of 18 articles in Ahora, June-December 1969).
- \_\_\_\_\_. Trujillo: Causas de Una Tiranía Sin Ejemplos. Caracas: 1961.
- Brown, Seyom. The Faces of Power. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, Chapter 19.
- Brugal Alfau, Danilo. Tragedia en Santo Domingo. Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, 1966.
- Campillo Pérez, Julio G. El Grillo y el Ruiseñor: Elecciones Presidenciales Dominicanas. Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, 1966.

- Carey, John (ed.). The Dominican Republic Crisis 1965. Dobbs Ferry, N. Y.: The Ninth Hammarskjöld Forum, Oceana Publications, 1967.
- Caribbean Research, Ltd. Preliminary Tables: Public Attitude Study, Dominican Republic. Santo Domingo: Unpublished Report Prepared for the United States Embassy, December 10, 1962.
- Carlos, Newton. São Domingo: A Guerra Da América Latina. Río de Janeiro: 1965.
- Castillo de Aza, Zenón. Trujillo y Otros Benefactores de la Iglesia. Ciudad Trujillo: Editora Handicapp, 1961.
- Center for Strategic Studies. Dominican Action-1965: Intervention or Cooperation? Washington: Georgetown University, Special Report Series No. 2, 1966.
- Chang-Rodríguez, Eugenio (ed.). The Lingering Crisis: A Case Study of the Dominican Republic. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.
- Chung, Hoon Mok. The Case of the Muffed Mission: The 1963 Coup d'Etat in the Dominican Republic. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1966. (Preliminary Draft, The Caribbean Project, Foreign Policy Research Institute.)
- Clark, Reverend James A. The Church and the Crisis in the Dominican Republic. Westminster, Ma.: The Newman Press, 1967.
- Comité de Estudios Dominicanos. Guía Bibliográfica de Asuntos Dominicanos: Biblioteca Espailat. Santiago, R. D.: Asociación para el Desarrollo, Inc., Septiembre, 1967.
- Cordero Michel, Emilio. La Revolución Haitiana y Santo Domingo. Santo Domingo: Editora Nacional, 1968.
- Corten, André y André. Cambio Social en Santo Domingo. Río Piedras, Puerto Rico: Instituto de Estudios del Caribe, 1968.
- Crassweller, Robert D. Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966.



- Deadline Data on World Affairs. "Dominican Chaos." On Record, Vol. II, No. 10 (June 1965).
- Draper, Theodore. The Abuse of Power. New York: The Viking Press, 1967.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Dominican Revolt: A Case Study in American Policy. New York: Commentary Reports, 1968.
- Espaillet, Arturo. Trujillo: The Last Caesar. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1963.
- Estrella, Julio C. La Revolución Dominicana y la Crisis de la OEA. Santo Domingo: Talleres de la Revista Ahora, 1965.
- Evans, Rowland, and Novak, Robert. Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power. New York: New American Library, 1966.
- Fagg, John E. Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965.
- Ferreras, Ramón A. Guerra Patria. Santo Domingo: 1966.
- Fiallo, Fabio. La Comisión Nacionalista en Washington, 1920-1921. Ciudad Trujillo: Imprenta La Opinión, 1939.
- Franco, Franklin. República Dominicana: Clases, Crisis y Comandos. La Habana: Casa de las Américas, 1966.
- Franco, Pericles A. Mi Protesta Contra el Golpe Militar. Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, 1964.
- Free, Lloyd. Attitudes, Hopes, and Fears of the Dominican People. Princeton, N. J.: Institute for International Social Research, 1962.
- Fullbright, Senator J. William. The Arrogance of Power. New York: Random House, Inc., 1966, pp. 82-105.
- Galindez, Jesús de. La Era de Trujillo. Buenos Aires: Editorial Americana, 1958.
- Gallegos, Gerardo. Trujillo. Madrid: Ediciones Iberoamericanas, 1968.

- García, José Gabriel. Compendio de la Historia de Santo Domingo. Santo Domingo: Publicaciones Ahora, Reprinted 1968, IV vols. (Originally published circa 1875.)
- Geyelin, Philip. Lyndon B. Johnson and the World. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966, Chapter 10.
- Goldwert, Marvin. The Constabulary in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua: Progeny and Legacy of United States Intervention. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962.
- González Blanco, Pedro. Trujillo: La Restauración de un Pueblo. Mexico: 1946.
- Henríquez, Enrique Apolinar. Episodios Imperialistas. Ciudad Trujillo: Editora Montalvo, 1959.
- Henríquez, Noel. La Verdad Sobre Trujillo. La Habana: Imprenta Económica en General, 1959.
- Hicks, Albert C. Blood in the Streets: The Life and Role of Trujillo. New York: Creative Age Press, 1946.
- Jiménez Grullón, Juan Isidro. La República Dominicana: Una Ficción? Mérida, Venezuela, 1965.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Una Gestapo en América. Santo Domingo: Editora Montalvo, 1949, 1962.
- Jiménez Rodríguez, Manuel A., and Perez Sánchez, Leopoldo. El Evangelio de Nuestra Desgracia: Génesis de Una Monstruosa Traición Histórica. Santo Domingo: Editorial Trinchera, 1964.
- Johnson, Hughes, and Gwertzman, Bernard M. Fullbright: The Dissenter. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1968, pp. 207-224.
- Julien, Claude. El Imperio Americano. Trans. E. Riambau. Barcelona: Ediciones Grijalbo, 1968.
- Knight, Melvin K. The Americans in Santo Domingo. New York: Vanguard Press, 1928.
- Kurzman, Dan. Santo Domingo: Revolt of the Damned. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1965.

- Larrazábal Blanco, Carlos. Los Negros y la Esclavitud en Santo Domingo. Santo Domingo: Julio D. Postigo e hijos, 1967.
- Latorre, Eduardo, et al. Bonao: Una Ciudad Dominicana. Santiago, R. D.: Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra, forthcoming. 2 vols.
- Lazala Bobadilla, Josefina A. El Delito Político y Tiranicidio en la República Dominicana. Santo Domingo: Editora Montalvo, 1962.
- Lieuwen, Edwin. Generals Vs. Presidents: Neomilitarism in Latin America. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964, pp. 53-63.
- Llano Montes, Antonio. Barricadas de Odios. México: Editores Mexicanos Unidos, 1966.
- Logan, Rayford W. Haiti and the Dominican Republic. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Long, George S. Desenmascarando al Comunismo. Ciudad Trujillo: 1957.
- \_\_\_\_\_. El Caso Jerry Murphy y la República Dominicana. Ciudad Trujillo: 1957.
- Lugo, Américo. Historia de Santo Domingo. Ciudad Trujillo: Editorial Librería Dominicana, 1952.
- Madariaga, Salvador de. Cristóbal Colón. México: Editorial Hermes, 1952.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Fall of the Spanish American Empire. New York: Collier Books, the Crowell-Collier Publishers, 1947, 1963.
- Mallin, Jay. Caribbean Crisis: Subversion Fails in the Dominican Republic. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1965.
- Marrero Aristy, Ramón. La República Dominicana. Ciudad Trujillo: Editora del Caribe, 1958, 2 Vols.
- Martin, John Bartlow. Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Crisis From the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil War. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1966.

- Martínez, Julio César. Santo Domingo: desde Trujillo a la Revolución de Abril. Caracas: Impreso en "Rotolito," 1966.
- Maunce, Gary, and Sutherland, Anne H. (eds.) After Santo Domingo, What? Austin, Texas: University Colloquy on Public Issues, 1966.
- Mecham, J. Lloyd. The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960. Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1961.
- Mejía, Luis F. De Lilís a Trujillo. Caracas: Editorial Elite, 1944.
- Mejía Ricart, Marcio A. Las Clases Sociales en Santo Domingo. Ciudad Trujillo: Librería Dominicana, 1953.
- Miller, Linda B. World Order and Local Disorder: The United Nations and Internal Conflicts. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1967, pp. 149-165.
- Mir, Pedro. Tres Leyendas de Colores. Santo Domingo: Editora Nacional, 1969.
- Monclús, Miguel Angel. El Caudillismo en la República Dominicana. Ciudad Trujillo: Impresora Dominicana, 1948.
- Moreno, José A. Barrios in Arms: Revolution in Santo Domingo. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970. (Originally his Ph. D. dissertation, Sociological Aspects of the Dominican Revolution, Cornell University, 1967.)
- Morrison, De Lesseps S. Latin American Mission. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965, pp. 116-147, 263-264.
- Mota, Fabio A. Un Estadista de América: Obra Socio-Política de Trujillo. Ciudad Trujillo: Editora Montalvo, 1945
- Movimiento Revolucionario 14 de Junio. Dictadura y Democracia en Santo Domingo. Santo Domingo: Thesis presented to the Third Conference of Political and Social Science, Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo, November-December 1967.
- Munro, Dana G. Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1927. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1964.
- Nanita, Abelardo R. Trujillo. Ciudad Trujillo: Editora del Caribe, 1951.

- Nehemkis, Peter. Economic and Social Development of the Dominican Republic. Washington: Pan American Union, 1962.
- Niedergang, Marcel. La Revolución en Santo Domingo. Trans. Ramón Pina Acevedo y Martínez. Santo Domingo: Editorial Renovación, 1968.
- Odena, Isidro J. La Intervención Ilegal en Santo Domingo. Buenos Aires: 1965.
- Ornes, Germán E. Trujillo: Little Caesar of the Caribbean. New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1958.
- Pagán Perdomo, Dato. Por Qué Lucha el Pueblo Dominicano. Caracas: 1959.
- Partido Revolucionario Dominicano y Movimiento Popular Dominicano. Libertad de Prensa para Santo Domingo. La Habana: Editorial La Verdad, 1956.
- Pattee, Ricardo. La República Dominicana. Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1967.
- Penson, José F. El Partido Dominicano. Ciudad Trujillo: Imprenta Arte y Cine, 1948.
- Peña Battle, Manuel Arturo. Obras Escogidas. Santo Domingo: Julio D. Postigo e hijos, 1968, Vol. I.
- Pepén, Juan F. La Cruz Señala el Camino: Influencia de la Iglesia en la Formación y Conservación de la Nacionalidad Dominicana. Ciudad Trujillo: Editorial Duarte, 1954.
- Pérez Cabral, Pedro A. La Comunidad Mulata. Caracas: Gráfica Americana, 1967.
- Perkins, Dexter. La Cuestión de Santo Domingo. Ciudad Trujillo: 1955.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The United States and the Caribbean. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1947.
- Pichardo, Bernardo. Resumen de Historia Patria. Buenos Aires: Talleres Gráficos Americalee, 1947.

- Price-Mars, Jean. La République d'Haiti et la République Dominicaine: les Aspects Divers d'un Problème d'Histoire, de Géographie, et d'Ethnologie. Port-au-Prince: 1953, 2 Vols.
- Ravelo, Clara, et al. La República Dominicana Frente a la Integración Económica. Santiago, R. D.: Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra, 1967.
- "Report on the Dominican Republic." Latin American Report, Vol. V (September 1963).
- Rodman, Selden. Haiti: The Black Republic. New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1954.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Quisqueya: A History of the Dominican Republic. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964.
- Rodríguez Demorizi, Emilio. Antecedentes de la Anexión a España. Ciudad Trujillo: 1955.
- Rogers, Gifford E. Tenencia de la Tierra en la República Dominicana. Santo Domingo: International Development Services, Inc., 1963.
- Rosa, Antonio de la. Las Finanzas de Santo Domingo y el Control Americano. Santo Domingo: Editora Nacional, 1915. Reprinted in 1969.
- Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M. A Thousand Days. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965, pp. 769-773.
- Selser, Gregorio (ed.). ¡Aquí Santo Domingo!: La Tercera Guerra Sucia. Buenos Aires: Editorial Palestra, 1966.
- Slater, Jerome. The United States and the Dominican Revolution. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1970.
- Szulc, Tad. Dominican Diary. New York: Delacorte Press, 1965.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Winds of Revolution. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.
- Tamanes, Ramón. La República Dominicana Frente a la Integración Económica de América Latina. Buenos Aires: 1968.

- Tejeda, Teodoro. Yo Investigué la Muerte de Trujillo. Barcelona: Plaza y James, S. A., 1963.
- Thomas, Norman (ed.). Dominican Republic: A Study in the New Imperialism. New York: Institute for International Labor Research, 1965.
- Tolentino, Hugo. La Traición de Pedro Santana. Santo Domingo: Impresos Brenty, 1968.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Orígenes, Vicisitudes y Porvenir de la Nacionalidad Dominicana. Santo Domingo: Mimeographed Report, Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo, 1963.
- Troiani, Osiris. Dominicana: Sólo Para Adultos. Buenos Aires: 1965.
- Troncoso Sánchez, Pedro. Estudios de Historia Política Dominicana. Santo Domingo: Julio Postigo e hijos, 1968.
- Trujillo, Rafael L. The Basic Policies of a Regime. Ciudad Trujillo: Editora del Caribe, 1960.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Evolution of Democracy in Santo Domingo. Ciudad Trujillo: 1950.
- Uribe, Max. Función del Partido Dominicano en la Era de Trujillo. Ciudad Trujillo: Impresora Dominicana, 1961.
- Valdeparés, Manuel. Acción y Pensamiento de Trujillo. Ciudad Trujillo: Editora del Caribe, 1955.
- Van Alstyne, Richard W. The Rising American Empire. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960.
- Vega, Bernardo. La República Dominicana Ante el Proceso de Integración Económica en Latinoamérica. Santo Domingo: Banco Central de la República Dominicana, 1966.
- Vega y Pagán, Ernesto. Historia de las Fuerzas Armadas. Ciudad Trujillo: Impresora Dominicana, 1955. 2 Vols.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Military Biography of Trujillo. Ciudad Trujillo: Editorial Atenas, 1956.

- Vicini, José D. La Isla del Azúcar. Ciudad Trujillo: 1957.
- Wedge, Bryant. Attitudes of Dominican Youth: A New Political Culture. Princeton, N. J.: Institute for the Study of National Behavior, 1965.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Revolutionary Dominican Youth and the United States: Problem in Dialogue. Princeton, N. J.: Institute for the Study of National Behavior, 1965.
- Welles, Sumner. La Viña de Naboth. Trans. M. A. Moore. Santiago, R. D.: Editorial El Diario, 1938, 2 Vols. Originally, Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1944-1924. New York: Payson & Clarke, Ltd., 1928, 2 Vols.
- Wiarda, Howard J. Dictatorship and Development: The Methods of Control in Trujillo's Dominican Republic. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, Latin American Monographs, Second Series No. 5, 1968.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Dominican Republic: Election Factbook. Washington: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1966.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Materials for the Study of Politics and Government in the Dominican Republic, 1930-1966. Santiago, R. D.: Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra, 1968.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Aftermath of the Trujillo Dictatorship: The Emergence of a Pluralistic Political System in the Dominican Republic. Gainesville: Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Florida, 1965.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Dominican Republic: Nation in Transit. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.
- Wilgus, A. Curtis (ed.). The Caribbean: Current United States Relations. Vol. XIV. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1966.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Caribbean: Its Political Problems. Vol. VII. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1956.
- Zapico, O. P., Marcelino. Revolución en Hispanoamérica: Lo que Vi en Santo Domingo. Madrid: Escélier, S. A., 1966.



Signed Articles

- Abreu F., R. Antonio. " Tiene Base Jurídica la Demanda de Bosch a EE. UU. por US\$ Mil Millones?" Ahora, No. 113 (27 Diciembre 1965), pp. 17-21.
- Adams, Randolph G. "Santo Domingo: A Study in Benevolent Imperialism." The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. XX, No. 1 (January 1921), pp. 10-24.
- Alba, Víctor. " Bastarán las Elecciones en la República Dominicana?" Ahora, No. 125 (28 Marzo 1966), pp. 22-23.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Historia de Una Iniquidad: Los Generales y los Personajillos Contra el Pueblo Dominicano." Panoramas, Supplement to No. 6 (Noviembre-Diciembre 1963).
- \_\_\_\_\_. "La República Dominicana a la Escuela de la Libertad." Cuadernos, Vol. LXX (March 1963), pp. 74-76.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Lessons of an Absurd Situation." New Politics, Vol. IV, No. 2 (Spring 1965), pp. 56-58.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "República Dominicana: La Herencia del 'Benefactor.'" Cuadernos, No. 62 (August 1962), pp. 62-72.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Why Bosch Fell." The New Republic, Vol. 149, No. 15 (October 12, 1963), pp. 12-14.
- Alexander, Robert J. "After Trujillo What?" The New Leader, Vol. XLIV (June 12, 1961), pp. 3-4.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Dictatorship in the Caribbean." The Canadian Forum, Vol. XXVIII, No. 328 (May 1948), p. 35.
- Allan, Donald R. "Santo Domingo: The Empty Showcase." The Reporter, Vol. 29 (October 5, 1963), pp. 28-31.
- Alvarez Castellanos, Francisco. "Entrevista Con el Doctor Juan Isidro Jiménez Grullón." Ahora, No. 15 (25 Agosto 1962), pp. 9-11, 50-52.

- Alvárez Castellanos, Francisco. "Entrevista Con Juan Bosch." Ahora, No. 11 (20 Junio 1962), pp. 5-9.
- Alvárez, Max. "Paliques de Actualidad: Luis Amiama Hace Declaraciones." Ahora, No. 113 (27 Diciembre 1965), pp. 14-15.
- Aristy, Héctor. "Aporte de la Revolución Dominicana de 1965." Ahora, No. 288 (19 Mayo 1969), pp. 26-30.
- Arredondo, Alberto, and Campos, Carlos M. "Las Condiciones de Vida del Campesino Dominicano." Panoramas, No. 4 (July-August 1963), pp. 81-110.
- Artyushenkov, M. "Occupation Continues." International Affairs, No. 3 (March 1961), pp. 87-88.
- Augelli, John P. "Agricultural Colonization in the Dominican Republic." Economic Geography, Vol. 38, No. 1 (January 1962), pp. 15-27.
- Ayuso, Juan José. "De la Revolución a Un Campo de Polo: El Gólgota Constitucionalista." Ahora, No. 212 (4 Diciembre 1967), pp. 18-22.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Dissección de las Turbas." Ahora, No. 14 (13 Agosto 1962), pp. 5-15.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "El Golpe de Estado: ¿Un Recurso Vigente?" Ahora, No. 140 (18 Julio 1966), pp. 13-14.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "La Reducción y Depuración de las Fuerzas Armadas." Ahora, No. 13 (20 Julio 1962), pp. 43-46.
- Baeza Flores, Alberto. "La Crisis Dominicana y el Dilema de América Latina." Política, Vol. IV (June-July 1965), pp. 13-20.
- Balaguer, Joaquín. "Austeridad Moral." Ahora, No. 99 (13 Marzo 1965), p. 35.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "La Parálisis de Progreso." Ahora, No. 48 (10 Enero 1964), pp. 11-12.
- Balcácer, Juan Daniel. "Dictadura con Respaldo Popular: Una Utopía." Ahora, No. 296 (14 Julio 1969), pp. 17-21.

- Baquero, Gastón. "Semblanza de Juan Bosch." Mundo Hispánico (February 1963), pp. 63-68.
- Beals, Carleton. "Caesar of Caribbean." Current History, Vol. XLVIII (January 1938), pp. 31-34.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Gunboat Diplomacy and the Dominican Crisis." National Guardian (December 11, 1961), p. 1.
- Bender, J. B. "Dominican Intervention: The Facts." National Review, Vol. XVIII, No. 6 (February 8, 1966), pp. 112-114.
- Benítez, Jaime. "The Leadership Crisis." Saturday Review, Vol. 48, No. 29 (July 17, 1965), p. 20.
- Berle, Adolf A., Jr. "A Stitch in Time." The Reporter, Vol. 32 (May 20, 1965), pp. 22-23.
- Berquist, Laura. "The Legacy of a Dictator." Look, Vol. 26, No. 13 (June 19, 1962), pp. 34-41.
- Bethel, Paul D. "Correspondence With Theodore Draper and Commentary, Appropriate and Inappropriate." National Review, Vol. XVIII, No. 34 (August 23, 1966), pp. 823-824.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Dominican Intervention: The Myths." National Review, Vol. XVIII, No. 6 (February 8, 1966), pp. 107-111.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Dominican Republic Goes to the Polls." The Reporter, Vol. 34, No. 11 (June 2, 1966), pp. 18-25.
- Bobea Billini, Mario. "Bosch: ¿Será Tan Buen Presidente Como Fue Político?" Ahora, No. 28 (1era Quincena Marzo 1963), pp. 3-4.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "¿Cómo Están las Relaciones Entre el Presidente y las Fuerzas Armadas?" Ahora, No. 33 (2da Quincena Mayo 1963), pp. 8-9, 28.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "¿Desean las Mayorías Derrocar a Juan Bosch?" Ahora, No. 30 (1era Quincena Septiembre 1963), pp. 53-54.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "La Ley de Prensa Ante el Paredón." Ahora, No. 34 (1era Quincena Junio 1963), pp. 8-9.

- Bochkaryov, Yuri. "Back to the Juntas." New Times, No. 41 (October 16, 1963), pp. 10-11.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Dominican Crisis--Highlights and Sidelights." New Times, No. 2 (January 10, 1962), pp. 11-13.
- Bonafede, Don. "The Dominican Elections." The Nation, Vol. 197, No. 3 (January 12, 1963), pp. 28-30.
- Bosch, Juan. "A Tale of Two Nations." The New Leader, Vol. XLVIII, No. 13 (June 21, 1965), pp. 3-7.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Comentarios al Libro de Un Dominicano Honesto." Ahora, No. 95 (Febrero 13, 1965), pp. 23-24.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Communism and Democracy in the Dominican Republic." Saturday Review, Vol. 48, No. 32 (August 7, 1965), pp. 13-15, 47.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Dictadura Con Apoyo Popular." Ahora, No. 199 (4 Septiembre 1967), pp. 4-5.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "El Futuro Se Llama Revolución." Ahora, No. 253 (16 Septiembre 1968), pp. 28-29.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "El Plan Para Una Dictadura en la República Dominicana." Ahora, No. 187 (12 Junio 1967), pp. 22-24.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "El Porvenir de América." Mundo Nuevo, No. 13 (Julio 1967), pp. 57-61.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "La Crisis Dominicana en el Panorama Mundial." Ahora, No. 218 (15 Enero 1968), pp. 26-28.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Mensaje a la Juventud Dominicana." Ahora, No. 182 (8 Mayo 1967), pp. 13-16.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Países Pobres del Mundo." Cuadernos, No. 71 (Abril 1963), pp. 3-4.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Panorama Político en 1961." Cuadernos, No. 53 (Octubre 1961), pp. 12-15.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Dominican Revolution." The New Republic, Vol. 153, Nos. 4-5 (July 24, 1965), pp. 19-21.

- Bosch, Juan. "Trujillo: Problema de América." Combate, Vol. I, No. 5 (Marzo y Abril 1959), pp. 9-13.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Trujijohnson, Pérez y Balaguer." Ahora, No. 281 (31 Marzo 1969), pp. 18-24.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Why I Was Overthrown." The New Leader, Vol. XLVI, No. 21 (October 14, 1963), pp. 3-4.
- Brouker, José de. "¡La Verdad Desnuda Tras la Polémica Actuación del Nuncio Clarizio!" Ahora, No. 132 (6 Mayo 1966), pp. 12-18, 59-62. Reprinted from Informations Catholiques Internationales, No. 62 (15 Abril 1966).
- Brugal P. Rafael A. "Creemos que Triunfaremos." Ahora, No. 234 (6 Mayo 1968), p. 17.
- Camilo-Fernández, J. A. "Dictadura con Respaldo Popular." Ahora, No. 297 (21 Julio 1969), pp. 25-27.
- Campa, Valentín. "La Gran Burguesía Ante la Invasión Yanqui de Santo Domingo." Política, Vol. VI (June 1, 1965), p. 47.
- Campos, Carlos M., and Arredondo, Alberto. "Las Condiciones de Vida del Campesino Dominicano." Panoramas, No. 4 (Julio-Agosto 1963), pp. 81-110.
- Cárdenas, Florangel. "División Entre los Comunistas Dominicanos." Ahora, No. 144 (15 Agosto 1966), pp. 13-16, 60.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "El Pentágono Contra el Departamento de Estado: Intimidaciones de la Crisis." Ahora, No. 117 (24 Enero 1966), pp. 8-11.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Entrevista con Fidelio Despradel." Ahora, No. 133 (23 Mayo 1966), pp. 56-57.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "La Universidad de Santo Domingo: Un Trayecto Difícil de la Tiranía a la Libertad." Renovación. Series of articles appearing at random in the weekly, beginning with No. 139 (21 al 27 de Octubre, 1969) at least until the end of the year. The series is forthcoming in book form published by Renovación.
- Casals, Pedro Manuel, and Gómez, Tana de. "Dominican Prospects." Liberation, Vol. XI (March 1966), p. 34.

- Cassini, Igor. "When the Sweet Life Turns Sour: A Farewell to Scandal." Esquire, Vol. LXI (April 1964), pp. 94 ff.
- Carter, Douglass, and Pincus, Walter. "Our Sugar Diplomacy." The Reporter, Vol. 24, No. 8 (April 13, 1961), pp. 24-28.
- Clark, James A. "The Church and the Dominican Crisis." Thought, Vol. LXI, No. 160 (Spring 1966), pp. 117-131.
- Claude, Inis L., Jr. "The Organization of American States, the United Nations, and the United States." International Conciliation, No. 547 (March 1964), pp. 47-60.
- Clements, R. J. "Events that Judge Us." The New Republic, Vol. CXXXV (July 2, 1965), pp. 9-12.
- Clos, Max. "Santo Domingo's Activist Adventurers." The Reporter, Vol. XXXII (June 17, 1965), pp. 29-31.
- Connell-Smith, Gordon. "The OAS and the Dominican Crisis." The World Today, Vol. XXII (June 1965), pp. 229-236.
- Cordero Michel, Jose Ramón Enrique. "Datos Sobre la Reforma Agraria en la República Dominicana." Caribbean Studies, Vol. II, No. 1 (April 1962), pp. 23-32.
- Cordero Regalado, Ramón Antonio. "Entrevista con el Padre Francisco Sicard." Ahora, No. 173 (6 Marzo 1967), pp. 14-16.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Luna Morales Cree en su Triunfo Sin Usar el Nombre del Presidente." Ahora, No. 234 (6 Mayo 1968), pp. 26-27.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Mainardi Reyna Confía en el Triunfo." Ahora, No. 231 (15 Abril 1968), pp. 22-24.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "¿Por Qué los Dominicanos No Cortamos Caña?" Ahora, No. 184 (22 Mayo 1967), pp. 22-24.
- Corten, André. "Cómo Vive la Otra Mitad de Santo Domingo: Estudio de Dualismo Estructural." Caribbean Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (January 1965), pp. 3-19.
- Cotten, Richard. "Dominican Tragedy." Conservative Viewpoint, Vol. III (December 18, 1965), pp. 1-4.

- Crist, Raymond E. "Cultural Dichotomy in the Island of Hispaniola." Economic Geography, Vol. XXVIII (April 1952), pp. 105-121.
- Cuello, Julio A. "Memorias de Una Tentativa Frustrada por Mediación por la Paz." Ahora, No. 112 (18 Diciembre 1965), pp. 7-11.
- Cuello, J. I., and Domínguez, Asdrúbal. "The Dominican Republic, Two Years After." World Marxist Review, Vol. 11 (March 1968), pp. 38-39.
- Cuello, J. I., and Isa Conde, N. "Revolutionary Struggle in the Dominican Republic and Its Lessons." World Marxist Review, Vol. 8 (December 1965), pp. 71-81.
- Cury, Jottin. "Donald Reid No Prende." Ahora, No. 73 (12 Septiembre 1964), pp. 10-11.
- Daniel, James. "Castro, Trujillo, and Turmoil." Saturday Evening Post, Vol. CCXXXIX (January 16, 1960), pp. 63ff.
- Dare, Captain James A. "Dominican Diary." United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 91 (December 1965), pp. 37-45.
- Davies, John Paton, Jr. "Yankee Go Home: Stay Home? Intervene?" New York Times Magazine (May 23, 1965), p. 28ff.
- De Camps, Hatuey. "Factores Que Determinaron el Triunfo del FUSD." Ahora, No. 289 (26 Mayo 1969), pp. 45-48.
- De Graff, Edward. "The Strange Legacy of 'El Benefactor.'" The Reporter, Vol. 25, No. 1 (July 6, 1961), pp. 30-31.
- Despradel, Fidelio. "Los Problemas de la Revolución Agraria en Nuestro País." Ahora, No. 298 (28 Julio 1969), pp. 36-39.
- Despradel Jasoon, Lil. "Introducción al Estudio de los Sindicatos de la Industria Azucarera en la República Dominicana." Ahora, No. 321 (5 Enero 1970), pp. 57-60, 73-75, 79.
- Díaz Rangel, Eleazar. "La Revolución Dominicana: ¿Por Qué No Dejan de Difundir Mentiras?" Ahora, No. 230 (8 Abril 1968), pp. 17-20, 77.

Draper, Theodore. "A Case of Defamation: U. S. Intelligence Vs. Juan Bosch." The New Republic, Vol. 154, No. 8 (February 19, 1966), pp. 13-19; and Vol. 154, No. 9 (February 26, 1966), pp. 15-18.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Bosch and Communism." The New Leader, Vol. XLVI, No. 21 (October 14, 1963), pp. 9-14.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Dominican Crisis." Commentary, Vol. 40, No. 6 (December 1965), pp. 33-68.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Roots of the Dominican Crisis." The New Leader, Vol. XLVIII, No. 11 (May 24, 1965), pp. 3-18.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Trujillo's Dynasty." The Reporter, Vol. 5, No. 11 (November 27, 1951), pp. 20-26.

Dudman, Richard. "Report from the Dominican Republic." The New Republic, Vol. 152, No. 23 (June 5, 1963), pp. 15-16.

Dyer, D. R. "Distribution of Population in Hispaniola." Economic Geography, Vol. 30 (October 1954), pp. 337-346.

Estrella, Julio C. "Comparación de Dos Empréstitos: El Empréstito Hartmont de 1869 y el Convenio con el Cosorcio Suizo de 1963." Ahora, No. 31 (2da Quincena Abril 1963), pp. 7-8, 30-31; and No. 32 (1era Quincena Mayo 1963), pp. 11-12, 24, 28.

\_\_\_\_\_. "De Washington a Nuestros Cañaverales: La Lección Que Debemos Aprender." Ahora, No. 146 (29 Agosto 1966), pp. 5-7.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Entre Vietnam y Santo Domingo." Ahora, No. 118 (31 Enero 1966), pp. 18-19.

\_\_\_\_\_. "La Izquierda Democrática: Unica Alternativa al Reto Comunista." Ahora, No. 119 (7 Febrero 1966), pp. 7-8.

\_\_\_\_\_. "La Responsabilidad del Gobierno en la Lucha Nacionalista." Ahora, No. 122 (7 Marzo 1966), pp. 7-11.

\_\_\_\_\_. "¿Puede el Presidente Crear Impuestos Por Decreto?" Ahora, No. 147 (5 Septiembre 1966), pp. 23-25.

Estrella Veloz, Santiago. "En el Dorado Exilio." Ahora, No. 170 (13 Febrero 1967), pp. 4-5.



- Evans, Rowland, Jr. "First Steps in Dominican Democracy." The Reporter, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January 3, 1963), pp. 21-23.
- Evanson, Philip. "The Third Dominican-Haitian War and the Return of General Santana: Part of a Long Story." Caribbean Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (April 1964), pp. 13-23.
- Félix, Guido. "Entrevista Con el Doctor Alfonso Moreno Martínez." Ahora, No. 52 (20 Febrero 1964), pp. 20-22.
- Fiallo, José Antinoe. "La Paz No Es Posible en Una Sociedad Que Sustenta La Violencia." Ahora, No. 296 (14 Julio 1969), pp. 25-27.
- Figueredo, Sergio. "Medellín-Santo Domingo: ¿Eje Peligroso?" Ahora, No. 307 (29 Septiembre 1969), pp. 14-16, 77.
- Figueres, José. "Mandato de las Naciones Unidas en la República Dominicana." Combate, Vol. I, No. 2 (Septiembre-Octubre 1958), pp. 67-70.
- Fournier, Fernando. "Trujillo: Dictador Tropical y Folklorico." Combate, Vol. IV (November-December 1962), pp. 27-31.
- Franco, Franklin. "Enfoque Sobre la Crisis en Santo Domingo." Ahora, No. 252 (9 Septiembre 1968), pp. 26-29; and No. 253 (16 Septiembre 1966), pp. 34-35, 75.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Marx y Bosch." Ahora, No. 250 (26 Agosto 1968), pp. 34-37.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Trujillo, Levántate y Anda." Ahora, No. 301 (18 Agosto 1969), pp. 26-29.
- Frías de Rodríguez, Thelma. "Bosch Se Opuso a la Modificación de la Ley Orgánica de la Policía." Ahora, No. 86 (12 Diciembre 1964), pp. 10-11, 70.
- Galíndez, Jesús de. "Un Reportaje Sobre Santo Domingo." Cuadernos Americanos, Vol. LXXX (March-April, 1955), pp. 37-56.
- Gall, Norman. "Dominican Republic: The Goons Again." The Nation, Vol. 198, No. 8 (February 17, 1964), pp. 159-161.

- Gall, Norman. "Ferment in the Caribbean." The New Leader, Vol. XLVI, No. 12 (June 10, 1963), pp. 8-10.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "How Trujillo Died." The New Republic, Vol. 148, No. 15 (April 13, 1963), pp. 19-20.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Struggle in Santo Domingo." The New Leader, Vol. L, No. 1 (January 2, 1967), pp. 2-9.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Dominican Imbroglio." The New Republic, Vol. CLIII (July 18, 1963), pp. 12-13.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Fall of Juan Bosch." The Nation, Vol. 197, No. 13 (October 26, 1963), pp. 253-256.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Strange Dominican Election." The New Leader, Vol. XLIX, No. 13 (June 20, 1966), pp. 3-7.
- Gerassi, John. "Intervention in Santo Domingo." Liberation, Vol. 10 (June-July 1965), pp. 3-7.
- Girbau, León Vicente. "Imperialism in the Dominican Republic." Monthly Review, Vol. CVII (September 1965), pp. 9-29.
- Goff, Fred, and Locker, Michael. "The Violence of Domination: United States Power and the Dominican Republic." In Irving Louis Horowitz, Josue de Castro, and John Gerassi (eds.), Latin American Radicalism (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 249-291 [originally published by NACLA, the North American Congress on Latin America (August 1967)].
- Gondo, Ovidio. "Una Esperanza en el Caribe." Cuadernos, No. 73 (June 1963), pp. 23-26.
- González Tamayo, Segundo A. "¿Debe Recaer o No en las Fuerzas Armadas Dominicanas la Responsabilidad de los Descalabros Que Sufre el País?" Ahora, No. 156 (7 Noviembre 1966), pp. 8-12, 74-75; and No. 157 (14 Noviembre 1966), pp. 39-43, 77-78.
- Goodsell, James N. "Balaguer's Dominican Republic." Current History, Vol. LIII, No. 315 (November 1967), pp. 298-302, 309.
- Graber, D. A. "United States Intervention in Latin America." In The Yearbook of World Affairs, 1962. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962, pp. 23-50.

- Grant, Donald. "The Dominican Tragedy." The Progressive, Vol. 30, No. 9 (September 1966), pp. 20-22.
- Grant, Frances R. "Dominican Ordeal Ending." Hemispherica, Vol. X (November-December 1961), pp. 1-3.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Dominicans Face Elections." Hemispherica, Vol. XI (December 1962), pp. 1-4.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Hemisphere Repudiates Trujillo." Hemispherica, Vol. IX (October 1960), pp. 1-2.
- Gruening, Ernest. "Dictatorship in Santo Domingo: A Joint Concern." The Nation, Vol. CXXXVIII (May 23, 1934), pp. 583-585.
- Grullón, Ramón. "Antecedentes y Perspectivas del Momento Político Dominicano." Cuadernos Americanos, Vol. CXX (Enero-Febrero 1962), pp. 221-252.
- Halper, Sam. "A Second Chance." The New Leader, Vol. XLIX, No. 13 (June 20, 1966), pp. 8-10.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Dominican Upheaval." The New Leader, Vol. XLVIII, No. 10 (May 10, 1965), pp. 304.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Inside Story of the Dominican Republic Grab." Life, Vol. LV (October 18, 1963), pp. 49-50.
- Hamel, Claude. "Histoire Sommaire du Parti Communiste Dominicain." Est & Ouest, No. 362 (Mai 1966), pp. 23-32.
- Haza L., Orlando. "La Recuperación Económica Dominicana, Un Modelo de Frustración." Foro Internacional, Vol. V (Julio-Septiembre 1964), pp. 38-52.
- Hennessy, A. "Background to the Dominican Coup." World Today, Vol. 21 (July 1965), pp. 236-239.
- Hernández, Miguel A. "¿Cumplirá Bosch Su Mandato?" Ahora, No. 38 (1era Quincena Agosto 1962), pp. 15-16, 54.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Entrevista con Balaguer." Ahora, No. 117 (24 Enero 1966), pp. 12-13.

- Hernández, Miguel A. "Entrevista con el Senador Casimiro Castro." Ahora, No. 147 (15 Septiembre 1966), pp. 7-9.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Entrevista con García-Godoy." Ahora, No. 123 (14 Marzo 1966), pp. 18-22.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Entrevista con Juan Bosch." Ahora, No. 119 (7 Febrero 1966), pp. 9-11.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Entrevista con Peña Gómez." Ahora, No. 127 (11 Abril 1966), pp. 7-9.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Entrevista con Rafael (Fafa) Taveras." Ahora, No. 116 (17 Enero 1966), pp. 17-19.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "¿Quién Ganará las Elecciones en la UASD?" Ahora, No. 140 (18 Julio 1966), pp. 30-33.
- Herring, Hubert. "Scandal of the Caribbean: The Dominican Republic." Current History, Vol. 38, No. 223 (March 1960), pp. 140-143, 164.
- Hoepelman, Armando. "Los Estudiantes Dominicanos: Una Juventud en Peligro." Combate, Vol. IV, No. 19 (Noviembre-Diciembre 1961), pp. 65-71.
- Hoetink, Harmannus. "Materiales Para el Estudio de la República Dominicana en la Segunda Mitad del Siglo XIX." Caribbean Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (October 1965), pp. 3-21; Vol. 7, No. 3 (October 1967), pp. 3-34; Vol. 8, No. 3 (October 1968), pp. 3-22; and Vol. 8, No. 4 (January 1969), pp. 3-37. Forthcoming in book form.
- Javier Castillo, Caonabo. "El PRSC y la Oposición Constructiva." Ahora, No. 172 (27 Febrero 1967), pp. 4-5, 75.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "En Torno a Un Mensaje . . . Repuesta a Juan Bosch." Ahora, No. 186 (2 Junio 1967), pp. 4-5, 78.
- Jiménez, Honorato. "Hoy en Santo Domingo." Tiempos Nuevos, Vol. XXIII (October 1965), pp. 16-18.
- Jiménez Grullón, Juan Isidro. "Burguesía 'Atípica' y Burguesía Auténtica en Nuestro País." Ahora, No. 258 (21 Octubre 1968), pp. 46-48.

- Jiménez Grullón, Juan Isidro. "Desarrollo Histórico de las Fuerzas Armadas." Ahora, No. 91 (16 Enero 1965), pp. 41-45.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Dos Años de Gobierno de Balaguer." Ahora, No. 248, (12 Agosto 1968), pp. 36-38.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Dos Farsas Impúdicas: La Conferencia de Cancilleres y la Reunión Cumbre." Ahora, No. 176 (27 Marzo 1967), pp. 22-24, 79.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "El Drama Dominicano y Sus Soluciones." Ahora, No. 112 (18 Diciembre 1965), pp. 58-62, 64.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Juan Bosch: Talento y Delirio." Ahora, No. 98 (6 Marzo 1965), pp. 8-9.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "La Decisión Abstencionista del PRD." Ahora, No. 228 (25 Marzo 1968), pp. 14-16.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Por Qué Ha Fracasado la Democracia Liberal en Nuestra América." Ahora, No. 271 (20 Enero 1969), pp. 70-72.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Qué Es la Oligarquía." Ahora, No. 302 (25 Agosto 1969), pp. 45-48; No. 303 (1 Septiembre 1969), pp. 12-16; and No. 304 (8 Septiembre 1969), pp. 65-68.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Reconozca Sus Errores Sr. Bosch." Ahora, No. 95 (13 Febrero 1965), pp. 20-22.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Treta Gubernamental Frente a las Elecciones Municipales." Ahora, No. 232 (7 Abril 1968), pp. 36-37.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Trujillo: More Croesus Than Caesar." The Nation, Vol. CLXXXIX (December 26, 1956), pp. 485-486.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Unica Solución al Drama Nacional." Ahora, No. 195 (7 Agosto 1967), pp. 30-32.
- Juárez, Joseph Robert. "United States Withdrawal from Santo Domingo." The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 42, No. 2 (May 1962), pp. 152-190.
- Kamynin, L. "Election Farce." International Affairs, No. 2 (February 1963), pp. 89-90.

Kamynin, L. "Inter-American Force, A Weapon of Neo-Colonialism." International Affairs, No. 3 (March 1967), pp. 27-33.

Kantor, Harry. "Ascenso y Caída de Rafael Trujillo." Cuadernos, No. 72 (Mayo 1963), pp. 47-54.

Kelsey, Carl. "The American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 100 (March 1922), pp. 166-199.

Kemble, Penn. "No Joy in Santo Domingo." New America, Vol. V, No. 21 (June 15, 1966), pp. i, 7.

Kopkind, Andrew. "Fullbright Furioso." New Statesman, Vol. 70 (October 1, 1965), p. 473.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Outlook for Bosch: A Report from the Dominican Republic." The New Republic, Vol. 154, No. 21 (May 21, 1966), pp. 15-18.

Kurzman, Dan. "Democracy Vs. Dictator's Ghost." Saturday Review, Vol. 49, No. 52 (December 24, 1966), pp. 48-49.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Dominican Constitutionalism." The New Leader, Vol. XLIX (July 18, 1966), pp. 9-10.

Landolfi, Ciriaco. "Los Gobiernos Colegiados en las Antillas." Ahora, No. 58 (20 Abril 1964), pp. 35-36; No. 59 (30 Abril 1964), pp. 15-17; and No. 60 (10 Mayo 1964), pp. 18-21.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Los Insustituibles." Ahora, No. 48 (10 Enero 1964), pp. 14A-14B, 62B; and No. 52 (20 Febrero 1964), pp. 56-57.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Ponderación de los Factores Reales de la Política Dominicana." Ahora, No. 66 (10 Julio 1964), pp. 17-19; No. 67 (20 Julio 1964), pp. 10-13; No. 68 (30 Julio 1964), pp. 9-10; and No. 69 (10 Agosto 1964), pp. 13-14, 16.

Lens, Sidney. "Coup in the Caribbean." Liberation, Vol. VIII (October 1963), p. 4.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Santo Domingo: The Unfinished Revolution." The Nation, Vol. 202, No. 18 (May 2, 1966), pp. 520-523.

- Lens, Sidney. "Tinder Box in the Dominican Republic." The Progressive, Vol. 27, No. 9 (September 1963), pp. 35-38.
- Levin, V. "The USA Uses the Big Stick." International Affairs, Vol. LVIII (December 4, 1961), pp. 49-51.
- Levine, Hal. "Between Rebels and Rightists." Saturday Review, Vol. 48, No. 48 (November 27, 1965), pp. 36-37.
- Levine, Harold. "Dominican Success: Power, Policy and People." Newsweek, Vol. LVIII (December 4, 1961), pp. 49-51.
- Levine, John L. "The Politics of Metternich." New Politics, Vol. IV, No. 2 (Spring 1965), pp. 70-77.
- Listov, Vadim. "Big Stick Against a Small Nation." New Times, No. 20 (May 17, 1965), pp. 8-11.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "No Surrender in Santo Domingo." New Times, No. 25 (June 23, 1965), pp. 22-23.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Battle of Santo Domingo." New Times, No. 21 (May 26, 1965), pp. 14-15.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Dominican Tragedy." New Times, No. 22 (June 2, 1965), pp. 12-14.
- \_\_\_\_\_, and Shukov, V. "Their Men in Santo Domingo." New Times, No. 23 (June 9, 1965), pp. 4-7.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Washington's Setback in Santo Domingo." New Times, No. 37 (September 15, 1965), pp. 13-14.
- Logan, Rayford W. "Crisis Impending in the Dominican Republic." World Today, Vol. 16, No. 11 (November 1960), pp. 480-490.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Dominican Republic: Struggle for Tomorrow." The Nation, Vol. 193, No. 21 (December 16, 1961), pp. 488-490.
- Lowenthal, Abraham F. "Foreign Aid as a Political Instrument: The Case of the Dominican Republic." Public Policy, Vol. XIV (1965), pp. 141-160.

- Lowenthal, Abraham F. "Limits of American Power: The Lessons of the Dominican Republic." Harper's Magazine, Vol. 228 (June 1964), pp. 87-95.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Dominican Intervention in Retrospect." Public Policy, Vol. XVIII, No. 1 (Fall 1969), pp. 34-58.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Dominican Republic: The Politics of Chaos." In Arpad Von Lazar and Robert F. Kaufman (eds.), Reform and Revolution: Readings in Latin American Politics (New York: Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 1969), pp. 34-58.
- Lugo Lovatón, Ramón. "Ejercicio del Poder Ejecutivo en la República Dominicana." Ahora, No. 11 (20 Junio 1962), pp. 23-24; No. 12 (4 Julio 1962), pp. 3-4; No. 13 (20 Julio 1962), pp. 25-26; No. 14 (3 Agosto 1962), pp. 20-21; and No. 16 (1era Quincena Septiembre 1962), pp. 8-11.
- Maldonado Denis, Manuel. "El Triunfo de Balaguer: Un Retroceso Histórico." Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, Vol. III (July 1966), pp. 3-8.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Hacia Un Esbozo de las Oligarquías en el Caribe Hispano-Parlante." Caribbean Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Enero 1968), pp. 3-10.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "La Caída de Juan Bosch y la Política en la República Dominicana." Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, Vol. I (November 1963), pp. 9-12.
- Manlin, Lieut. Colonel Wallace J., and Brown, Major Richard M., U. S. Army. "Key to a Crisis." Military Review, Vol. 46 (February 1966), pp. 9-14.
- Marchant, Roberto. "El Legado de Trujillo." Cuadernos, No. 54 (Noviembre 1961), pp. 71-75.
- Martin, Fran [Mrs. John Bartlow Martin]. "Our Boys Took to Embassy Life." Parents Magazine, Vol 41 (December 1966), pp. 68-69, 81.
- Martin, John Bartlow. "Struggle to Bring Together Two Sides Torn by Killing." Life, Vol. 58 (May 28, 1965), p. 28ff.



- Martínez, Julio César. "Como la Crisis Dominicana Determinó el Cierre de Dos Importantes Revistas Internacionales." Ahora, No. 125 (28 Marzo 1966), pp. 12-13.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Revolution and Counter Revolution in the Dominican Republic." New Politics, Vol. IV, No. 2 (Spring 1965), pp. 47-55.
- Martínez G., Rafael. "¿Se Está Llevando a Cabo la Reforma Agraria Que Necesitamos?" Ahora, No. 35 (2da Quincena Junio 1963), pp. 8-10.
- Martínez Viñas, Livino. "Análisis de los Pronunciamientos de la Asociación Dominicana de Hacendados y Agricultores, Inc." Ahora, No. 294 (30 Junio 1969), pp. 57-60.
- Mayer, Karl E. "The Lesser Evil Doctrine." The New Leader, Vol. XLVI, No. 21 (October 14, 1963), p. 14.
- Mejía Ricart, Tirso. "La República Dominicana en el Marco del Desarrollo Socio-Político Contemporáneo de la América Latina." Ahora, No. 255 (30 Septiembre 1968), pp. 68-71; and No. 256 (7 Octubre 1968), pp. 64-69.
- Mejía Santana, J. "Las Razones Históricas Que Obligan al Pueblo Dominicano a Cambiar Sus Métodos de Lucha." Ahora, No. 101 (27 Marzo 1965), pp. 15-16.
- Messina, Milton. "La Programación del Desarrollo en la República Dominicana." Ahora, No. 111 (6 Diciembre 1965), pp. 7-12, 72-74.
- Miller, Linda B. "Regional Organization and the Regulation of Internal Conflict." World Politics, Vol. XIX, No. 4 (July 1967), pp. 582-600.
- Mockler, Tony. "Santo Domingo: Labyrinth of Policy." The Nation, Vol. 202, No. 6 (February 7, 1966), pp. 154-157.
- Molina Morillo, Rafael. "Cuidado con el Partido Amarillo." Ahora, No. 1 (15 Enero 1962), pp. 5, 10.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Entrevista con Juan Bosch." Ahora, No. 110 (3 Octubre 1965), pp. 31-33.

- Molina Morillo, Rafael. "Historia Intima de Cómo Se Desarrolló el Golpe Militar." Ahora, No. 44 (1era Quincena Noviembre 1963), pp. 7-9, 56-57.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Los 'Cursillos de Cristiandad': Moda o Revolución." Ahora, No. 64 (20 Junio 1964), pp. 9-12.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "¿Qué Hace la AID en Santo Domingo?" Ahora, No. 155 (31 Octubre 1966), pp. 9-14.
- Molina Pérez, Rafael. "Juan Pablo Badía Confía en Ganar la Sindicatura de Moca." Ahora, No. 233 (29 Abril 1968), pp. 26-27.
- Monclús, Angiolino. "¿Quiénes Son los Culpables." Ahora, No. 173 (6 Marzo 1967), pp. 23-25.
- Montalvo, Alvaro. "¿Cuál Sería el Resultado de Una Ruptura Entre Bosch y el PRD?" Ahora, No. 41 (2da Quincena Septiembre 1963), pp. 3-4.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "El Equipo Con Que Bosch Inicia Su Gestión Gubernativa." Ahora, No. 29 (2da Quincena Marzo 1963), pp. 34-36.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Las Cantinas Militares." Ahora, No. 60 (10 Mayo 1964), pp. 7-9.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Las Ultimas Horas de Gobierno del Profesor Bosch." Ahora, No. 43 (2da Quincena Octubre 1963), p. 17.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "¿Por Qué Caonabo Javier Fué Expulsado del Directorio del PRSC?" Ahora, No. 39 (2da Quincena Agosto 1963), pp. 19-21.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Puntos Neurálgicos de la Política Dominicana." Ahora, No. 57 (10 Abril 1964), pp. 11-12.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "¿Qué Hay en el Fondo del Famoso 'Affaire' de la Refinería de Petróleo?" Ahora, No. 26 (1era Quincena Febrero 1963), pp. 34-36.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "¿Se Relaciona la Huelga de los Choferes con el Regreso de Balaguer?" Ahora, No. 55 (20 Abril 1964), pp. 8-10.
- Nahama, Saby. "Communist-Anti U.S. Campaign Found Losing Ground in Dominican Republic." Inter-American Labor Bulletin, Vol. XIII (May 1962), p. 2.

- Niebuhr, Reinhold. "Caribbean Blunder." Christianity and Crisis, Vol. XXV (May 31, 1965), pp. 113-114.
- Nikolayev, P. "The Dominican Putsch." New Times, No. 43 (October 30, 1963), pp. 20-21.
- Núñez, Carlos. "Entrevista con Balaguer." Ahora, No. 138 (4 Julio 1966), pp. 17-19.
- O'Brien, W. V. "International Law, Morality and American Intervention." Catholic World, Vol. CCI (September 1965), pp. 388-393.
- Ogelsby, J. C. M. "Haiti and the Dominican Republic." In Ben G. Burnett and Kenneth Johnson (eds.), Latin America: Dimensions of the Quest for Political Stability (Whittier, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 145-170.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Prospects for Democracy in the Dominican Republic." International Journal, Vol. XXI (Spring 1966), pp. 205-210.
- Parkinson, F. "Santo Domingo and After." In The Yearbook of World Affairs, 1966. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966, pp. 143-168.
- Perallón, Guillermo. "Entrevista con Caamaño." Ahora, No. 110 (3 Octubre 1965), pp. 13-14.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "¿Existe Unidad Militar?" Ahora, No. 85 (1 Diciembre 1964), pp. 13-14.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Un Delicado Imperativo: Reducir las Fuerzas Armadas." Ahora, No. 64 (20 Junio 1964), pp. 20, 74.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Una Utopía: La Apoliticidad Militar." Ahora, No. 61 (20 Mayo 1964), pp. 21-23.
- Piacentini, Pablo. "Estamos Ante Un Hecho Nuevo." Ahora, No. 109 (25 Septiembre 1965), pp. 5-7.
- Pina Acevedo y Martínez, Ramón. "Le Ilegalización del 1J4." Ahora, No. 127 (11 Abril 1966), pp. 10-14.

- Plank, John N. "The Caribbean: Intervention, When and How." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 1 (October 1965), pp. 37-48.
- Plastrik, Stanley. "The Crime at Santo Domingo." Dissent, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer 1965), pp. 291-294.
- Pulley, Raymond H. "The United States and the Trujillo Dictatorship, 1933-1940: The High Price of Caribbean Stability." Caribbean Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (October 1965), pp. 22-31.
- Rambo, A. Terry. "Dominican Republic." In Martin C. Needler (ed.), Political Systems of Latin America. Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1964, pp. 165-180.
- Ramos, Leoncio. "El Golpe de Estado del 25 de Septiembre." Ley y Justicia, Vol. 1 (25 Octubre 1963), pp. 16-30.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "La Crisis Política de San Isidro." Ley y Justicia, Vol. I (18 Agosto 1963), pp. 3-11.
- Raymond, Nicholas, and Carty, Winthrop P. "Balaguer's Burden: The Trujillo Holdings." The Reporter, Vol. 37, No. 9 (November 30, 1967), pp. 26-28.
- Rettie, J. "Hungary in the Caribbean?" New Statesman, Vol. 69 (May 7, 1965), p. 710.
- Reynoso Solís, Miguel Angel. "Entrevista con José de Jesús Morillo López." Ahora, No. 122 (7 Marzo 1966), pp. 14-16.
- Riccio, Humberto. "Entrevista con Rodríguez Echavarría." Ahora, No. 45 (2da Quincena Noviembre 1963), pp. 11-12.
- Rivas, Ubi. "Cayetano Visitó a Mao." Ahora, No. 122 (7 Marzo 1966), pp. 12-13.
- Roche, John P. "Return of the Syndicate." The New Leader, Vol. XLVI, No. 21 (October 14, 1963), pp. 5-8.
- Rodman, Selden. "A Close View of Santo Domingo." The Reporter, Vol. 33, No. 2 (July 15, 1965), pp. 20-27.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Balaguer: The First Nine Months." The New Republic, Vol. 156, No. 12 (March 19, 1967), pp. 19-23.

- Rodman, Selden. "Why Balaguer Won: Anatomy of a Revolution That Failed." The New Republic, Vol. 154, No. 25 (June 18, 1966), pp. 17-21.
- Rodríguez Echavarría, Pedro Rafael. "Los Agregados Militares Desconocían y No Apoyaron el Movimiento del 19 de Noviembre de 1961." Ahora, No. 133 (23 Mayo 1966), pp. 23-25.
- Romualdi, Serafino. "Trujillo on the Carpet." Inter-American Labor Bulletin, Vol. XI (March 1960), p. 1.
- Rosa, Jesús de la. "Los Escolares y la Política." Ahora, No. 144 (August 15, 1966), pp. 33-35.
- Roucek, Joseph S. "The Dominican Republic in Geopolitics." Contemporary Review, Vol. 206, No. 1193 (June 1965), pp. 289-294; and Vol. 206, No. 1194 (July 1965), pp. 12-21.
- Rubin, Morris H. "Two Dictators Share an Island: Haiti and the Dominican Republic." The Progressive, Vol. 25, No. 6 (June 1961), pp. 34-37.
- San José, Miguel. "Cuando Bosch le Cantó el Requiem a la Huelga la Sabía Fracasada de Antemano." Ahora, No. 33 (2da Quincena Mayo 1963), pp. 21-22.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Está en Marcha la Reforma Agraria." Ahora, No. 42 (1era Quincena Octubre 1963), pp. 52-53.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Guerrillas en Santo Domingo." Ahora, No. 47 (2da Quincena Diciembre 1963), pp. 11, 14.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Un Análisis Técnico del Movimiento Insurreccional Dominicano." Ahora, No. 49 (20 Enero 1964), pp. 7-8.
- Sánchez Cabral, Eduardo. "Bosch-Balaguer-Reid: Tres Hombres en la Vida Política Dominicana." Ahora, No. 91 (16 Enero 1965), pp. 15-18; No. 93 (30 Enero 1965), pp. 11-14; and No. 99 (13 Marzo 1965), pp. 7-11.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "El Caso Dominicano en Río de Janeiro." Ahora, No. 114 (3 Enero 1966), pp. 29-32; No. 116 (17 Enero 1966), pp. 21-24; No. 117 (24 Enero 1966), pp. 14-16; and No. 119 (7 Febrero 1966), pp. 34-35, 78.

- Sánchez Cabral, Eduardo. "El Movimiento Constitucionalista: La Más Bella Revolución Dominicana." Ahora, No. 109 (25 Septiembre 1965), pp. 10-11, 68.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Entrevista con Fidelio Despradel." Ahora, No. 75 (26 Septiembre 1964), pp. 7-9.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Habla Máximo López Molina." Ahora, No. 74 (10 Septiembre 1964), pp. 13-14, 70.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Treinta de Mayo de 1961: Nuestra Ultima Epopeya." Ahora, No. 185 (29 Mayo 1967), pp. 22-25.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Una Actitud Anti-Nacionalista de Nuestro Embajador en la OEA." Ahora, No. 172 (27 Febrero 1967), pp. 22-24.
- Santibáñez, Abraham. "Le Ley del Más Fuerte." Ahora, No. 110 (3 Octubre 1965), pp. 27-30.
- Sauvage, Leo. "Distorting the Dominican Revolution." The New Leader, Vol. L, No. 2 (January 16, 1967), pp. 19-21.
- Schreiber, Anna P., and Philippe, S. E. "The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the Dominican Crisis." International Organization, Vol. XXII, No. 2 (Spring 1968), pp. 508-528.
- Shapiro, Samuel. "The Dominican Dilemma." New Politics, Vol. IV, No. 2 (Spring 1965), pp. 59-69.
- Silva Herzog, Jesús. "La República Dominicana, Nación Mártir." Cuadernos Americanos, Vol. CXLI, No. 4 (Julio-Agosto 1965), pp. 7-18.
- Simmons, E. L. "Balaguer Takes Over." Commonweal, Vol. 84 (July 8, 1966), pp. 437-440.
- Sinks, Alfred H. "Trujillo, Caribbean Dictator." The American Mercury, Vol. LII, No. 202 (October 1940), pp. 164-171.
- Slater, Jerome. "The Limits of Legitimization in International Organizations: The Organization of American States and the Dominican Crisis." International Organization, Vol. XXIII, No. 1 (Winter 1969), pp. 48-72.

- Slater, Jerome. "The United States, the Organization of American States, and the Dominican Republic." International Organization, Vol. XVIII (1964), pp. 268-291.
- Soñé Uribe, Víctor M. "La Tragedia de Haití y Santo Domingo." Ahora, No. 85 (5 Diciembre 1964), pp. 23-25.
- Souchère, Elena de la. "Diario de Santo Domingo." Mundo Nuevo, No. 3 (Septiembre 1966), pp. 42-56.
- Stone, I. F. "Special Report from Santo Domingo." I. F. Stone's Bi-Weekly, April 1, 1963, pp. 1-4.
- Szulc, Tad. "After Trujillo, a Reformer with a Mission." The New York Times Magazine (September 8, 1963), pp. 30, 114.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Santo Domingo: No Alliance." The New Leader, Vol. XLVI (January 7, 1963), pp. 4-5.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Trujillo's Legacy: A Democratic Vacuum." The New York Times Magazine (September 2, 1962), pp. 9, 40-41.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Uneasy Year 29 of the Trujillo Era." The New York Times Magazine (August 29, 1959), pp. 9ff.
- Tapia Brea, Manuel. "La FIP, Atentado a la Democracia." Ahora, No. 152 (10 Octubre 1966), pp. 21-22.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "La Revolución de Abril y la Intervención Norteamericana." Ahora, No. 233 (29 Abril 1968), pp. 14-16.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Se Equivoca Mister Humphrey: La OEA No Autorizó la Intervención USA a Santo Domingo." Ahora, No. 252 (9 Septiembre 1968), pp. 14-16.
- Tejeda Ortíz, Juan Dagoberto. "Reflexiones Sociológicas en Torno a las Elecciones de la UASD." Ahora, No. 290 (2 Junio 1969), pp. 29-32.
- Thackray, John. "The Dominican Military." The New Republic, Vol. CLIII (August 7, 1965), p. 12.
- Thomas, Norman. "Carta Abierta al Presidente Balaguer." Combate, Vol. 3, No. 18 (Septiembre-Octubre 1961), pp. 8-12.

- Thomen, Antonio. "La Función de la Corporación de Fomento." Ahora, No. 42 (1era Quincena Octubre 1962), pp. 55-56.
- Thomson, C. A. "Dictatorship in the Dominican Republic." Foreign Policy Reports, Vol. XII (April 15, 1936), pp. 30-40.
- Thorning, J. F. "The Dominican Republic: Twenty-Five Years of Peace and Prosperity." World Affairs, Vol. CXVIII (Summer 1955), pp. 45-47.
- Vázquez Acosta, Rogelio. "Asumir la Dirección del Ayuntamiento de Barahona es una Gravísima Responsabilidad." Ahora, No. 235 (13 Mayo 1968), p. 28.
- Viñas Martínez, Livino. "Análisis de los Pronunciamientos de la Asociación Dominicana de Hacendados y Agricultores, Inc." Ahora, No. 294 (30 Junio 1969), pp. 57-60.
- Volman, Sacha. "La Educación Para el Cambio Social." Panoramas, Vol. XIII (Enero-Febrero 1965), pp. 5-88.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Las 'Guerras de Liberación.'" Ahora, No. 119 (7 Febrero 1966), pp. 18-24.
- Von Lazar, Arpad, and Hammock, John C. "The Dominican Republic." In Ben G. Burnett and Kenneth F. Johnson (eds.), Political Forces in Latin America. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 2nd Edition, 1970, pp. 209-228.
- Wagenheim, Kal. "Dominican Republic: Burden of the Past." The Nation, Vol. 203, No. 17 (November 21, 1966), pp. 541-544.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Talking with Juan Bosch." The New Leader, Vol. XLIX (February 28, 1966), pp. 7-10.
- Weckslar, James A. "Managing the News: The Dominican Case History." Current, No. 62 (August 1965), pp. 33-34.
- Wedge, Bryant. "The Case of Student Political Violence: Brazil, 1964, and Dominican Republic, 1965." World Politics, Vol. XXI, No. 2 (January 1969), pp. 183-206.
- Wells, Henry. "The Dominican Experiment with Bosch." Orbis, Vol. X, No. 1 (Spring 1966), pp. 274-280.



- Wells, Henry. "The Dominican Search for Stability." Current History, Vol. 51, No. 204 (December 1966), pp. 328-332, 364-365.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The OAS and the Dominican Elections." Orbis, Vol. VII, No. 1 (Spring 1963), pp. 150-163.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Turmoil in the Dominican Republic." Current History, Vol. 50, No. 293 (January 1966), pp. 14-20.
- Wessin y Wessin, Elías. "A Todos Mis Hermanos de Armas." Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas, No. 132 (Mayo-Junio 1963), p. 1.
- Whitney, Thomas P. "In the Wake of Trujillo." The New Republic, Vol. 145, No. 24 (December 11, 1961), pp. 6-8.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The U. S. and the Dominicans." The New Republic, Vol. 146, No. 7 (February 12, 1962), pp. 13-15.
- Wiarda, Howard J. "Contemporary Constitutions and Constitutionalism: The Dominican Republic." Law and Society Review, Vol. 2 (June 1968), pp. 385-405.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "From Fragmentation to Disintegration: The Social and Political Effects of the Dominican Revolution." América Latina, Vol. X, No. 2 (April-June 1967), pp. 55-70.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Round Two in the Dominican Republic." Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, Vol. I (July 1964), pp. 3-4.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Changing Political Orientation of the Catholic Church in the Dominican Republic." A Journal of Church and State, Vol. VII, No. 2 (Spring 1965), pp. 238-254.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Development of the Labor Movement in the Dominican Republic." Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1966), pp. 41-63.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Dominican Fuse." The Nation, Vol. 206, No. 8 (February 9, 1968), pp. 238-244.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Dominican Republic: Dictatorship, Development, and Disintegration." In Martin C. Needler (ed.). Political Systems of Latin America. Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Norstrand Company, 2nd Edition, 1970, pp. 184-200.

- Wiarda, Howard J. "The Dominican Revolution in Perspective: A Research Note." Polity, Vol. I, No. 1 (Fall 1968), pp. 114-124.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Politics of Civil-Military Relations in the Dominican Republic." Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. VII, No. 4 (October 1965), pp. 465-484.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Prospects for New Elections in the Dominican Republic." Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, Vol. II (March 1965), pp. 4-7.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The U.S. and the Dominican Crisis: Background to Chaos." Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, Vol. II (July 1965), pp. 5-8.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Trujilloism Without Trujillo." The New Republic, Vol. 151, No. 12 (September 19, 1964), pp. 5-6.
- Wilson, Larman C. "Estados Unidos y la Guerra Civil Dominicana." Foro Internacional, Vol. VIII (Diciembre 1967), pp. 155-178.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Dominican Policy of the United States." World Affairs, Vol. 128, No. 2 (July, August, September, 1965), pp. 93-101.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Monroe Doctrine, Cold War Anachronism: Cuba and the Dominican Republic." The Journal of Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2 (May 1966), pp. 322-346.
- Wright, Theodore P., Jr. "The United States and Latin American Dictatorship: The Case of the Dominican Republic." Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (1960), pp. 152-157.
- Yegorova, N. "Dominican Republic: A Broken Shop Window." International Affairs, No. 11 (November 1963), pp. 81-82.
- Zervignón, Pedro. "El Exilio Cubano y la Revolución Dominicana." Ahora, No. 132 (6 Mayo 1966), pp. 36-38.
- Zhukov, Vladimir. "Dominican Resistance Continues." New Times, No. 17 (April 26, 1966), pp. 17-18.
- Zigler, Jean. "Santo Domingo, Feudo de Trujillo." Cuadernos, No. 46 (Enero-Febrero 1961), pp. 98-102.

Unsigned Articles

- "Abridgement of Security Council Debate on Dominican Crisis." United Nations Monthly Chronicle, Vol. II, No. 6 (June 1965), pp. 3-12; No. 7 (July 1965), pp. 3-11; and No. 8 (August 1965), pp. 10-16.
- "¿Acercamiento Socialcristiano al Gobierno?" Ahora, No. 171 (20 Febrero 1967), pp. 4-5, 80.
- "Ajedrez de Posiciones." Ahora, No. 242 (1 Julio 1968), pp. 6, 8.
- "Amiama Tió Tras los Hilos del Atentado contra Imbert." Ahora, No. 177 (3 Abril 1967), pp. 4-7.
- "Análisis de la Tesis de Bosch." Ahora, No. 298 (28 Julio 1969), pp. 4, 74-75.
- "Ante la Convención del PRD: Se Levanta el Telón." Ahora, No. 155 (31 Octubre 1966), pp. 6-7.
- "¿Apoyaría Balaguer a García-Godoy?" Ahora, No. 283 (14 Abril 1969), pp. 3-5.
- "Azúcar y Política." Ahora, No. 148 (12 Septiembre 1966), pp. 7-8.
- "Balaguer Enfrenta el Problema Militar." Ahora, No. 141 (25 Julio 1966), pp. 8-9.
- "Bitter Salt of Stanger's Bread." National Review, Vol. XVII, No. 42 (October 19, 1965), p. 911.
- "Condenan Plan Reelectionista." Ahora, No. 296 (14 Julio 1969), pp. 5-6.
- "Conspiraciones Otra Vez." Ahora, No. 242 (Julio 1, 1968), p. 8.
- "Denuncias del Encuentro de Cristianos Comprometidos: Censuras a la Iglesia Católica." Ahora, No. 273 (3 Febrero 1969), pp. 4-7.
- "División en el PRD." Ahora, No. 155 (31 Octubre 1966), pp. 5, 75.
- "Dominican Republic: Chamber of Horror." Times, Vol. LXXXIX (April 13, 1962), p. 41.

- "El Caso del Diputado Martínez." Ahora, No. 258 (21 Octubre 1968), pp. 6-7.
- "El Desacato Militar y la Huelga, Características de la Crisis." Ahora, No. 117 (24 Enero 1966), pp. 6-7.
- "¡El Discurso Prohibido!" Ahora, No. 196 (14 Agosto 1967), pp. 4-5.
- "El FMI Exige al Gobierno Pago de la Deuda de 1969." Ahora, No. 261 (11 Noviembre 1968), p. 7.
- "El Frente y la Coexistencia." Ahora, No. 238 (3 Junio 1968), p. 7.
- "El Gobierno de Balaguer y la Oposición Creadora." Ahora, No. 137 (27 Junio 1966), pp. 5-7.
- "El Informe del CIAP." Ahora, No. 271 (20 Enero 1966), pp. 6-7.
- "El Plan Reeleccionista." Ahora, No. 295 (7 Julio 1969), pp. 4-5.
- "El 'Pleito Casao' Entre Balaguer y Wessin." Ahora, No. 200 (11 Septiembre 1967), pp. 4-5.
- "El Presidente y el Nuncio." Ahora, No. 298 (28 Julio 1969), pp. 3-4.
- "El Problema de la UASD." Ahora, No. 113 (27 Diciembre 1965), pp. 44-45.
- "El Reformismo en Campaña." Ahora, No. 254 (23 Septiembre 1968), pp. 6-7.
- "¡El Secreto Azucarero Debe Terminar!" Ahora, No. 253 (16 Septiembre 1968), pp. 4-6.
- "Elecciones." Ahora, No. 237 (26 Mayo 1968), pp. 4-7.
- "Entrevista con Angel Miolán." Ahora, No. 113 (27 Diciembre 1965), p. 9.
- "Entrevista con Antonio Rosario." Ahora, No. 121 (28 Febrero 1966), pp. 44-47.
- "Entrevista con Balaguer." Ahora, No. 65 (30 Junio 1964), pp. 7, 12.

- "Entrevista con Caamaño en Londres." Ahora, No. 125 (28 Mayo 1966), pp. 7-9.
- "Entrevista con Cayetano Rodríguez." Ahora, No. 132 (6 Mayo 1966), pp. 19-20.
- "Entrevista con el Coronel Caamaño." Ahora, No. 128 (18 Abril 1966), pp. 15-17.
- "Entrevista con el Dr. Víctor Hidalgo Justo." Ahora, No. 126 (4 Abril 1966), pp. 28-29, 60.
- "Entrevista con el General Enrique Pérez y Pérez." Ahora, No. 126 (4 Abril 1966), pp. 21-22.
- "Entrevista con el Lic. Francisco Augusto Lora." Ahora, No. 131 (9 Mayo 1966), pp. 25-27.
- "Entrevista con el Lic. Manuel Joaquín Castillo." Ahora, No. 126 (4 Abril 1966), pp. 16-17.
- "Entrevista con el Padre Marcial Silva." Ahora, No. 138 (4 Julio 1966), pp. 8-9.
- "Entrevista con Emmanuele Clarizio." Ahora, No. 121 (28 Febrero 1966), pp. 30-33.
- "Entrevista con Jiménez Grullón." Ahora, No. 138 (4 Julio 1966), pp. 25-27.
- "Entrevista con Juan Bosch." Ahora, No. 136 (20 Junio 1966), pp. 9-10.
- "Entrevista con Narciso Isa Conde." Ahora, No. 131 (9 Mayo 1966), pp. 13-15.
- "Entrevista con Rafael Bonelly." Ahora, No. 123 (14 Mayo 1966), pp. 26-30.
- "Felipe Herrera, El BID y la República Dominicana." Ahora, No. 169 (6 Febrero 1967), pp. 17-24.
- "Fuerzas Armadas Discriminan en Ascensos." Ahora, No. 272 (27 Enero 1969), pp. 5-6.

- "García-Godoy Enfrentado al Poder Militar." Ahora, No. 116 (17 Enero 1966), pp. 7-8.
- "Gobierno y Nunciatura Intercambian Notas." Ahora, No. 281 (31 Marzo 1969), pp. 4-5.
- "Haiti-Dominican Republic Dispute Considered by Security Council." United Nations Review, Vol. X, No. 6 (June 1963), pp. 35-37.
- "Homecoming: Return of Balaguer." Time, Vol. 153 (July 9, 1965), p. 34.
- "Juan Bo's Return." Newsweek, Vol. 66 (October 4, 1965), p. 59.
- "Juan Versus Láutico: El Debate del Año." Ahora, No. 14 (1ra Quincena de Enero, 1963), pp. 13-16.
- "La Acción Política Sensibilizó al Candidato Reformista a Síndico." Ahora, No. 232 (22 Abril 1968), pp. 20-23.
- "La Aspiración del Candidato Verde: ¡Responsabilidad y Honestidad en la Política!" Ahora, No. 232 (22 Abril 1968), pp. 25-28.
- "La Cancillería: Departamento de Trabajo Arduo Pero Discreto." Ahora, No. 188 (19 Junio 1967), pp. 12-13.
- "La Crisis del PRD." Ahora, No. 167 (23 Enero 1967), pp. 34-35, 45.
- "La Destitución de Folch Pérez." Ahora, No. 150 (26 Septiembre 1966), p. 10.
- "La Destitución de Tejada Álvarez." Ahora, No. 271 (20 Enero 1969), p. 9.
- "La Destitución del Jefe de la Policía Nacional." Ahora, No. 285 (28 Abril 1969), pp. 3-5.
- "La Dictadura Más Sangrienta Pero Más Breve de la República Dominicana." Ahora, No. 2 (31 Enero 1962), pp. 54-55.
- "La Huelga de Transporte Urbano." Ahora, No. 252 (9 Septiembre 1968), p. 6.

- "La Iglesia en la Cruzada Redentora." Ahora, No. 1 (Enero 15, 1962), pp. 18-19.
- "La Iglesia y el Gobierno." Ahora, No. 294 (30 Junio 1969), pp. 4-5.
- "La Integración: Asperas Negociaciones y Solución a la Inversa." Ahora, No. 139 (11 Julio 1966), pp. 26-27.
- "La Semana Dominicana." Ahora, No. 105 (24 Abril 1965), pp. 38-41.
- "La Verdad Desnuda Sobre los Contrabandos." Ahora, No. 90 (9 Enero 1965), pp. 5-6.
- "Lanzan Candidatura de Lora." Ahora, No. 277 (3 Marzo 1969), pp. 4-6.
- "Las Fuerzas Incontrolables." Ahora, No. 282 (7 Abril 1969), p. 2.
- "Las Revelaciones de Castro Fañas." Ahora, No. 276 (24 Febrero 1969), p. 5.
- "Las Revelaciones de Everstz Fournier . . . ¿Quién Explicará?" Ahora, No. 259 (28 Octubre 1968), pp. 4-6.
- "Lessons of the Armed Struggle in the Dominican Republic." World Marxist Review, Vol. VII (June 1964), pp. 51-53.
- "Lora en la Oposición." Ahora, No. 295 (7 Julio 1969), pp. 5-6.
- "Los Programas de Gobierno de los Partidos y Candidatos." Ahora, No. 133 (23 Mayo 1966), pp. 5-12.
- "¡Luis Amaima Está Listo para Renunciar!" Ahora, No. 180 (24 Abril 1967), pp. 5-9.
- "Luis Amiama Tió: 'Investigador Investigado.'" Ahora, No. 182 (8 Mayo 1967), pp. 3-5.
- "Movimientos en el PRD." Ahora, No. 244 (15 Julio 1968), pp. 4-5.
- "MPD, Derechas, FA, y EU: Poker de Ases Para el Gobierno." Ahora, No. 245 (22 Julio 1968), pp. 4-5.

- "Obreros Ocupan Templos Católicos Para Reclamar sus Salarios." Ahora, No. 261 (11 Noviembre 1968), p. 8.
- "Partidos." Ahora, No. 244 (15 Julio 1968), pp. 6-7.
- "Pesimismo Entre los Liberales." Ahora, No. 240 (17 Junio 1968), pp 4-5.
- "¿Podrá el Gobierno Erradicar el Terrorismo?" Ahora, No. 183 (15 Mayo 1967), pp. 4-5.
- "Política." Ahora, No. 243 (8 Julio 1968), pp. 4-5.
- "Posibles Cambios Militares." Ahora, No. 302 (25 Agosto 1969), pp. 5-6.
- "Primer Aniversario de la Muerte del Teniente Coronel Rafael Tomás Fernández Domínguez." Ahora, No. 133 (23 Mayo 1966), pp. 14-19.
- "Privilegio para los Militares." Ahora, No. 269 (6 Enero 1969), pp. 5-6.
- "Prohíben Entrada de Sacerdotes." Ahora, No. 293 (23 Junio 1969), pp. 7, 77.
- "Promueve Protesta el Asalto a Poasi." Ahora, No. 263 (25 Noviembre 1968), pp. 5-6.
- "¿Qué Hay de Cierto en la Investigación a la Policía?" Ahora, No. 184 (22 Mayo 1967), pp. 4-5.
- "¿Qué Pasa en los Cuarteles?" Ahora, No. 78 (17 Octubre 1964), pp. 7-9, 60.
- "Raíces y Proyecciones del Suceso de Santiago." Ahora, No. 114 (3 Enero 1966), pp. 6-22.
- "Reid Cabral: Obligado a Carabina." Ahora, No. 85 (5 Diciembre 1964), pp. 4-5.
- "Regresan Wessin y Reid Cabral." Ahora, No. 271 (20 Enero 1969), pp. 7-8.



- "Repercusiones del Acuerdo de Benidorm." Ahora, No. 266 (16 Diciembre 1968), pp. 6-7.
- "¿Se Conspira Contra el Gobierno!" Ahora, No. 162 (19 Diciembre 1966), pp. 14-15.
- "Se Debilita Respaldo Sectores Empresariales al Gobierno." Ahora, No. 261 (11 Noviembre 1968), pp. 5-6.
- "Se Enfrentarán Iglesia y Gobierno." Ahora, No. 278 (10 Marzo 1969), pp. 5-7.
- "Son Impunes los Militares o es Ineficaz Nuestra Justicia." Ahora, No. 89 (2 Enero 1965), pp. 9-10.
- "Terrorismo: Una Interrogante." Ahora, No. 244 (15 Julio 1968), p. 8.
- "Texto del Discurso de Renuncia de Caamaño Deñó." Ahora, No. 108 (18 Septiembre 1965), pp. 39-42.
- "Trasfondo del Discurso Presidencial." Ahora, No. 278 (10 Marzo 1969), pp. 3-4.
- "Una Ojeada a la Agenda Económica del Nuevo Gobierno." Ahora, No. 138 (4 Julio 1966), pp. 5-6.
- "U. S. A. I. D. In the Dominican Republic: An Inside View." NACLA Newsletter, Vol. IV, No. 7 (November 1970), pp. 1-10.
- "Votos y Agricultura." Ahora, No. 170 (13 Febrero 1967), pp. 20-21.
- "Wessin: Consecando Tempestades." Ahora, No. 254 (23 Septiembre 1968), pp. 4-5.
- "Wessin y Caamaño Podrán Entrar al País." Ahora, No. 267 (23 Diciembre 1968), p. 4.

Newspapers and Magazines

Ahora, January 1962-January 1970.

Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, "Clipping File on the Dominican Republic," January 1960-November 1967.

El Caribe, January 1968-January 1970.

El Nacional, January 1968-January 1970.

Listín Diario, January 1968-January 1970.

## APPENDIX

NUMERICAL INDICATORS OF RECENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE<sup>(a)</sup>

	1950	1960	1964
<u>DEMOGRAPHIC</u>			
Total Population	2,135,872	3,047,070	-
Urban Population	508,408	917,981	-
Percentile of Total (b)	24%	31%	-
Rural Population	1,627,464	2,095,544	-
Percentile of Total	76%	69%	-
Population of Santo Domingo (The Capital)	181,553	367,053	-
Percentile of Total	8%	10%	-
<u>ECONOMIC</u>			
Gross National Product (GNP) (c) in millions of RD\$	461.5	803.9	978.3
Total Investments in mil- lions of RD\$	46.7	66.7	80.0
Per Capita Gross Internal Product in RD\$ (c)	216.1	263.8	278.7
Total Exports in mil- lions RD\$	86.9	174.4	179.4
Total Imports in millions RD\$	43.0	90.3	202.4
Wholesale Price Index in Santo Domingo	100.0	113.4	126.7
Cost of Living Index in Santo Domingo	100.0	106.1	123.4
<u>INDUSTRIAL (d)</u>			
Total number of Employees, Workers, and Apprentices	34,334	64,873	89,156
Average Yearly Income in RD\$	391.05	436.43	753.70
Income Index with 1962=100.0%	47.9%	53.5%	92.3%
<u>GOVERNMENT</u>			
Income in millions of RD\$	89.9(e)	143.2	220.6
Expenditures in millions of RD\$	62.9	147.3	214.2

- (a) Unless otherwise specified, all the numbers given come from two sources: Secretaría Técnica de la Presidencia, Oficina Nacional de Planificación, Plataforma Para el Desarrollo Económico y Social de la República Dominicana, 1968-1985 (Santo Domingo: 1968); and, Secretariado Técnico, Oficina Nacional de Planificación, Bases Para el Desarrollo Nacional: Análisis y Perspectivas de la Economía Dominicana (Santo Domingo: Diciembre 1965).
- (b) These percentiles were calculated by the author.
- (c) Based on 1962 prices. Officially, one Dominican peso (RD\$) is equal to one dollar (US\$), but in the black market, after 1962, it varies ranging from 10% to 20% less.
- (d) The figures given for 1964 are actually 1963.
- (e) This figure is actually 1951.